Political parties and party systems in world politics : a comparative analysis of party-based foreign policy contestation and change by CHRYSSOGELOS, Angelos-Stylianos
  
Political Parties and Party Systems in World 
Politics: A Comparative Analysis of Party­
Based Foreign Policy Contestation and 
Change 
 
Angelos­Stylianos Chryssogelos 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to  
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences  
of the European University Institute 
Florence, December, 2012 
 
European University Institute 
Department of Political and Social Sciences 
Political Parties and Party Systems in World Politics: A 
Comparative Analysis of Party­Based Foreign Policy 
Contestation and Change 
Angelos­Stylianos Chryssogelos 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to  
obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences  
of the European University Institute 
Examining Board 
Professor Dr. Friedrich Kratochwil, EUI (Supervisor) 
Professor Dr. Luciano Bardi, University of Pisa 
Professor Dr. Sven Steinmo, EUI 
Professor Dr. Bertjan Verbeek, Radboud University Nijmegen 
© Angelos­Stylianos Chryssogelos, 2012 
No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted 
without prior permission of the author 

 
 
 i 
ABSTRACT 
 
The argument of this dissertation is that instances of foreign policy change can be 
best understood as interactions between ongoing dynamics of important aspects of 
domestic party systems and changes in a state’s normative and material international 
environment. I identify three types of dynamics of party systems: different patterns of 
coalition and opposition, different patterns of expression of social cleavages through 
parties, and redefinitions of the meaning attached to the main axis of competition. These 
dynamics provide partisan actors with the ideational resources to make sense of changes 
in the international system, contribute to the creation of new (domestic and foreign) 
policy preferences and bring about political incentives for the promotion of new foreign 
policies. The pace, content and fields of change are determined by the specific aspects of 
a party system undergoing change.  
Using insights from party systems theory and political sociology, the dissertation 
promotes the idea that the contestation of foreign policy, the engagement of domestic 
political actors with developments in the international system, and ultimately foreign 
policy change, all take place within a thick social and institutional structure that 
prescribes interests and delineates the terms of debate. In this way, this dissertation 
introduces in the field of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
a view of domestic politics that is made up of constrained but enabled political agents, 
and social structures that impose continuity while containing opportunities for effecting 
political change. This is a significant departure from existing works on political parties 
and foreign policy that usually focus on the partisan effect in government or see parties 
only as carriers of ideologies or societal preferences.  
This dissertation applies its theoretical framework to three deep historical case-
studies (Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the decision of Canada to enter a Free Trade 
Agreement with the USA, and Greece’s decision to allow Turkey to acquire the status of 
an EU candidate-member) and four shorter cases in the shape of a plausibility probe. 
Using the method of structured-focused comparison, the research shows how, in varying 
historical, social, institutional and international contexts, foreign policy change was 
brought about by partisan actors who were constituted by domestic social and 
institutional structures, but who still found opportunities to engage with these structures 
and promote their own version of change in accordance with the systemically defined 
interests of their political parties.  
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and meta-theoretical 
implications of the comparative research, focusing especially on the importance of 
sociological approaches like the agency/structure debate in FPA and the need to ‘give 
teeth’ to the constructivist project in IR by applying its premises to real-world problems 
and cases, and by opening up the discipline to insights from other literatures. By taking 
comparative party politics literature seriously, this dissertation reveals the link between 
this conceptualization of domestic politics and debates in IR and FPA on the interplay of 
agents and structures, as well as the possibility of change within pertinent social and 
institutional arrangements. 
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CHAPTER 1 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND FOREIGN POLICY: TOWARDS A 
SYSTEM-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF PARTY-BASED FOREIGN 
POLICY CHANGE 
 
STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
 
The general theoretical question this dissertation is concerned with is the effect of 
party politics on state foreign policies – and more precisely the role of political parties in 
foreign policy change. The dissertation embarks from the assumption that existing 
literature concerning the effects of political parties on foreign policy offer many valuable 
and generalizable insights on the way parties as carriers of ideologies and interests 
influence state foreign policies; but also concludes that these works fail to expand further 
into the field of comparative party politics and make use of this literature in order to gain 
an improved understanding of world politics. The result is that whatever literature on 
political parties and foreign policy there does exist, only builds upon a simplified 
conceptualization of party politics. This conceptualization serves the creation of 
parsimonious arguments, but to the detriment of more daring theoretical questions within 
the field of International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and of 
empirical accuracy. This dissertation seeks to expand on existing works surrounding 
political parties and foreign policy while trying to remedy certain emphasis on political 
parties as dependent carriers of exogenous preferences (and not as actors in and by 
themselves), as well as the inability to see preferences on domestic and international 
issues as forming coherent wholes. 
Even though I will emphasize the shortcomings of the existing literature on parties 
and foreign policy, I am far from ignoring their important contributions within a field that 
seems to ignore the topic altogether. Works in IR stemming from the tradition of the 
transnational relations literature ignore parties and party systems as meaningful societal 
agents of world politics; FPA literature surprisingly overlooks parties while focusing on 
its traditional interests of bureaucracies and personalities; and comparative party politics 
very rarely looks into the way domestic and international politics interact. Existing 
literature on parties and foreign policy boldly insists on a topic whose relevance seems to 
be on the rise in the press and among the lay public. Thus this dissertation positions itself 
within this existing literature and recognizes its important contributions, while trying to 
identify shortcomings and improve our understanding of the links between democratic 
politics and foreign policies. 
My argument differs from prevailing tendencies in two important respects. First, I 
try to scale down the research question from ‘foreign policy’ into ‘foreign policy change’. 
Surprisingly enough, FPA tries to explain foreign policy outcomes as outcomes in se. 
There is much less interest in the dynamics of foreign policies as a series of outcomes 
 
 
 4 
within time. I believe that it makes sense to try and understand the effect of party politics 
(or any other factor we are interested in for that matter) on foreign policy through the 
general question of how they impact on a significant change of policy. In this way we can 
understand the impact of processes and dynamics on foreign policy, with change serving 
as a laboratory environment where the factors we are studying play themselves out.  
The second way my argument differs from the current literature is my 
conceptualization of political parties as independent and interdependent actors of 
domestic politics. I see parties as ‘independent’ because I think that most current 
literature on political parties and foreign policy simplifies the idea of political parties. To 
the extent that it sees political parties as shortcuts for ideological and societal preferences, 
it is not really a literature about party politics as much as literature about other things 
(ideologies, preferences, norms, personalities etc.) using political parties as useful but 
secondary intermediate layer between roots and outcomes of policy. I also see parties as 
‘interdependent’ because I think that existing literature on parties and foreign policy 
misses the key insight which comparative party politics offers, namely the fact that 
parties form part of a systemic environment prescribing positions within a policy space, 
codifying patterns of interaction, reproducing histories and identities and creating a 
language of competition. This systemic environment – domestic ‘party systems’ – is what 
political parties function in, what constrains and enables them. 
In other words, current literature on parties and foreign policy only sees parties as 
monistic and isolated actors. Instead, I propose a richer image of domestic politics, one 
where the formation of foreign policy preferences and the decision on foreign policy 
change are the results of interactions between parties and of parties with their systemic 
environment. 
The argument of this dissertation is that instances of foreign policy change can best 
be understood as interactions between ongoing dynamics of important aspects of 
domestic party systems and changes in a state’s normative and material international 
environment. In other words, dynamics with party systemic potential are necessary 
conditions for the emergence, articulation and implementation of new foreign policy 
preferences. Flows of change in the international arena are a necessary impetus, but it is 
only when these meet new dynamics in party systems that states readjust their foreign 
policies. These dynamics of reform of party systems provide political agents with the 
ideational resources to make sense of changes in the international system, contribute to 
the creation of new preferences and bring about political incentives for the promotion of 
new foreign policies. In this way, the pace, the content and the field of change are 
determined by the specific aspects of a party system undergoing change.  
This view sees foreign policies reflecting a specific equilibrium between the 
dominant ideas about a state’s position in the world and its domestic governance, and 
dominant material and discursive conditions in the international system. Foreign policy 
change reflects an effort to rebalance this equilibrium by creating policies that reflect a 
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state’s adaptation to new international conditions according to ideas and preferences 
emerging within domestic competition. Assuming that flows from the international 
system are the impetus for change in the various fields of foreign policy, changes in 
important dimensions and terms of domestic party competition arise as the critical factors 
that determine the kind and timing of foreign policy change. 
Far from discarding the importance of other roots of foreign policy such as ideas, 
institutional features and policymaking procedures, this argument considers that these 
things do not take place in a vacuum. Indeed, ‘ideas do not float freely’ (Risse-Kappen 
1994) and neither do policymakers or institutional arrangements. In democratic societies, 
mature liberal democracies where government is ‘party government’, all these things play 
themselves out within a context of partisan competition. Party systems do not simply 
prescribe electoral interests to selfish partisan actors, nor do they just automatically cue 
party preferences according to ideology or dominant societal interests. Instead, and 
beyond that, they codify a language of competition and patterns of interaction among 
partisan actors. They give meaning to policy contestation and help those actors interpret 
changes in the international sphere and express preferences within a discursively 
meaningful pattern of interactions.  
This view of foreign policy change as a result of a combination of changes in the 
international system and in domestic party systems has important repercussions in the 
way various literatures treat the topic of domestic politics and foreign policy. The 
creation of a theoretical framework based on comparative party politics thus should not 
conceal the main ambition of this dissertation: to make a contribution to the wider field of 
International Relations and use the empirical results to answer important theoretical and 
metatheoretical questions of this literature. Most works on parties and foreign policy 
position themselves within this wide literature after all, however they shy away from 
asserting a position on critical theoretical questions both of IR and FPA. I believe that IR 
has the capability to absorb thorough discussions from other fields of the social sciences 
– here, comparative party politics can contribute to the methodological rigor of studies of 
world politics, as well as contribute to foundational discussions about actors and 
processes of world politics. 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Political parties are generally an understudied topic in the realm of comparative 
Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations works on sub-state actors and the 
domestic politics of international affairs. FPA has traditionally focused on issues of 
personality, leadership, bureaucracy and organizational decision-making processes. More 
recent turns in FPA seek to go beyond the field’s behavioralist roots, but the substantial 
and empirical foci remain largely the same (Houghton 2007; Kaarbo 2003). Work on sub-
state and transnational actors in IR has highlighted the importance of norms and ideas in 
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the study of domestic politics and its links to international affairs, but political parties are 
conspicuously absent – perhaps because the analytical turn to domestic affairs coincided 
with the empirical novelty of the rise of sub-state and transnational actors like NGOs, 
epistemic communities etc. (Risse-Kappen 1995). Somehow, that mainstay of modern 
democratic (and less so) politics, political parties, has failed to enter the picture.  
Situation of the field is not more encouraging at the other end of the divide, 
comparative politics. In comparative public policy and party politics, foreign policy is 
seldom considered as a significant output of partisan interaction. Some have argued that 
the nature of the policy itself makes it different than other public policies, so party effect 
on foreign policy is not to be expected1. The net result is that the link between political 
parties and foreign policy is rarely raised in literature – which is a pity given the 
abundance of lay and anecdotal perceptions that ‘there is something’ linking democratic 
politics and foreign policies. 
Nevertheless, in recent years this situation has slowly been changing, as more and 
more works within the FPA tradition or empirical fields of study (such as European 
security) look at the effect of political parties on foreign policies. These works raise 
important issues such as the importance of party ideologies and the causal links between 
parties in government and implemented foreign policies. Yet they organize the discussion 
in a disparate way, diluting the real nature of party politics and, more importantly, the 
nature of the links between domestic and international politics. Where these works try to 
establish a link between substantive political party positions and foreign policy output, 
they miss the institutional effect of domestic party systems on partisan activity. Mostly 
they are confined to an inside-out argumentation, failing to see the feedback loop of 
foreign policy into domestic politics. And they miss the opportunity to head the call of 
the literature on transnational relations about the need to include more focus on the role 
of international and domestic norms and ideas (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993; Risse-
Kappen 1995). Nevertheless, there are important theoretical insights to be gained from 
existing works on partisan effects on foreign policy, most importantly their 
methodological rigor and their effort to decisively link party policies with foreign policy 
output.  
 An obvious route to take when studying partisan effects of foreign policy is a 
straightforward inside-out view of politics, mostly on cue with the liberal strand of IR2 
and classical FPA. Here political parties are seen as expressions of domestic preferences 
and the interests of societal actors. As such any space for their independent effect on the 
domestic interest formation is lost. However, some of these works, most notably 
Trubowitz (1999), manage to highlight the importance of domestic institutional setups 
such as Congress. Others, like Alons (2007), take into account the International Political 
                                                
1 For example see the emphasis on the ‘urgency’ of foreign policy decisions in Blondel and Nousiainen 
(2000). 
2 See Moravcsik (1997). 
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Economy argument about state-society relations as a qualification of domestic politics 
and link domestic and international politics through a structural/materialist ontology of 
international pressures and domestic interests. Precious as these finding may be, they do 
not constitute real partisan arguments as much as efforts to use political parties as 
heuristics for domestic/societal preferences on the international scene3.  
Some works have a clear empirical focus, and their discussion of parties serves more 
to highlight broader institutional issues that affect foreign policies. For example Kaarbo 
and Beasley (2008) look at the role of coalition governments and how junior parties 
affect the decisions of coalitions4. DeLaet and Scott (2006) focus on Congressional 
voting of arms control treaties and check for ideological and partisan effect. Both articles 
employ quantitative techniques. Whereas DeLaet and Scott’s conclusions are intriguing, 
since they find an independent partisan alongside an ideological effect, it is difficult to 
generalize cross-nationally because of the uniqueness of the American institutional 
setting. Kaarbo and Beasley on the other hand pose interesting questions, but quantitative 
methods as the one they employ fails to capture the relational nature of, for example, 
‘extreme parties’5.  
The American invasion in Iraq in 2003 and the disparate European responses to it 
provided an opportunity to comparativists to verify the effect of party politics on 
European policies towards a common foreign policy issue (Mouritzen 2006; Mouritzen 
and Wivel 2005; Schuster and Maier 2006; Stahl 2005; Stahl et al 2004). For some, the 
partisan effect on foreign policy was conditioned by a state’s position within the 
international distribution of material power, thus resembling the realist argument that 
domestic politics affect responses within a very narrow field of alternatives (Schuster and 
Maier 2006). Other works took a more post-positivist view of things, seeing parties 
responding to domestic dominant identity imperatives (Stahl 2005).  
Indeed, few works in the literature of political parties and foreign policy take this 
ideational turn. An exception is Cordell and Wolff (2007), who discuss how German 
foreign policy towards the East relates to international and domestic norms. However, 
they take a ‘matter-of-fact’ view of such norms, and political parties are seen as simple 
reproducers, as opposed to creators or contenders, of those norms. Earlier, Barnett (1999) 
had offered a vivid account of the domestic contestation of the Oslo accords in Israel, 
seeing party-based actors as normative entrepreneurs and active agents of change, 
employing international norms and interacting with domestic ideas and electoral 
institutions. Barnett does a fine job in setting a partisan argument within a wider IR 
discussion concerning ideas, agents and structures. Concurrent to Cordell and Wolff 
however, his model can be quite demanding when trying to apply it on a cross-national 
comparative design. Elsewhere, Ozkececi-Taner (2005) matches political parties and 
                                                
3 Also see Narizny (2007). 
4 On the importance of coalitional and parliamentarian politics in foreign policy outputs also see the part by 
Everts in Hagan et al (2001). 
5 Here see Capoccia (2002). 
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specific sets of ideas, and then assesses whether other institutional and contextual factors 
(e.g. ministerial positions or issue saliency) affect how these ideas find expression in a 
coalition’s foreign policy decisions within the Turkish context. The party system emerges 
here as the main structuring factor of the interplay among contesting ideas about foreign 
policies.  
A very influential recent work is Rathbun (2004). His aim is to explain the reactions 
of national governments in Germany, France and Great Britain towards the security 
emergencies in the Balkans throughout the 1990s. His claim is that foreign policy 
decisions and changes can be traced back to the ideological heritage of governing parties 
according to whether they are left-or right-wing. Leftist parties will generally seek 
policies that promote ‘inclusive’ goals, justice and human rights; rightist parties will 
stress more limited objectives like the safeguarding of a narrowly defined national 
interest. A similar task is undertaken by Hofmann (2009), who checks how party 
ideologies affected the creation of security institutions in Europe. Her argument is that, in 
instances when the government parties of Germany, France and Great Britain expressed 
similar positive values towards European security institutions simultaneously, these 
institutions expanded. The key insight from both of these works is their comparative 
rigor, which builds on a common foreign policy challenge across national cases unfolding 
contemporaneously, as well as a parsimonious operationalization of political ideologies. 
This creates an empirical basis upon which alternative explanations, such as 
international/structural conditions, can be refuted. 
Rathbun does offer a vivid empirical account of his partisan argument, but one 
cannot ignore simplifications that lie at the heart of it. The most important one is the 
complete mooting of the possible effect of the international system on foreign policy, 
both in material and normative terms. By the same token, the simple extrapolation of 
‘left’ and ‘right’ ideological components to the international arena misses the influence of 
international normative developments in the domestic ideological constellation of 
individual countries. ‘Left’ and ‘right’, even understood in the way Rathbun presents 
them, differ from national setting to national setting, and evolve constantly depending on 
how they absorb and structure new issues. Hofmann on the other hand does a better job in 
presenting ideological components of parties not along a unique axis of competition, but 
rather along multiple value-axes that structure partisan preferences on European security. 
A weakness in her account however, lies precisely where Rathbun’s strength is – in the 
empirically rich account of the politics of justification and normative contestation that 
lies at the core of party politics. For Hofmann partisan attitudes in government translate 
unproblematically into foreign policy action.  
It is interesting to see the dialectic of both books, especially in their effort to 
conceptualize party politics. Rathbun starts with the plausible assertion that there is an 
inherent consistency between the domestic and international policies of parties, 
something Hofmann does not deny either (Hofmann 2009: 30). Rathbun decides to 
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conceptualize these positions along a Left-Right axis, which incorporates awkwardly the 
two main axes of modern party politics, the socio-economic and the cultural one (see 
Kriesi et al 2006: 923-924). In as much, for him foreign policy issues are absorbed by the 
existing constellation of party competition in domestic political arenas. Hofmann on the 
other hand takes the view that foreign policy issues cut across existing dimensions of 
political space, i.e. the policies of parties on them cannot be deduced from a single 
existing axis of competition. Empirically this would seem to be the case, but it adds a 
degree of complexity to the argument. Hofmann decides to keep things simple by 
assuming that foreign policy values of parties are crosscutting on existing axes of 
competition, but that they are essentially independent from other cleavages and ideas that 
have created the current ideological profile of parties. She says this is so because most 
foreign policy issues do not have domestic consequences – in her case, European security 
issues have low redistributional repercussions, hence the socioeconomic Left-Right (and 
by extension office-seeking posturing towards the electorate, Hofmann 2009: 32-33) is 
irrelevant for how parties reach their opinions on such foreign policy issues (ibid: 19-22, 
29). 
This argument raises an obvious objection. Domestic cleavages have an identity 
element (us-versus-them) that usually extends to the international sphere as well. Indeed, 
constructivists have tried to trace foreign policy positions to domestic constellations of 
social identities (Hopf 2002)6. Foreign policy issues like treaty making, regional orders, 
restructuring of foreign relations etc. are foundational issues that affect the way a state 
sees itself and its place in the world (Ashizawa 2008: 592-593). By extension, domestic 
actors look inside of their own identities to make sense of these changes. Such foreign 
policy decisions may not always redistribute material resources, but hold the potential of 
redistributing ideational power among identity constructions concerning key political and 
social issues. To claim that parties have opinions on foreign policy issues independent of 
their social roots, and to base this on the alleged insignificance of such issues for politics 
at large (Hofmann 2009: 26), is a self-defeating assertion for a partisan argument7. I do 
not think this move hurts Hofmann’s argument too much, yet it should not be expected to 
yield wholly accurate empirical results when parties face more controversial foreign 
policy issues – even ones that do not have immediate redistributional repercussions8. 
                                                
6 The view of societal cleavages as identities is the base of the discussion in the following section. 
7 See here Marks et al (2002: 586). 
8 ‘Once the public gets involved in security affairs and the issue salience raises, the political processes do 
not look much different from those in any other issue-area’ (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 38). For an 
argument linking domestic policy repercussions with positioning on the ‘European’ issue see Hooghe et al 
(2002). Their argument that a party’s positioning on the Left-Right axis conditions the party’s position 
towards Europe is basically the straightforward redistributional argument Hofmann feels does not apply on 
more general foreign policy issues. Yet their discussion of the equally compelling effect of the 
libertarian/authoritarian axis is a vindication that ideational and identity concerns (so not concerned with 
redistributional issues) also affect a party’s position towards an external issue. Hooghe et al then allows us 
to assume that party attitudes towards a foreign policy issue can be deduced by its rooting in societal 
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Even for high-politics issues such as security alliances, we know that party-based 
actors have recourse to domestic identities and argue based on them. Most significantly, 
their preferences are informed by these domestic identities. To talk of the CDU’s or 
Labour’s preferences on Europe without reference to the cleavages upon which these 
came about gives an incomplete picture at best. Hofmann’s response would be that 
parsimony could take a severe blow when we try to include too many layers of historical 
and ideological explanation – and that historical explanation is not her interest anyway. 
Although it is a valid point, the objections I raise here show that the will for parsimony 
sacrifices empirical accuracy of party politics because if a foreign policy issue cuts across 
dominant axes of party competition, then the social cleavages that are already submerged 
in these axes are called upon to give meaning, structure arguments and provide 
justifications – in other words, they become reenergized.  
Hofmann is correct in saying that foreign policy positions start abroad: it is the 
inability of political parties to agree on the normative framing of new material 
constellations of the international system that leads to partisan differences of foreign 
policy (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 31; Risse-Kappen 1995: 28-29). However, the 
example of the interaction between European party systems and the issue of ‘Europe’ has 
shown us that political parties understand new foreign issues with reference to their 
domestic identities – sometimes more than one of those exists within a party, sometimes 
one of those cuts across numerous parties etc. (Marks and Wilson 2000)9. We also know 
that there is significant leeway for partisan agency as to how and when a new issue will 
be presented, absorbed within the existing language of politics etc. Despite the 
dominance of the socioeconomic axis (and the very high relevance of a cultural/new 
politics axis), social cleavages do not wither away, they just become structured under 
these axes (Marks et al 2002: 592).  
Usually, as Hofmann implies, foreign policy issues are not very salient, and adding 
historical explanatory layers confuses things. But more often than not, foreign policy 
issues are so important that they necessarily energize domestic identities stemming from 
persistent cleavages (Müller and Risse-Kappen 1993: 40-41). If she is correct that the one 
dominant axis of partisan competition is insufficient to explain partisan foreign policy 
ideas (and I believe she is), she also has to live with the fact that the different domestic 
cleavages submerged under this axis are the social roots of how foreign policy issues 
become defined and discussions around them organized.  
Both Rathbun and Hofmann construct a simple image of political parties as carriers 
of ideologies in order to gain in parsimony. Yet this is a monistic view of political parties 
                                                                                                                                            
cleavages that express worldviews beyond redistributional issues. Marks et al (2002) argue along these 
lines as well.  
9 Marks and Wilson also show how the European issue is organized through cleavages that extend beyond 
redistributional issues. In their discussion, only the Social-Democratic parties see Europe through a clear 
functional lens reflecting their concerns about domestic economic order. Liberals, Christian Democrats and 
Conservatives have such concerns as well of course, but questions of domestic governance, identity and 
ideology also come into play.  
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as lonely societal actors. The reality is that political parties interact with each other and 
the wider discursive environment of domestic and international arenas10. Rathbun does 
show that political parties can be resourceful in pursuing their policies, but does not relate 
domestic justification of foreign policies with other norms, as for example Barnett does. 
Hofmann on the other hand is better at showing that partisan positions on international 
issues have their roots in value-attitudes that extend beyond the Left-Right axis and so 
allows for a richer mapping of political space. But again, political parties are seen more 
as heuristic labels for the values of foreign policy actors than as independent actors 
engaging with international issues. Both aim to make arguments within the framework of 
IR/FPA; consequently, their simplified conceptualization of party politics is meant to 
serve this goal. 
As a good example of how to see partisan foreign policies as outputs of a wider 
institutional environment, Thérien and Noël (2000) undertake a very interesting effort to 
show how the historical patterns of domestic party systems condition the foreign policy 
output of these systems11. It is worth quoting their argument at length. They start from 
the position that ‘parties matter’ for foreign policy, but they do not assume a direct 
relationship between parties and policies. Instead, ‘[i]n foreign as in domestic policy, 
patterns tend to be established at critical junctures and change only incrementally 
thereafter. The dominance of a party over a long period probably matters more than the 
distribution of power at any moment’ (Thérien and Noël 2000: 153). In other words, 
what they term ‘partisan cumulative power’ is the most decisive signal of whether and 
how parties matter in foreign policies. Their empirical question has to do with the effect 
of left party incumbency on the amount of foreign aid given out by states. For this they 
conduct a statistical analysis with a closer look at their various cases, which includes a 
historical comparative research. In all, the results confirm their hypothesis that ‘political 
parties do matter, not directly and in the short run, but indirectly and over the years’ 
(ibid: 160).  
Thérien and Noël present an image of domestic politics taking place not in a 
preference-promoting free-for-all, but in a political space defined by prior patterns of 
political dominance, and set the stage for a more dynamic integration of the domestic 
arena in the study of international relations, whereby politics and institutional (or 
normative) constraints shape the environment within which foreign policies take place. 
Parties may have ideological attributes, but the way these play out is contingent on a very 
peculiar constellation of domestic histories, patterns of social representation, political 
agency and international conditions. New foreign policies are not just policy outputs but 
intellectual constructions whose longevity is dependent on their successful 
                                                
10 For the same argument being made about transnational actors in the Soviet Union, see Evangelista 
(1999). 
11 Here also see Keohane and Milner (1996), especially chapters 3 and 10. 
 
 
 12 
institutionalization in a normatively rich political space. What constitutes this 
institutional space in democratic polities is the topic of the following chapter. 
 
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF PARTIES: CLEAVAGES, AXES OF COMPETITION 
AND PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
Based on the above, we can see that most work on partisan effects on foreign policy 
of liberal democracies takes a rather monistic view of political parties and their 
interactions. Political parties are seen as markers of the dominance within the executive 
of specific foreign policy ideas, of certain societal interests, or of specific preferences on 
foreign (and domestic) issues. The ‘politics’ of party politics gets lost. In as much, the 
process by which specific ideas or preferences come to dominate a government becomes 
largely overlooked. This is partly in line with a public policy view of foreign policy: the 
presence of a specific party in government means that analogous ideas about domestic 
issues will become expressed in governmental policies12. But foreign policy has an added 
amount of complexity: it is directed towards, and is being influenced by, developments 
and actors beyond the executive’s control. This is to a certain extent true for all public 
policy of course, which is why there remain lingering doubts about whether parties really 
do make a difference13. But if one wishes to make the argument that parties do make a 
difference in foreign policy, one is compelled to untangle the whole web of domestic and 
international conditions that confront a party-based actor when promoting a new foreign 
policy issue14. 
This work on parties and foreign policy reproduces, within International Relations 
and Foreign Policy Analysis, the general tendency within comparative politics to look at 
parties as individual actors and to overlook the systemic essence of domestic party 
politics. Bardi and Mair (2008) claim that parties are usually seen by party politics 
scholars as unique actors with the systemic dimension only rarely taken into account 
(Bardi and Mair 2008: 147-154); almost inevitably this bias becomes translated into the 
work of those who want to study the effect of political parties on foreign policy. In this 
way they ignore the very important set of constraints within which political parties 
operate, namely the sum of patterned interactions as prescribed by parties’ relative 
strength, policy distance and other parameters. 
                                                
12 For an extensive literature review defending the partisan argument in public policy, see Schmidt (1996). 
For a ‘governmental’ partisan argument vis-à-vis EU policies, see Manow et al (2008). 
13 A very eloquent defense of the anti-party thesis is provided by Rose (1984). 
14 One note here: I will be using the terms ‘party’, ‘party group’, ‘party-based actor’ or ‘partisan actor’ 
interchangeably. There are two reasons behind this. The first reason is to remind the reader that I am not 
attempting a reification of the analytical unit ‘party’. Second, as will become evident down the way, groups 
within parties are as capable of doing ‘party politics’ as whole parties united behind one policy – and, when 
looked at in this way, a party leadership in the end is just one group within a party leading the party in a 
specific moment.  
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Here I follow the plea by Bardi and Mair in that I see the systemic focus as a viable 
way to overcome the limitations of current discussions about political parties and foreign 
policy.  These limitations concern mainly the inability to theorize about an independent 
partisan (as opposed to an ideological or a preference-based) effect on foreign policy, the 
discarding of the effect of the international arena in the domestic politics of foreign 
policy, and an empirical bias against the actual politics of foreign policy contestation. 
The systemic focus of party politics can remedy these shortcomings of current literature 
by providing a view of political parties as actors constrained but also enabled by the 
format and the patterns of the systems they operate in; and a better understanding of 
where partisan foreign policy preferences come from as well as the timing and pace of 
their expression. 
There are two distinct, but closely interrelated, avenues in the study of party systems. 
The one takes a historical and sociological look at party systems, aiming to trace their 
historical descent and analyzing their current dynamics with reference to their social 
roots. This literature revolves around the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and 
conceptualizes party politics through the prism of social cleavages, i.e. dimensions of 
opposition between social groups that gave rise to the formation of political parties in the 
past and structure partisan competition today. The other avenue is concerned with the 
mechanics of partisan competition, taking a more positivist view of party politics as 
interactions between units within a web of systemic restrictions. This view of party 
politics as systemic structures revolves around the work of Sartori (1976), and seeks to 
make the point that party systems are more than just a sum of their constituent parts 
(Bardi and Mair 2008: 152; Mair 1997: 51). 
These two approaches are distinct, but profoundly complementary. The social 
cleavages approach sees party systems as creations of social interactions and deep 
historical processes. This bottom-up view is complemented by the top-down view of the 
systemic theorists who prefer to emphasize the independent effect of systemic exigencies 
on the structuring of new social conflicts. The distinction, of course, is not clear-cut and it 
was never meant to be: a party system at any given point in time is the culmination of 
long historical processes that absorbed the expression of various cleavages into some 
basic axes of competition. These axes then regulate the way new issues are absorbed into 
public discourse and how they interact with, or affect, existing cleavages. 
Already two years after Lipset and Rokkan, Rose and Urwin argued that West 
European party systems are to a very large extent structured by the historical cleavages of 
the past, but that a significant part of individual parties’ outlook and the dynamics of 
party systems can also be attributed to the strategies of parties themselves in their effort 
to broaden their appeal (Rose and Urwin 1969: 26-30). In their seminal work, Bartolini 
and Mair argued that the structuring of political competition by historical cleavages went 
a long way towards explaining the small (at the time of their writing) electoral volatility 
in West Europe, but that systemic demands on party strategies and institutional factors 
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were an important counterforce pointing towards electoral volatility (Bartolini and Mair 
1990: ch. 10). Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2002) see European parties 
responding to the issue of the EU according to their rooting in social cleavages; positions 
in the party system are important in explaining party policies, but as a ‘subset of the 
political cleavage hypothesis’ (Marks et al 2002: 592). In sum, a systemic view of party 
politics sees partisan actors as historically constrained by their rooting in social 
cleavages, but it also accounts for partisan agency and its ability to structure new issues 
and alter various characteristics of party systems. Indeed, this dialectic between systemic 
exigencies and individual (partisan) agency is a recurring feature of system-focused work 
on comparative party politics15. 
Bartolini and Mair (1990) offered a celebrated conceptualization of social cleavages 
within which partisan competition is embedded. They differentiated between three 
dimensions of a social cleavage: first, a social cleavage has an objective social basis, i.e. 
a social group which clusters around a dimension of opposition against a certain 
development, policy etc. Yet this social basis is not enough for a social cleavage to enter 
the political realm. The other two dimensions complete this transition. The second 
characteristic is the embedding of a social cleavage within an ideational dimension, 
namely the creation of political identities around oppositions and grievances. The third 
characteristic is the organizational dimension and it involves the mobilization of these 
social identities and their expression in organized mass politics through political parties. 
In other words, a view of party politics through the concept of cleavages highlights the 
ideational dimension of domestic politics – the mobilization of identities – and the ability 
of partisan actors to influence the way social developments and new issues are expressed 
as partisan issues (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 213-220)16. 
More recent scholarship sees modern party systems in Western Europe as being 
structured along two basic axes of competition that absorb and restructure old cleavages. 
Apart from the socioeconomic Left-Right, these works advocate that it is empirically 
more accurate to also see a vertical cultural axis crosscutting the Left-Right. These 
dominant axes of competition do not have a fixed content. Partisan actors reinterpret the 
content of the axes of competition according to the cleavages they represent and the way 
these are affected by social developments. Additionally, they may even have the 
capability of using issues in an effort to reform the meaning of an axis in order to make it 
more compatible with their ideological profile or their electoral needs (Bornschier 2010; 
Kriesi et al 2006; Manow et al 2008).  
A focus on cleavages has important repercussions if one wishes to make a partisan 
argument about foreign policy. It provides a richer template of the intellectual resources 
for foreign policy argumentation than the one offered e.g. by Rathbun (2004), who 
                                                
15 For an example, see Batory and Sitter (2004). 
16 For a classical treatment of the translation of social cleavages into political issues and the particular 
nature of political competition vis-à-vis simple social divisions, see Schmitt (2007 [1932]). 
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collapsed all dimensions of competition into one Left-Right axis including cultural and 
economic issues. It also allows for a better conceptualization of foreign policy ideas as 
part of integrated coherent policy sets offered by parties. Hofmann (2009) for example 
wholly separates foreign policy ideas from domestic policies. Ozkececi-Taner (2005) is 
bolder in conceptualizing ideas of foreign policy as part of general sets of ideas 
institutionalized within parties (she even calls those parts of ‘cleavages’), but she does 
not relate them to party systemic effects and conditions, such as electoral competition or 
ideational agency.  
If we accept the Bartolini/Mair conceptualization of cleavages as political identities, 
we are very close to work done on ideas and foreign policy that sees domestic ideas as 
creating domestic identities with international referents17. I assume that independent 
partisan agency absorbs and structures the demands of social cleavages into coherent 
policy setups that are consistent across domestic and foreign policy sectors18 - the reason 
for this is that, by creating political identities, social cleavages help identify not only 
domestic but also international ‘others’. Ultimately, foreign policy ideas institutionalized 
within political parties are as much the result of this aggregating process as they are 
rooted within important historical traditions.  
We saw that Hofmann (2009) argued that the nature of foreign policy is such that, 
because it does not entail redistributional conflicts, political parties have recourse to 
foreign policy ideas and preferences that are independent of ideas on domestic 
governance. The effort of political parties to offer a consistent policy profile to their 
voters across policy sectors is well documented (Manow et al 2008: 24-25). Hofmann’s 
assertion also presupposes that the socioeconomic Left-Right axis is devoid of 
ideological/cultural meaning, that it is unable to organize opposition on foreign issues as 
much as it is able to on domestic issues. Now, some foreign policy issues may lend 
themselves to interpretation according to the class cleavage. But also other, less obvious, 
policy areas can be interpreted by the apparently irrelevant class cleavage. The reason for 
this is precisely the fact that a cleavage includes an ideological element, which politicizes 
it and turns it from a social into a political fact. The underpinning of the class cleavage 
for example is not just a general redistributional issue, but also the opposition between 
socialist ideology and pro-capitalist reaction. How could one account, for example, for 
positions of West European social democratic parties on peace and superpower relations 
during the Cold War without this ideological component, which fixes foreign policy 
preferences in conjunction with domestic policies19? 
Nevertheless, even without the socioeconomic Left-Right, most foreign policy issues 
can be absorbed by, or upset, the vertical cultural axis of partisan competition which 
structures cleavages concerning intangible values of domestic governance. Yet one would 
                                                
17 See Hopf (2002); also Barnett (1999). 
18 On consistency of party positions across policy areas as part of the representative and integrative function 
of parties, see Rose and Urwin (1969: 23). 
19 On the example I used, see Risse-Kappen (1994). 
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be mistaken to think that this dimension of competition is also devoid of direct practical 
implications for voters. Instead, partisan preferences translated into foreign policy 
preferences may represent salient societal preferences about the nature of domestic 
governance, questions of citizenship and nationality, personal values etc.20. The point 
here is that foreign policy issues are being interpreted through relevant domestic 
cleavages whose ideational dimensions organize political identities both with domestic 
and international ‘others’, and that foreign policy issues can be potentially presented as 
having tangible or intangible repercussions if the partisan agency wishes to present it in 
this way. As Manow et al (2008: 25) describe parties pursuing European policies, the sum 
of redistributional and ideational goals a party can pursue through its foreign policies 
constitute ‘visions of domestic society’. 
If the above line of reasoning is correct, one is legitimated to think of foreign policy 
positions of political parties as a combination of the two sublime counterforces Bartolini 
and Mair identified: parties’ rooting in social and historical traditions which have shaped 
modern party systems; and their incentives to engage with the domestic language of 
competition in an effort to improve their political fortunes21. The systemic view allows us 
to see how cleavages create what has been called ‘rationally bounded’ partisan actors 
when confronted with a foreign policy issue (Marks and Wilson 2000). But, to fully 
account for party positions on foreign policy issues we also need to evaluate the prior 
position parties within systemic space and the constraints of patterned interactions parties 
respond to.  
The main systemic elements that structure the interaction between parties are a party 
system’s properties and format (Mair 2000: 28). Format refers to the number of relevant 
parties in the system, while the properties refer to the established interactions between 
parties in terms of antagonism and coalition-making. According to Sartori (1976), there is 
a clear connection between the number of relevant parties in a system and that system’s 
ideological and policy stretch, or polarization. The emphasis here is on the mechanics of 
the party system, which to a very large extent regulate the movements of parties within 
political space, as well as the dominant language of politics. It is an integral aspect of 
partisan competition, the framework within which the interpretation of foreign policy 
issues and ideational entrepreneurship as discussed above takes place. The systemic 
constraints imposed on political parties are the result of the integration of historical 
                                                
20 See Moravcsik’s (1997) systemization of the struggle between various ideational and non-tangible 
preferences in his concepts of ‘ideational liberalism’ (struggle between ideas and identities) and ‘republican 
liberalism’ (struggle between norms of domestic governance).  
21 Bartolini and Mair (1990: 194-195) study voter volatility and the opening of electoral markets, which 
effectively are the mirror image of the systemic availability for independent party strategies. In their view, 
in the real world a party system is a mix of two ideal types of a perfectly mobilized electorate along social 
cleavages, and of a perfectly de-aligned electorate fluctuating freely among parties. By extension, party 
strategies fluctuate between reflecting parties’ social roots and independent vote-seeking. But Bartolini and 
Mair still ascribe analytical and empirical precedence to social cleavages as structuring forces of party 
systems. 
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cleavages in some essential dimensions of competition. These dimensions constrain 
parties not only in terms of what they can do, but also what they can say (and how): ‘[A] 
given party system, and a given structure of competition, act to ‘freeze’ into place a 
specific language of politics. Party competition, and politics more generally, then 
becomes dominated by a particular overriding choice, to which other considerations are 
subordinated’ (Mair 1997: 13)22. 
So what does this systemic aspect add to a partisan argument about foreign policy? 
First of all it remedies the tendency to view parties solely as carriers of preferences or 
ideas that are being unproblematically carried over from the electoral arena to 
government and from there to policymaking. Instead, partisan actors are embedded 
within a thick institutional structure including both structural constraints and ideational 
resources, and which both constrains and enables them in their effort to improve their 
political fortunes. Within such a structure, parties’ interpretation of foreign policy issues 
cannot be divorced neither from their response to social traditions informing their 
domestic preferences, nor from their effort to make the best of their position within the 
systemic arrangement of patterned interactions between parties and a dominant language 
which regulates what party competition is ‘about’ (ibid: 14).  
Second, the systemic view allows us to incorporate the international dimension of 
foreign policy making in a partisan argument. If we see political parties as unique, lonely 
actors carrying foreign policy ideas or societal preferences, the inside-out view of foreign 
policy is inescapable. Political parties are just an intermediate layer between domestic 
preferences and foreign policies. With a systemic view of domestic politics, we are 
forced to see political parties as true social actors, interacting with other parties, ideas and 
systemic conditions. In this dynamic view, the international arena can become more 
easily incorporated as another source of ideational resources in the parties’ efforts to 
preserve or redefine the dimensions of domestic competition, to overcome systemic 
constraints, win elections and promote their preferred policies. 
Based on the above, a foreign policy issue is being interpreted according to the 
domestic cleavages institutionalized and mobilized within political parties in the shape of 
political identities. But there is no social determinism here. Sometimes foreign policy 
issues are so remote that partisan actors are free to interpret them as a ‘clean slate’. Even 
pressing foreign policy issues do not lend themselves easily to a fully societal 
interpretation due to their complexity. But there must always exist a minimum basis of 
understanding international issues, and they are inseparable from party positions on 
domestic issues. The social and ideological roots of parties then create a framework 
within which they function to interpret foreign policy issues23. But they are not static. 
                                                
22 Mair’s analysis builds on Sartori’s view that party system mechanics are to a large extent regulated by 
the ideological stretch within the system. In other words, there is a discursive underpinning of parties’ 
position within policy space. 
23 However, there is no perfect match between political parties and ideas stemming from given mobilized 
cleavages. As Mair put it: [T]here is no simple one-to-one correspondence between an individual party 
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Instead, they are resources for partisan actors to pursue their systemically defined goals. 
Parties also want to expand their social basis or ameliorate their position along the 
various axes of competition within a party system. A systemic view of party politics 
would allow for cross-case comparisons of how the interrelationship between partisan 
agency and systemic structures of competition affected the interpretation of foreign 
policy issues into policies24.  
 
WHY FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE? 
 
The prevailing tendency within FPA is to study foreign policies as outcomes and not 
relate them within a series of outcomes. However, there are good theoretical reasons to 
shift the focus from studying foreign policy to studying foreign policy change. A 
persuasive argument for this is presented by Welch (2005). The ontological nature of the 
problem at hand – the small number of observed cases (state foreign policies) and the 
complexity of policymaking – makes it difficult to generalize about foreign policies the 
way typical positivist epistemology, which dominates FPA, would expect. What is more, 
analyzing foreign policy necessitates a real-life threshold along which policy outcomes 
can be judged and evaluated. Yet the peculiar nature of international politics (whereby 
‘interests’ are difficult to identify beyond tautologies25) makes this threshold elusive. 
Welch puts forth the idea that this predicament can be remedied if we shift from analysis 
of foreign policy to analysis of foreign policy change. If we decide to study cases of 
foreign policy change, we not only have a very good guide as to what it is we are looking 
for in the policy making process, but we can also let the cases guide us to a better 
understanding of what states want, and how they come to want it, in a specific policy 
setting. Focusing on change means that we start from an observable real-life occurrence, 
while being able to draw theoretical conclusions about the sources and processes of 
interest and goal-formation. This applies particularly to the question of the effect of party 
                                                                                                                                            
organization and the presence of a cleavage, for while the political relevance of the latter requires 
expression in some form of political organization, such a political organization may nevertheless include 
two or more parties competing for more or less the same constituency’ (Mair 1997: 65). Other times, more 
than one cleavage is represented within a party (see Rose and Urwin’s (1969) discussion of heterogeneous 
parties). 
24 This argument essentially sees parties functioning with a view of ameliorating their position within party 
systems. This is a more dynamic view of what parties can do under systemic constraints. For example Mair 
is concerned with parties’ strategies to maintain the predominant language of a party system against 
contenders – parties that want to change it altogether, or opponents of party-government in general (Mair 
1997: ch. 1, especially p. 14, and ch. 4, especially p. 87-90). Here I consider that parties will still want to 
change features of a party system without necessarily looking to undermine its very existence or its 
predominant language. Parties that wish to introduce new dimensions of competition also cannot be 
considered necessarily as looking to undermine the very existence of a party system. Whereas Mair sees 
efforts to change the dominant language of a party system as anti-systemic, my argument here concerns 
party strategies that seek to infuse the existing language of competition with new elements, i.e. alter-
systemic efforts.    
25 See here Kratochwil (1982).  
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politics on foreign policy. An analysis of the relationship between parties and foreign 
policy would most probably have us believe that parties negotiate the details and rough 
edges of commonly accepted goals that arise from pre-given interests – the reason being 
that a ‘policy’ leads us to assume (perhaps unconsciously) the existence of prior 
determined interests. An analysis of the role of political parties in foreign policy change 
though changes matters significantly, because it necessitates to look at how parties 
contest not only policy but also goals and even supposedly pre-given ‘national 
interests’26.  
The first important issue that needs to be clarified is the exact meaning of ‘change’. 
In his classical volume, KJ Holsti (1982) talks of ‘restructuring’ of foreign policy, under 
which he means a wholesale realignment of all of a state’s policies and relationships vis-
à-vis a larger ‘patron’. In their article, Volgy and Schwarz (1991) also talk of far-reaching 
restructuring spanning policy areas, but for them the essence of the matter is the sudden 
and sensational nature of change. In this way, they differentiate between ‘change’ and 
slow and incremental bureaucratic ‘shifts’. Goldmann (1988: 10) defines change as 
‘either a new act in a given situation or a given act in a situation previously associated 
with a different act’. Hermann (1990: 5) distinguishes four gradations of change: 
adjustment, change of means and methods, change of goals, and wholesale restructuring.  
Here I follow as a first step Goldmann: I identify foreign policy change with a policy 
that was presented, perceived or generally evaluated to be a departure from previous 
continuous practices. But for the purposes of my argument and in order to see how party 
politics affect generally foreign policy, such a departure will have to go beyond 
Hermann’s ‘adjustment’. Instead, a focus on cases where methods to achieve goals or 
some of the goals themselves were contested will allow us to see how partisan actors 
redefined and engaged with the foundations of their states’ foreign policies. So here, 
while I am very much aware of the distinction between the two, I will include both the 
second and the third versions of Hermann’s change under my understanding of foreign 
policy change. As will become evident from the cases, this middle level of foreign policy 
change between adjustment and restructuring usually provokes contestation of both 
methods and goals – indeed, partisan actors would move the discussion across the two 
levels according to their strategic needs. However, contestation of methods and 
contestation of goals take place on the same level of intended change, one that seeks to 
reform and innovate while engaging with an existing normative structure of accepted 
interests that serves as the backdrop (but also as a resource in seeking change).   
Foreign policy restructuring is of course the time when the interests themselves 
come under severe redefinition. Cases like that are very rare. However, the borders 
                                                
26 Indeed, even two of the most thorough works on parties and foreign policy, Rathbun’s and Hofmann’s, 
can be seen as implicitly tackling the question of change. Their respective arguments are especially stark in 
their dealing of, for example, the decision of Germany to contribute to the use of force abroad (Rathbun) or 
the decision of Great Britain to support CSDP under Blair (Hofmann).  
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between what I call foreign policy change and restructuring are very malleable in any 
case. Foreign policy change in one sector may imply far-reaching reorientation in 
multiple other aspects of a state’s international standing (as the example of Canada’s 
commercial policy will show). In other words, the contestation of methods and goals may 
even concern altering the understanding of some of the state’s interests in all but name.  
Holsti and Volgy and Schwarz include in their understanding of foreign policy all of 
a state’s external relationships and policies. Holsti makes a point that cultural and identity 
issues are as important as military and economic ones. Here, the broad definition offered 
by Hermann comes to mind: ‘Foreign policy is a goal-oriented or problem-oriented 
program…directed towards entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction…[I]t 
is a program (plan) designed to address some problem or pursue some goal that entails 
action toward foreign entities’ (Hermann 1990: 5). This definition raises two points: First, 
foreign policy is any policy directed towards other states, independent of issue-area. 
Second, the ‘problem’ to be solved can be potentially domestically defined, and the 
designed policy can have important ramifications for domestic politics. 
Another issue is what kind of states are more likely to implement foreign policy 
changes. Volgy and Schwarz think that small states are less likely to escape the pressures 
of the international system and implement far-reaching changes in their foreign policies. 
This is a view made within the field of political economy by Katzenstein (1985) as well. 
Holsti on the other hand focuses precisely on small states rearranging their international 
orientation vis-à-vis powerful international others. Moon (1985) also understands foreign 
policy change as restructuring of a state’s grand orientations (with an emphasis on 
developing countries). Holsti’s and Moon’s work in this regard is manifestly influenced 
by the Cold War reality, where small state’s external policies were usually coherent 
across policy areas in their dealings with the two blocs. As for Volgy and Schwarz, their 
model makes sense within a Western European context (where France, Germany and the 
UK are indeed bigger than Ireland and Belgium), but one wonders if its logical 
conclusion is that even bigger democratic states (e.g. US or India) are even freer to 
implement far-reaching changes.  
Works on foreign policy change have the important advantage of being bolder in 
incorporating international and domestic explanations than most FPA literature. Holsti 
and Moon explicitly see the source of foreign policy change as a combination of 
international and domestic parameters. For them, especially for small(er) states, domestic 
political issues have inescapable international dimensions, so decisions to realign foreign 
policy reflect both domestic and international reasons. Volgy and Schwarz develop a 
model of domestic reasons for foreign policy change, yet recognize that a better 
understanding of the forces that trigger change would also include international factors. 
According to Hermann ‘foreign policy begins with a problem – a threat or opportunity – 
that motivates concern’ (Hermann 1990: 13). This means that identification and analysis 
of cases must start with the establishment of foreign policy challenges a state faces. 
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Finally, Gustavsson (1999), in his exciting literature review of important works on 
foreign policy change, differentiates between international, domestic political and 
domestic bureaucratic sources of foreign policy change. Yet he ascribes particular 
importance to a sense of crisis as an impetus for change (a theme also encountered in 
Holsti) and, implicitly, ascribes empirical priority to international factors.  
Of importance here is Kupchan (1994), which is not a book about foreign policy 
change per se, but also sees foreign policy decision starting from conditions of 
‘international uncertainty’. His argument is concerned with historical cases of empires 
that needed to balance changing international conditions in the imperial center and the 
periphery. In a general sense, his argument is that foreign policy outputs are triggered by 
events outside of the realm of the state, but that uncertainty of policymakers is an 
important condition for the direction adaptation will take. If we see cases of foreign 
policy change as cases of adaptation towards conditions of initial uncertainty, Kupchan’s 
view is important because it locates these conditions of uncertainty in both the beliefs of 
policymakers and their institutional and political interests. 
In summation: first, foreign policy refers to a wide array of policy areas, spanning 
political, military, economic and cultural/identity issues. Usually important foreign policy 
issues in one of these areas bears consequences for the other areas well. So we are 
looking for significant departures from previous patterns of a state’s policy in at least one 
important policy area. Second, foreign policy issues have domestic repercussions. These 
could refer simply to how they reflect on domestic day-to-day electoral politics, but they 
may also refer to their linkage with important ideas of domestic governance (or ‘visions 
of domestic society’ as Manow et al (2008) put it). For Kupchan foreign policy decisions 
are inseparable not only from the individual beliefs of policymakers, but also from the 
general ideational and institutional environment within which they function. Third, as to 
the importance of size of states, one would expect that these conclusions apply mostly to 
smaller states, which are more dependent and susceptible to international pressures. Yet, 
having said that, the empirical fact is that all kinds of states engage in foreign policy 
change.  
An argument about foreign policy needs to maintain the importance of the 
international sphere for states’ foreign policies. It is what makes foreign policy unique 
among public policies (see Blondel and Nousiainen 2000), and it is sadly all too often 
(and all too easily) forgotten by a vast part of scholarship in FPA. Here, I not only claim 
that foreign policy change is triggered by international events – but also that these events 
and the way they are framed by domestic actors play an important role in the way foreign 
policy is contested and the directions it takes.  
What kind of developments in the international system can trigger a state to consider 
changing its orientations? Here, I take a broad view of these terms, and I will include 
both material and ideational changes in the international system as triggers of foreign 
policy change. Material changes are any changes in the international distribution of 
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power that affect an aspect or the whole of a state’s foreign policy. A regional enemy 
becoming much stronger due to economic development or military innovations, or a 
change in the global distribution of power (or the logic underlying it), are examples that 
fall under this category. Ideational changes refer to the emergence of relevant norms, 
ideas or ideologies that affect the conduct of a state’s foreign policy in a regional or 
global setting, as well as the discursive resources of domestic actors in contesting foreign 
as well as domestic policies (Veliz 2010). Usually these two changes go hand in hand. 
New arrangements of power, new structures or institutions produce underlying norms that 
regulate practices – and the emergence of ideas can bring about new material 
arrangements. With this definition I take on a broader view of international developments 
than Kupchan. Even though his work is a bold effort to incorporate individual 
psychological and institutional ideational factors in the study of foreign policy adaptation, 
his view of international development impacting on foreign policy is decisively realist; 
his focus is exclusively on material conditions. However, I believe that an argument that 
takes domestic politics into account needs to include normative changes in the 
international sphere as well27.  
Because of the bias within the field of foreign policy research and practice towards 
continuity, focusing on cases of foreign policy change creates a kind of a laboratory 
environment where we can hope that the conditions we are interested in play themselves 
out on the influence of foreign policy. In as much, this dissertation is about the impact of 
party politics on foreign policy change. The argument is that under changing international 
conditions, pressures from a state’s international environment need to be filtered through 
significant dynamics of change in the underlying conditions of domestic party politics for 
foreign policy change to occur. These dynamics of domestic party systems create 
different combinations of preferences, discursive resources and political incentives that 
make foreign policy change conceivable, feasible and helpful towards the goals of 
partisan actors. It is toward the elaboration of this argument that I will now turn. 
 
THE ARGUMENT: SYSTEMIC DYNAMICS OF PARTY POLITICS AS 
NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
 
A state in its continuous foreign policy conduct constantly receives signals of change 
in its environment. Neighbors, allies and enemies become stronger or weaker, patterns of 
economic interaction change, new ideas gain in prominence or subside. Yet incidents of 
significant change in an aspect of a foreign policy, let alone a wholesale redirection of a 
                                                
27 Also to note here: The use of the word ‘adaptation’ throughout the text signifies, apart from linguistic 
variety in the place of the constant use of ‘change’, my understanding of foreign policy as a response to 
international systemic pressures. Thus the meaning of adaptation is different than the meaning of foreign 
policy ‘adjustment’ in Hermann’s terminology discussed above (i.e. an adaptation of some aspects of 
ongoing policy whose content and direction remains the same).  
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country’s orientation, are relatively rare. This means that the constant flow of information 
about change in the international system becomes filtered and interpreted by states in a 
way that privileges continuity.  
There are many possible reasons for this bias towards continuity, and FPA has dealt 
with them (albeit not through an analytical lens of continuity/change) in various works on 
bureaucracies, leadership etc. All these aspects can be credible candidates for why a state 
keeps its foreign policy constant – or why at some points change occurs. However the 
possibility that a state’s party system provides this bias towards continuity, as well as the 
resources for the institutionalization of change, has rarely been considered. Since flows of 
events and information coming from abroad are frequent, but foreign policy changes are 
rare, foreign policy change will by definition be a result of a combination between these 
flows and a kind of change in the party system28.  
Here, it is important to think of Kupchan’s book again, and especially his focus on 
‘strategic culture’ and ‘national identity’ as important contributing factors to a state’s 
adaptation to international change29. For him the domestic ideational and institutional 
setup intervenes between the individual beliefs of policymakers and international change 
to inhibit timely adaptation and or completely prevent reasonable policies. Kupchan 
himself admits that culture and identity are fuzzy notions, yet they are indispensable for 
an explanation of the pace and content of foreign policy adaptation (Kupchan 1994: 26-
27, 67 ff). Here I see party systems as a needed institutional corrective to Kupchan’s 
significant introduction of ideational variables: the party system is the institutional setup 
within which a policy equilibrium is codified, agreed upon and reproduced. Concurrently 
my argument also reaches out to important works on ideas and foreign policy30, seeing 
these ideas not as ‘floating freely’ but as being embedded within a specific arrangement 
of domestic ideas and interests codified in the party system.  
Mair puts forward a definition of party system change that is restrictive and 
demanding for our purposes. According to him party system change occurs only when 
one party system passes from one class or type to another – e.g. from a two-party pattern 
of competition to a form of multiparty, crosscutting competition (Mair 1997: 51-52). 
Developments in the party system such as changing voting patterns, changing patterns of 
coalition or realignment of representation of social strata through parties are important 
only to the extent that they bring about changes of the basic features of a party system: 
the pattern of interactions and the logic or ‘language’ of politics which regulates what 
party competition is ‘about’. For Mair, one of these two things has to change for party 
system change to occur (ibid: 75). 
                                                
28 This sentence should not be read inversely – changes in the party system do not necessarily lead to 
foreign policy change if there are no suitable or relevant developments in the international sphere; but cases 
of significant foreign policy change have to be analyzed with reference to changes in the party system.  
29 For the role of identity in world politics see Jepperson et al (1996). However their analytical framework 
sees identity more as a source of entrenched policies (i.e. continuity) rather than of change. 
30 See e.g. Barnett (1999). 
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The problem with this definition for my argument is that such changes of party 
system are few and far between. With so few party system changes and few foreign 
policy changes as defined here, hoping to find a case where both occur at the same time is 
really a demanding proposition. And since foreign policy change is a combination of 
suitable international developments and changes in the party system, if we see party 
system change the way Mair sees it, cases where party system change is accompanied by 
foreign policy change would be very few indeed. Clearly one needs a wider definition of 
what changes in the party system are of interest for a foreign policy argument. 
Following Mair, I believe it is important to focus on systemically relevant 
developments in domestic party politics. His definition of party system change may be 
demanding, but it alerts us to the fact that simple volatility in election results or changes 
in voting behavior of various groups are not systemically consequential changes (ibid: 
200). It thus helps us limit the range of phenomena we should be looking at to only the 
ones that hold a potential to influence the systemic workings of the environment within 
which parties function. In this vain, I identify three types of dynamics in the party system 
that fall short of party system change, however are of significance for the argument here, 
especially because they concern the way social cleavages filter and interpret a foreign 
policy issue.  
The first kind of dynamics in the party system that is of interest is changing patterns 
of coalition and opposition between parties. Mair himself accepts that such shifts are 
consequential if they lead to a change of the logic of the party system, i.e. a change of the 
language and the main dimensions of competition that structure voters’ choices. In other 
words, a change in the way parties align or oppose each other may lead to, or reflect prior 
dynamics that signal, a changing logic of competition and so a new pattern of systemic 
effects. However, changes in the way parties interact with each other may be important 
without necessarily changing the overriding logic of the party system – instead, changes 
of patterns of competition and opposition may imply a redefinition or updating of the 
main axis of competition, without changing the prevailing structures. Indeed, renewed 
and inventive patterns of coalition may actually strengthen the primary dimension of 
competition, while new elements enter it31. To the extent that different patterns of 
coalition within the same logic of competition can produce different policy outputs, I 
believe they are worth identifying as significant evolution of the party system32. 
                                                
31 Using an example from the first case study of this thesis, the decision of the FDP to break out of the 
bourgeois camp and enter a coalition with the SPD in 1969 in West Germany did not change the primary 
logic of the party system, which was a binary competition between two big Volksparteien. In order to 
understand how this change of coalition patterns was systemically relevant, we can contrast it with the 
various coalition patterns within the bourgeois camp between 1949 and 1966, when change of coalition 
partners for CDU did not affect the overriding logic of the system at all.  
32 In an indirect way I am also addressing Mair’s argument that predictability of governing alternatives and 
patterns of coalition making is an important tool in the hands of parties to maintain the basic structures of a 
party system – with unpredictability signaling potential party system change (Mair 1997: 211-214). Here I 
claim that there is an intermediate option between predictability and unpredictability – namely the renewal 
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A second type of systemically relevant evolution in a party system concerns the 
change in the patterns of expression of societal cleavages through different parties – 
again, this may or may not lead to party system change (ibid: 55). But it can be yet 
another evidence of a change in the meaning of competition, if not of its overall direction. 
This aspect is particularly important for my argument because I see partisan preferences 
on foreign policy rooted in social cleavages33. Which cleavages become energized, which 
ones gain or lose in importance, which ones align or oppose each other according to 
which parties represent them, are critical issues of how a party system will ultimately 
determine a foreign policy change. In terms of the content of policy outputs from a party 
system, the patterns of expression of cleavages through parties are important. The format 
of a party system, and the main direction of competition, may remain more or less the 
same. But some new features will definitely be added if various identities change political 
hosts34. In this way, the direction of competition may remain largely stable, however the 
actual language, or stakes, of competition may evolve. 
The third type of dynamics one can observe in the party system is a redefinition of 
the meaning of one of the dominant axes of competition. This shift is to a large extent a 
derivative of the other two dynamics I discussed above – and like them, it can be very 
consequential for the structure of a party system but fall short of provoking complete 
change. According to Kriesi et al (2006) for example, mature party systems usually align 
around a two-dimensional space, whereby one axis of competition concerns 
socioeconomic issues (Left-Right) and the other concerns values. Their argument is that 
party agency serves to redefine the meanings attached to this second axis. In such cases, 
the main dimensions of political competition and interactions of parties may remain 
largely the same. However, such evolution may be very consequential in terms of policy 
outputs. If a new foreign policy issue arises and calls for interpretation, parties that 
function along renewed and evolving axes of competition may read different things in a 
new situation than what they did at the time when they originally formulated a foreign 
policy. As I claimed, this aspect of a change in a party system is usually the result of the 
two other changes I discussed above – the role of party agency in the emergence of these 
new meanings of competition being crucial (Sitter 2001). But, as Mair would say, these 
                                                                                                                                            
of government alternatives within the same direction of competition. Without qualifying as party system 
change, it rather constitutes important ways a party system reproduces itself.  
33 See here Marks and Wilson (2000). Interestingly they speak of ‘bounded rationality’ of partisan actors as 
they interpret the EU issue according to the cleavages they are rooted in. ‘Bounded rationality’ is also a 
term used by Kupchan (1994: 45-46, 491) to denote the ideational and institutional constraints imposed on 
foreign policymakers.  
34 Here we can use an example from the second case of this thesis, Canada. The Conservative decision to 
enter a Free Trade Agreement with the US in the late 1980s was the result of a novel alliance between the 
two most pro-free trade regions of the country (Quebec and the West), under the same party. The party 
system that produced this decision was not newer than what it had been for most of the century in terms of 
format and patterns of competition – however the parties forming it were different enough to make new 
combinations of the demands of cleavages (in this case, the regional cleavage) and thus produce new 
policies. 
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changes are not always consequential in terms of renewed dimensions of competition; 
instead, direct political agency may make it so that an existing structural dimension of 
opposition becomes reinterpreted in a way that serves the promotion of specific policies, 
with phenomena like realignment of cleavages or new coalition patterns following it35. 
The fact that I differentiate between three different types of dynamics of change of a 
party system should not give the impression that each type is inconsequential towards the 
others. On the contrary, new patterns of coalition may reflect or create new 
understandings of the language of competition, and new patterns of expression of societal 
interests through partisan hosts may create new patterns of coalition and new stakes of 
competition. Indeed, the interaction between them qualifies them as significant changes, 
rather than mere volatilities of cleavage and vote Mair dismisses as systemically 
inconsequential. All three different types of dynamics may originate from below, due to 
deep and longstanding changes in a society’s outlook, and above, due to parties’ and 
partisan entrepreneurs’ efforts to ameliorate their position within policy space. Each type 
may or may not lead to wholesale party system change, however they are deemed enough 
for the purposes of my argument concerning foreign policy change if only they are 
systemically relevant, i.e. if they have the potential to contribute to the renewal or 
redefinition of the dominant language of politics, the normative anchor of the party 
system. 
The mechanism of party-based foreign policy change proceeds as follows:  
a) The evolution dynamics of important parameters of a party system create 
realignments of interests and governance ideas within partisan hosts and give rise to new 
preferences promoted by parties – a new anchor around which party competition 
revolves. If such changes occur while the state is faced with significant changes in its 
international normative and material environment, this realignment of interests and ideas 
about domestic governance will also result in new preferences on foreign policy. The 
issue area within which new ideas and preferences will arise will be contingent on the 
combination between domestic and international changes.  
b) Together, new domestic and foreign policy preferences from the various partisan 
actors form coherent sets of ‘visions of domestic society’. In this way, under conditions 
of renewal or systemic evolution in party systems, partisan competition extends to 
foreign policy as partisan actors try to promote contending visions of domestic society. 
This is a different thing than saying that politicians promote foreign policy goals as a 
diversion from domestic matters (Smith 1996), or even that foreign policy goals are just 
symbols or signals for changes in the domestic field. Instead, domestic political actors 
                                                
35 How this redefinition of the policy space can lead to new policies can be seen in the third case of this 
thesis, Greece. There the overriding structural characteristic, a binary competition between the socialist 
PASOK and the conservative New Democracy parties, was maintained but the meaning of Left-Right 
competition changed radically in the second half of the 1990s: From a polarized competition between two 
class-based mass parties, it turned into a convergent competition between two parties seeking to increase 
their catchall appeal under conditions of essential convergence around the goal of Greece entering the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  
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pursue foreign policy changes honestly, precisely because they form part of a wider 
whole under which domestic policies also fall.  
c) In honestly pursuing foreign policy preferences, partisan actors use party systemic 
and institutional features as opportunity structures for the contestation, promotion and 
institutionalization of new policies. In this way, a dynamic interplay between 
developments in foreign policy and party systems arises: the realignment of domestic 
preferences and ideas that initially gave rise to new foreign policy preferences will only 
be cemented in reformed party systemic features once the new foreign policy preferences 
are also translated into new policies. If the challenge to existing foreign policies fails, this 
means that the existing dominant patterns of systemic interaction between parties are 
strong enough to absorb underlying dynamics in the party system, which then remain 
systemically inconsequential.  
In this way, we can see domestic alignments of ideas and societal interests forming 
an equilibrium with ideas institutionalized within foreign policies. Once domestic 
arrangements shift, foreign policies also have to change in order to reflect the state’s self-
view and its position in the world more accurately36. However changes in the 
international system are also needed for full-blown foreign policy to take place. This 
implies that even under conditions of international change, changes in foreign policy are 
only possible when domestic rearrangements produce new preferences and new 
ideational frames that make new policies conceivable and create incentives to pursue 
them. It is changes in the institutional setup within which ideas and preferences are 
codified that make new policies possible – without such changes, even external impetus 
remains inconsequential, since partisan actors have neither the ideational tools to make 
sense of them, nor the institutional incentives to pursue them. 
d) The end result of foreign policy contestation may be thought of as a new 
equilibrium. Successful institutionalization of foreign policy through creative 
engagement of party systemic parameters also results in the cementing of new features of 
party systems themselves, reflecting the initial dynamics that sparked the formulation of 
new foreign policy preferences in the first place. In this way, cases of foreign policy 
contestation and change may be seen as more general cases of systemic interaction 
between domestic party systems and the international system. This new equilibrium 
                                                
36 The idea of an equilibrium between domestic politics and ideas expressed in foreign policy is partially 
taken from Wæver (2001). He is concerned with the way discourses about ‘Europe’ express domestic 
conceptions about ‘state and national identity’ (Wæver 2001: 25). He systematizes this in three layers of 
discourse analysis: the basic conceptual understanding of state and nation (domestic level), the relational 
position of the state/nation vis-à-vis Europe (interplay between domestic and international) and the concrete 
policy for Europe (international level). Changes in the basic normative constellations are harder the more 
one moves from the external to the domestic layers. The more changes one sees at the top, the more 
possible it is that efforts will be made to instrumentalize these changes through discursive reframing in 
order to alter the dominant identity constellation domestically. This framework then accounts for the role of 
domestic agency in realigning domestic conceptions of governance with ideas expressed within foreign 
policy. Even though I do not share this emphasis on discourses, Wæver highlights the importance of close 
correspondence between dominant domestic ideas and foreign policy. 
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comes about as actors with new preferences and political incentives use the occurrence of 
change in a state’s international environment to promote their policies. To the extent that 
initial dynamics in party systems only become finalized as party system features after 
new foreign policy preferences result in new foreign policies, the new domestic 
arrangements may be seen as indirect outcomes of the impact of the international system 
on domestic politics. The mechanism of this is partisan agency that uses international 
changes as discursive resources to promote foreign (and accompanying domestic) 
preferences that end up making changes in party systems more permanent. The following 
graph outlines the mechanism of the argument: 
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This view of party system dynamics combines the two dimensions of a party system 
which affect the positions of parties on new issues: their rooting in social cleavages that 
cue their preferences on foreign policy issues; and their embedding within an institutional 
environment that prescribes positions within the policy space and, thus, electoral and 
political incentives. Political parties interpret changes in the international system and 
create new foreign policy preferences as they respond both to their societal commitments 
and the systemic demands of the party system. Changes in the way these two poles of the 
party system – the bottom-up effect of cleavages and the top-down structuring of 
competition through systemic patterns – interact create the preconditions (systemic 
dynamics) for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences, as well as their 
successful promotion. 
The significance of this expectation can be better established if we contrast it with 
two rival expectations, which seem plausible, intuitive and slightly more parsimonious. 
However, I want to argue that either of these views by themselves is insufficient to 
portray adequately the conditions under which foreign policy change takes place. The one 
rival expectation sees political parties as expressing the societal cleavages they are rooted 
in without reference to any other interests. Political parties are pure policy seekers and 
foreign policy change must be traced in the development of cleavages, their rise and their 
fall. The other rival expectation sees parties responding only to electoral needs. Political 
parties formulate foreign policies as part of their office and vote seeking activities, and 
foreign policy change would need to be deduced from parties’ interests as these are 
determined by their position within policy space and their interactions. Both of these rival 
expectations are plausible, however they offer less than satisfying insights into the 
conditions under which foreign policy change becomes possible. 
The first alternative essentially focuses on the bottom-up view of party politics and 
sees parties as carriers of the ideas and views prescribed by their rooting within political 
cleavages. Most existing work on political parties and foreign policy are variations of this 
perspective, even though some do not go as far as to pursue the argument that foreign and 
domestic policies of parties form coherent wholes. As much as the perspective of 
cleavages is a progress over the simplistic view of parties as representatives of societal 
interests, it still leaves open the question of how it relates to foreign policy change. At a 
specific point in time, a policy equilibrium can be plausibly explained with reference to 
the balance of strength between parties representing various policy preferences. However, 
an explanation of foreign policy change under this view would have to account not only 
for the rise of new cleavages and ideas within society, but also for the ways in which 
these come to influence policymakers, i.e. how they come to be institutionalized within 
parties. For this, the argument would have to go beyond a simple cleavage-based 
argument. In sum, a bottom-up view of party systems is very good in accounting for a 
foreign policy equilibrium at a specific point in time. It can also, in a more dynamic view, 
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incorporate the international dimension. However, it needs to be expanded in order to 
account for foreign policy change.  
The top-down view is more straightforward. It sees foreign policies as part of the 
general effort by parties to respond to the systemic demands they face for gaining votes 
and office. Parties compete along specific axes of competition and this competition 
determines the policies they express. This view sees parties engaging a more or less 
dealigned electorate – they are not constrained by particular societal commitments as 
much as by their effort to lure the ever-crucial median voter (Downs 1957). This view of 
parties as office-seekers is not very popular in the literature on foreign policy, since it 
leaves very little room for ideas and preferences. Concurrently, such a view also leaves 
very little room for the incorporation of the international perspective in the study of 
foreign policy. However, this top-down view is recognized as an essential complement of 
cleavage-based arguments (see Batory and Sitter 2004). Political parties are not 
completely free to move around policy space and electorates are not socially dealigned 
(Bartolini and Mair 1990: 193-196); yet the timing and pacing of the expression of these 
cleavages is to a very large extent determined by systemic factors. In addition, this view 
of parties as being capable of substantial agency serves to accommodate the element of 
foreign policy change, something which a cleavage-based perspective lacks. 
What this argument omits is direct reference to other potential sources of foreign 
policy change such as bureaucracies, individuals or pressure groups. First, this is a 
conscious decision to focus the argument on political parties alone, something that is very 
rarely done in FPA, where analyses of these other determinants of foreign policy abound. 
While I recognize that reality is much more complicated than that political parties alone 
matter in complex states and societies, I prefer not to blur the emphasis of the argument 
of this thesis – especially when party politics is already being conceptualized as a 
multifaceted analytical unit including systemic mechanics and social identities. Second, 
the focus of this thesis already implies where I personally stand on the question as to 
which domestic factors matter the most (though not exclusively) in the domestic politics 
of foreign policy. In liberal democracies important foreign policy decisions, and 
especially ones that signal significant reorientations, cannot be made without some sort of 
consultation and adjudication in the public arena (and perhaps they cannot even be 
conceived by policymakers with this dimension in mind).  
I think that the approach I propose here goes some way towards reconciling the 
question of multiple actors of foreign policy: The focus is not really on political parties in 
government (as competitors for analytical primacy to, say, a specialized bureaucracy or 
an epistemic community or trade unions) but on party systems, an institutional space 
codifying patterns of expression and interaction between parties that themselves have 
prior societal commitments. It is within this institutional space of democratic deliberation 
that the ideas and preferences of other actors, institutions or even bureaucracies try to 
find hosts and promote their ideas. I am very much interested in how the mechanisms of 
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deliberation themselves allow the emergence of policy change, but this does not mean 
that I discard the potential that ideas and preferences of foreign policy are rooted outside 
of the party system. I will return to the question of why analytical priority to party 
politics is justified in the concluding chapter, with references to the empirics of the case 
studies.  
 
TESTING THE ARGUMENT 
 
The above discussion gives rise to various alternative propositions and explanations. 
This dissertation will test them in a comparative research design. The core of the 
argument is that foreign policy change occurs only in the presence of two necessary 
conditions: international change and ongoing systemic dynamics of party politics. In 
other words, it will test the validity of the following antithetical pairs of propositions: 
 
Proposition Ia: Foreign policy change is the contingent result of the combination of two 
necessary conditions, international systemic change and ongoing dynamics in domestic 
party systems. 
Proposition Ib: Absence of foreign policy change is the result of the absence of ongoing 
dynamics in domestic party systems. 
 
Proposition IIa: Foreign policy change responds solely to international systemic change; 
evolutions of party systems are non-necessary for foreign policy change.  
Proposition IIb: Foreign policy change responds solely to dynamics of domestic party 
systems; change in the international system is non-necessary for foreign policy change. 
 
This thesis will test these propositions in cases of foreign policy change. The aim of 
this exercise is to show that there are significant links between foreign policy change and 
crucial developments in the party system. Comparing the role of party systemic factors as 
intermediate factors between international developments and foreign policy outputs in 
cases of foreign policy change creates a sound empirical environment within which 
specific mechanisms and causal paths can be discovered. In this vein, short 
counterfactuals in each of the cases of foreign policy change would demonstrate how this 
specific change would have been impossible in the absence of either systemically 
relevant developments in party systems or changes in the international environment. 
However, the exact role of party system dynamics as necessary factors of foreign policy 
change would remain unexplored if the research also did not control for the actual 
occurrence of foreign policy change as well. By using at least one case study where 
international material and normative conditions did change, but foreign policy remained 
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stable, we should be able to see how party system conditions underpinned the bias 
towards stability37.  
This dissertation does not, however, only make an argument about the necessity of 
domestic change for foreign policy change to occur in general, but also pursues the point 
that systemically relevant dynamics of party competition is crucial for foreign policy 
change, thus justifying the view that political parties are both enabled agents of change 
and constituted by the structures of party competition. It is important to show in every 
case study that foreign policy change became possible due to the kind of systemically 
relevant dynamics we identified in the previous section: new patterns of coalition-
making, realignment of political identities across parties, and redefinition of the meaning 
of one major axis of competition leading to the emergence of a qualitatively altered 
language of competition. In this way, we make use of the insights of literature on party 
system change (especially Mair) in order to go beyond standard accounts in IR and FPA 
that see parties as dependent carriers of societal preferences and political identities, as 
well as simplistic arguments that see foreign policy as derivative of crude movements of 
parties along an asocial axis of competition. 
For this reason, at the end of each case study it will also be portrayed that bottom-up 
or top-down explanations, alone, would be insufficient to make us understand the kinds 
of processes that filter international pressure into foreign policy change. The three types 
of party system dynamics we identified contain precisely both dimensions of party 
systems: they are systemically relevant because they imply both a realignment of political 
identities across parties, and changes in the patterns of interaction between parties. It is at 
the intersection of these two dimensions that a normative redefinition of the stake and 
language of party competition takes place. So, in the cases of foreign policy change we 
study, a short counterfactual argument would need to show that either of the two 
dimensions (bottom-up and top-down) of change in a party system by themselves would 
be insufficient for foreign policy change to have taken place. Instead, it will be shown 
that it was the sequence from one dimension to the other that made developments in the 
party system relevant and foreign policy change possible.  
Finally, for each of these cases, alternative explanations for the foreign policy 
change at hand need to be considered and the strength of the partisan argument against 
them demonstrated. This will be done with reference to strong accounts that focus on the 
empirics of each case, but also seek to make wider theoretical contributions. In this way, 
each case study will serve as a test of strength of the argument of the thesis vis-à-vis 
multiple literatures of IR and comparative politics. 
Comparison has been recognized as essential for the creation of at least meaningful 
generalizations both in the constructivist and the newly emergent ideational FPA 
                                                
37 Since this dissertation seeks to establish the necessity of party system dynamics for foreign policy 
change, cases of foreign policy stability in the absence of international change will not be considered here. 
Even if party systems were changing in such cases, the explanation according to the argument here would 
be that foreign policy did not change due to international systemic stability.   
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literature (Carlsnaes 1992; Kaarbo 2003). The method of comparison recommended is 
that of a structured/focused one, which is generally wedded to a language of variables 
and knowledge accumulation (George 1979; George and Bennett 2005). The 
structured/focused comparison is a method to do comparative case-study research with 
the aim of unravelling close causal relations through process tracing (George and Bennet 
2005: 67-72)38. Here I eschew the methodological and epistemological goals (identify 
variables, accumulate knowledge)39; but I retain the commitment to: 
a) Abide by an analytical model that will guide my research through specific  
    questions. 
b) Streamline the findings so that they allow contingent generalizations. 
The comparison will be focused because not all of the information arising through the 
historical cases will be of interest, and it will be structured because it will revolve around 
specific analytical categories as these arise from the theoretical discussion (George 1979: 
61-62).  
The analytical categories around which comparison will be structured are: 
a) A foreign policy challenge: I assume that foreign policy restructurings start from 
an upheaval of the state’s structural environment (Gustavsson 1999: 84-85)40. A foreign 
policy challenge (not necessarily a crisis, as in ibid: 86-87) is also assumed to carry 
contested meanings: Different domestic interests and identities see different things in 
every new foreign policy challenge, and this contestation expresses itself in different 
understandings of what the state’s interests are (ibid: 83-84). Here, the first step in every 
case is to briefly show what different understandings each foreign policy challenge 
carried. 
b) Dynamics of the party system: In the case of foreign policy stability, this part of 
the comparison will show that if the relevant party system underwent any changes, they 
did not qualify as ‘systemically relevant dynamics of the party system’ as defined above 
– i.e. they did not lead to the reformulation of the normative anchor that would have 
allowed the absorption of international pressures into new conceptions of a state’s 
political identity, place in the world and, ultimately, interests.  
c) The mechanism of change: The emergence of new partisan foreign policy 
preferences and ideas, their institutionalization first within individual parties and then 
within the party system as new foreign policies, and their parallel embedding in lasting 
party systemic features will be reconstructed. The emphasis will be on the main two 
functions of partisan agency as mechanism of change: the synergy and synchronicity in 
the development of foreign and domestic preferences (‘visions of domestic society’) of 
                                                
38 On process-tracing see Vennesson (2008). 
39 See the discussion on metatheory in the last section of this chapter. 
40 Gustavsson writes that foreign policy change has both domestic and international sources. But his focus 
on ‘crises’ clearly shows that he perceives systemic (i.e. international) factors as the primary instigators for 
change. Domestic sources are included as sources to the extent that they inform actors with policy 
‘solutions’ (i.e. identity/interest bundles) waiting to be attached to a ‘problem’ (86). The same logic is at 
play in Volgy and Schwarz’s (1991) discussion of sources of foreign police restructuring. 
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political parties; and the use of partisan actors’ preferred interpretation of the foreign 
policy challenge as normative argumentation in the process of contestation of foreign 
policy.  
The first two steps of the comparison will reconstruct the domestic and international 
background of each case. Works of diplomatic and political history will highlight the 
situation in the international and domestic political field. Expert accounts of party politics 
will reconstruct the point of equilibrium of the party system at the point when foreign 
policy contestation started, as well as the different foreign policy preferences and 
interpretations of foreign policy challenges by parties. The tracing of the process of 
foreign policy contestation will be made through the use of both secondary sources 
(expert accounts of intra-party politics and personalities) as well as primary material such 
as party documents (programs, electoral material), speeches and interviews41.  
Continuing to the background conditions of the comparison, a parameter we need to 
control for in both cases of foreign policy change and non-change is politicization of the 
given foreign policy issue. In our cases the foreign policy issue at hand needs to be an 
object of high-profile (if not intense) competition between parties. In this way it becomes 
easier to see how parties use argumentation consistent with their ideological traditions 
and how they frame foreign policy issues as important determinants of partisan 
competition. Lack of politicization in cases of non-change could be explained by a 
partisan argument, but that would be laboring the point, as many other explanations 
(systemic, rationalist etc.) would be equally adequate. A combination of politicization of 
foreign policy and non-change on the other hand is very important, because in these 
empirical occurrences obviously some actors actively seek to implement new foreign 
policy preferences and the pathways through which party systemic factors keep them 
from achieving this become more highlighted. In cases of foreign policy change, 
politicization is a control condition, which allows us to see foreign policy actors acting as 
partisan actors beyond other institutional allegiances42.  
Another parameter the comparison will control for is the relative size of states. 
Literature on foreign policy change is generally inconclusive as to whether bigger or 
smaller states are more likely to engage in foreign policy change. Volgy and Schwarz 
(1991) think that only big states have the capacity to implement change and the ability to 
                                                
41 The list of sources draws largely on Kaarbo’s (1996: 516-517) research design. 
42 This reasoning would seem to imply that the argument of this thesis only applies to politicized or deeply 
salient foreign policy issues with important domestic repercussions. However, I would say that I expect 
party systemic factors such as the redefinition of the normative terms of party competition or the self-
repositioning of political parties to affect policy makers’ views on most foreign policy issues. In a sense I 
ascribe to an ontological and normative view of public policy issues as political issues, i.e. issues of 
redistribution and essential values. In other words politicization is the norm (despite different degrees); 
allegedly neutral issues are in reality ‘neutralized’ issues reflecting the interests of dominant political actors 
(see Buzan et al 1997, also Schmitt 2007 [1932]). For this reason I would say that the scope of my 
argument extends to all foreign policy issues; picking cases of high profile foreign policy contestation only 
facilitates the empirical research and presents cases where the mechanisms identified here play the 
predominant role.  
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escape the constraints of the international system. Katzenstein (1985) had also made a 
similar argument in the field of political economy. Conversely, work on realignment of 
foreign policy within the context of the Cold War focused on how smaller states changed 
aspects or the whole of their foreign policy orientations (Holsti 1982, Moon 1985). My 
primary argument would be that size is not necessarily relevant, and that it is in any case 
a relational concept. However size of a polity is not only relevant regarding the state’s 
international standing; it also bears consequences about the abilities of domestic actors to 
implement far-reaching changes. The bigger the polity and the more complicated the 
state, the more demanding will be the preconditions for the implementation of change. 
For the argument of the thesis to be strong, I will include examples of states of varying 
size in order to account for differences in this respect. 
The final factor I intend to control for is type of state, including state-society 
relations and accompanying political arrangements and party politics. Following a basic 
classification of democracies (Lijphart 1999; Risse-Kappen 1991), I differentiate between 
consensual, democratic corporatist states, where party systems link strong societal 
interests with strong state institutions and where coalition governments and multiple 
checks between the executive and the legislative branch exist; Westminster democracies 
with pluralitarian government, dominance of the executive and competitive societal 
interests that compete for representation through the party system; and South European 
states with polarized and dispersed societal interests, dominant states vis-à-vis societies, 
strong executives and party systems that reflect political cleavages overlying constantly 
shifting societal ones. This classification will inform case selection to the extent that it 
will show that parties within party systems with different degrees of societal 
commitments, historical trajectories and embedding institutions respond in the same 
general manner to foreign policy challenges, and that the mechanisms of foreign policy 
preference formation and expression identified here can be applied to a representative 
sample of different types of liberal democracy43.  
 
THE LOGIC OF CASE SELECTION 
 
Based on the various qualifications I have identified, a complex matrix of potential 
cases of interest arises. I am interested in covering cases of both big and small states, of 
three different types of state, and of both successful and non-successful foreign policy 
change. Such a design yields the following table: 
 
 
 
                                                
43 For the importance of institutional settings such as parliaments, executives etc. as arenas within which 
party systemic interactions unfold (often with substantial differences from one setting to the other), see 
Bardi and Mair (2008). 
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Type	  of	  State	   Size	  of	  State	   Foreign	   Policy	  Change	   No	   Foreign	   Policy	  Change	  Consensus/Corporatist	   Big	  	   1	   2	  Small	  	   3	   4	  Westminster	   Big	  	   5	   6	  Small	  	   7	   8	  South	  European	   Big	  	   9	   10	  Small	  	   11	   12	  
 
Obviously conducting 12 deep case studies that cover all the possible types of 
foreign policy contestation while satisfying the criterion of visible politicization 
(controlling for politicization would multiply the possible types by 2 and complicate case 
selection even more) is not feasible. There would need to be some hierarchy of the 
different criteria in order to justify the selection of a manageable number of cases in a 
meaningful way. In my view the type of democracy is the primary criterion, and for this 
reason there would need to be at least three cases, each covering a type we have 
identified here. Ideally there would need to be at least one case of change and non-change 
per type, thus raising the number of required case studies to six – which is still a high 
number. I consider size a secondary qualification and the variety of the concept can be 
captured by choosing states of various sizes, without insisting on how size relates to the 
other criteria.  
Based on the above premises, I have identified three cases of successfully politicized 
foreign policy change covering all three types of state: 
 - West German Ostpolitik 1969-1972: The decision by West Germany to change 
substantially its relationship with the Eastern bloc in 1969-1970, and by extension its own 
self-conception as sole legitimate German state, came on the heels of a significant 
political change: for the first time since 1949 the Christian Democrats were in the 
opposition, due to the creation of a coalition between the Social Democrats and the Free 
Democrats. Novel foreign policy preferences served as a signal for the creation of this 
coalition. The creation of this new government reflected the definite establishment of a 
competitive binary system of alternation of government, which in turn made the new 
foreign policy possible. The elections of 1972, largely fought on the question of 
Ostpolitik, cemented this new equilibrium. In many ways, the specific content and timing 
of Ostpolitik was the result of prior changes in the West German party system, and its 
contestation was as much contestation about the direction of the dynamics of the party 
system. 
 - Canada and free trade with the US 1988-1993: In 1988 the Conservative 
government in Ottawa decided to enter a Free Trade Agreement with the United States. 
The decision was fiercely contested by the opposition Liberals and New Democrats. The 
decision was seen as carrying far-reaching consequences for Canada’s political, 
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economic and social identity. In the elections of 1988 the Conservatives took advantage 
of the splitting of the anti-free trade vote between the Liberals and the New Democrats 
and won in what amounted to official ratification of the FTA. According to the analytical 
framework suggested here, the successful foreign policy change can be adequately 
explained by the creation of an electoral pro-free trade coalition between the Canadian 
West and Quebec, reflecting specific understandings about the relationship between the 
different communities of Canada. It was this concentration of significant ends of the 
dominant cleavages of Canadian politics (region and language) within the same partisan 
host that made the difference from earlier efforts to accept foreign trade with the US.  
- Greece and the EU candidate status of Turkey 1999-2000: In late 1999 Greece 
changed a significant aspect of its foreign policy towards Turkey by allowing the EU to 
grant Turkey official membership candidate status. This change was more than a tactical 
maneuver. Instead it represented a profound change in the way Greece viewed Turkey 
and its relationship with it. The decision became the object of intense political debate 
between, and within, Greece’s two main parties, the then ruling socialists of PASOK and 
opposition conservatives of ND. The decision was the result of PASOK’s shift away from 
its populist past and towards a modernizing message about Greece’s image (which also 
included a vision of Europeanized Greek-Turkish relations) after a new leadership took 
over in 1996. Behind the decision in Helsinki lay the strategic decision of PASOK first 
and ND later to reformulate the stakes of the Right-Left axis that structured their 
competition, from one of polarized class politics to one of convergent ‘modernization’ of 
the economy in order to absorb pressures by an increasingly dealigned electorate.  
- In addition to these three main case studies, I will conduct a plausibility probe of 
the main argument in four shorter case studies. These will also cover cases of non-change 
in order to satisfy the logic of comparison as specified above, while they will portray the 
ability of the argument here to ‘travel’ across time and space. The cases included in the 
plausibility probe will be Austria (a case of non-change, regarding the maintenance of 
neutrality after the Cold War), the Netherlands (a case of change, in the sense that a 
hitherto emphatically Atlanticist security policy for the first time received a Europeanist 
dimension in the 1990s), and Australia and New Zealand (taken as a pair, exploring why 
Australia did not go through with foreign policy change and its famous ‘Asianization’ of 
the 1980s and 1990s whereas New Zealand actually moved away from the orbit of the 
United States to develop a more independent security policy at around the same time).  
 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND METATHEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Efforts to widen our understanding about the role of domestic politics in 
international affairs until today have been less than satisfying precisely because 
comparative politics have been incorporated in discussions within IR and FPA only 
imperfectly. The main challenge for this dissertation is to show that the preceding 
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discussion about parties, party systems and party system change broadens our 
understanding of the way domestic and international politics interact and contribute to the 
theoretical advancement of the study of international phenomena. 
Since the 1980s already, works in International Political Economy, influenced 
greatly by Gourevitch’s (1978) seminal article, created arguments about the interplay of 
domestic and international politics. Indeed, recent scholarship on the work of parties 
seems to forget where ‘it all started’, namely initial interest in the effect of domestic 
politics on international affairs which mostly came from work in International Political 
Economy. Yet one of the main insights of IPE, whose spillover into IR was reflected in 
‘Second Image Reversed’ arguments, was that inside-out policies only make sense if 
placed within a more holistic view of politics, one which spans borders and levels of 
analysis (Keohane and Milner 1996; Risse-Kappen 1995: 15-16). In this view, partisan 
foreign policies can be better understood if we see them as reactions to, and 
incorporations of, input from the international arena. 
Turning to IR, interest in the role of domestic politics took an upturn from the mid-
1990s on, mostly through heightened interest in transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 
1994, 1995) and the development of liberalism by Moravcsik (1997) as a distinct 
theoretical strand of International Relations theory. However key insights and pleas of the 
transnational relations literature for further research remained unheeded. Original work 
on the effect of sub-state and transnational actors in state foreign policies laid particular 
importance on, and further pleaded for more attention to, the role of ideas and norms in 
politics (Evangelista 1999: 377; Risse-Kappen 1995: 31-32). Party politics is about 
deliberation and justification, and party-based actors constantly look for normative tools 
in their effort to promote new policies and defend old ones. The always-insufficient 
engagement of the discipline with the cause of ideas and norms undoubtedly hampers the 
way it approaches party politics.  
Moving to Moravcsik’s (1997) liberalism, it theorizes state interests and foreign 
policies as expressions of sets of preferences of societal actors who compete in an open 
market of political competition. Moravcsik considers his societal actors pursuing both 
material and ideational interests, and patterns of international conflict and cooperation 
being determined by the transnational interactions of societal preferences. But Moravcsik 
remains agnostic as to the process of preference formation, opting to see preferences as a 
given outcome of political deliberations, which he is not interested in. Moravcsik’s 
liberalism is a useful framework for the incorporation of domestic politics in the study of 
international relations. Surprisingly it has rarely been put to use, perhaps because of its 
ambitious nature. Unlike Moravcsik, I do not seek to explain systemic results with 
reference to the cross-border interaction of societal interests. Instead, I simply see how 
these interests come to be expressed internationally through new foreign policies after 
fighting it out in the domestic arena. On the other hand, I problematize Moravcsik’s 
simplistic view that societal actors form preferences ‘prior to politics’. Here I show that 
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domestic preference formation is all about politics, and that it is informed by structural 
and ideational factors. 
Turning to another major theoretical strand of IR, constructivism as a broad 
metatheoretical school takes interest, among other things, in domestic politics as a 
process of state interest formation. For constructivism (especially the domestic 
constructivism of Hopf 2002), domestic social identities inform state interests and are 
extrapolated into the international arena through framing and interpreting changes in the 
international system. But constructivism is not primarily a theory of domestic politics. On 
the contrary, its dominant strand – systemic constructivism – is concerned with norms on 
the systemic level, and how interaction among states constitutes an international 
normative order, which then informs interests and identities (Wendt 1999).  
If it involves domestic politics then, constructivism decisively does so by seeing 
international and domestic arenas as a discursive whole, a social space where actors 
engage both with domestic and foreign identities, ideas and norms (Houghton 2007: 27-
30). Unlike liberalism, constructivism adds ideas into the mix and conceives of domestic 
interests as bundles of material interests and identities, and of societal actors as bounded 
rational actors, pursuing identity informed interests by rationally engaging in a political 
process (Barnett 1999: 6-7, 26) – not unlike the elaborate view of social cleavages as 
organizational and ideational dimensions, and the literature seeing party positions on 
European integration conditioned by a combination of ideological commitments and 
partisan incentives. 
Despite its opposition to structural realism, systemic constructivism remains equally 
agnostic (not to say indifferent) to the issue of individual foreign policies. Yet any 
systemic theory should be able to show that systemic developments have effects on the 
behaviour of the units. Similarly, strands of constructivism that emphasize ideas in the 
domestic arena sometimes lose focus of the fact that ideational politics constitutes a 
whole, spanning the domestic and the international realm. In both cases, constructivism 
needs a better understanding of unit-change within a system, because these unit-changes 
ultimately determine systemic developments as well. Using party systems theory is also 
an effort to fill the constructivist ‘shell’ with the insights of a literature seldom used in 
IR, but which can complement the broad metatheoretical constructivist understandings 
with concrete empirical contributions.  
The argument of this dissertation also engages with other works falling within, 
emanating from, or moving even further than, the constructivist project. More 
mainstream applications of constructivism’s focus on ideas and linkages between 
international and domestic politics have been made in the study of national identity as a 
source of, and institutional embedding of, foreign policy ideas and preferences 
(Jepperson et al 1996). More post-modern studies (falling within the field of post-
structuralism) look at how domestic discourses serve as institutional structures that 
reproduce foreign policy ideas (Campbell 1992; Hansen 2006).  
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This dissertation aims to offer an ‘institutional corrective’ to studies of national 
identity by showing that party systems are crucial institutional settings within which ideas 
about a state’s self-image and place in the world are formed and reproduced. In this view, 
party-based foreign policy change reflects a reappraisal of the way domestic political 
forces view the state’s position in the international system and, by extension, visions of 
domestic society. To the extent that studies of national identity reproduce within states 
the conventional constructivist view of powerful ideational structures, the argument here 
also complements attention of domestic institutional settings with an emphasis on agency 
and the possibility of creative engagement with such structures. In addition, my argument 
remains far more critical of discourse-based, post-structural accounts of foreign policy 
formation. The implications for mainstream constructivism (identities etc.) and post-
structuralism will be discussed more extensively in the concluding chapter of the thesis.  
When it comes to Foreign Policy Analysis, the recent turn to cognitive and ideational 
approaches serves the study of the traditional ‘darlings’ of FPA such as individuals, 
bureaucracies etc. (Houghton 2007: 31-33; Kaarbo 2003: 160-161). This research applies 
the two basic tenets identified as a major advancement of FPA, namely the turn to 
constructivist ontology and the employment of modest positivist methodology like 
structured/focused comparison. It shows how foreign policies become possible under 
conditions of political contestation in a wide range of cases.  
When it comes to comparative party politics, this dissertation builds on some very 
interesting early (Valen 1976), as well as more recent (Golden 2004), works where the 
impact of international issues on domestic party politics was the focus. The argument of 
this dissertation is about how changes in the domestic party systems filter international 
developments to produce foreign policy change. However, to the extent that the role of 
agency is crucial in this process and that the end result of this process is a new 
equilibrium between new foreign policies and altered party systems, foreign policy 
change must also be seen as a process through which international norms and material 
conditions impact on domestic arrangements. At the same time, in showing that party 
systems can have policy outputs in foreign policy, this dissertation brings attention to the 
inescapable importance of the international dimension in the workings of domestic 
politics. 
If we had to use the parlance of IR metatheory, the ontology of this dissertation 
would be idealist and holist; it sees political parties as actors within a thick discursive 
environment spanning the domestic and the international. And if we had to embed the 
ontological argument of the thesis and its epistemological repercussions within a 
discussion of social and scientific theory, the best tool would be the agency/structure 
debate. 
The agency/structure debate of social theory has been applied both in the field of IR 
(Dessler 1989) and Foreign Policy Analysis (Carlsnaes 1992). It focuses on political 
agency and how political actors interact with their surrounding structures, which both 
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constrain and enable them. In this picture, political parties can be thought of as 
constrained and enabled by a combination of the international normative environment, 
the domestic constellation of identities and the exigencies of party competition and 
electoral survival (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 622-626). In times of contestation of foreign 
policies one can think of party-based actors as creatively engaging with international and 
domestic norms in order to institutionalize their preferred interpretations of foreign policy 
and domestic order (Barnett 1999: 24); but also, one can think of them as constrained by 
the established limits of discursive contestation of domestic orders and by the burden of 
the social identities they are meant to represent (Carlsnaes 1992: 265-268).  
My research operationalizes the domestic normative structure within which political 
parties function, by looking at party systems theory. Party systems are understood here as 
institutions, prescribing interests and terms of debate for their members, political parties. 
The domestic structure party agents engage with is the structure of codified patterns of 
interaction and the accepted language of politics that gives meaning to domestic political 
competition. It also constrains them, most notably by prescribing terms of debate and 
strategies for electoral success (Barnett 1999: 8-9)44. 
This dissertation then falls within the broad category of works of IR that embark 
from a view of politics as flows of interactions, rather than linear relations, and are lead 
by this ontological assumption towards an epistemological view that prioritizes the 
untangling of processes and aims at contingent generalizations. This correlates with Hopf 
(2002), who claims to make only ‘modest truth claims’. What is really interesting is that 
such modest research goals can have important theoretical implications: ‘[In case of 
empirical validation of theoretical expectations] the theory should be considered to be 
applicable to other domains, even though the empirical evidence itself is necessarily 
uniquely bound to its historical context’ (Hopf 2002: 31). This means that the empirical 
findings in each case yield theoretically important results, rather than empirically 
universal claims. Blyth (2008) on the other hand emphasizes that the contingent and 
unstable state of social reality and the importance of ideas as tools that make sense of this 
world make continuity and stability in social research a futile exercise. Rather, the world 
itself is a world of uncertainty and unregulated interactions and social science needs to 
reflect such a reality. Of particular importance in this analysis is the author’s call for 
paying closer attention to agency. Agency is affected by environmental pressures that 
create a thick social environment conditioned by feedback loops and constant interaction. 
In such a world, causality itself is rarely linear and conclusions that hold in one social 
setting are only hardly transferable elsewhere.  
                                                
44 Barnett is indeed a useful example here. Whereas his piece on the ideational politics of Israeli foreign 
policy change is excellent in showing how key constructivist tenets shed light in one particular case, and it 
clearly addresses the issue of party politics in this process, its scope remains quite limited. An ideal 
situation would be to have a Barnett × n, or a comparative study of the interplay between domestic 
institutions, political agency and ideas cum interests. The inevitable scaling down of descriptive accuracy 
due to time and other constraints can be compensated for by a more rigorous comparative method, seeking 
to frame key empirical insight in analytical/theoretical terms.  
 
 
 42 
Even though I ascribe to a post-positivist epistemology, it must be clear that my 
methodology tries to address some basic concerns of scientific research and parsimony. I 
do not see foreign policy and party systems as variables in a causal relationship, but 
rather as co-constituting discursive entities. Comparison does not try to answer which of 
the two affects which, as much as it tries to show how processes of mutual influence 
unfold (Barnett 1999: 18). My analysis of the interplay between party politics and 
changes in the international arena as determinants of foreign policy change resembles the 
mutual constitution of state interests and domestic orders in agency/structure-informed 
works within FPA, and also aims at contingent generalizations and a close untangling of 
processes and constitutive links between actors and structures (Carlsnaes 1992: 267; 
George and Bennett 2005: 32).  
Finally, taking a broader look of the discipline of IR, I see my work being positioned 
within the problematique developed by Buzan and Little (2001). What is of interest here 
is the authors’ call for a ‘thicker, more holistic form of theorising’ (Buzan and Little 
2001: 34) that is capable of making sense of large-scale social phenomena; the focus on 
deep historical analysis; and the reference to the potential of IR to ‘become a kind of 
meta-discipline, systematically linking together the macro sides of the social sciences and 
history.’ (ibid: 22). I see my work here as responding to these epistemological concerns. I 
also think that IR has the potential to incorporate the teachings of other fields of social 
science – here being comparative party politics. My belief is that an emphasis on the role 
of political parties in international relations as social entities with global outreach can 
enrich the understanding of world politics as politics as such, i.e. as a process of 
deliberation and social representation within a context of interest expression and 
deliberation.  
Summing up, the empirical question of the thesis, the development of an analytical 
framework based on comparative party politics and the employment of the comparative 
method also constitute advancements within IR. As a study of the interplay between 
domestic and international politics, this dissertation seeks to develop the liberal and 
constructivist agenda by showing the importance of domestic preferences, the impact of 
the international system on domestic politics as mediated through political agency, and 
the link between the domestic and international arena as ideational settings. It highlights 
the importance of domestic institutions and identities, and is also an exercise in 
metathoretical questions by seeing political actors in a dynamic interplay with the 
structures that enable and constrain them. In this way, this dissertation seeks to go beyond 
offering an improved empirical view of the issue at hand, but it also seeks to touch upon 
its repercussion for International Relations in general. In the concluding chapter of this 
thesis, I will address how the findings of the comparison impact these different 
literatures, as well as make an effort to put the question of party-based foreign policy 
change in even more abstract sociological terms, by seeing how it can be stated in terms 
of open-systems theory.  
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PART II 
 
FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND PARTY 
POLITICS IN THREE CASES: 
WEST GERMANY, CANADA, GREECE 
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CHAPTER 2 
WEST GERMANY 1966-1972: OSTPOLITIK, THE SOCIAL-
LIBERAL COALITION AND REFORMED BIPOLARITY  
 
“The worst tragedy is that election in ’69. If this National Party, that extreme right 
wing party, had got three-tenths of one percent more, the Christian Democrats would be 
in office now”. 
Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, June 16 197145 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER AND ARGUMENT 
 
Ostpolitik refers to the new policy of rapprochement towards the Eastern bloc 
practiced by SPD Chancellor of West Germany Willy Brandt and FDP foreign minister 
Walter Scheel between 1969 and 1974. In literal terms, Germany has always practiced a 
‘policy towards the East’. In the past, West German foreign policy had insisted on 
insulating, isolating and antagonizing the Eastern bloc, hoping that the inter-bloc struggle 
would result in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc and the absorption of East Germany 
(and hopefully the lost territories to the East of the Oder) by the Federal Republic. This 
policy, conceived by Adenauer and imposed by him during the heyday of the CDU’s 
dominance over West German politics, was as much dictated by international 
developments as by Adenauer’s and CDU’s identity conceptions. To him, the foreign 
policy of Westbindung and Alleinvertretungsanspruch (claim to sole representation of the 
German nation by West Germany) was an essential ingredient of a policy that would 
stabilize democracy, liberal economy and international respectability for Germany. The 
intense competition between the US and USSR facilitated the imposition of this 
understanding. West German foreign policy in the 1950s was thus a distinct CDU 
creation. 
Throughout the 1960s West Germany was confronted with the imperative of détente, 
i.e. of superpower rapprochement that brought the US commitment to European security 
and German unification into doubt. Détente revealed the dead-end Adenauer’s ‘policy of 
strength’ had run into with regards to German reunification: It was very clear that the US 
would not risk direct confrontation with the USSR for the sake of reunification. The time 
was ripe for a reevaluation of West German foreign policy, which became even more 
forthcoming after Adenauer left the Chancellery in 1963. The process of this reevaluation 
culminated in the Ostpolitik. But this reevaluation could not have been translated into 
concrete action without permissive party system circumstances. The background of 
Ostpolitik is as much a matter of international as of domestic politics. 
                                                
45 Cited in Klitzing (2009: 103). 
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Even though all major West German political parties carried political identities with 
demands for foreign policy reform, the new Ostpolitik only became possible, in the shape 
it took on, once dynamics of the party system culminated in a systemically relevant 
change of the logic of party competition: The SPD-FDP coalition formed after the 1969 
elections. It was the first of its kind and allowed the two parties to put forth a different 
conception of the stakes of party competition, beyond the anti-Communism that had 
allowed the CDU/CSU to dominate political life until then. Once these parties found 
themselves within this new systemic constellation, the reformist foreign policy agendas 
they were carrying became energized and led to the formulation of a far-reaching foreign 
policy change. The contestation of Ostpolitik in 1972 from the CDU was intense, despite 
the presence of many reformists in the party’s ranks, precisely because the reformulation 
of the meaning of party competition was at stake. The new Ostpolitik captured accurately 
the preferences of a coalition intent on reforming the political identity of the Federal 
Republic. The impressive victory of the Brandt-Scheel coalition in 1972 signified the 
institutionalization of a new normative anchor of party politics and a new corresponding 
foreign policy identity.  
 
POLITICAL CLEAVAGES, DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION, POLITICAL 
IDENTITIES OF GERMAN POLITICS 
 
The two main cleavages that initially dominated political life of Germany since the 
creation of parliamentary life in the 1860s and unification under Prussian domination in 
1871 have been religion and national integration46. These two crosscutting cleavages 
crucially determined the shape of the German party system, which was further 
complicated by the advent of social class as yet another cleavage of importance after the 
lifting of restrictions against the Social Democrats (SPD) in the 1890s. The interplay of 
social developments, history and geography carried on these cleavages to the post-World 
War II era in West Germany and decidedly shaped the West German party system. 
By 1871 the first political families had been formed – despite important 
heterogeneity of their various regional incarnations. The main agents of national 
integration were the liberal parties, heavily Protestant, committed to a strong modernizing 
state and a modern capitalist economy. However they severely split after 1866 over the 
question of the relationship between executive and legislative power: The more 
conservative and heavily Prussian National Liberals sided with Bismarck’s powers over 
the Parliament; the less numerous and more heterogeneous (due to strong presence in the 
                                                
46 Information on this chapter has been largely drawn from Tormin (1966), Pulzer (1971), Vogel et al 
(1971), Rohe (1990) and Lösche (1994). More detailed references will be made where appropriate. In this 
and the other case-studies, references of multiple works in the parentheses will be given in chronological 
and not alphabetical order so that the contrast between sources of different chronological proximity to the 
cases will become more evident. In the chapters of theoretical discussion referencing will switch back to 
alphabetical order as was the case in the first theoretical chapter.  
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Catholic South) Social Liberals resisted this. The split of German liberalism between the 
proponents of the nation-state and the supporters of democratic values can be traced back 
to different philosophical ideas about politics – a split between Hegel and Kant to be very 
schematic (Winking 1991: 44-45). On the other side of the national cleavage lay initially 
various Conservative groupings, uniting social forces that felt threatened by the advent of 
the bourgeois class and the creation of a modernizing state. They had a dirigiste view of 
the economy, supporting industrialization under strong government supervision, and 
diligently safeguarded the old agricultural order as well as the three-class voting system 
in Prussia. 
The first crisis of national integration in Germany brought to the fore the crucial role 
of religion in the new Reich. Catholics were suspected of low commitment to the new 
state. Constituting a strong, albeit, minority, they became the target of Bismarck’s 
oppressive policies in what became known as the Kulturkampf. This combination of 
confessional persecution and a sublime cultural heritage codified in Catholic social 
thought crucially shaped the political identity of the Zentrum. It became a consciously 
cross-class alliance of Catholics, developing an ideology of social mediation, middle-of-
the-road political tactics and a commitment to democracy and social order. Despite the 
increasing presence of Catholic trade unionists from the 1890s onwards, the Zentrum’s 
dominant wing remained a centrist bourgeois one.  
Last to rise were the Social Democrats (SPD). With a much more uniform following 
than all other parties, and with much less differences in its identity geographically, the 
party of the working class overcame years of persecution and from 1890 onward, started 
a steady climb towards becoming the biggest-party in 1913. Its historical leaders, 
Ferdinand Lassalle in the 1860s and Eduard Bernstein in the 1890s, bequeathed it a 
doctrine of German patriotism, which the party sometimes felt compelled to 
overcompensate for due to the lasting suspicions of internationalism. The flip side of 
SPD’s patriotism was an aversion to the institutional structures of the Reich. Its following 
was almost exclusively working-class, even though for years the party failed to make 
inroads into the Catholic labor vote.  
These cleavages created the first discernible patterns of competition, cross-cutting or 
reinforcing each other according to the issue area: Catholics, Social Democrats and 
Social Liberals against National Liberal and Conservative Protestants on democracy, 
Liberals against Catholics and Conservatives on social protection and the economy, 
Social Democrats with Catholic labor allies (and even less significant Protestant social 
thinkers) against everyone else on reform of the capitalist system, National Liberals and 
Conservatives against all others on governance of the state and the prerogatives of 
Prussia, Catholics and Social Democrats against all others (the ‘national camp’) on 
foreign policy and national integration etc. By the beginning of World War I the German 
party system was characterized by fragmentation, polarization and problematic 
aggregation of cleavages through coalition politics.  
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The party system of the Weimar Republic faithfully and spectacularly reproduced 
these patterns, despite years of war and monumental changes in the state’s institutional 
order and geographical shape. Class, confession and the poisonous national question, 
inflated by the loss in the war as well as the humiliating terms imposed by the Entente, 
cut across and reinforced each other in roughly similar ways as before. The Zentrum 
maintained its strategic position in the center of the party system, its status augmented by 
its commitment to democracy. Now a regime party, the Zentrum highlighted its cross-
class appeal that allowed it to pursue alliances on both the left and right. However, the 
Zentrum grew increasingly conservative as the Catholic middle-class dominated its 
workings. The SPD was the second pillar of the Weimar regime, rising from the ashes of 
World War I as the agent of working-class interests and parliamentary democracy. 
However, it was deeply mistrusted by the bourgeoisie, and especially the pro-capitalist 
Liberals, for its protectionism, and by the right for its conciliatory foreign policy 
positions. Bridging the middle-class Zentrum and the working-class SPD was the DDP, 
the evolution of social liberalism and third founding party of Weimar. Also committed to 
democracy, representing entrepreneurial and merchant interests, it found itself torn 
between the need to cooperate with the SPD to defend democracy and its clientele’s fear 
of socialism. To the right of the Weimar alliance was the DVP, the new party of national 
liberalism, deeply nationalistic but ostensibly, if lukewarm, democratic – Protestant and 
bourgeois in outlook. Further to the right, the DNVP managed to form an umbrella party 
for all conservative, militaristic, traditionalist and nationalist forces. The DNVP was very 
strong in Prussia, however it made inroads into Bavaria as well, where it found a partner 
in Bavarian regionalists, allied on a national level with the Zentrum. 
The destruction brought about by World War II fundamentally changed the playing 
field, within which, however, the old cleavages remained pertinent. Two external and one 
internal factor determined the shape of the German party system. The first external factor 
was the country’s occupation and the important role of the Ally licensing policy of new 
parties. The second external factor was geography. As it became evident that democratic 
politics in some form would only develop in the occupied zones of the Western Allies, 
German political parties were going to function within a peculiar West Germany, a 
German state for the first time oriented towards the South and the West (rather than the 
North and the East), for the first time devoid of the Prussian presence, and (most 
crucially) for the first time since the Treaty of Westphalia containing a numerical balance 
between Catholics and Protestants47. The third crucial factor was endogenous to the new 
system, and concerned the strategies of party actors themselves. The development of the 
party system will be traced through this lens. 
The West German state contained the existing deep cleavages that had characterized 
German politics before. Fragmentation on the general level was small compared to the 
                                                
47 The importance of confessional balance first being achieved in West Germany after Westphalia is 
mentioned in Paterson (1975: 36) and Schmitt (1990: 183-184). 
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distinct patterns of opposition in the various regions of the new state48. The aggregation 
of all these crosscutting and overlying cleavages was overcome through the conscious 
strategies of the licensed parties. The lesson of Weimar was that fragmentation of social 
classes and confessions inhibited the emergence of a stable party system, characterized 
by centripetal politics.  
This concern informed the tactics of the Catholic parties, and especially the 
Rhineland leader of the local Christian Democratic branch Adenauer. His main concern 
was with the creation of a strong bourgeois party, committed to democracy and opposed 
to both right-wing and left-wing totalitarianism. This concern was at the root of the new 
strategy of political Catholicism: interconfessional politics. Adenauer successfully 
outmaneuvered the exponents of social Catholicism in the Ruhr and Berlin to impose a 
Christian (rather than a Catholic) profile to his party49. By maintaining the Catholic social 
doctrine’s inter-class appeal and combining it with an interconfessional strategy, the hope 
was that the new CDU party would overcome the fragmentation of the middle-class, as 
well as the fragmentation between the middle-class and the working-class50. However, 
the inclusion of conservative Protestants from the North, Adenauer’s personal 
preferences, and the advent of the Cold War, bequeathed the party with a decidedly anti-
Communist and conservative profile. The CDU remained in its beginnings a primarily 
Catholic party. Its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, also followed an interconfessional 
strategy, but due to its following’s rural and conservative Catholic outlook, was also 
much more to the right than the CDU. 
If the CDU/CSU was an effort to overcome the religious, class and national 
cleavages (the latter reflected in Adenauer’s foreign policy positions, as can be seen 
below), German liberalism found itself from the beginning struggling with the divisions 
of its various ideological traditions. At the onset, the new FDP was  plagued by the divide 
between conservative, nationalist and rural Protestants from the North and social liberals 
from the South. This divide also inhibited the party’s electoral strategies: There was 
always the question whether the FDP was going to develop into a catch-all party of the 
right, uniting all forces to the right of Catholicism, or whether it would develop into a 
liberal party of the middle. By the first West German federal elections of 1949, the FDP 
was seen as a party of the right, with its national liberal wing dominant (also reflected in 
its name, which did not contain the word ‘Liberal’), staunchly anti-socialist and always 
suspicious of Catholic clericalism. Its following was almost exclusively Protestant, 
however it also represented an effort to overcome the division of the middle-class which 
                                                
48 The volume edited by Rohe (1990) gives a very concise overview of the different geographical traditions 
of the West German party system patterns. For the Ruhr see the chapter by Rohe (1990b), for Bavaria the 
one by Mintzel, for South Germany the contribution by Niehuss, and for a general overview the 
introductory chapters by Rohe (1990a) and Ritter.  
49 On the first days of the CDU and Adenauer’s role in its programmatic development see especially 
Pridham (1975: 21-62) and Buchhaas (1981: 151-178). 
50 See here Pridham (1977) and Glaessner (2005) as well.  
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had plagued Weimar. Its roots in the middle-class and the national camp lead it to an 
inescapable but ambivalent alliance with the CDU51. 
The SPD on the other hand was less concerned with local diversities. The party’s 
main concern was the challenge mounted against the democratic order in the West by the 
KPD and the Soviet occupation of the East. Fearful of finding itself contained due to its 
alleged anti-patriotism once again, the SPD and its leader Kurt Schumacher developed a 
strategy of confrontation with the KPD and of conciliation with the bourgeois camp, 
mostly with the CDU and its social, labor Catholics. The party’s power lay with the 
working-class, especially in the North. It also attracted a significant, but by no means 
majoritarian, part of the Catholic working-class. Its following in Catholic areas closely 
followed the confessional line (such as its support primarily by the few working-class 
Protestants of Bavaria). Its main electoral breakthrough was in the 1950s in the industrial 
Ruhr, where the SPD managed to inherit the ‘national camp’s’ following against the 
Catholic milieu of the region and to incorporate Protestant ideologues beyond the 
working-class (Rohe 1990b: 140-144). This was a peculiar case however, and already by 
the late 1940s the party lacked the potential to escape its working-class fortress.  
The CDU/CSU quickly became the epicenter of the party system. By mopping up 
small conservative and particularist parties, it cemented its dominance of the bourgeois 
camp. Most importantly, it created the notion of the bourgeois camp. By employing a 
polarizing anti-Communist discourse, and aided by the Cold War climate of the time, 
Adenauer created an alliance of the middle-class spanning the old religious borders. The 
remaining working-class Catholics who voted for the CDU emphasized the fact that its 
roots and establishment were still impinged with Catholicism. However the party 
effectively created an interconfessional ideology of social mediation, reflected in its 
concept of the Social Market Economy, itself a compromise between the Catholic social 
doctrine and Protestant ordoliberal concepts of free market economy (Manow s.d.). 
However, the CDU was an effort to overcome not only religious and class fragmentation, 
but also the old national divide. The incorporation of much of the ‘national camp’ was 
successful not only due to Adenauer’s anti-Communism, but also due to his position on 
the issue of German unity and its foreign policies, which will be discussed below. 
In the 1950s CDU’s political agency cemented the patterns of West German politics 
in a simplified aggregating axis of competition. By uniting all forces to the right of Social 
Democracy, the CDU and the FDP formed a bourgeois camp representing an alliance of 
middle-class and agricultural voters of both confessions; a fraction of Catholic working-
class votes both reflected and reinforced the CDU’s commitment to a soft form of welfare 
protection. Pitted against the bourgeois camp was the SPD, confined to roughly a third of 
the votes, with entrenched dominance within the working class and few Länder, but 
essentially doomed to perennial opposition (Jesse 1990: 89). This first form of West 
                                                
51 For the FDP in particular see Juling (1977). 
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Germany’s party system found its apex in 1957, when the CDU secured an absolute 
majority of the electorate. 
 
Table 1 
Bourgeois and Socialist camps, vote percentages in Bundestag elections 1949-65 
 Election	   Bourgeois	  Camp	  %	   Socialist	  Camp	  %	  1949	   56,0	   34,9	  1953	   67,5	   31,0	  1957	   67,7	   31,8	  1961	   61,7	   38,1	  1965	   59,1	   40,6	  
 
Bourgeois camp: CDU/CSU, FDP, Zentrum (1949, 1953, 1957), BayernPartei (1949, 1953, 1957), DP 
(1949, 1953, 1957), BHE (1953, 1957), GdP (1961), nationalist parties (DRP, NPD) 
Socialist camp: SPD, KPD (1949, 1953), DFU (1961, 1965) 
Adapted from tables in Vogel et al (1971) 
 
From 1959 onwards, incremental changes in the party system started unsettling this 
arrangement of power. The Godesberg program of the SPD was the most important 
development, in that the party accepted the existing social order of the social market 
economy and started presenting itself not as a radical reformer of the capitalist system, 
but as a moderate reformer of the democratic and economic order of the Federal 
Republic52. In 1960 the FDP decidedly resolved its self-positioning dilemma by electing 
as its leader Erich Mende, a national liberal who however wanted to break from the 
party’s rightist past. Culminating in the elections of 1961, the FDP created the image of 
the ‘liberal corrective’ of the CDU, remaining within the bourgeois camp but occupying 
the middle position between the CDU and the SPD. Finally, within the CDU/CSU itself 
fatigue with Adenauer and various scandals started undermining the party’s position as a 
catchall aggregator.  
Consequently, in the 1960s important electoral developments started altering 
established patterns, thus undermining the Adenauer consensus in domestic and foreign 
policy. The new SPD strategy allowed the party to break out of the 30% fortress, 
primarily by making inroads into the Catholic labor and the middle-class urban vote, and 
by challenging the conservatism of the political order and the foreign policy of West 
Germany. Led by Willy Brandt, SPD recorded vote gains both in 1961 and 1965. The 
CDU on the other hand, despite a short-term boost due to the replacement of Adenauer by 
Erhard in 1963, saw its support being eroded steadily and its distance from SPD 
shortening. The FDP on the other hand saw its support explode in 1961, but was back to 
                                                
52 See SPD, Godesberger Programm, 13-15/11/1959. 
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its normal levels in 1965, and its coalition with CDU was fraught with tensions, primarily 
with conservative Catholics and the CSU.  
 
Table 2 
Difference between CDU and SPD, Bundestag elections, vote percentage, 1949-1965 
 Election	   CDU/CSU>SPD	  %	  1949	   0,8	  1953	   16,4	  1957	   18,4	  1961	   9,1	  1965	   8,3	  
 
Adapted from tables in Vogel et al (1971) 
 
In 1966, an economic recession and tensions within the coalition forced Erhard to 
resign. The CDU and the new chancellor, Kurt Georg Kiesinger, formed a grand coalition 
with the SPD, with Willy Brandt taking over as foreign minister and Karl Schiller of the 
SPD as minister of finance. This coalition was meant to serve only instrumental goals: 
For conservative Catholics within the Union it was an opportunity to create a new 
electoral law that would cause the destruction of the FDP and revert the CDU’s loss of 
influence within the middle-class. For more liberal Protestants of the CDU it was an 
opportunity to find a more powerful coalition partner that would allow reforms of rigid 
domestic and foreign policies against conservative Catholics. For the SPD, it was an 
opportunity to gain credibility as a governing party. None of the two parties disputed the 
main binary pattern of competition of the party system; the Grand Coalition was a needed 
respite before normal competition would ensue again53. To its horror, the FDP realized 
that the bourgeois-social democratic competition could take place without it. The specter 
of a new electoral law, particularly popular among vindictive Christian Democrats, lay 
like a Damocles sword above the party’s head. 
 
POLITICAL IDENTITIES AND FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES IN GERMANY 
 
The CDU was a broad coalition of Catholics and Protestants, however throughout 
the 1950s the party’s roots and the presence of Adenauer left no doubt about the 
predominance of Catholic preferences, especially in foreign policy. Historically German 
Catholicism had been very reluctant towards the Prussian and Protestant dominated 
Reich. Due to its regional epicenter in Western Germany, Catholicism developed an 
                                                
53 On the Grand Coalition in general, see Lehmbruch (1968); on party strategies during the Grand Coalition 
and ahead of the elections of 1969, see Edinger (1970).  
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affinity for Europe understood as the enlightened ‘Abendland’ – a Carolingian vision of a 
unified Western Europe and a close cooperation between Rheinland and France. In the 
post-World War II context, with Eastern Europe under Soviet influence, this Catholic 
vision of the Abendland was updated with anti-Communism and repackaged as 
unqualified support for European integration – ‘Europe’ meaning the democratic, free, 
capitalist and ‘civilized’ West. In both its traditional and newer incarnation, the Catholic 
concept of foreign policy closely reflected unease with German nationalism and its roots 
in Central Europe (Glatzeder 1980: 55; Clemens 1989: 22-23). The anti-Communism of 
Catholicism (understood as a refusal of atheism, materialism and totalitarianism) also 
infused the CDU with a big support for NATO and close alliance with the US against the 
Soviet Union. 
This identity construction, with the Soviet Union, the East and Communism (but also 
Prussia, German nationalism and the Nazi past) as hostile ‘others’ (Engelmann Martin 
2002), found its expression in Adenauer’s unequivocal policy of Westbindung, or 
complete participation in all structures of international integration of the West. His firm 
position within the Cold War context offered West Germany respectability towards some 
of its old enemies (and still formally occupiers) and complemented his domestic policies 
of democratic rule and the social market economy (Pridham 1977: 24-26, 34; Bellers 
1979: 366). In this view, his decision to bring about a sharp differentiation with the SPD 
must be seen both as a conscious choice for binary politics (against the crosscutting 
fragmentation of Weimar), and a symbol of his position towards socialism of all kinds 
internationally – two interrelated goals. 
However the CDU was no Catholic party – and West German foreign policy’s main 
concern was still the national question of Germany, reunification between a capitalist 
Western Federal Republic and a communist Democratic Republic. The conscious 
decision of the CDU to appeal to Protestant middle-class voters was in many ways an 
effort to integrate those strata, which had mostly supported Hitler in the new democratic 
system. In such a context, securing democracy within the new state required a delicate 
balancing act from Adenauer: He could not ignore the question of the loss of the Eastern 
territories of the Reich to Poland, the Soviet-imposed division of Mitteldeutschland and 
the demands of around 12 million refugees without risking the rise of nationalism and the 
fragmentation of anti-socialist forces – an outcome that would essentially replicate the 
dreaded Weimar arrangement (Clemens 1989: 16; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 38-39). On 
the other hand, he considered domestic democracy and international respectability 
interlinked and sublime goals of his policy – and, one might add, he was in no rush to 
bring about the abolition of a German state where Catholics were finally free from the 
Prussian yoke (Lösche 1994: 113; Granieri 2003: 16). He decided to support 
Westbindung, a policy that in the eyes of many cemented the division of the country due 
to Soviet hostility (Tilford 1975: 1; Glaessner 2005: 47), with a ‘policy of strength’ 
towards the East. He claimed he was for reunification, but only ‘within freedom’, 
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implying that any approach towards the Soviet Union or the East Berlin regime was 
endangering the democratic order of the Federal Republic; and that only a policy of 
confrontation with the East could force the Soviet bloc into concessions. He went further 
by claiming that because of its democratic nature, West Germany was the sole legitimate 
expression of the will of the German people and hence the continuation of the German 
state. In this vein, he refused to recognize the DDR and embarked on an international 
diplomatic crusade to keep other states from doing so (claim to sole representation or 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch) (Clemens 1989: 18-30).  
By maintaining this 56oralizing tone towards the communist bloc, claiming 
continuity with the Bismarckian Reich (Tilford 1975) and refusing to recognize the 
territorial losses of Germany, Adenauer managed to include German nationalist and 
refugee groups in his foreign policy vision even though it put swift reunification on the 
backburner. This foreign policy in turn further reinforced the domestic catchall strategy 
of the CDU – the unity of pro-European Catholics with conservative and nationalist 
Protestants – symbolized in the policy of the social market economy (Buchhaas 1981: 
223; Clemens 1989: 18; Granieri 2003: 14). However, the glue that kept this alliance 
together was essentially a reactive value: anti-Communism (Paterson 1975: 28). As long 
as the Cold War made Adenauer’s adversarial ‘policy of strength’ inescapable, this 
delicate balance between values of domestic governance, the creation of a broad domestic 
coalition and contradictory policies towards the West and East seemed to make sense 
(Lehmbruch 1968: 183). The problem was that from the early 1960s onwards this foreign 
policy set was under increased pressure from the advent of Cold War détente. 
Détente was a structural imperative, emanating from the almost destructive outcome 
of superpower competition in various hot spots during the early 1960s (mainly Berlin and 
Cuba). Building on other relevant works (see Romano 2009) I conceptualize détente as a 
policy on behalf of Europeans to overcome the Cold War division of the continent. For 
Western European polities this meant the activation of conflicting visions of what exactly 
a ‘reunified’ Europe should look like. Clashes over détente were essentially clashes over 
the future security architecture of Europe and the values attached to European integration 
(Hacke 1975: 23). Détente in Europe was being claimed by two contending visions of 
European unification. The one vision was emanating from France and was imprinted by 
De Gaulle’s thought and policies. The other was represented by a broad array of actors 
supporting the closer relation between Europe and the US and the promotion of détente in 
Europe in a way that did not contrast with the interests of the wider Western alliance 
(Bozo 1998: 343). 
Gaullism was far from being a consistent ideology. De Gaulle was promoting the 
interests of France first and foremost, and Europe was a required framework for the 
promotion of France’s leadership. De Gaulle was the first European leader to actively 
promote détente as a goal and ideal for the future European order (Wall 2008: 136). From 
the early 1960s he was propagating the vision of a Europe ‘from Atlantic to the Urals’. 
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His was a dynamic and aggressive détente, in the sense that it was Euro-centric and was 
going against both American and Soviet interests in Europe. In the early 1960s De Gaulle 
picked up the vision of European integration around the EEC, promoted the ‘Europe of 
the fatherlands’ and essentially called for the creation of a strong and independent 
Western Europe, capable of checking American initiatives in the continent (Granieri 
2003: 3).  
A more conservative redefinition of the need for détente came from the US, NATO 
and pro-Atlanticist European governments. The idea here was that détente in Europe was 
best served by a direct communication and negotiation between the blocs, with the West 
possibly recognizing the insecurities of the Soviet bloc concerning the viability of 
regimes in Eastern Europe and the permanence of borders (Bozo 1998: 359; Wall 2008: 
147). The American conception of détente was a conservative one because it focused on 
management rather than transformation. If détente was to lead to the easing of tensions in 
Europe, this was to be done through negotiations and a slow pulling of Eastern regimes to 
the European orbit through increased contacts and normalization of relations (Bozo 1998: 
348-349). The point of reference for the Atlanticist détente was the publication of the 
Harmel report in December 1967, a NATO document which was published ahead of the 
expiration of the alliance founding treaty in 1969 (Haftendorn 2008: 104) and which 
stated that NATO’s goal in Europe was, apart from security, the promotion of détente 
(Bozo 1998: 356; Haftendorn 2008).  
With time, an alliance of Protestant reformists from within the CDU and the FDP 
concerned with the effects of Adenauer’s policy on reunification and West Germany’s 
relations with its allies started undermining his foreign policy tenets. The well-known 
Atlanticist-Gaullist controversy within the bourgeois coalition of 1961-1966 reflected the 
limits of the integration of Catholic and Protestant political identities54. Unlike Catholics, 
Protestants held a vision of Europe that spanned the borders of a Carolingian Catholic 
Europe55. Under a climate of ensuing détente in the early 1960s, they were also unwilling 
to see the commitment to Europe as antithetical to the strength of the country’s Atlantic 
links with the US and NATO. They were afraid that the Southern Catholics’, primarily 
among them the CSU’s, affinity for a small Europe was running away with them towards 
a Gaullist vision of an independent Europe, equally separated from the US and the USSR. 
What was worse, this vision of small Western Europe was misreading De Gaulle’s true 
intentions and was jeopardizing the prospect of reunification (Bellers 1979; Granieri 
2003). 
                                                
54 On the Atlanticist-Gaullist disagreement within the Union through a lens laying major importance on 
religion, see the very thorough and engaging study by Granieri (2003). Bellers (1979: 350-402) also 
touches upon the issue. 
55 Unlike the Catholic Church, the Protestant Church was much more vocal on the issue of reunification, 
thus providing Protestant thought with a gesamtdeutsch ideology (i.e. a view of the German nation still 
informed by the Bismarckian understanding of unity of the Reich) (Paterson 1975: 32).  
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Protestants within the CDU represented traditional concerns of the old national camp 
that was afraid of the Catholic conservative anti-Communist side taking over the agenda 
of foreign policy completely. In essence, they tried to reclaim the agenda of the 
Bismarckian state from the Catholics. The FDP on the other hand represented an even 
stronger aversion towards Adenauer’s tenets – his commitment to a closed, protectionist 
and ‘clericalist’ EEC and his overcompensation of nationalism in the East to the 
detriment of reunification. Being the heir of the parties that mostly stood for national 
integration, the FDP was the party mostly committed to national unification. For this 
reason it was willing to entertain ideas of more flexible policies towards the Soviet bloc 
despite its ardent anti-Communism56. Unlike the Catholics’ pro-Western credentials and 
the anti-Communism of the conservatives, the FDP looked back to a tradition of activist 
diplomacy that took into consideration German national interest beyond ideals of 
European cooperation.  
If the SPD had a religion it was Protestantism (Buchhaas 1981: 237; Mintzel 1990: 
158; Lösche 1994: 135). Within this context, the party also held a vision of European 
integration more congruent with the FDP than the CDU. It looked positively to the UK 
and Scandinavia, which would temper the Catholic and conservative character of the 
EEC57. As a reformist mainstream party, the SPD adhered completely to Westbindung 
after 1960 and, with Willy Brandt in the forefront, rode the wave of détente, highlighting 
its Atlanticist credentials. The détente of the Kennedy years allowed the SPD to frame its 
patriotic message within a progressive message of reform of both foreign and domestic 
policy. Détente encouraged an approach towards the East for the goal of reunification. 
The party also resisted the idea that European integration and NATO were inconsistent – 
as long as integration was not seen as a defensive union of Gaullist Western European 
countries. Just like the CDU in the 1940s, the SPD seemed to be finding an equilibrium 
between its domestic reformist and progressive message, its commitment to international 
peace, its Protestant-informed open view of Europe and Atlanticism, and its patriotic 
commitment to reunification within democracy. 
In conclusion, we see that the cleavage-based political identities within West 
Germany informed foreign policy ideas and preferences consistent with these identities’ 
visions of domestic society. However, the translation of these identities into foreign 
policies did not take place automatically. It was a combination of political agency and its 
interaction with the international system. In this particular case, the foreign policy tenets 
of West Germany during its first 20 years of existence reflected a specific pattern within 
the party system. By employing the divisive language of the early Cold War, Adenauer 
cemented CDU’s political dominance within a binary logic of the party system pitting a 
                                                
56 For FDP’s early foreign policy positions Glatzeder (1980) is the most concise guide. 
57 Factors that made Protestantism very relevant within the SPD were the Protestant church’s agony over 
the spiritual state of the East German population and its neutralist inclinations. The Catholic Church’s 
conservative orientation was also evident in its support for West German rearmament. The Protestant 
Church has always been much more associated with pacifist goals (Risse-Kappen 1988: 65). 
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pro-Western bourgeois camp against a suspect neutralist SPD – a policy whose 
usefulness for the Union became evident in the early 1960s when it maintained its 
position of strength vis-à-vis the rising SPD by mopping up the vote reservoir of smaller 
right-wing parties (Partch 1980: 92). The aggregation of the multiple cleavages into this 
new axis of competition was helped by the international circumstance and made possible 
a specific set of foreign policies. For as long as the framework of competition was this 
bourgeois v.s. socialist pattern, West Germany’s policies towards the Eastern block and 
its conception of the question of reunification was only slightly modified by the ongoing 
détente of the 1960s. The value of reunification within one free German state was the 
starting point for all three major parties, as well as the discursive framework within 
which even daring proposals for revision were taking place. In other words, this 
normative anchor was the axis around which discussion was taking place and the 
ideational framework that informed interpretations of relations with the East for all 
relevant actors. It would take the rise of a new dimension of competition, a new 
‘language’ of politics, for détente to be translated into a fundamentally new Ostpolitik.  
 
THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: GOVERNMENT CHANGE AND OSTPOLITIK 
 
The new Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany concerns the radical 
reappraisal of the basic principles of its policy towards its Eastern neighbors and the 
Soviet Union. Officially West Germany did not give up on the promotion of the goal of 
German unity within a framework of liberal democracy, and the preservation of peace 
was explicitly not antithetical to the continuation of close ties with the West. The 
underlying logic of these goals, as well as the emphasis among them, however changed 
radically: The Federal Republic officially gave up its (theoretical, however always 
rhetorically present) demands on the lost lands of the German Reich, as well as official 
support for refugee demands; it let go of its demand to speak and represent as the only 
legitimate state entity the German nation internationally by recognizing the factual 
existence of the DDR; and, even though it did not recognize legally the state of East 
Berlin, it accepted that there were two states of the German nation (Glaessner 2005: 52-
53). These steps were codified in three treaties signed with the Soviet Union, Poland and 
(most controversially of all) DDR over a period of two years (1970-1972). In all, the 
Federal Republic completely gave up the old tenet of legally claiming the re-creation of 
the German Reich within the 1937 borders, thus politically, and psychologically, cutting 
any links with the Bismarckian era (Tilford 1975). Unification was still the ultimate goal, 
however it was relegated to second order after the prevalent demand for peace and 
modernization of relations with the East. 
This sensational change, symbolic on countless levels and very consequential for the 
relations of the Federal Republic and its people with its neighbors, history and the state’s 
own identity, was brought about shortly after the creation of a coalition between the SPD 
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and the FDP following the elections of 1969. This was the first coalition of its kind, and 
the first time that West Germany had a prime minister that did not belong to the CDU. 
The new foreign policy became the main policy of the government and the most salient 
political topic of West German politics. Due to the fact that the Ostpolitik was not just a 
general diplomatic activity, but was codified in international treaties, domestic politics 
became extremely pertinent due to the need for ratification from the Federal Parliament, 
the Bundestag (Roberts 1972: 438). The potential for political drama increased due to the 
fact that the Social-Liberal coalition enjoyed only a slim majority of 6 seats, which would 
diminish over time due to defections. 
The feud between Atlanticists and Gaullists within CDU in the early 1960s had 
already reflected different degrees of devotion to the existing ‘policy of strength’: 
Whereas the Gaullists wanted to maintain pressure on Eastern Germany and Soviet Union 
in order to bring about reunification through competition and attraction to a strong 
integrated Western Europe, the Atlanticists saw the meaning of Westbindung in precisely 
following the new US policy of détente and severing some of the most dogmatic aspects 
of the policy towards Communist countries. The FDP also sided with the Atlanticists in 
this discussion. In effect, by the mid-1960s the issue of Ostpolitik divided German 
political elites in two camps cutting across partisan allegiances. The Gaullists defended a 
foreign policy along the lines of the 1950s; however, their support was dwindling and 
was confined essentially to the very conservative CSU, CDU politicians from the 
Catholic South and West, and the joined parliamentary group. The Atlanticists 
encouraged a more flexible policy towards the East so that the goal of unification would 
be adapted to a reality of increasing contacts between the two superpowers and their 
preference for peace in Europe. This was a broad coalition comprising Northern 
Protestants of the CDU and most members of the party’s Youth organization and infantile 
party bureaucracy, the FDP and the SPD (Granieri 2003).  
The creation of the Grand Coalition in 1966 under Kurt Georg Kiesinger further 
strengthened the Atlanticists – and so the idea that German-East relations should adapt to 
the climate and imperative of détente – within the government. Even though the impetus 
for the creation of this coalition were domestic issues such as the economy and justice 
reform (Haftendorn 2008: 106), and so the entry of the SPD in the government was 
generally welcomed by the conservatives within the CDU who were tired of FDP’s 
heckling, the SPD used this opportunity to promote its foreign policy conception. The 
symbol of this strategy was the occupation of the post of foreign minister by the party’s 
leader and perennial Chancellor-candidate Willy Brandt. His aim was to continue the 
‘policy of small steps’ inaugurated by his predecessor, CDU politician, Gerhard 
Schrőder, a goal to which also the ostensibly conservative Kiesinger acceded. However, 
until 1969 the terms of the debate were firmly set, and the differences in policy did not 
represent differences of hierarchy of the main goal: reunification without compromising 
West Germany’s domestic regime and its links with the Western camp. Non-recognition 
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of borders in the East and the East Berlin regime were still official Federal policy 
(Pridham 1977: 175; Roth 1995: 60; Haftendorn 2008: 106). 
After three years of relative bipartisan stability on foreign policy (Pulzer 1971: 9), 
the two main parties parted ways ahead of the election of 1969. The Grand Coalition had 
been a temporary arrangement for everyone involved: Ideally for some in the Union it 
would lead to a perfect binary system of competition, with the FDP being absorbed by the 
CDU. For the SPD the ideal scenario would also be the creation of a coalition without the 
CDU. A new Grand Coalition would be the worst possible scenario for both parties, and 
an event only probable if the far-right NPD stole enough votes from the FDP and entered 
in the Bundestag instead58. In other words, both main parties entered the campaign with a 
clear understanding that they were running against each other. In this vain, the CDU tried 
to revert from its policy of adaptation to the demands for more flexibility in Ostpolitik by 
making ‘security in the 1970s’ its main message, and with foreign policy the marker of a 
campaign centered on the defense of the nature of the regime and the main economic, 
political and social arrangements that characterized West Germany until then (Edinger 
1970: 556; Pulzer 1971: 14; Roberts 1972: 436-437). However the SPD shifted the 
campaign to domestic issues, where it presented a rejuvenating profile of domestic 
reform in the economy, education and justice (Edinger 1970: 556; Pulzer 1971: 14). The 
other two smaller parties of the election, on whose success to enter the Bundestag future 
coalition potentials would be dependent, the FDP and the NPD, made foreign policy a 
flagship of their campaign59. 
The outcome of the election was a surprise: the much anticipated failure of the FDP 
to enter the Bundestag and the much feared success of the NPD to do so did not 
materialize; both parties crossed and failed to reach the 5% limit by a few percentage 
points respectively. A few days later the FDP acted on the pledge it made for the first 
time before elections to enter into a coalition with the SPD. Willy Brandt became 
Chancellor and FDP leader Walter Scheel became foreign minister. In his first speech as 
Chancellor Brandt gave an indication of his government’s agenda: His would be a 
reforming government that would ‘dare more democracy’ (mehr Demokratie wagen) in 
Adenauer’s republic (Hacke 1975: 27; Pridham 1975: 46). However, while his party’s 
electoral focus was on issues of domestic governance (which were also seen as more 
urgent by the public) (Paterson 1975: 37), his first statement contained a revolutionary 
element, clearly influenced by the new ideas propagated by the FDP. His was the first 
                                                
58 The NPD was essentially a right-wing expression for alienation from the Federal Republic. It was an 
effort to reinvigorate the national cleavage, thus representing a sense of insecurity and discomfort of the 
German nation with the West German state (Lehmbruch 1968: 203; Warnecke 1970: 635; Paterson 1974: 
134). Its anti-Soviet and anti-American message was a crude adoption of the theme of détente (Czempiel 
1970: 623; Von Beyme 1970: 217). For the role of the indeterminate national question on the resurgence of 
the radical left as well, see Shell (1970: 659). 
59 The elections of 1969 were essentially about domestic issues (Roberts 1972: 436) – in fact this was 
considered at the time a sign of growing maturity and that political life was no longer about critical and 
passionate decisions (Czempiel 1970: 607; Von Beyme 1970: 207). 
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statement by a Chancellor that did not mention unification by name as a goal of West 
Germany’s foreign policy. After this, both Brandt’s chancellorship and the politics of the 
opposition were to be dominated by foreign policy, thus bringing West German politics 
into an era of polarization that had not been seen since the Adenauer-Schumacher feud 
over rearmament in the early 1950s. 
 
Table 3 
1969 Bundestag election results, vote percentages and seats Party	   Vote	  %	   Seats	  CDU/CSU	   46,1	   242	  SPD	   42,7	   224	  FDP	   5,8	   30	  NPD	   4,3	   -­‐	  ADF	  (radical	  left)	   0,6	   -­‐	  Others	   0,5	   -­‐	  
 
Table in Vogel et al (1971: 308) 
 
Foreign policy and Ostpolitik completely consumed Brandt and his government 
(Roberts 1972: 443; Laux 1973: 513). Despite severe criticism from the opposition, 
defections from the meager parliamentary majority in the Bundestag (mostly from the 
FDP) and losses in various state elections (again, with the brunt mostly being borne by 
the FDP), Brandt and Scheel proceeded swiftly (some, even from within the government, 
would say hastily) to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union and Poland in 1970. Both 
treaties affirmed the signing parties’ commitment to peace and détente, renunciation of 
violence and West Germany accepting the validity of existing borders in central Europe 
(Roberts 1972: 437-438). In this way, the Federal Republic gave assurances about 
borders that did not even touch upon her territory (the DDR had concluded a treaty to that 
effect with Poland in the 1950s); however, the symbolism of a state that laid claim to the 
legacy of the German Reich relinquishing any claims for the sake of peace (and in the 
case of Poland, recognition of past atrocities) was stark. In the fall of 1972 West 
Germany concluded a Basic Treaty with the DDR, thus ending a 25-year period of 
mutual diplomatic isolation and an international campaign against the legitimacy of the 
Communist regime in East Berlin. The Basic Treaty once again recognized the stability 
of mutual borders and regimes, and the two German states were now also free to enter the 
UN. The Federal Republic did not officially recognize East Berlin, however it came very 
close. The treaty basically amounted to a practical mutual recognition and for all intents 
and purposes the two states were now entering a period of normalized diplomatic 
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contacts (Clemens 1989: 107-108). According to Brandt’s formulation, there were ‘two 
states in the German nation’60 and practical politics did finally reflect this. 
Ostpolitik, thus, was not an abstract foreign policy change reflected in a changing 
diplomatic mood or inter-governmental activities; because it was codified in these three 
treaties, the prospects of the new foreign policy were intimately tied with the reality in 
the Bundestag, which would have to ratify them. In this way, West German party politics 
entered a phase of intense interaction with international politics: the debates on the 
ratification of the treaties were closely followed internationally, and after Brandt and the 
Americans agreed to link ratification of the treaty with the Soviet Union to the successful 
completion of the talks on the status of Berlin, the outcome of ratification in the 
Bundestag would impact directly on superpower-relationships (Edemskiy 2009; 
Ruchniewicz 2009). Failure to ratify the treaties would mean that the West would lose 
leverage over the Soviet Union in the Berlin talks, with unforeseen consequences on the 
development of talks and détente.  
From the outset the CDU/CSU was very reluctant towards Brandt and Scheel’s 
diplomatic activism. However the party was far from unified in its criticism of the 
government. Whereas old Gaullists, chiefly Catholic conservatives around CSU leader 
Franz Josef Strauss and old Chancellor Kiesinger, developed a principled and pronounced 
rejection of any opening up of relationships with the East, mainstream opinion within the 
CDU including the ex-foreign minister Schroeder converged around a position of critical 
reluctance towards the government. This part of the Union was the heir to the old 
Atlanticist camp and continued to support the idea of a breakthrough in German-East 
relations, as well as to worry about alienation between West Germany and her Western 
allies. The flexible CDU never gave up the idea of reunification as an ultimate goal; 
however, it feared much less the effect of contacts with the East on West Germany’s 
interests and identity as a Western liberal democratic state61. The end result was that this 
camp was unwillingly adjusting to Brandt’s argumentation about ‘change through 
rapprochement’, ‘reunification through peace’ and ‘détente as an important goal’, 
retaining only a conservative timidity towards the speed and ambition of actual changes. 
Balancing between these two views was the new CDU strong man, Rainer Barzel. 
Leader of the parliamentary group after 1969, he successfully outmaneuvered Schrőder 
by beating the latter’s protégé Helmut Kohl to the party leadership and effectively 
coopted Strauss to gain the title of joint Union Chancellor-candidate in 1972, doing away 
with the obsolete Kiesinger62. Despite these tactical successes, the conciliatory at heart 
Barzel (Risse-Kappen 1988: 98) was caught within the Union’s complex institutional 
reality. Having been a party of government all its life, the CDU was devoid of a strong 
party mechanism and was still very reminiscent of a party of notables. Power and 
                                                
60 From his first speech as Chancellor in the Bundestag, October 1969, cited in Roth (1995: 56). 
61 See here generally Clemens (1989). 
62 For an account of intra-CDU/CSU politicking, of Barzel’s rise to power and of Ostpolitik’s role in this, 
see Hacke (1975: 61-68). 
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authority of decisions still lay within the parliamentary group, which was still very 
conservative in outlook (Pridham 1975: 52). Thus reformists like Kohl rising through the 
party organization had still very little input in party policy formulation. Second, any CDU 
politician striving for national power would have to confront the concrete bloc of the 
CSU, led by the flamboyant Strauss (Von Beyme 1970: 205; Clemens 1989: 16-17). 
Whereas Barzel sensed that the uncompromising position of the conservatives was at 
odds both with West German public opinion and the Federal Republic’s allies, he had to 
carefully balance and take into account the institutionally powerful conservative wing as 
well (Hacke 1975: 70-71). 
Barzel tried to overcome this predicament by strongly opposing the government’s 
foreign policy on tactics and management. His idea was that the CDU’s input was needed 
in the negotiations. Sensing the party’s eagerness for a swift return to power, inflated by a 
series of regional election debacles for the coalition and the certainty that the CDU would 
once again mop up the votes of the right (NPD) to win a majority (Conradt and Lambert 
1974: 76), Barzel tried to maintain the idea that the CDU was a necessary component of 
power. However this policy was not only offering a temporary respite to Barzel’s 
predicament but also contained an inherent contradiction: by engaging in a critical 
approval of the government’s broad directions, he was indirectly acceding to its 
redefinition of the basic values of its foreign policy63. Barzel could not solve the dilemma 
that constructive opposition against Brandt’s and Scheel’s radical rearrangement of 
foreign policy priorities also essentially meant acceptance of such priorities; claiming that 
he could do the ‘same things in a better way’ was logically incoherent with his party’s 
clinging to the old tenets of Adenauer’s foreign policy.  
Encouraged by the steady erosion of SPD-FDP majority in the Bundestag, Barzel 
tried to have it both ways while doing himself a favor: In April 1972, he caused a 
constructive vote of no-confidence against the government, which meant that in case of 
defeat of the government he would rise to the post of Chancellor himself. His promise 
was that he would renegotiate the treaties to include more clearly his party’s concerns 
about the recognition of the DDR and Germany’s claims in the East. In this way, he could 
avoid a severe split within his own group by postponing the actual vote on the treaties 
themselves. Barzel seemed certain of victory, however his plan dramatically backfired 
when he lost by one vote, and consequently the treaties stood as they were64. In the actual 
vote, Barzel and the CDU/CSU abstained, but not before they pushed through a joint 
resolution, which contained reservations to the treaties. A week later though the 
government’s precarious position became evident when a vote on the budget produced a 
tie. Brandt decided to dissolve the parliament and call elections in the fall in order to 
achieve a bigger majority65. 
                                                
63 Barzel’s strategy was codified in his famous aphorism ‘So nicht!’ (not like this). As Clemens succinctly 
observes, so nicht amounted more to ‘yes, if’ (Clemens 1989: 94). 
64 It was later revealed that two CDU/CSU members of the Bundestag had been bribed (Larres 1995: 48) 
65 For a concise account of these events, see Clemens (1989: 97-106). 
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The elections of November 1972 were almost exclusively about Ostpolitik (Roberts 
1972: 434; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 43). They were recognized at the time as the ‘most 
polarized elections in the history of the Federal Republic’ (Conradt and Lambert 1074: 
61; Paterson 1975: 37), a far cry from elections in Adenauer’s serene times66. The SPD 
and the FDP campaigned strongly in favor of the Ostpolitik, branding it a flagship-policy 
for their vision of a reformed and more democratic Federal Republic, at peace with its 
neighbors and in harmony with its allies. Under conditions of polarization, the CDU fell 
back to an all-out opposition of the treaties, representing them as a negation of all West 
Germany had stood for until then and, hence, a danger to her constitutional and 
democratic order as well (Hacke 1975; Glaessner 2005).  
The election results were a debacle for the CDU. For the first time, the party was 
overtaken by the SPD as first party. The FDP also did particularly well, increasing its 
vote and easily entering parliament. Given the complete disappearance of the NDP, 
whose votes obviously went to the CDU, the extent of the latter’s erosion towards the 
governing parties became staggeringly obvious. The election result was interpreted as an 
unambiguous approval of the Brandt/Scheel Ostpolitik and a general sign of political 
maturity and civic identification of the West German populace with the Federal Republic 
as a democratic state, with a new and distinct liberal identity beyond traditional German 
nationalism. For Brandt and Scheel it was a personal vindication, given that their 
insistence on Ostpolitik went against a cascade of defections, electoral losses and intra-
government disunity. It also was a critical election result in the development of the West 
German party system, as the ambiguous governmental change of 1969 was resoundingly 
approved, and the CDU/CSU would now have to reconsider its role as a real opposition, 
and not a government-in-waiting party. In this way, two-party system, which had seemed 
threatened first by CDU/CSU’s ambitions and then by the prospect of a permanent Grand 
Coalition, was finally unequivocally established as the perceived main direction of 
competition (Laux 1973: 523; Pridham 1975: 57). 
 
Table 4 
1972 Bundestag election results, vote percentages and seats 	   Vote	  %	   Seats	  SPD	   45,8	   230	  CDU/CSU	   44,9	   225	  FDP	   8,4	   41	  Others	   0,9	   -­‐	  
 
Adapted from Laux (1973: 516) 
 
 
                                                
66 A time when elections were characterized as ‘plebiscites for refrigerators’ (cited in Paterson 1975: 27). 
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DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND 
DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION 
 
The Social-Liberal coalition was the culmination of at least 10 years of undergoing 
changes in the West German party system. First came the SPD’s decision in 1959/60 to 
officially accept the main tenets of CDU’s domestic and foreign policy, the social market 
economy and Westbindung. This was part of a general ideological renewal of the SPD 
following the party’s weakness against the ever-rising CDU, which in 1957 won the 
absolute majority of the popular vote. The SPD, guided by a new generation of leaders 
around Willy Brandt, decided to embark on a more flexible strategy in order to attract 
voters beyond its core working-class audience (primarily of Protestant background). The 
main element of the new SPD message was democratic reform and renewal of rigid and 
conservative power structures of the Federal Republic in the economy and justice. This 
message of renewal was transposed to the field of foreign policy as well where the party, 
without giving up on its long-held goal of reunification, proposed more flexible policies 
towards the East and closer cooperation with the West (Bellers 1979: 285-287; Cordell 
and Wolff 2005: 66). This message tapped into the SPD’s tradition as a party with a 
progressive, pan-European view of European security. It combined a progressive 
Atlanticism and an internationalist pacifism (thus allowing the party to associate itself 
with the popularity of new US President Kennedy’s approach on détente), and it allowed 
the SPD to claim a more nuanced and refined version of its original goal of reunification. 
At around the same time the FDP, equally distressed with CDU’s incessant rise, also 
underwent domestic changes. Its new leadership, first under Thomas Dehler and, after 
1960, under Erich Mende, decided to draw the party away from the position of a right-
wing support of the CDU and instead position it in the center between the two big parties. 
The original goal  was to make the FDP an indispensable partner of the CDU, a ‘liberal 
corrective’ of Adenauer’s conservative ideas. Whereas the FDP made only modest 
changes in its socioeconomic profile, it highlighted its new course by shifting towards a 
foreign policy of accommodation with détente and opening towards the East. This was to 
showcase the party’s ability to move the rigid CDU into new directions; however the 
broad framework of foreign policy preferences (reunification within a German state 
under freedom, continuation of the legal personality of the pre-War Reich, and claims in 
Eastern Europe) remained essentially the same. The FDP was poised to show its ability to 
conceive of more imaginative ways to pursue these goals within a shifting international 
environment. Apart from that, its position within the bourgeois camp, as well as its, and 
the SPD’s, verbal commitment to the hierarchy of foreign policy goals as implemented by 
Adenauer, remained unambiguous (Pulzer 1971: 5; Juling 1977: 26-29; Glatzeder 1980: 
67-84; also generally Mende 1972). 
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The combination of SPD and FDP strategies had a detrimental effect on the 
CDU/CSU. The elections of 1961 and 1965 produced Christian-Liberal coalitions, but 
both showcased a steady erosion of CDU support. The SPD was expanding its appeal 
among Catholic workers, thus breaking the long-standing confessional divide in the left67, 
as well as white-collar and new urban strata. The FDP also showed a similar increase in 
its influence, which was however more erratic. The extent of the success of both parties 
was further underlined by undergoing social changes such as the numerical strengthening 
of the services sector. However, it was mostly party strategy that allowed both parties to 
capitalize on such social change. The CDU for its part entered a period of introspection, 
whereby its internal confessional harmony was upset by the détente debates of the early 
1960s68. More and more, it seemed to be becoming the party of rural and small 
ownership, of parochial economic and social forces. 
The impetus for a deep restructuring of the party system and its gradual alignment 
with evolving social processes was the creation of the Grand Coalition in 1966. The 
Grand Coalition was supposed to be a power-sharing agreement between the two big 
parties after the CDU/FDP coalition had run into severe internal infighting and had 
proved unable to deal with the first economic crisis in the history of the Federal Republic. 
Further, the Grand Coalition reflected the CDU’s understanding that severe problems of 
governance such as the economy and justice could only be dealt with from a strong 
majority in the Bundestag. Despite fears that the West German party system would 
develop into some kind of permanent cartel government such as Austria (where ironically 
the permanent grand coalition was dissolved also in 1966) (Lehmbruch 1968: 190-193; 
Pulzer 1971: 8-9), both parties were clear that their coalition was going to be a temporary 
measure. The CDU’s main ambition was to include in the package of reforms (some of 
which required constitutional revision) a new electoral law that would lead to FDP’s 
exclusion from the Bundestag (Lehmbruch 1968: 185-186; Pridham 1977: 158). The SPD 
initially agreed with the plan, but in the end it balked, fearing that it would result in an 
entrenchment of CDU majority in government (while at the same time the FDP was 
becoming a more attractive coalition partner) (Jesse 1990: 73).  
The Grand Coalition represented the biggest danger for the FDP in its history until 
then. The party was faced with the prospect of a new electoral law and the outright 
hostility of the only party it had considered a viable, if imperfect, coalition partner. The 
party fell victim to the entrenchment of the binary axis of competition between bourgeois 
and socialist camps, which in the past had served it well making it a needed coalition 
partner of CDU. Now, many saw the emergence of a perfect two-party system along the 
British example as an inevitable outcome – indeed, it was welcome as the culmination of 
                                                
67 Also aided by a conscious strategy of rapprochement with the Catholic Church such as the concordat that 
was signed between the two sides. See Partch (1980: 91). At the same time, the Catholic Church itself 
became more receptive towards SPD overtures (Schmitt 1990: 187). 
68 On theological and interconfessional debates within the CDU see generally Buchhaas (1981) and more 
particularly pp. 298-303. 
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a process of concentration that would cement centripetal competition and stability of the 
West German democratic regime (Pridham 1977: 28). 
This prospective change of the structure of the party system, and the existential 
threat it posed to FDP, was the opportunity for a new leadership of the party around 
Walter Scheel to impose its new ideas as well as radically renew the party’s outlook. The 
main idea was to emphasize FDP’s equal distance from both big parties and preserve its 
position of needed coalition partner in both directions. Whereas Mende had tried to 
sharpen FDP’s profile without taking it away from the bourgeois camp, Scheel sought to 
rearrange West German politics in a way that the FDP would find its pivotal position 
again.  
Scheel ousted Mende as leader of the FDP in 1968 in Freiburg69. Already in 1967 a 
new programmatic document, the Hanover Action Program, reiterated party commitment 
to détente, peace and improvement of human conditions between the two Germanies. 
Scheel’s strategy was not taking place in a historical void: most of the changes he 
imposed on the FDP’s domestic and international preferences could be traced 
ideologically and philosophically to the party’s social liberal tradition. It is no 
coincidence that Scheel’s bases of support within the party lay in Baden-Württemberg, 
Hamburg and Bremen, the strongholds of social liberal thought. Instead, in areas such as 
Rheinland and Bavaria, liberalism was at the same time the traditional political 
expression of Protestant nationalists in a two-front struggle against what they perceived 
to be anti-nationalist Catholics and socialists; in the North on the other hand liberalism 
had coincided closely with religious affiliation and social class, pitting Protestant rural 
and middle-class groups against socialism. In this respect, Scheel was trying to impose a 
view on his party that was at odds with the political experiences and historical traditions 
of most of the regional expressions of liberalism. 
With the Grand Coalition consumed with domestic reform, Scheel chose foreign 
policy as the marker policy of FDP’s new profile. For the first time one of the established 
parties of the Federal Republic broke with accepted tenets of foreign policy, calling for a 
radical reappraisal of West German goals and expectations in relations with the East. The 
FDP took over its pro-détente and pan-European notions and expanded them in proposals 
for a de-facto recognition of DDR, normalization of relations with all Communist 
neighbors and for reappraisal of the goal of reunification from an aggressive pursuit of 
absorption of the ‘delegitimized’ East Berlin regime into an acceptance of realities and an 
emphasis on practical improvements for everyday contacts of people living in the two 
German states. This idea culminated in the official submission in the Bundestag of a plan 
for a treaty with the DDR – which would also imply a formal acceptance of the Federal 
Republic of its unique status as a new democratic German state beyond the burden of the 
succession of the German Reich. This break with the stated goals of West German 
foreign policies went beyond what reformists within the CDU and the SPD had been 
                                                
69 For a vivid account of the FDP infighting, see Mende (1972: 220-227). 
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willing to ask for up to that point, and increased the distance between the FDP and the 
Union camp even further (Von Beyme 1970: 194-196).  
For the SPD, this radical reformism in foreign policy was a signal that the FDP was 
ready to break out of the bourgeois camp and potentially form a reformist coalition 
against CDU. The SPD itself had nurtured similar thoughts on foreign policy; however, 
the party’s historical baggage made it difficult to renounce reunification as the ultimate 
goals. Brandt’s foreign policy concept, formulated in conjunction with Egon Bahr and 
revealed in a speech in 1963, was summed up in the slogan ‘Change through 
Rapprochement’. The essence of the argument was that the DDR and division was a fact 
of life, and that reunification was not served by a polemic attitude, which would 
strengthen the resolve of the East Berlin regime and maybe even contribute to the 
creation of some kind of East German civic identity, but by a shrewd policy of 
communication and openness, which would allow human contacts between the two sides 
to penetrate the borders and make East Germany slowly shift towards the Western orbit 
(Roth 1995: 58). This plan fell within a general concept of détente in Europe and an 
overcoming of the division between the blocs through negotiations (Von Beyme 1970: 
215-216; Bellers 1979: 67-68). However, while in government in 1966-69, the SPD’s 
ambitions were checked by the CDU; and anyway, formal recognition of the DDR regime 
was still not an accepted solution by the general public. 
This gradual rapprochement between SPD and FDP was made evident in the election 
of Gustav Heinemann to the Federal Presidency in 1969 with the support of both 
parties70. It was not however approved by what seemed to be the majority of FDP cadres, 
most of whom disliked this turn towards the left (Von Beyme 1970: 195-196). It also 
became the target of CDU animosity. Indeed, seeing that bridges with the FDP had been 
terminally damaged, the Union knew that the only way to return to power by itself was 
for the FDP to miss the 5% threshold for entry into the Bundestag. The Christian 
Democrats were confident that in a two-party Bundestag, they would hold the majority. 
At the same time, Scheel’s turn alienated many of the party’s traditional voters, 
especially rural and nationalist Protestants in Northern Germany. The rise of the power of 
the nationalistic and authoritarian NPD can be interpreted through this as well (Roberts 
1972: 444).  
In the elections of 1969 issues of domestic policy dominated. The FDP and the NPD 
were the only parties that ran almost exclusively on a foreign-policy platform. The FDP 
was representing new ideas and a will for a normative re-founding of the Federal 
Republic’s position in the world71; the NPD on the other hand mobilized almost 
exclusively on the national cleavage, expressing a similar unease with the political 
identity of the Federal Republic but from a nationalistic, anti-NATO and anti-Communist 
                                                
70 Heinemann, a Protestant who broke ranks with the CDU in the early 1950s because of his gesamtdeutsch 
ideas and his skepticism towards Adenauer’s uncommitted turn to the West (Mende 1972: 45), was a vivid 
symbol of what was bringing the SPD and the FDP closer together (Pulzer 1971: 11).  
71 ‘We want to change Germany’ was the party’s far-reaching election slogan (Mende 1972: 230). 
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viewpoint. The SPD on the other hand tried to capitalize on its status as a governing party 
by presenting the image of a moderately reform-minded and competent party, whose 
‘team of experts’ was capable of remedying the economy (Edinger 1970: 557-558). The 
party avoided the potentially divisive issue of foreign policy and tried to maintain its 
image as an establishment party (ibid: 563). 
The Union for its part also campaigned mostly on domestic issues, primarily by 
promoting the Chancellor Kiesinger as the right leader. However, the party chose a 
defensive slogan as its main message: ‘Security in the 70s’ (Pulzer 1971: 14). Also 
running on its first official platform since the Hamburg Program of the early 1950s, the 
Berlin Program of 1968, CDU made an awkward attempt to address the widespread 
demand for domestic reforms by incorporating some timid provisions in its economic and 
social policy (Buchhaas 1981: 309-315). However, the party decided to highlight its 
image as the traditional governing party, capable of protecting West Germany from 
potential perils – domestically and abroad (Roberts 1972: 436-437). Committing itself to 
peace and détente, the party nevertheless maintained the classical idea of Adenauer that 
peace was only possible as a result, not a precondition, of reunification (CDU, Berliner 
Programm: point 17). Aiming to exterminate the FDP, the Union tried to neutralize its 
reformist message by highlighting ‘security’ as the supreme value – thus maintaining the 
traditional link in its thought between anti-Communism at home and abroad, and between 
defense of liberal democracy and the market economy with a principled foreign policy 
(Czempiel 1970: 622-623). The Union was ‘going for broke’ with its strategy, with the 
ultimate goal of attaining the absolute majority (Edinger 1970: 555) and maintaining the 
competition between ‘freedom’ and ‘socialism’ as the defining feature of party 
competition. Ultimately, détente was dropped altogether from CDU’s election program 
(Czempiel 1970: 611).  
Responding to this direct challenge, the FDP played its last card. For the first time it 
formally committed to a coalition before the elections, by signaling its preference 
towards the SPD a few days before election-day. Once it became evident that the FDP 
had managed to enter the Bundestag by a few votes, and that the NPD had failed to do so, 
Brandt and Scheel missed no time in announcing their coalition. West German politics 
was ushering into a new era, with far-reaching consequences for foreign policy. 
  
OSTPOLITIK, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A 
NEW DIMENSION OF COMPETITION 
 
The new Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel government was a unique occurrence to the 
extent that it was a major departure not only from the orthodoxy of West German foreign 
policy but also from the criticisms of the mainstream reformists. The simultaneous 
reversal of West Germany’s land claims in the East and of its claim to sole representation 
of the German people called for a thorough reappraisal of the goals of West German 
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foreign policy and, by extension, of its identity as a German state. Détente and peace 
replaced stark anti-Communism as the values of foreign policy, and the goal of 
reunification was reconceptualized as the promotion of human contacts and the joint 
feeling of belonging to the German nation to the citizens of both Republics (Von Beyme 
1970: 215-216). This reevaluation of West Germany’s self-understanding was intimately 
linked with a new logic of relations with the Soviet Union, the DDR and Poland. To this 
extent, domestic reform was reflected in and reinforced by credible reformist ambitions 
in the international sphere.  
For the SPD, foreign policy always coincided with the ambition to realize domestic 
economic and social goals (Paterson 1974: 129; Bellers 1979: 53-54)72. In the 1950s the 
party’s unease with the capitalist and anti-Socialist order of Adenauer’s republic was also 
reflected in its insistence on reunification, if need be in a trade-off with West Germany’s 
integration in Atlantic security structures. From 1960 onwards the party’s foreign policy 
profile was harmonized with the modest reformism of its domestic policies. This foreign 
policy reformism drew on the main political identities that the party represented by virtue 
of its history, but it also aimed to broaden the appeal of SPD’s message: it was consistent 
with the party’s Social-democratic pacifism, with Protestant-informed Atlanticism and 
pan-European views prevalent in the German North, but it updated its democratic 
patriotism from a state-based view of the German question into a nation-based view, 
whereby rapprochement with the East was being considered as the precondition, not the 
result, for reunification (Paterson 1975: 31; Pridham 1977: 176; Klitzing 2009: 87). The 
foreign policy argumentation was offered by Bahr and Brandt, but this change in 
preferences was essential for the party to escape the suspicion of latent pro-Communism 
which had served Adenauer so well in election campaigns. By providing valid foreign 
policy argumentations, the SPD was indirectly supporting its own vision of a more 
democratic and receptive Federal Republic.  
However, the party’s careful reformism was reflected in constructive criticism, 
engagement of West Germany’s allies (such as Kennedy) and an emphasis on its own 
belief in the important continuities of West German foreign policy, such as Westbindung 
and the goal of reunification without endangering the democratic regime. Both during the 
foreign policy controversies of the early 1960s and during its spell in government in the 
late 1960s, the SPD did not stray from this path of reformism. In the elections of 1969 
foreign policy did not even feature prominently in its campaigning; the party felt that the 
crux of its message was about domestic reforms in the economy, justice and education. 
Foreign policy could be much of a dividing issue, and it was deemed to be the 
prerogative of the Union parties, which could use it to mobilize conservative support. 
Instead, SPD tried to create the image of a ‘party of technocrats’. In its 1969 election 
                                                
72 Already in 1945, Kurt Schumacher: ‘The contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over 
internal policy and the social content of the political order…Foreign policy sets the limits to the 
possibilities of our economic and social policy’ (cited in Granieri 2003: 9). 
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program, SPD defined moderately ‘maintenance of peace’ as ‘cooperation and 
coordination of policy with the West and arrangement with the East’ (Czempiel 1970: 
609-610). The election results vindicated this strategy, as the party made a ‘major 
breakthrough among white-collar workers’ (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 67). SPD’s 
foreign policy activism, which started immediately after the new government entered 
office, must be seen as a surprise then, given the party’s positions and electoral needs up 
to that point. 
The FDP on the other hand entered government precisely on the strengths of its 
foreign policy conceptions. Its abrupt turn to the left was highlighted by the aggressive 
promotion of its new foreign policy preferences. Social liberalism in the past had been 
recognized as the more flexible (and sincere) current of German liberalism in issues of 
European integration and cooperation (Winking 1991). Since 1966 and the party’s 
expulsion from government it decisively gained the upper hand within the FDP and the 
result was a spectacular break with the party’s policies up to that point73. These changes 
must account for the losses the FDP suffered in the elections of 1969 that almost cost it 
entry into the Bundestag – the bulk of its conservative, rural and Protestant followers 
deserted it to the NPD and CDU/CSU (Von Beyme 1970: 194-196). Once in government 
though, the FDP became the main driver of the new Ostpolitik. With time, it developed a 
coherent doctrine of reform, and in the Freiburg Theses of 1971 (FDP, Freiburger Thesen 
zur Gesellschaftspolitik) a direct reference to Friedrich Naumann and the progressive 
heritage of liberalism was made in the introduction. Modern liberalism was to evolve into 
a promoter of ‘democracy’ and more socially conscious policies. Once the ‘liberal 
corrective’ of the bourgeois camp, the FDP was now posing as the liberal corrective of 
the reformist camp. In its electoral call for the 1972 elections (FDP, Vorfahrt für 
Vernunft), the party stressed that the ‘SPD requires liberal control’74. 
For the CDU/CSU the link between foreign policy and domestic governance could 
not have been more critical. It could be said that even the success of the party’s electoral 
strategy and its ability to overcome confessional and class barriers, with the end effect of 
it attaining a dominant position in the center-right part of the spectrum, was largely due to 
its clear positioning in the Cold War as a fundamentally anti-Communist force. With the 
creation of the Grand Coalition, the Union was essentially conceding the need for reforms 
and this was reflected in the foreign policy of ‘small steps’ carried on by Schrőder and 
then Brandt. In its Berlin program, détente was again seen as the result of progress on the 
German question, not a precondition for it. The Soviet bloc was still presented as the 
‘other’ of West Germany’s political identity. And this identity needed managerial 
improvements, rather than far-reaching changes (as evidenced in the discussion over 
labor participation in firm management) (Pridham 1977: 179-180): 
                                                
73 See the FDP 1967 Hannover Program and the 1969 Nuremberg election program. 
74 For an insider’s account of the different conceptions within the FDP about its programmatic 
development, see Mende (1972). 
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‘Freedom and unity for the whole German people is the goal of German policy. The 
right to self-determination for the German people, the state unity of Germany must be 
pursued together with the overcoming of the division of Europe. A lasting peace is not 
possible without the solution of the German question’75. 
 
In the elections of 1969 the conservatives within the Union imposed a rollback of the 
party’s reformism. The message of ‘security’ tried to neutralize the general appeal of the 
reformist policies of the SPD by highlighting yet again the link between stability of the 
democratic regime and a firm foreign policy. It was a defensive move by the party, since 
it felt the approach between SPD and FDP. In a sense though, it was also tactically 
ambitious and far-reaching. The CDU, namely, entered the election hoping to complete 
the elimination of the FDP from federal politics. The message of gradual reform within 
the same framework of Westbindung and the social market economy was hoped to attract 
enough voters from the FDP, make the CDU the only force of a majoritarian bourgeois 
camp and ensure an absolute majority in the Bundestag. 
Once Ostpolitik was underway, the emergent dimension of competition became 
crystallized: the government embedded its new foreign policy within a moralistic and 
reformist discourse that clearly made the connection between the new foreign policy and 
the reevaluation of the political identity of the Federal Republic as a democratic state. 
The Social-Liberal coalition did not only contain two parties that had for long advocated 
changes in foreign policy. It also included parties whose long trajectory in West German 
politics had led them to meet in a common message of overall reform of both domestic 
institutions and the state’s position in the world. Together, both parties now formed part 
of a reformist progressive camp of West German politics76. By virtue of policy priorities, 
profile and position within the party system, both parties had their fortunes inextricably 
tied. An aggressive strategy of maintaining and entrenching their position within the 
party system was the only way left. Ostpolitik was to serve this goal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
75 CDU Berliner Program, point 1. Also see the chapter ‘Reform of Democracy’ and the chapter about the 
Social Market Economy. 
76 On the different conceptions of ‘democracy’ of the major parties (broadly understood as ‘reform’ and 
‘anti-Communism’ respectively), see Warnecke (1970: 641), Tilford (1975: 6-7), Glaessner (2005: 167) 
and Niedhart (2008: 117-118). 
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Table5 
Mean support for CDU/CSU and SPD among Nonmanuals (middle-class and farmers), 
selected years Year	   Support	  for	  CDU/CSU	  %	   Support	  for	  SPD	  %	   Difference	  CDU>SPD	  %	   Sum	  CDU+SPD	  1953	   52,5	   12,5	   40	   65	  1957	   55	   15	   40	   70	  1961	   55	   26	   29	   81	  1965	   55	   30	   25	   85	  1969	   49	   40	   9	   89	  1972	   45	   44	   1	   89	  
 
Adapted from Conradt and Lambert (1974: 83). Percentages in approximation. Source: Allensbach 
 
The CDU/CSU on the other hand found itself in the opposition for the first time after 
20 years. This was a shock for which the party was definitely not prepared (Clemens 
1989: 15). With foreign policy being a major policy issue, the Union parties faced the 
prospect of severe infighting again. However, the internal structure of the party and the 
inescapable logic of partisan competition determined the patterns of opposition to 
Ostpolitik. Whereas in the 1960s the moderate Atlanticists had proved to be more 
decisive, and in the end carried the day under Chancellors Erhard and Kiesinger who 
were responsive to their concerns (Bellers 1979; Clemens 1989), after 1969 they found 
themselves in the defensive since a moderate critical opposition towards the Ostpolitik 
was deemed inconsistent with the goal of a swift return to power. Indeed, almost all 
important players within the Union used criticism towards the Ostpolitik at one point or 
another77.  
Barzel himself chose to contain the discussion to tactics and management, rather 
than engage on a principled opposition of Ostpolitik, which would entail polarization on 
domestic politics as well. However, this position was untenable and internally incoherent 
as Ostpolitik directly threatened to undo CDU’s broad coalition and to undo the 
normative anchor of the party system that had allowed it to dominate (Roberts 1975: 87). 
A string of good results in regional elections, rising student radicalism and government 
infighting boosted the conservative argument that opposition to the Ostpolitik was the 
best way for the party to return to power, put a halt to the government’s reformism and 
usher in a new era of Christian Democratic dominance (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 76). 
The NPD’s strong showing in 1969 and the FDP’s woes seemed to prove their contention 
that opposition to the Ostpolitik would allow the CDU to absorb these nationalist votes 
and recreate the cross-class coalition of Catholics and nationalists which had served it so 
well before by stressing the link between West German political identity and the 
                                                
77 See Hacke (1975). 
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traditional conception of the German nation-state (Roberts 1972: 443, 445; Clemens 
1989: 237).  
For conservatives within CDU and CSU, Ostpolitik posed a structural threat to the 
identity of the Federal Republic as a democratic state attached to the Western alliance. 
For them, the Ostpolitik had essential domestic repercussions (Risse-Kappen 1988: 128). 
As it was taking place within a climate of student unrest and rise of far-left radicalism, 
CDU conservatives feared that the Ostpolitik was a half-open door to Communist 
infiltration in the Federal Republic (Laux 1972: 512; Pridham 1975: 49-50). For example, 
the government’s call for more ‘human contacts’ was seen by these CDU elements not as 
a way to influence Communist societies, but as an invitation to Communist influence in 
West German society (Hacke 1975: 35; Tilford 1975: 14; Clemens 1989: 60). For the 
CDU this old link established by Adenauer between domestic order and international 
orientation still held. If West Germany’s unequivocal orientation towards the West was 
being put in danger, also the political identity of West Germany as a liberal democracy 
was affected (Pridham 1975: 52):  
 
‘He who concedes equal treatment to the leftist totalitarianism in East Berlin, he will 
become witness and facilitator – even unwillingly – of the assault of left extremists on our 
freedom’78. 
 
Clearly for these conservatives the world still functioned in a bipolar confrontational 
mode. If West Germany’s political identity was the product of the relentless Cold War 
competition of the 1940s and 1950s, détente and Ostpolitik could very well loosen the 
ties between West Germans and democracy (Clemens 1989: 262; Roth 1995: 82-83). 
Conservatives were acutely aware of any links between the climate of upheaval 
created by Ostpolitik and signs of leftist agitation in West German society. This link is 
difficult to establish in retrospect, even though it is undeniable that Ostpolitik coincided 
with, drew on, and further reinforced a sense of renewal of West Germany79. 
Consequently, the discursive framework within which party competition was taking place 
until then was changing to the detriment of CDU’s entrenched position of dominance. 
The conservative wing of the Union responded to this with a strengthened emphasis on 
the old arguments about threats to the social order of the Federal Republic80. The 
difference this time was that the importance of the national question of Germany as a 
glue for the Adenauer coalition, as well as the electoral need to turn to the right in light of 
a centre-left coalition in government, infused the old arguments about Communism, 
democracy and totalitarianism with a distinctly Bismarckian and nationalist flavor – 
                                                
78 CSU heavyweight von Guttenberg in 1972, cited in Roth (1995: 82). 
79 ‘A new mood pervades West Germany’, New York Times, 21/10/1969, cited in Klitzing (2009: 84). 
80 Conservatives’ effort to brand Ostpolitik as a Communist threat by stealth, soon reached hyperbolic 
proportions (e.g. the Brandt-Scheel-Honecker popular front) (Hacke 1975: 93; Tilford 1975: 14), and 
proved to be out of touch with the majority of the population (Czempiel 1970). 
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ironic if one considers that most of these arguments were made by Europeanist Catholics 
(Von Beyme 1970: 200) accusing Social Democrats and Liberals as traitors of the 
national cause (Roth 1995: 80): 
 
‘We will oppose, ladies and gentlemen, the limitation of the homeland feeling to the 
Federal Republic. I have no intention of becoming a Federal Republican. We are 
Germans and intend to remain so’81. 
 
 The end result was that the CDU was driven away even more from the normative 
center (or the ‘new political middle’ according to Conradt and Lambert, 1974) – or in 
other words, it was fighting a new battle with old weapons. 
The ambivalence of the CDU between the ideas expressed by the conservatives and 
pressing electoral needs, and the effort to adapt to the new reality, is evident in the 
reformed Berlin Program, as revised in 1971 in Dűsseldorf (CDU, Berliner Programm, in 
der Form der zweiten Fassung vom 18. Bundesparteitag). In foreign policy, peace and 
the division of Europe are recognized as important systemic conditions that will influence 
the course of reunification. Contacts with DDR and negotiations with the USSR are 
accepted as valid methods for the ultimate goal of reunification. Central and Eastern 
European countries are recognized as potential members of a free European community, 
however until then free Europe needed to strengthen its integration and unity. The ‘final 
settlement’ of the borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia is also recognized as an 
important issue, however it needed to wait for a general peace treaty. ‘Freedom and 
unity’ would be maintained as the goal of West German foreign policy. The same timid 
and half-hearted reformism is evident in the parts on domestic policy as well, which also 
do not stray from the main tenets of the social market economy.  
The elections of 1972 were dominated by the issue of Ostpolitik82. Following his 
failure to be elected Chancellor through the Bundestag, Barzel’s position was 
compromised and he ran on a platform dictated by the conservatives of his party. He tried 
to balance between his contention that Ostpolitik was important, but conducted much 
more carefully and slowly, and the conservatives’ view that the very foundations of 
Ostpolitik were wrong. It was natural that the campaign of CDU would be plagued by 
incoherence against a government galvanized by the challenge it had just survived 
(Clemens 1989: 107-109). It is telling that, according to opinion polls, a majority of the 
electorate still considered the CDU more capable in economic matters (Paterson 1975: 
                                                
81 Rainer Barzel in the Bundestag, 15/2/1973. Cited in Roth (1995: 115-116). 
82 However see Partch (1980: 103) who claims that Ostpolitik was only important to voters who switched 
from CDU/CSU to SPD. He maintains that economic as well as law and order issues were more important 
for voters. This statement however needs to be seen as a refined understanding of election outcomes as a 
combination of expression of stable cleavages and party strategies and voter fluctuation. In this sense, even 
Partch would indirectly agree that Ostpolitik was the most important difference-maker in the election of 
1972 if it influenced the voters who produced the most important result of the election, namely the SPD’s 
attaining first-party status. 
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38); however the general demand for change, and the more specific appeal of Ostpolitik, 
helped the coalition to decisively win the elections. The CDU, much like the SPD in 
1969, turned to a ‘team approach’ in its campaign and indeed tried to neutralize the 
Ostpolitik issue by highlighting the dangers of high inflation through the prism of 
‘instability’ (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 71-72). This tactic did little to stave off the 
upcoming defeat. The governing camp emphasized foreign policy, since this was the 
policy sector where the government had shown any success (ibid: 65). For the first time 
in German history, debates among the four party leaders (Brandt, Scheel, Barzel and 
Strauss) were organized and Ostpolitik and foreign policy in general occupied 40% of the 
time devoted to them (Baker and Norpoth 1980: 337), with the economy, inflation and 
terrorism following suit. In other words, and despite CDU hopes83, the elections of 1972 
were decided on a very friendly ground for the government. 
The elections of 1972 cemented trends in patterns of expression of cleavages through 
parties and finalized the realignment of party competition around a new anchor of 
competition. The SPD managed to hold on to its middle-class following, which had been 
nurtured and increased during the 1960s, while it increased its appeal even further among 
the working-class to almost absolute dominance. This increase came mostly thanks to its 
Catholic voters. In other words, the confessional barriers within the working class had 
finally been brought down, while the CDU’s claim to being a cross-class alliance was 
now under severe doubt. The CDU on the other hand further increased its appeal among 
rural voters as well as traditional groups of the middle-class. If we take into account the 
fact that the Union almost completely absorbed NPD support from 1969, we can see that 
its 25 year-long interconfessional strategy was finally complete. Most of the traditional 
rural and urban Protestant groups that usually voted for the FDP were now within the 
CDU/CSU, thus completing the latter’s effort to unite broad middle-class groups over the 
religious barrier. However, this success came to the expense of its appeal among Catholic 
labor, as well as ever expanding groups of young urban professionals. It is among these 
last groups that the FDP drew most of its gains. In 1972 the party essentially found itself 
with a wholly new following of younger, more educated and more progressive voters 
than what had been the case for most of its history. By virtue of social outlook, the FDP’s 
conversion into a center party, a long process that had started in the mid-1950s, was now 
complete. As we saw, by virtue of all parties’ framing of foreign policy positions within 
coherent visions of domestic order, Ostpolitik was decisive in SPD’s sustained strength, 
in CDU/CSU’s transformation into a more conventional conservative party, and in FDP’s 
conversion into a liberal party of the center. Cumulatively, these foreign policy elections 
stabilized the predominance of the Social-Liberal coalition as the dominant force of 
German politics, especially if we consider that the razor-thin majority mastered by them 
                                                
83 According to Clemens (1989: 106-107), even the staunch opponent of the Treaties Strauss was in favor 
of switching the Union campaign to domestic issues. However there was little room for changing the terms 
of the debate by then. 
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in 1969 was also based on the one third of FDP voters who, according to opinion polls, 
still preferred a coalition of their party with the CDU84.  
On a regional level, the cumulative effect of the elections of 1969 and 1972 was 
evident in two of the Federal Republic’s most important regions. In Bavaria, CSU’s 
interconfessional strategy was essentially completed in 1972 after Strauss’ principled 
opposition to Ostpolitik allowed him to attract Protestant groups that had until then voted 
for the conservative Bavarian branch of the FDP (Mintzel 1990: 164-166). Indeed, 
Bavaria was the only Land where the Union increased its vote share in 1972. In the Ruhr, 
SPD’s expansion towards national-minded and reformist Protestant and secular middle-
class groups was complete by 1972, and it was enhanced by increasing inroads into the 
local Catholic labor vote, partially let down by CDU’s turn towards a middle-class 
profile, thanks to Brandt’s inspirational marrying of the goals of national reunification 
and domestic reform (Rohe 1990b: 137-140). In both cases, patterns of political 
dominance were laid down that only in recent years began to be upset. However, they 
also presented, in a kaleidoscopic fashion, the wider realignments of voting behavior 
brought about by party strategies on foreign policy. 
 
Table 6 
Mean support for CDU/CSU and SPD among Catholics, selected years 
 Year	   Support	  for	  CDU/CSU	  %	   Support	  for	  SPD	  %	   Difference	  CDU>SPD	  %	   Sum	  CDU+SPD	  %	  1953	   57,5	   27	   30,5	   84,5	  1957	   57,5	   25	   32,5	   82,5	  1961	   64	   27	   37	   91	  1965	   57,5	   33,5	   24	   91	  1969	   51	   37	   14	   88	  1972	   49	   41,5	   7,5	   90,5	  
 
Adapted from Conradt and Lambert (1974: 84). Percentages in approximation. Source: Allensbach 
 
The year 1972 had defined the SPD as a Volkspartei where the labor and Protestant 
imprint was still dominant. Now the CDU/CSU was a Volkspartei of the center-right, its 
penetration of conservative Protestant strata complete and its dominance among the 
Catholic middle-class absolute, but with less appeal among secular urban and working-
class groups. Both of these developments reflected party strategies of engaging with the 
party system and the main axis of competition, as well as prior historical traditions and 
constraints. The converging result of these dynamics was the reinterpretation of the main 
                                                
84 For an extremely elucidating analysis of the social basis of the results of the 1972 elections, see Conradt 
and Lambert (1974).   
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axis of competition from one allowing the CDU/CSU to dominate as the leading force of 
a majoritarian bourgeois camp to one allowing the SPD and the FDP to enjoy a majority 
as exponents of a majoritarian democratic and reformist camp (Conradt and Lambert 
1974: 75). These developments partially reflected underlying social processes of course85, 
but these only accentuated what were the intended results of partisan agency. To the 
extent that this reform of the stakes of competition included a reevaluation of foreign 
policy goals, Ostpolitik was essential in this process. Being a foreign policy issue though, 
Ostpolitik was also to be judged on its merits as a policy convincingly aligning West 
German interests with international developments. For this reason we will now turn to the 
normative translation of international systemic developments, namely détente, into policy 
prescriptions integrated within visions of domestic society. 
 
DÉTENTE, PARTISAN AGENCY AND THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY ON 
WEST GERMAN POLITICS  
 
The normative contestation of Ostpolitik was highly determined by the ability of 
partisan actors to effectively support their foreign policy preferences and their visions of 
domestic society with an argumentation that proved that their policies were congruent 
with developments in the international sphere. Both sides had to prove that the 
reevaluation of goals and values was responding to systemic developments in West 
Germany’s environment. In this way, they would have been able to translate international 
systemic developments through their own preferred discursive lens into policy 
imperatives that matched their efforts to rearrange or maintain the main axes of 
competition. In other words, partisan agency mediated a dense interaction between 
domestic and international politics: international developments were arguments for 
foreign policy change, but also supported political and social realignments within the 
party system that in return rendered new policies possible. 
In the late 1960s, the German problem as posed by Adenauer (a prerequisite for 
peace and stability in Europe, i.e. an adversarial concept against the Soviet bloc) was 
becoming incompatible with détente. In the absence of a better concept, for conservatives 
the only option seemed to be clinging on to an outdated Gaullist vision of a strong 
Western Europe applying pressure on the Eastern bloc by keeping the hard reality of 
division open to potential changes (Wall 2008). The camp of Ostpolitik on the other hand 
was meticulous in employing détente and peace as a goal in and of itself in order to 
justify its policies. This required a thorough reevaluation of the priorities of West German 
foreign policy goals, which in return were congruent with their ideas about overall reform 
of the political identity of the West German state. The first party to develop this 
intellectual construction was the FDP. Caught in opposition against the two major parties, 
and with its future in jeopardy, the FDP under Walter Scheel formulated a foreign policy 
                                                
85 Such as the ongoing secularization of Catholic labor (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 71).  
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whose main value was ‘peace’ and ‘détente’ rather than unification. The FDP could 
afford to be so forward-looking, as its vulnerable position within the party system 
allowed it to look elsewhere to sharpen its profile and break out of CDU’s orbit (Juling 
1977: 36; Engelmann Martin 2002: 102).  
For the SPD détente was also a valuable normative resource, especially since its 
social-democratic ideology made it normal to appeal for peace in Europe. Throughout the 
1960s the SPD and Brandt personally invested heavily in détente and a pro-Atlanticist 
policy, especially in an effort to make the party look more mainstream and acceptable to 
broader masses of voters (Bellers 1979). However, the official policy of the SPD did not 
see détente as the overarching goal of foreign policy. Brandt and Bahr’s concept of 
‘change through rapprochement’ was meant to serve the goal of German reunification, 
something which Brandt himself never relinquished and which caused various concerns 
among observers of West German foreign policy such as Henry Kissinger86. However, 
‘change through rapprochement’ was a long-term goal at best; in the short term, it offered 
a valuable bridge between SPD’s traditional pro-unification policy and its new emphasis 
on détente. The SPD balanced between these two goals in its long march towards 
respectability and ultimately governing-party status throughout the 1960s. This 
ambivalence towards the national question and foreign policy was a very important part 
of the party’s strategy. It was only when the SPD found itself in government with the 
FDP, and the opportunity to permanently realign West German politics appeared, that it 
decided to engage détente as the main normative resource of its argumentation. 
For the CDU, and especially the conservatives within its fold, the prevalence of 
détente as a positive value was a potentially disastrous disadvantage. Especially 
problematic was the emerging sense of disagreement between the Union and West 
Germany’s Western allies. What had once been the ultimate tool of political dominance, 
West Germany’s anchoring within the Western alliance (Paterson 1975: 26-28; Clemens 
1989: 26-28), was now turning into a huge disadvantage. Especially disconcerting was 
the attitude of the US that, even under a Republican administration, saw the German 
problem as a hindrance towards the ultimate value of détente. Adenauer’s view that 
reunification would bring peace in Europe was now reversed and the Christian Democrats 
were now in danger of seeing their adversaries reaping the effects of international 
respectability and statesmanship (Bellers 1979: 345; Cordell and Wolff 2005: 14).  
However the Ostpolitik of Brandt and Scheel was not without its own controversies. 
Among the Federal Republic’s allies a sense of unease dominated about Brandt’s 
sensational initiatives and the newly found ambition and independence of West German 
foreign policy. The Americans, also influenced by the obsessions of Kissinger, were 
always worried about the extent of West Germany’s commitment to its Westbindung. 
                                                
86 For the persistent historical debates on whether Brandt’s Ostpolitik was a sincere pro-unification 
nationalist policy or a policy that entrenched stasis, see Larres (1995); also the discussion in Roth (1995: 
233-238, 340-344) and Suri (2003). 
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The French on the other hand were annoyed that their own concept of dynamic détente 
was being high jacked by the Germans. In short, the Federal Republic’s allies found 
themselves in a predicament, as West Germany was finally practicing détente with 
determination, only now they were afraid that this might be a way through which German 
nationalism and Schaukelpolitik would rise from their graves (Niedhart 2008; Klitzing 
2009).  
The Union parties sought to make the most out of this ambivalence, since it seemed 
to offer the opportunity to match their own concerns about Ostpolitik with a fact of 
international life, namely West Germany’s allies’ concerns with Brandt’s enthusiasm for 
direct dealings with the Soviets. The argumentation that emanated from the camp of 
Christian Democrats was that Ostpolitik would go against not only the interests of the 
West German state and the German nation in general, but also that it would jeapordize 
West Germany’s place within the Western alliance. Indeed, the claim to lands beyond the 
Oder/Neisse line and DDR’s uncertain status were seen as heritage from the post-War 
days, as issues that would need to be settled by joint negotiations between Germans and 
the winners of World War II (Clemens 1989: 60-61). In this way, the CDU/CSU was also 
trying to play into any phobias the Americans might have had, while gaining an 
endorsement for their policy of restraint. Barzel also tried to convey this message directly 
to the Americans (Wall 2008: 145). The paradox here was that, whereas the CDU and 
CSU conservatives were at odds with the Americans and NATO in the 1960s (Paterson 
1996: 54), they now presented the main danger of the Ostpolitik to be the isolation of 
West Germany from its western allies and, primarily, America (Roberts 1972: 445; 
Morgan 1975: 100). In this, they were assisted by the very reserved position of the Nixon 
administration, and Henry Kissinger personally, towards Ostpolitik, Brandt and his close 
associate Bahr (Niedhart 2008: 125-126; Wall 2008: 141): 
 
‘[Socialist neutralists] are slowly pulling the Federal Republic out of close 
cooperation with the Atlantic West and are slowly leading it to cooperation with the 
Communist world’87. 
 
For the Americans the Ostpolitik was potentially a revolutionary policy that was 
straying from the American concept of controlled and superpower-to-superpower détente 
(Clemens 1989: 58; Wall 2008: 134; Klitzing 2009: 81-83). Kissinger was also very 
worried about the resurgence of any kind of German nationalism, West German go-it-
alone attitude and Bahr’s ideas of change in the German question (Von Beyme 1970: 
217; Morgan 1975: 100; Klitzing 2009: 85). The CDU was using this American 
conservative attitude to strengthen its argument that the Ostpolitik was not serving, rather 
that it was endangering, Westbindung. If Westbindung was a precondition for the liberal 
democratic order of West Germany, a threat against it would also endanger that domestic 
                                                
87 Dieter Cycon in Die Welt of 10/11/1972, cited in Roth (1995: 83). 
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order (Tilford 1975: 14; Pridham 1977: 176). Hence attack on Ostpolitik was also an 
attack on the government’s reformism on the domestic front, which was presented as a 
threat, not a needed change of the Federal Republic’s political structures (Pridham 1975: 
46).  
In essence the Union parties were trying to overcome their inability to match 
domestic discourses, foreign policy preferences and international systemic realities. For 
the more conservatives, a solution was to highlight the realities of the Cold War beyond 
wishful thinking about détente, negotiations and cooperation in Europe. Their main 
argument was that the international conditions that forced Adenauer to formulate his 
‘policy of strength’, namely the uncertain legal status of the two German states and the 
reliance of West Germany on the victors of the World War (now both allies and foes), 
still held: the Federal Republic had to refrain from activities that jeopardized its 
anchoring within the Western alliance because this anchoring would determine whether 
any future settlement about Germany would satisfy not only the goal of unification, but 
also the goal of democracy and liberty. It also had to refrain from activities that were 
strengthening the position of the Soviet Union and DDR in any future such negotiations 
(Clemens 1989: 55-88). In other words, conservatives within CDU were still clinging to a 
Cold-War image of the international system and tried to overcome the reality of détente 
by focusing on the deep structure of bipolar adversity between the two camps.  
Ultimately the Ostpolitik camp resolved any sources of discontinuity between their 
aims and those of the Allies, which could offer argumentative opportunities to the Union 
conservatives, by firmly embedding their foreign policies within a European political 
framework and discourse. Détente and peace were operationalized as policies for 
‘Europe’, i.e. as policies that would overcome the division of Europe and create the 
conditions under which the German question would be resolved (albeit the commitment 
of some of the government actors such as Scheel to the actual goal of unification within 
one German state was quite questionable at the time). This European discourse gave 
détente an actual content, and it made it something tangible.  
After its success in attaching its foreign policy values to the emerging détente of the 
early 1960s, the SPD’s foreign policy vision of a pan-European security architecture 
received further boost from the publication of the Harmel report, when Brandt was 
already foreign minister of the Federal Republic. The Harmel report codified détente as a 
goal of the Western alliance, thus vindicating SPD’s view that détente was actually 
congruent with West Germany’s international commitments and interests, not a negation 
of them (Czempiel 1970: 613-614; Risse-Kappen 1988: 42). The Harmel report also 
allowed the SPD to later present Ostpolitik as an important step towards the security of 
the Western alliance. The Brandt-Scheel government was practicing what the Harmel 
report had said to be the goal of NATO in Europe: extending détente through a controlled 
process of negotiation with the governments of the Soviet bloc. Similarly to the feud over 
Europe in the 1960s, the SPD was again in a position to show that its Ostpolitik was not 
 
 
 83 
in opposition with Westbindung. Instead, it was a perfect proof of its devotion to the 
system of alliances Adenauer had created (Haftendorn 2008: 109-111). The SPD took the 
argument a bit further by actually claiming that the Ostpolitik was nothing more than the 
extension of Adenauer’s Westbindung to the East (Morgan 1975: 101; Engelmann Martin 
2002: 153). Just as Adenauer saw West Germany’s international respectability and status 
passing through normalization with its Western partners (Glaessner 2005: 49), Brandt 
completed this process by having West Germany face up to its political and moral 
obligations towards its Eastern neighbors (Roth 1995: 70).  
The SPD’s effort to position the Ostpolitik within a consciously defined European 
and Western framework88 can also be seen in Brandt’s efforts to portray his policies as 
falling completely within the framework of Alliance politics (Roberts 1972: 444; 
Clemens 1989: 241; Glaessner 2005: 169). Brandt was making a big point of the fact that 
he was keeping all of West Germany’s allies, and most notably the US, informed and 
updated of his moves (Niedhart 2008: 121-122; Wall 2008: 133). The truth is of course 
that Brandt had taken West German initiatives a step further (Morgan 1975). He usually 
did not ask for consultation but merely informed allies of his intentions (Niedhart 2008: 
124; Klitzing 2009: 102-103). Yet the point remains: Ostpolitik was Adenauer’s 
Westpolitik drawn to its logical conclusion, i.e. achieving West German respectability in 
international diplomacy (Niedhart 2008: 127) and furthering Western goals through West 
German foreign policy (Engelmann Martin 2002: 156). It was within the framework of 
Ostpolitik that Brandt for example agreed to the creation of European Political 
Cooperation and called for further enlargement of the EEC (Morgan 1975: 99; Moeller 
1996: 39; Klitzing 2009: 88); it was an effort to alleviate any impressions that West 
Germany was ‘going it alone’ in its efforts to establish new relations with the East.  
Similar to the SPD, the FDP presented détente as a desired policy in and of itself 
(Czempiel 1970: 614). But in what kind of Europe? In the Atlanticist-Gaullist conflict in 
the early 1960s the FDP had positioned itself clearly in favor of Atlanticist solutions, 
favoring enlargement of the EEC and the strengthening of NATO (Juling 1977: 32; 
Glatzeder 1980: 96-97). This position can be attributed to the party’s anticlerical, anti-
Catholic origins. A small Europe around France and West Germany did not appeal to the 
Liberals (Bellers 1979: 397-402). German liberalism also had a tradition of focussing on 
Central Europe, dating back to its nationalism and imperialism. But apart from these 
general attitudes, no coherent concept of Europe arose in the FDP because none was 
needed: if West Germany was to employ détente it could do so by itself, paying lip 
service to its Atlantic alliances but without expecting to be constrained by them (Mende 
1972: 245; Glatzeder 1980: 97-101). All this changed with Scheel. His decision to take 
pragmatism in Ostpolitik to its logical extent could only make sense if it was presented as 
part of a European order:  
                                                
88 Also see the SPD’s 1969 election program, which defined ‘maintenance of peace’ as ‘cooperation and 
coordination of policy with the West and arrangement with the East’ (cited in Czempiel 1970: 610). 
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‘From the outset we reached the paradoxical position, to be looking for integration 
in the West and at the same time for national restoration in the East…To have both of 
these together means a failure of both policies. The new word for our new position is: 
Détente…To overcome the division, this is not an isolated process between West and East 
Germany, but a part of the process to overcome the division of Europe’89. 
 
Perhaps more than the FDP’s advanced German plans to establish diplomatic 
relations with DDR and negotiate with the Soviets, it was the party’s adherence to Europe 
that marked the most impressive change in the FDP’s conceptions. Scheel used Europe as 
a legitimizing discursive tool in his effort to show that the German question and West 
Germany’s position vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc could be reconceptualized (Cordell and 
Wolff 2005: 73). The Europe of the FDP reflected German liberalism’s Atlanticism and 
Mittel-Europa focus. But it nevertheless was there, an important parameter in the 
interpretation of détente (Czempiel 1970: 621). For the FDP West Germany was not to 
initiate negotiations with the Eastern bloc only to achieve concrete benefits in return. 
Instead, such a policy would assist détente in Europe understood as overcoming Cold 
War divisions, securing peace and increasing contacts between the two blocs:  
 
‘Europe – not just Western Europe but both, East and West – must become a capable 
Whole and be responsible for itself…[this alternative] is our constructive decision for the 
overcoming of Germany’s division, for the overcoming of Europe’s division, for a final 
peace in this part of the world’90.  
 
The FDP’s Ostpolitik then, radical as it was in relation to the main ideas that 
underscored West German foreign policy until then, was framed as a continuation of an 
essentially European policy, a policy aiming at the creation of a European framework 
within which the German question would find its solution (Winking 1991: 88-91). In 
parallel with the SPD, the FDP was presenting détente as a policy for Europe, and 
because of that as a natural West German goal. Both parties adhered to the inversion of 
the Adenauer conception: the solution of the German question as a consequence, not a 
precondition, of détente.  
Nevertheless, there were nuances in the party’s conversion (Clemens 1989: 267). In 
the elections of 1969 the FDP made a point of its independent position in the German 
question vis-à-vis the two parties of the Grand Coalition, by putting forward a dissenting 
profile in foreign policy, emphasizing West Germany’s interests (interpreted of course 
through the lens of détente) and the need to keep its independence from possible 
                                                
89 Scheel at the FDP conference in Freiburg, 1968 (cited in Bellers and Winking 1991: 267-268). 
90 Scheel, cited in Winking (1991: 92). 
 
 
 85 
influences of its allies. But again, Europe was used as the legitimating framework for a 
self-conscious foreign policy of interest promotion (Czempiel 1970: 612): 
 
‘[The Federal Republic] must free itself from one-sided dependence on its allies; at 
the same time, she must engage Cold War enemies as partners of a European peace 
order. This is why our foreign policy goal must be a European peace order’91. 
 
Summing up, Ostpolitik translated détente into policy proposals consistent with the 
main actors’ visions of domestic society, i.e. coherent images about West Germany’s 
domestic governance and position in the world. However, these actors also needed to 
support these visions of domestic society with a firm reading of the material and 
ideational structures of the international system. These readings reflected efforts of 
partisan actors to align party competition according to their party systemic needs. For 
SPD and FDP, détente was an important discursive resource that matched the ideas 
codified within them, served their party strategies and supported the realignment of the 
West German party system in a direction that served domestic and foreign reform. For 
the conservatives in the Union parties, their effort to maintain the old direction of 
competition, which was born out of the ‘hot’ Cold War of the 1950s, led them to 
downplay détente and overemphasize the pitfalls of a hyperactive Ostpolitik, the fears of 
allies and the shrewdness of their adversaries.  
The elections of 1972 proved that a broad social coalition for reform and a dominant 
narrative of international politics were inextricably linked as a recipe for political 
realignment. The analysis thus far had shown that the conditions for foreign policy 
change, namely the creation of this powerful narrative on détente and Europe, were only 
met once party strategies and party system dynamics created the right condition of ideas 
and incentives. As this part has shown though, the actual existence of international 
systemic changes is an invaluable asset to the creation of domestic coalitions and the 
realignment of the terms of domestic debate itself. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Whereas the main axis of binary competition between Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats was maintained, the Grand Coalition of 1966 nevertheless created 
questions as to the exact meaning and content of this competition. With discussions about 
a new electoral law pointing to the will of the two major parties to turn the party system 
into a perfect two-party system, the small Liberals found themselves in a nightmare-
situation. If the party system until then had functioned as a competition between the 
bourgeois and the socialist camp, the powerful Christian Democrats seemed more 
interested in doing away with the pesky Liberals and dominating the bourgeois part of the 
                                                
91 FDP 1969 election program, page 16. 
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spectrum. With the SPD moving more towards the center after Godesberg, the Liberals 
also risked losing their identity as a modernizing party. Without changing its main 
features, the existing party system seemed to be pushing the FDP into oblivion. 
The party’s position made a change of outlook and profile necessary. The FDP 
needed to forge a middle ground between both big parties and make itself useful to both 
as potential coalition partner. The rise of the social liberal current under Walter Schell 
emphasized the party’s affinity for radical reform projects in the economy, the justice and 
education. These new domestic preferences cued preferences on foreign policy as well. 
Social liberalism differed from the nationalism of national liberalism in that it saw the 
German nation as a cultural and not a political fact, and it saw the essence of the 
relationship with the DDR in communication and human contacts. This was in 
accordance with a vision of domestic society that went beyond the anti-Communism and 
conservatism of Adenauer’s years.  
The importance of the rise of social liberalism within the FDP for the creation of the 
Ostpolitik is shown by the fact that the SPD itself, despite its declared willingness to 
loosen up some of Adenauer’s foreign policy tenets, went into the election of 1969 
focusing more on domestic issues. Among the three major parties, the CDU and FDP 
campaigned on foreign policy, but from fundamentally different viewpoints. Because of 
this, it can be assumed that it was the FDP’s entry into government that also pushed the 
SPD to go along with a far more radical course of foreign policy than the one it had 
already practiced during the Kiesinger years. Since 1960, the SPD’s acceptance of the 
realities of domestic governance of Adenauer’s republic was connected with the 
acceptance of Westbindung. Yet the way it embarked on concluding treaties with East 
Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland was not a foregone conclusion based on the 
party’s record until then.  
The creation of the Social-Liberal coalition was an important change in the patterns 
of the West German party system – it did not change the basic binary nature of 
competition between the two big parties, but it did realign preferences and representation 
of interests between them. Under the new dynamics, the party system produced a change 
in foreign policy that would not have been conceivable under any other coalition. The 
new logic of competition now was not between a pro-Western and anti-Communist 
bourgeois camp and an isolated Social Democratic party, but between a reformist camp 
and a conservative Christian Democratic party. Just like the party system in its first 
shaping produced the policy of Westbindung, in its renewed format it gave rise to the 
Ostpolitik.  
Ostpolitik contributed to the change of meaning of the main binary axis of 
competition – but in a sense it also renewed it and strengthened it. It reinforced already 
evident changes in the patterns of expression of cleavages through political parties. The 
main effect of this process was the slow decrease of the importance of denomination in 
party politics and the halting of CDU’s expansive strategy. Both the initial idea of change 
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of the electoral law in 1966 and the narrow result of the 1969 election were instances 
when the party system could have maintained its existent dynamics of competition – and 
allowed the CDU to occupy a position of dominance similar to the one enjoyed by ruling 
conservative parties in Italy and Japan (Kitschelt and Streeck 2003: 6-7).  
CDU’s growth was based on its interdenominational character on the one hand, and 
its cross-class appeal inherited from its Catholic character on the other. However this 
broad coalition was held together by anti-Communism, whereby foreign policy was 
extremely important. The translation of détente into an issue of domestic governance by 
the SPD and the FDP put into question the glue that kept together the Adenauer coalition, 
as well as the dimension of competition that had allowed the party to dominate West 
German politics. Its unequivocal opposition to Ostpolitik was no foregone conclusion 
given the party’s factionalism. With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the party 
could not but fight this last battle. 
The elections of 1972 cemented SPD’s inroads into the Catholic labor vote and 
FDP’s shedding of its conservative Protestant character. Ostpolitik left CDU a religious 
middle-class party. It was no longer a dominant all-encompassing Begemoth – just a 
strong catchall Volkspartei. In this way, what could have developed into a system of 
limited pluralism, with a big CDU in the center of the party system and smaller parties 
revolving around it in perpetual opposition, remained a system of binary competition. 
This case shows that initial changes in the party system, such as the realignment of 
patterns of coalition and opposition of 1969, may be enough for the rise of new foreign 
policy preferences – however the process of foreign policy contestation drives these 
changes further and institutionalizes them within new permanent features of the party 
system. Westbindung was supportive of the party system of 1949-1969 and Ostpolitik 
was as much the expression as a pillar of the renovated party system of 1969. Ostpolitik 
was the symbol of the new axis of competition: reform of authoritarian social structures 
(‘democracy’) versus conservative economic and social values. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, it suffices to point out Ostpolitik’s contingent 
nature. It was the outcome of a complex combination of Cold War détente and the 
marrying of reformist agendas of the SPD and the FDP. Its linkage with the coalition’s 
domestic agenda may explain Brandt’s obsession with foreign policy – which ironically 
drew criticism for his alleged ignorance of domestic issues. Ideas about changes in the 
relations with the Soviet bloc circulated since the early 1960s, even inside the CDU. The 
specific content of the 1970-1972 treaties (complete normalization of relations with the 
DDR, recognition of the Eastern borders etc), their ideological foundation (Germany as a 
cultural nation, reunification as a distant goal), and their justification as congruent with 
the value of détente, make them a distinct creation of Willy Brandt and Walter Schell.  
This case study tries to vindicate the hypothesis that it takes a combination of new 
systemic imperatives on parties and a realignment of patterns of expression of societal 
cleavages through partisan competition to make political parties formulate new foreign 
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policy preferences and contest foreign policy. There are thus a host of other alternative 
explanations that need to be refuted.  
First is the question whether, if we focus on domestic politics as necessary condition 
for foreign policy change, new alignments of cleavages or systemic pressures on parties 
are each by themselves enough for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences and 
ideas. Is Ostpolitik the result of a simple realignment of societal interests within the party 
system? As we saw, the West German party system was undergoing change for some 
time already in the 1960s and the change of coalition patterns reflected this. Main 
changes were the withering away of Catholic labor support for the CDU in favor of the 
SPD and the gradual inroads of the Union parties in the conservative Protestant groups 
that were traditionally supporting the FDP – both of these changes amounted to a general 
decline of CDU’s catchall appeal beyond an essentially center-right space. These changes 
may account for a different constellation of foreign policy ideas expressed by the parties 
– and more specifically their position on the issue of German reunification and the idea of 
the German nation.  
However these changes are not enough to explain why Ostpolitik happened when it 
happened and took the direction that it did. First, all three main parties expressed ends of 
cleavages that represented reformist ideas towards the Eastern bloc and the DDR. The 
Atlanticists within the CDU, largely Northern Protestants, strived to reform Adenauer’s 
tenets throughout the 1960s. The FDP had experimented with ideas about normalization 
of relations with the East since the 1950s according to social liberal ideas. And the SPD 
had ridden the Kennedy bandwagon and made détente a basic value of its new foreign 
policy profile from early on, employing its traditional Atlanticism and pacifism. In other 
words all parties had ideological resources and societal commitments that allowed the 
emergence of reformist ideas of foreign policy. Yet institutional and political conditions 
where decisive in the timing of their expression. Atlanticists within the Union could not 
break the ‘alliance of chairmen’ Adenauer and Strauss (Granieri 2003), and later 
relinquished control as the party went into opposition and fought for the remnants of its 
political dominance. Reformist ideas could only take hold of FDP once the party’s 
position in the party system changed to the worse, and the SPD formalized a radical 
agenda on foreign policy only after it found itself in a government freed from the checks 
of the Grand Coalition. In other words, things within the parties were changing, but it was 
only when the patterns of their interactions changed that these new constellations of 
political identities could burst to the open in the shape they did.  
On the other hand, it would also not be accurate to ascribe the change to systemic 
pressures on parties only. As we saw, the impetus for change was brought on by the 
creation of the Grand Coalition, the change within the FDP and the rise of the social 
liberal current. The patterns of opposition on Ostpolitik also reflected changes in parties’ 
systemic position. The Union’s vehement opposition, a departure if one considers the 
party’s internal heterogeneity and its ambivalent attitudes towards change throughout the 
 
 
 89 
1960s, also was informed by the party’s entering opposition for the first time in 20 years 
and its effort to maintain the systemic features that had allowed it to dominate politics up 
to that point. However, as the previous paragraph shows, the new preferences that arose 
were contingent on prior rooting of parties within specific cleavages. For the FDP its 
effort to distance itself from the CDU and occupy a central position did not take place in 
an ideological vacuum; instead, the party looked back to the traditions of social 
liberalism, democratic radicalism and reformism that formed until then the minority 
current of the party. The SPD, once in government, sought to underwrite its differences 
from Adenauer’s regime with a discourse of democratic, pacifist and reformist values. 
And the CDU did not practice opposition for opposition’s sake but instead looked for 
argumentations and morale-boosting in conservative, nationalist values about the German 
nation and state. 
The above thus vindicates the use of party system dynamics as an important 
analytical category for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences. Changes in the 
representation of ideas and identities through parties and changes in the position of 
parties within policy space are interrelated developments. Changes in one dimension 
bring about changes in the other. For a realignment of expression of societal interests to 
have consequences for policy outputs, it is important that it has systemic consequences – 
that it impacts the patterns of the party system. Similarly, in order for adaptation of 
parties to spatial changes to have policy relevance, it is important that it results in the 
expression of meaningful alternative ideas and preferences that would not have been 
expressed otherwise. In other words, party systems impact foreign policy when they 
themselves undergo systemically relevant changes that affect policy outputs. 
However, even if we establish what kinds of changes we think are meaningful for a 
party system to have new policy outputs, the question remains whether they are by 
themselves enough for change of foreign policy. The case of Ostpolitik suggests that 
changes in party systems are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the emergence of 
new foreign policies. The changes in the party system identified here could have taken 
place without creating a change of foreign policy – indeed, they were very meaningful for 
other policy sectors such as justice, education and the economy. The two big West 
German parties went into the election of 1969 thinking they were competing in the field 
of domestic policy. However, there was a systemic change, which called for policy 
response. Cold War détente was a structural development, which, just like the Cold War 
itself, lent itself to various discursive interpretations. Ostpolitik responded to a demand 
from within the field of foreign policy – the international system. Foreign policy change 
required the impetus from the international system, which in return served as a 
justification for the promotion of the various foreign policy preferences.  
This argument also indirectly puts to rest the question as to whether the international 
dimension was sufficient by itself for the change of foreign policy – a classical realist 
argument. However, we need only remember that détente was already underway for some 
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years (definitely from 1962 onwards) and that it was recognized as an important 
parameter and a reason for foreign policy change by a wide coalition comprising the 
SPD, a large part of FDP and the Atlanticists of the Union. However that coalition only 
streamlined West German foreign policy with the imperative of détente after the 
institutional setting of the domestic party system allowed the expression, alignment and 
successful promotion of new foreign policy preferences. 
The Social-Liberal coalition of 1969 was no simple realignment of coalition patterns 
between parties. Instead, it was the result of long-standing converging party strategies 
that both reflected and engaged with changes in the social composition of the West 
German electorate and the expression of social cleavages through party politics. In other 
words, the government change of 1969 was a systemically relevant evolution in the 
direction and the logic of the West German party system – even though the overarching 
structural feature, the binary competition between a bourgeois and a social-democratic 
party, remained the same. However, this government change reflected a foundational 
change in the stake of competition, as well as the normative anchor that structured the 
expression of preferences, the filtering of international changes into new policy ideas, and 
the promotion of new policies. Whereas in the past the essential question of domestic 
governance had been ‘liberal democracy and market economy v.s. socialism’, it was 
transformed to ‘market economy within more democracy v.s. market economy within 
more conservative governance structures’. In this way, whereas the previous dominant 
axis of competition produced a bourgeois majority that negotiated within its camp the 
various aspect of the overriding choice of Westbindung, the new axis created a reformist 
majority which matched its ideas of a new political identity of the Federal Republic with 
a foreign policy that sought to accommodate her neighbors, as well as the German 
people’s past.  
The new Ostpolitik was the end result of this domestic shift though when presented 
as a dominant ideational setup that promised to adjust West Germany’s foreign policy 
with a shifting international environment, it also became an asset in the effort of SPD and 
FDP to decisively push through their common vision of domestic society. It was this 
potential impact on the normative anchor of partisan competition that had so served it in 
the past that pushed the CDU/CSU towards high politicization of opposition against the 
Ostpolitik. The end result was a new equilibrium between parties with renewed outlooks, 
competing along a structurally stable, but normatively changed axis of competition, and a 
foreign policy made possible by domestic realignment of ideas and interests supported by 
the new stake of competition between contending visions of domestic society. 
The importance of this argument becomes more evident if we juxtapose it to other 
accounts of Ostpolitik. Here I will concern myself particularly with the work of 
Engelmann-Martin (2002). Hers is an effort to systematize the analysis of a historical 
phenomenon under the constructivist literature – in particular, that part of constructivism 
that lays emphasis on national identities and the ability of actors to engage with dominant 
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discourses. Engelmann-Martin’s argument about Ostpolitik is that Brandt and Scheel 
successfully appropriated West Germany’s ‘European’ identity construction that until 
then had served the CDU under Adenauer.  
For Engelmann-Martin this dominant discursive framework remained the same 
during the 1960s, but it was used by the Social-Liberal coalition in order to promote the 
opposite policy as Adenauer’s. By showing that the West was striving for détente, the 
new government could legitimately claim that a hardline policy against the East was 
actually putting West Germany at odds with its allies. A new Ostpolitik could be shown 
to be more in line, indeed to be the logical outcome, of Adenauer’s policy of anchoring 
West Germany in Europe. Instead, the CDU/CSU found itself in the awkward position of 
supporting a policy that seemed to increase residual nationalism and to isolate the Federal 
Republic. These were precisely the kinds of developments Adenauer was seeking to do 
away with. The theoretical conclusion is that Ostpolitik was an identity-based societal 
outcome, heavily dependent on its presentation as a continuation of the normative 
construction ‘Europe’ that defined Germany’s political identity.  
In many ways my analysis is in agreement with that of Englelmann-Martin. Her 
account of SPD’s and FDP’s adaptation to the dominant identity construction of CDU is 
in broad agreement with my view of political parties as enabled political actors with the 
ability to engage with discursive constructions. Her view of foreign policy outcomes as 
socially constructed events is also in line with my theoretical assumptions, while her 
emphasis on détente as an external powerful normative condition for winning the debate 
was partially an inspiration for the argument of this dissertation and the importance of the 
‘external argument’ in foreign policy contestation. Here I am claiming that my account 
does not seek to discredit, but rather to critically enhance Engelmann-Martin’s own story 
about the success of Ostpolitik.  
First is the obvious issue of the eventual institutionalization of the European identity 
construction across the party system. As Engelmann-Martin herself acknowledges, this 
was to a large extent a result of party strategies, especially of the adaptation and the effort 
of the SPD and the FDP to escape the dominating presence of the CDU/CSU. 
Engelmann-Martin does not negate the importance of party politics in her thesis. Yet 
party system dynamics seem to be the key transmission mechanism through which an 
identity construction goes from being divisive (as Westbindung was in the early 1950s) to 
being dominant; the party system seems to be the key institutional space within which the 
variation in the strength of different political identities can be ‘measured’.  
Second is the question of ‘European’ identity construction itself. Following 
Engelmann-Martin’s narrative one is left with the impression that ‘Europe’ is a uniform 
and diachronical normative framework, conditioning contestation of West German 
foreign policy the same way from the early 1950s to the early 1970s (indeed, to the early 
1990s since Engelmann-Martin’s second case-study is the decision of Germany to 
support EMU). Yet she herself accepts that West Germany was a substantially different 
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place over these 20 years: ‘The constructivist argument would be that as the West 
German society completed a process of ‘Westernization’, including processes of 
modernization and democratization, the Federal Republic also became a more ‘Western’ 
state through its foreign policy of Ostpolitik’ (p. 159). In other words, the German state’s 
very political identity was evolving over time, and dominant understandings of what 
‘West’ and ‘Europe’ meant must have evolved with it.  
Indeed, as we saw Europe was understood much differently by a politician identified 
with the adversity of the Cold War like Adenauer than by a pan-European pacifist like 
Brandt. Again, the dynamics of the party system offer a more accurate image of national 
identities, not as stable structures over periods of time but as fluid constructions where 
meanings can be attached and reattached constantly. Here, the emphasis on the 
development of the normative anchor through the 1960s from one based on anti-
Communism to one based on internal democratization is shown to account accurately for 
a more dynamic relationship between normative structures and actors. Also here, party 
politics seem to be the crucial mechanism through which new policies become 
institutionalized; such a focus on mechanisms of change is generally lacking in 
Engelmann-Martin’s work, as there the narrative sees actors as just capable of 
appropriating discourses without reference to the institutional space within which they 
function and which usually determined the pace, success and incentives of such a 
process.  
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CHAPTER 3 
CANADA 1984-1993: FREE TRADE AND PARTY SYSTEM 
COLLAPSE 
 
This isn’t so much about free trade as it is about the heart and soul of this country. 
It’s about the definition of Canada. 
Canada’s ambassador to the UN and NDP politician Stephen Lewis, Winnipeg 198892 
 
OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENT OF THE CHAPTER 
 
In November 1988 Canadian voters went to the polls to elect a government knowing 
that their choice amounted essentially to a verdict on whether Canada would embark on 
the most far-reaching foreign policy change of its history: the ratification of a 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States. Voting for the 
ruling Conservative party (or Progressive Conservatives, PCs), which had instituted this 
agreement, meant approval of this foreign policy change. Voting for the opposition 
Liberals or New Democratic Party (NDP, a social-democratic party) could result in 
halting this change – the Liberals had promised to ‘tear up’ the agreement and to only 
engage in free trade with the United States under better terms, while the NDP was in 
principle against any such venture. The polling booth gave the victory to the Tories, and 
so the FTA was ratified.  
International commercial policy preferences of the various political identities of 
Canadian politics are the result of a mix of cultural, economic and ideological factors. 
Foreign and trade policy of Canada was always affected by the interplay between these 
political identities, as these policies reached deep into questions of the political identity 
and institutional arrangements of the Canadian state. Historically, a coalition around 
Anglophone economic interests from the center of Canada imposed a policy of 
protectionism against the United States reflecting both the interests of Canadian industry 
and the wish to maintain Canada as an independent society in North America demarcated 
from the United States. While protectionism was implemented by the Conservatives in 
the 19th century, by the 1980s the main proponents of protectionist and nationalist 
sentiments were the Liberals, the party most identified with the 20th century identity of 
Canada as a progressive welfare and multicultural state. 
The process of unfolding of Canadian protectionism can be traced in the long 
process of alignment of pro-free trade ‘continentalist’ political identities under the mantle 
of the Conservative party of Brian Mulroney. The dynamics of the party system 
eventually brought together the geographical and linguistic extremes of the country (the 
Prairie West and Quebec), both united in an agenda of developing a closer relationship 
with the United States and reforming the dominant structures imposed by Anglophone 
                                                
92 Quoted in Owram (1994: 117). 
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nationalism of central Canada. As the analysis will show however, there was no simple 
linear connection between political identities represented within the Conservative party 
and the decision for going through with the FTA. Instead, the new Mulroney government 
oscillated for a year before coming out in favor of free trade. The key difference maker 
was the publication of the report of an independent parliamentary committee that showed 
how free trade not only served economic goals but could also help put the question of 
Canadian unity on renewed, and more firm foundations. This presented Mulroney the 
opportunity of not only promoting a policy that pleased his constituencies but also to 
redefine the stakes of party competition in a way that would make his party the guardian 
of a new conception of institutional relations between the central government, the 
provinces and linguistic communities. In other words, free trade was pursued only after 
the self-perception of the Conservative party changed and the prospect to redefine the 
stakes of party competition became apparent. 
 
THE POLITICAL CLEAVAGES STRUCTURING CANADIAN POLITICS 
 
Canada was first created as a Union of Upper and Lower Canada (Ontario and 
Quebec) in 1840 by Great Britain and expanded with the Confederation in 1867 that 
attached the Maritime and Western provinces93. The very creation of Canada represented 
a policy of Great Britain and a willingness of the majority of inhabitants of the new 
country to demarcate British North America from the US (Cooper et al 1988: 4; Lipset 
1990: 1-4). According to the initial political arrangement of 1867, Canada was to be a 
centralist democracy following the Westminster model of government, with a House of 
Commons elected through a first-past-the-post system and an appointed Senate. 
Organized political and electoral life started soon thereafter, even though it would take 
years before elections were to be held simultaneously across the vast country. 
The first cleavage that shaped Canadian politics concerned the institutional design of 
the new state. This cleavage gave rise to two dominant political parties, the Conservatives 
and the Liberals. The Conservatives were the party, to whom most of the founding fathers 
of Confederation belonged, committed to close ties with Great Britain, supporting 
authority and privilege, and believing in the agency of a strong central government to 
unite the new country. Much like conservatives in Europe at the time, Canadian 
Conservatives were reluctant towards capitalism and open markets. The Liberal party on 
the other hand represented more radical democratic and more liberal economic demands. 
It believed in free markets and its bourgeois outlook made it an adversary of the more 
patrician Conservatives.  
The two parties dominated Canadian politics from early on and, with the help of a 
conducive, institutional framework (an electoral system that punished small third parties 
                                                
93 In this section, information has been drawn from Christian and Campbell (1974), Johnston et al (1992: 
35-77) and Martin (2005). More detailed references will be made accordingly. 
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and parliamentary rules that imposed strict party discipline)94, practiced a politics of 
accommodation and absorption of new demands. The first two-party system had to 
absorb the second basic cleavage of Canadian politics: Quebec. The fact of a 
geographically homogeneous minority with a completely different ethnic and religious 
background than the rest of the population meant that the task of political parties in 
Canada was not only winning office, but also keeping the country united (Gibbins 1982: 
110; Carty et al 2000: 36).  
Upper and Lower Canada, Ontario and Quebec, are the cradle of Canada, the historic 
center of the country. It was there that the basic cleavages of Canadian politics were 
formulated and, through their interaction, where the first durable binary axis of 
competition was created. Yet Canada expanded vastly beyond this cradle, both towards 
the Atlantic and the Pacific. From early on, Canada also had a regional cleavage, pitting 
the center against the two peripheries. Atlantic Canada, the Prairie West and British 
Columbia represent distinct regional identities cuing a vast array of particular (and 
sometimes uncomfortable) economic and political demands. Especially the West (Prairies 
and BC) from early on represented a direct challenge to the political imprint of the new 
nation as negotiated in central Canada. Being a region settled by populations of different 
ethnic background than Ontario and Quebec (mostly East European), largely dependent 
on agriculture and, in the case of BC, orientated towards the Pacific and Asia as well, the 
West clearly formed an outlier within Canada. This status meant that the West could be 
relied upon to portray a political behavior expressing discontent and disharmony with 
policies emanating from central Canada95. 
The political activism of both parties brought about the merger of the state identity, 
linguistic/religious and regional cleavages into a binary dimension of competition where 
the main stake was the maintenance of national unity. This normative anchor meant that 
economic policies were to be judged according to their impact on the question of unity, 
but it also meant that national unity was a powerful argument for the promotion of 
specific socioeconomic preferences. In this context, changing historical patterns of 
dominance of one or the other party basically reflect their ability to constantly redefine 
the question of national unity according to strategic readings of the demands and 
interactions of cleavages (McDowall 1994: 91). 
From 1867 until World War I the Canadian party system was dominated first by the 
Conservatives (until 1896) and then the Liberals (until 1911). Conservative leader John 
                                                
94 The classical treatment of the effect of the electoral system on Canadian party politics is Cairns (1968). A 
more extensive discussion on the role of the Westminster institutional setup in the shape and dynamics of 
the Canadian party system is Gibbins (1982). 
95 For a very interesting discussion of the dialectic between the identities of central and Western Canada 
and the ethnic, economic and social preferences they codify, see Cooper (2002). Ontario is seen here as the 
political, economic and normative point of reference against which regional discontent is mobilized.  Here 
also see Holmes (1974: 621). For an outline of the reasons usually associated with Western alienation, see 
Henry (2002: 77-79). For a recent general discussion on the role of the regional cleavage in party politics, 
see Knutsen (2010). 
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A. Macdonald created a coalition of conservative Anglophones and Francophones based 
on affinity for hierarchy and a willingness to build a distinct society that would resist the 
pull of the radical and populist United States. After the Manitoba school crisis brought to 
the fore the inherent inconsistencies of the Tory coalition, the Liberals, led by Wilfrid 
Laurier, won over Quebec. The Francophone Laurier tempered the party’s traditional 
anticlericalism to lure Quebec and along with reliable support in the pro-free trade West, 
created a new winning coalition. Unlike Macdonald’s, this coalition was based on a 
vision of national unity consisting of more balanced relations with the US and Great 
Britain, more overtures towards free trade to please the West (Marchildon 1994: 22-23) 
and a respect for provincial community characteristics (Quebec). In this way, the question 
of national unity gave rise to the signature practice of Canadian parties dealing with the 
multitude of cleavages in Canada: brokerage of provincial interests within the party and 
the government96. 
In 1921 the Liberals returned to power under new leader William Mackenzie King. 
The new Liberal coalition brokered along the linguistic cleavage, harnessing the solid 
support of Quebec, the regional cleavage, continuing to enjoy success in the West, and 
the emerging class cleavage, as King developed a concept of proactive liberalism that 
aimed to marry traditional economic liberalism with ideas about a more activist state in 
light of increased urbanization. Making the Liberals a party differentiated on all 
cleavages, both central and peripheral, both French and English, both capitalist and 
reformist, King was able to realize his goal of making them the natural party of 
government. Their dominance would last until 1957. Still, the elections of 1921 were 
important for another reason: even though the main binary logic of competition remained 
intact, from then onwards the Canadian party system would be characterized by the 
sustained presence of significant third parties. All of these parties had their birthplace in 
the West, and more specifically the agrarian Prairie provinces (Carty et al 2000: 64-66).  
The brokerage coalition of the Liberals dominated the party system until 1957-8, 
when the Tories (now named Progressive Conservatives, PCs), under the leadership of 
John Diefenbaker, won the election, realigned the expression of political identities and 
yet again redefined the normative anchor of national unity. Diefenbaker’s dream was to 
forge a new Canadian identity that would finally accommodate his native West with the 
original conservative, pro-British political identity of Canada. Diefenbaker lost power in 
1963 to a reinvigorated Liberal party, however his tenure had one lasting effect: it 
realigned the patterns of expression of the regional cleavage. His policy of agricultural 
price support was the first time that central Canada subsidized a Western industry, while 
the tariff up to that point forced the West to subsidize the industry of Ontario (Hinich et 
al 1998: 416). Diefenbaker’s policies completely changed the partisan expression of the 
regional cleavage, making the West a bastion of PC support and leaving the Liberals with 
virtually no traces of support to the west of Ontario.  
                                                
96 On the notion of ‘brokerage politics’, see Carty et al (2000: 17-18) among others. 
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The Liberals under Lester Pearson returned to power reclaiming Quebec, but this 
was a very different Liberal party and a very different Quebec. The period in opposition 
gave the opportunity to a new generation of party cadres from Toronto to take over the 
party from the old brokers and modernize it. Also, by the time Pearson became Prime 
Minister, the Quiet Revolution was in full swing in Quebec. The Quiet Revolution 
concerned the rise of a new political and economic elite with a new national self-
awareness that sought to modernize Quebec and rebalance the relationship between 
English and French Canada (Martin 1994: 147-149)97.  
The normative anchor of national unity was different than before since the 
linguistic/ethnic cleavage had now turned into a national/constitutional one. In electing a 
youthful Francophone academic, Pierre Trudeau, as their leader in 1968, the Liberals 
hoped to find an answer to these demands. Trudeau’s answer was the creation of a new 
Canadian civic identity that would accommodate the Québécois as individual citizens, 
recognizing their individual rights but without fragmenting the institutional unity of the 
Canadian polity. The outcome of these considerations was an official policy of 
bilingualism and multiculturalism. By recognizing Canada as a bilingual nation, Trudeau 
hoped to absorb Quebec’s demands and to create the preconditions for Francophones to 
remain Canadians. This policy was met by the approval of federalist elites in Quebec but 
with the vehement opposition of the separatists. Trudeau’s strong personality and the 
Liberals’ electoral dominance redefined the stake of national unity into what became 
known as the era of pan-Canadian ideological politics. The 1960s and 1970s was the time 
when political parties were asked to formulate coherent political propositions that would 
appeal potentially to as many Canadians as possible over regional and language 
barriers98. In effect though this period of nationalization of Canadian politics did not undo 
the huge geographical discrepancies in the patterns of support for political parties. 
Increasingly the demands of fiscal and institutional accommodation of Quebec ran 
against the interests of the West.  
Following the failed Quebec referendum on sovereignty in 1980, Trudeau tried to 
solve the issue of Canada’s constitutional identity by ‘repatriating’ the constitution from 
Great Britain and charting a Bill of Rights in 1982. These documents were to 
institutionalize his approach towards Quebec’s position in Canada as a problem of 
accommodation of individual rights, as well as codify relations between the provinces 
and the English capital Ottawa. The separatist government in Quebec refused to sign the 
new constitution, thus precipitating a constitutional crisis (Salée 1997: 84). Around the 
same time, Trudeau tried to counter the mounting economic crisis by founding the 
National Energy Program (NEP), which would allow the central government to tap on the 
                                                
97 On the cultural aspect of the Quiet Revolution see Holmes (1974: 626), and on the economic/sociological 
one see Gilpin (1974: 868). 
98 The move from regionally isolated party competition and region-specific campaigning to pan-Canadian 
themes and competition was also greatly assisted by the advent of new communications technology such as 
the television (Cross 2002: 117-118). 
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energy resources of provinces such as Alberta. This served to deepen the rift between 
Trudeau and Western Canada (Nossal 1985: 68; Thomas 1988: 124-125)99.  
Trudeau left office in 1984 and the Liberals elected John Turner, a member of the 
Toronto financial community, as the next Prime Minister. Already in 1983 the Tories had 
elected Brian Mulroney as their leader, a bilingual Quebecker of Irish origin. This gave 
the ostensibly Anglo PCs their first competent Francophone leader in history. When 
Turner called elections in 1984 he suffered a bad defeat. Canada rallied behind 
Mulroney’s optimistic message of national reconciliation and economic rejuvenation. The 
elections of 1984 seemed to give Mulroney a true national mandate, as every region and 
every social group supported his election as a welcome change from the Trudeau years. 
Most strikingly, next to a hegemonic position in the West, the Tories now also enjoyed 
the support of Quebec (Kornberg and Clarke 1988).  
 
Table 7 
1984 Canadian General Election Parties	   Vote	  Share	   Seats	  Progressive	  Conservatives	   50.0	  %	   211	  Liberals	   28.0	  %	   40	  New	  Democratic	  Party	   18.8	  %	   30	  Others	   3.2	  %	   1	  Total	   100	  %	   282	  
 
Table adapted from Martin (2005) and www.elections.ca 
 
These elections could be seen as a continuation of the pan-Canadian politics of the 
past, with one party finally managing to unite all political identities around a national 
message of renewal and unity (Pammet 1989: 125). The PCs had bridged almost all 
meaningful cleavages of Canadian society. However, Mulroney’s strongest commitments 
along the regional, linguistic, and state identity cleavages were contradictory; the 
‘national reconciliation’ he had promised meant different things in Alberta, tired of the 
constitutional bickering of central Canada, than in Quebec, longing for a recognition as a 
distinct collectivity within Canada. In the past the ability of party leaders to dominate the 
axis of national unity had partially relied on their ability to also embed the visions that 
united their coalitions within corresponding foreign policies. Could it be that the political 
identities represented within Mulroney’s coalition were more united on foreign policy 
                                                
99 The question of energy relations between Canada and the US after the early 1970s had already caused the 
first rift in the relations between Ottawa and Western Canada (Keohane and Nye 1974: 602). 
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preferences than on domestic issues? And if yes, could it be that these preferences cued a 
coherent vision of domestic society around which to anchor party competition? 
 
Table 8 
An Analytical Periodization of Canadian Party Politics 
 
Period	   Stake	   of	  
competition	  
(national	  
unity)	  
Dominant	  
party	  
Dominant	  
leader	  
Political	   identities	   in	   ruling	  
party	  
1867-­‐1896	   Creation	   of	   an	  independent	  society	   Conservatives	   Macdonald	   Anglophone	   conservatives,	  Central	   Canada	   industry,	  Francophone	  Catholics	  
1896-­‐1921	   Emerging	  brokerage	   Transitional	  period	   Laurier	   Transitional	  period	  
1921-­‐1957	   Brokerage	   Liberals	   King	   Francophones,	   West,	   urban	  strata	  of	  Central	  Canada	  
1957-­‐1963	   Emerging	   civic	  nationalism	   Conservatives	  (transitional	  period)	   Diefenbaker	   West,	   Anglophone	  conservatives	  
1963-­‐1984-­‐
?	  
Civic	  nationalism:	  Strong	   state,	  multiculturalism	  
Liberals	   Mulroney	   Quebec,	  urban	  strata	  of	  Central	  Canada	  
 
FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES 
 
Canada was born as the border between Great Britain and the US, with a deliberate 
intention of upholding the anti-revolutionary ethos of the Empire against the republican 
United States (Holmes 1974: 612-613). Because of this position, Canada always had to 
balance between the commitment to Empire and the practicalities of life next to the 
United States (Holsti 1982: 101; Owram 1994: 118). This balancing had a domestic 
outreach as well: Canada’s initial self-conception as part of the British Empire was 
reflected in a specific institutional setup and specific ideas that reproduced this link 
through political practice. By extension, pro-American feelings were associated with a 
democratic, radical and libertarian ethos that sought to undermine what was seen as the 
essential ‘Tory strain’ of Canadian identity (Lipset 1990). Foreign policy preferences 
then always corresponded to distinct visions of domestic society.  
Protectionism and the National Policy were essential components of the pro-Imperial 
policies of the ruling Conservatives in the second half of the 19th century. The creation of 
a West-East axis of economic interaction fell within an Imperial conception of a direct 
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British link from the Atlantic to the Pacific (‘all red route to India’) (Johnston et al 1992: 
39). As part of a nation-building project, the National Policy codified the key preferences 
of the political identities John Macdonald (Prime Minister 1867-1873, 1878-1891) 
wanted to rally behind the project of the new state. These preferences includded 
Protectionism and latent anti-Americanism that pleased Tories and royalists who 
mistrusted the emancipatory ethos of the United States (Gibbins 1988: 341), 
Francophones who found in hierarchical Canada a convenient shield against the 
revolutionary Americans, fledgling economic and manufacturing interests from central 
Canada that needed protection from American competition, and the big mass of the 
Canadian population that would consume cheap agricultural products from the West 
(Christian and Campbell 1974: 86-87; Granatstein 1985: 12-17 and elsewhere; McDowall 
1994: 89).  
Foreign policy was also important in latter stages of the development of the 
Canadian party system. The long transitional period between the collapse of the 
Macdonald coalition in 1896 and the emergence of the modern Canadian party system of 
brokerage in 1921 was influenced by foreign policy events (Johnston et al 1992: 45-51). 
Foreign policy was an important part of Liberal Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier’s (1896-
1911) domestic balancing act. He did not undo the National Policy and committed 
Canada to service of the Empire, albeit with a more independent profile (Christian and 
Campbell 1974: 168; Johnston et al 1992: 46-47; McDowall 1994: 90). The only time 
Laurier strayed from this path was when he dared to put a free trade agreement with the 
US to the test of the polling booth in 1911. Laurier miscalculated the potency of the 
British link and anti-American feelings as electoral weapons. Molded in the flag of the 
Empire, the Conservatives won the election and the National Policy stood (McDowall 
1994: 101)100. 
The Quebec conscription crisis of 1917 ended any pretenses the Tories could have 
had to Québécois hearts and minds. By imposing mandatory conscription in Canada for a 
war in Europe, the Conservatives cut themselves out of Quebec and essentially became a 
party of Anglo-Protestant Canada (Christian and Campbell 1974: 87-89; Hinich et al 
1998: 414). Foreign policy was a major part in Mackenzie King’s (1921-1930, 1935-
1948) catchall strategy during his long reign as Prime Minister. As a Liberal enjoying 
overwhelming support in Quebec, he maintained ideas about closer links with the US and 
progressive loosening of the British link. Great Britain’s rapid decline in world status 
after World War I made this strategy easier (Christian and Campbell 1974: 90; Owram 
1994: 119). His verbal commitment to free trade principles allowed the Liberals to stave 
off the challenge of populist agrarian movements in the West that threatened to mobilize 
the regional cleavage (Carty et al 2000: 16-19). However, protectionism was a policy 
                                                
100 For a vivid account of the election of 1911 and the interaction of manufacturing economic interests and 
pro-imperial groups in luring the Tories in an anti-free trade position against an agreement that seemed 
fairly beneficial to Canada, see Granatstein (1985: 20-25). For an analysis of the 1911 election as a foreign 
policy election, see Welch (2005: 177-184). 
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more and more conducive with the interests of the ever-growing urban strata of central 
Canada that the Liberals attracted through their slow slide to the left. The formidable 
Liberal machine of 1921-1957 then was not only brokering assiduously domestic 
preferences, but also foreign policy ideas (Christian and Campbell 1974: 54-57; 
McDowall 1994: 103; Cooper 2002: 92). 
The latest example of this came with King’s swansong as Prime Minister in 1948. 
Shortly after World War II, the Americans offered Canada a favorable free trade deal that 
would allow Canada to tap on the booming US market. There was no more an Imperial 
connection to speak of, so King would not have to be afraid of his opponents using the 
Empire as an opposition tactic. However the lessons of the lost free trade election of 1911 
remained pertinent for King. Looking back at it, he could realize that the Imperial feeling 
of the time only enhanced a nascent national identity that was defined first and foremost 
in contradiction to the United States (Granatstein 1985: 25). Even without the Imperial 
link, a decision for free trade would threaten to split the country. In the end, King, fearing 
for his legacy and his party, stepped back from an agreement he had consented to101. 
The Liberals were not immune to reverting back to their continentalist views if the 
moment demanded it. As opposition to Diefenbaker (1957-1963), they milked the sense 
of unease Canadians felt with his anti-Americanism and romantic attachment to the dying 
cause of the British Empire (Martin 2005: 151-152). When Lester Pearson (1963-1968) 
became Prime Minister, restoring relations with the United States became one of his main 
goals. However Pearson was perhaps the last exponent of the Liberal version of 
brokerage of domestic and foreign political identities. The intensification of the regional 
cleavage (with the West finding itself in opposition after following Diefenbaker to the 
PCs), the linguistic cleavage (with the nationalist awakening of Quebec) and the class 
cleavage (with the rise of the NDP and university radicalism) also meant that the new 
Liberal coalition of the 1960s was representing a vastly different array of foreign policy 
preferences – and that this coalition had to be nurtured with a different set of foreign 
policies. 
Trudeau’s (1968-1979, 1980-1984) nation-building project eventually became 
inseparable from a foreign policy of antagonism towards the United States and 
protectionism (Booth 1988: 143)102. The rise of a certain left-wing Canadian Anglophone 
nationalism concerned with national unity (Holmes 1974: 618), the extent of US-
ownership of Canadian business and Canada’s degree of association with an expansive 
superpower (Gilpin 1974: 862-863), was best expressed by the NDP (Holsti 1982: 97). 
The New Democrats’ new allies in the trade union movement of Ontario trumped the 
                                                
101 For a thorough analysis of King’s decision to kill the proposed free trade agreement with the US in 1948 
see Welch (2005: 185-193). Apparently King could not be certain that even a favorable agreement would 
not energize nationalist feelings and lead to a defeat that would irrevocably harm the Liberal party and his 
own legacy. 
102 It is worth noting that Trudeau’s nationalism translated into antagonistic policies towards the US only 
gradually. In the mid-1970s he was still seen as a moderate nationalist with a pragmatic view of the 
Canada-US link (Holsti 1982: 94-95). 
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party’s agrarian origins and created the most reliably anti-American force of Canadian 
politics (Christian and Campbell 1974: 145-147; Owram 1994: 128-129) – and anti-
Americanism also meant staunch support for multilateralism and protectionism, in which 
organized labor also saw an insurance against excessive competition (Owram 1994: 136-
137). In the process, the Liberals saw the need to support the new identity that would 
accommodate Quebec with a policy of high visibility of the central government, and 
placating anti-American feelings with critical foreign policy rhetoric and increasing 
relations with alternative centers of power (Holmes 1974: 614; Holsti 1982: 90-92).  
Following the Nixon shock of the early 1970s, Trudeau sought to decrease the 
Canadian economy’s exposure to the United States (Gilpin 1974: 866; Keohane and Nye 
1974: 595-597). The creation of the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 1973 
was a response to the sentiments of economic nationalism prevalent at the time (Welch 
2005: 194-195). The Third Option built upon the established patterns of Canadian trade 
policy (multilateralism and protectionism against the US), and sought to underline the 
process of creation of a new Canadian identity. It also sustained the existing patterns of 
Canadian political economy by privileging the original constituencies that benefited from 
the tariff and on whose political identities Trudeau relied to forge the new Canadian 
nationalism (Gilpin 1974: 863-864). This meant that Trudeau’s concept was far from 
unifying: both of his domestic and foreign policies exacerbated some cleavages even if 
they were bridging others. Most evidently that was the case with the Western provinces, 
for which bilingualism, economic nationalism and constitutional bickering made little 
sense. The creation of NEP in the early 1980s symbolized everything that was wrong 
with Trudeau’s plan for the West (Gilpin 1974: 866-867; Johnston et al 1992: 67-68). 
A second front where Trudeau’s policies were proving very divisive was Quebec. 
Even though the Liberals were receiving the solid support of the province in national 
elections, in provincial politics the national cleavage was running deep between 
federalists and separatists (Carty et al 2000: 24). In Quebecois separatist political thought, 
sovereignty required a novel concept of an independent Quebec’s foreign policy. 
Increasingly it came to be seen that a continentalist context was more suitable to 
Quebec’s needs than the increasingly activist Canadian state – a view that came to be 
shared by federalists as well (Holmes 1974: 627). The Quiet Revolution had produced a 
vibrant Francophone business community that, just as the separatist Parti Quebecois, saw 
in the increased opportunities in the United Stated (Gilpin 1974: 869; Doern and Tomlin 
1991: 235).  
The sum result of the interaction between political identities and foreign policy was 
a reformulation but further strengthening of multilateralism and protectionism as the 
normative framework of Canadian foreign commercial policy (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 
62-63) – thus roughly following the constant reinterpretation of the normative anchor of 
domestic politics. Protectionism was the glue and output of a ruling coalition seeking to 
bridge the national, linguistic, cultural and class divides of the country (Holsti 1982: 
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217). The price for these twin domestic and foreign policies was an exacerbation of the 
regional cleavage, with the West (as the periphery) remaining the only significant 
political identity expressing continentalist preferences, politically imprisoned within the 
PC party, still committed to the National Policy. 
The party system of the 1970s did have an effect on the creation of rival foreign 
policy projects. Permanently in opposition, and with a foothold only in the West, the 
Tories started moving from being the old party of anti-American conservatism to being 
the party of pro-Americanism in foreign affairs (see below). However, the normative 
anchor of the party system reflected a systemic alignment of cleavages that 
overwhelmingly favored the Liberals, the new party of Canadian nationalism – and in as 
much also reinforced the dominant ideas and interests attached to protectionism. 
Protectionism not only symbolized Canada’s historical independence towards the United 
States, but it also always appealed to a formidable combination of powerful domestic 
political identities. As a steady part of the normative anchor of national unity – first as a 
balancing element in brokerage and then as an important practical complement of a 
strong state building a new Canadian identity – the National Policy was the inescapable 
normative framework within which evaluations of commercial policy (and evaluations of 
political risk associated with free trade) were taking place (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 229-
230).  
Even though the Mulroney election in 1984 expressed in many ways a profound 
wish for change among the Canadian electorate, it did not necessarily mean a change of 
the normative anchor. The result produced a national mandate for change, much like the 
patterns and interaction of parties in the previous 15 years had been on issues of national 
importance. Improving relations with the US on a symbolic level was one easy way for 
Mulroney to portray the new ways of the Canadian government (Booth 1988: 151). In 
terms of political identities though, two groups were dominating Mulroney’s huge 
parliamentary majority. One side of the regional cleavage, the West (Gibbins 1988: 338), 
was expressing steady pro-US sentiments – now, more than just price support for its 
agricultural production, it was asking for new markets for its products and energy 
resources (Granatstein 1985: 14). Mulroney had captured an impressive majority in 
Quebec as well, however most of his loyal supporters came from the anti-Trudeau wing 
of Québécois politics, looking for a more relaxed constitutional framework for Quebec.  
In this way, the Mulroney government became the first in history to express solid 
pro-free trade interests in such a decisive way (Carty et al 2000: 38). However Mulroney 
did not move on free trade despite his overtures to the USA. His foreign policy seemed 
securely embedded within the identity of protectionism and multilateralism despite 
manifest inabilities of these intellectual tools to measure growing challenges like USA 
protectionism and the failure of GATT. Mulroney himself had won the PC leadership 
contest in 1983 on a platform of protectionism (Merkin 1996: 258; Clarke et al 2000: 53) 
in order to win the support of voters from Ontario (Clarkson 2002: 27). Mulroney would 
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soon come to see that changing the terms of the debate in domestic politics and thus 
keeping his coalition together would require a daring transformative approach in foreign 
policy as well.  
 
Table 9 
An Analytical Periodization of Canadian Foreign Policy 
 
Period	   Stake	  of	  
competition	  
(national	  
unity)	  
Dominant	  
party	  
Foreign	  
policy	  
output	  
(Great	  
Britain)	  
Foreign	  
policy	  output	  
(USA)	  
Commercial	  policy	  
output	  
1867-­‐1896	   Creation	  of	  an	  independent	  society	   Conservatives	   Imperial	  link	   Demarcation	   Protectionism	  –	  National	  Policy	  
1896-­‐1921	   Emerging	  brokerage	   Transitional	  period	   Imperial	  link	  contested	   Bilateral	  relations	  contested	  by	  parties	  
Protectionism	  –	  Defeat	  of	  free	  trade	  in	  1911	  
1921-­‐1957	   Brokerage	   Liberals	   Imperial	  link	  receding	   Increased	  political	  and	  economic	  links	   National	  Policy	  with	  sectoral	  free	  trade,	  GATT	  
1957-­‐1963	   Emerging	  civic	  nationalism	   Conservatives	  (transitional	  period)	   Imperial	  link	  reviving	   Tension	   Revival	  of	  protectionism	  against	  the	  US	  and	  increased	  trade	  with	  Great	  Britain	  
1963-­‐1984-­‐
?	  
Civic	  nationalism:	  Strong	  state,	  multiculturalism	  
Liberals	   Imperial	  link	  extinct	   Initially	  increased	  ties,	  gradually	  increase	  of	  tension	  
After	  mid-­‐1970s	  revival	  of	  protectionism,	  seeking	  alternative	  trading	  partners	  
 
THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: GOVERNMENT CHANGE AND FTA 
 
Until 1985 the nationalist-continentalist cleavage did not correspond to the patterns 
of partisan competition – at least when it came to an aspect of it, commercial policy with 
the United States. The party system had managed to absorb the most vocal interests in 
favor of free trade into broad consensus-based coalitions – or else condemn them to 
opposition. This is particularly true of the regional cleavage, which, unlike the linguistic 
or class cleavage, ruling parties always sought to suppress or mute instead of integrating. 
Some degree of protectionism towards the US served the bridging of most major 
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important cleavages (language, political identity of the state, religion/culture, class), so 
much so that one can wonder whether it was not that the West’s free trade aspirations 
were frustrated because of the imperfect way with which the regional cleavage was 
structured by parties, but whether the very nature of the West’s demand – free trade – 
contributed to the exacerbation of the regional cleavage (McDowall 1994: 98). 
In the elections of 1984, relations with the United States were a moderately 
important issue, free trade though was nowhere on the radar. Mulroney was very vocal of 
his intentions to bring Canada closer to the United States (Booth 1988: 151). This was 
considered a handy marker-issue of Mulroney’s all-encompassing reformist message and 
his promise to change Trudeau’s ways in the economy, constitutional matters and 
relationship between communities. The elections of 1984 had a very important systemic 
result: thanks to Mulroney’s appealing promises on constitutional matters, Quebec shifted 
support to the PCs and for the first time since the 1950s the West and Quebec were 
represented within the same governing coalition. Only this time, the special weight of the 
West within this coalition was expected to be bigger, and Quebec was represented not as 
a timid element of brokerage but as a province with confident elites and specific 
constitutional and fiscal demands. The novelty of this coalition was lost amid the cascade 
of Mulroney’s victory, which represented a genuine desire for change among Canadians 
and reinforced at the time the impression of an undifferentiated electorate (Kornberg and 
Clarke 1988). Yet the institutionalization of the regional cleavage (the West) within the 
PC party, and the tactical willingness to take advantage of the national cleavage 
(Quebec), meant that these two political identities would play a decisive role in the 
working of the government (Gibbins 1988: 334). 
The first year of Mulroney’s government represented an abrupt fall from grace. His 
administration was marred by scandal and a distinct sense of helplessness (Gibbins 1988: 
337-339; Westell 1989: 2-3). His first actions were to dissociate his government from 
some of the most evident signs of Trudeau’s regime. He abolished the NEP, a key 
Western demand, and turned the FIRA from an investment-screening agency into an 
investment attraction agency (Thomas 1988: 128; Macdonald 1991: 157). On a foreign 
policy level, Mulroney’s foreign minister, Joe Clark (himself a Prime Minister in 1979-
1980 with a careful agenda of improving the Canada-US relation, Holsti 1982: 206), 
undertook to mend the ties with the powerful neighbor without undoing the essential 
normative framework of Canadian multilateralism and diplomacy (Booth 1988: 151-152). 
The new climate in Canada-US relations was sealed in the Shamrock Summit in Montreal 
in March 1985 between Mulroney and Ronald Reagan (Westell 1989: 8; Doern and 
Tomlin 1991: 25). Yet almost a year into his term, Mulroney had precious little to show 
for the two main goals he outlined in his Throne Speech: national reconciliation and 
economic development.  
The only consolation was that opposition leader John Turner was not doing much 
better; if anything, he was facing even more pressing problems leading a party in 
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disarray, divided on its future course (with Turner wanting to back away from Trudeau’s 
legacy, but the ex-Prime Minister’s shadow remaining) (Martin 2005: 175). The void was 
happily filled by NDP and its optimistic leader, Ed Broadbent. Broadbent, the most 
familiar and most popular party leader in Canada, had formulated a party strategy based 
on a mildly populist message centered on issues of integrity and distance between the big 
parties and the concerns of the electorate (Clarke et al 2000: 51). In the summer of 1987 
Broadbent and the NDP’s appeal reached its peak, when opinion polls gave it first place 
of voter intentions, with Liberals second and Tories third (Westell 1989: 14).  
The golden opportunity for Mulroney to reverse the course for his government came 
with the publication of the findings of the Macdonald Commission in September 1985. 
The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada 
had been established by Trudeau with the original aim of exploring alternatives in the 
economic model of Canada. Its chair, Donald Macdonald, had been a nationalist Liberal, 
whose attachment to an independent Canada could not be put into doubt (Clarkson 2002: 
29). The Macdonald report amounted to numerous volumes of hearings, testimonies and 
scientific research, and its recommendation to the Canadian government to engage in 
closer trade integration with the US was as close an authoritative endorsement of free 
trade as it could be. The Macdonald report supplied not only an economic rationale to 
free trade, but also an intellectual marrying between free trade and Canada’s goals as an 
independent state in North America (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 52-56). Most analysts 
agree that, for Mulroney, this was the point of personal conversion to the cause of free 
trade, as well as the golden opportunity to create a policy that would portray his pro-US 
stance in practice while showcasing his new vision for Canada (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 
29, 57; Clarkson 2002: 28-30). 
Shortly after the publication of the report, the Canadian government officially 
requested initiation of talks about trade liberalization with the United States on October 
1st (Westell 1989: 8). Negotiations began in May 1986 and lasted for more than two 
years. In the United States the issue was little more than a bleep on the news radar, even 
though Congress was very vigilant about potential repercussions of trade deals. In 
Canada however, the development of the trade negotiations was the most important item 
of the news agenda along with constitutional negotiations throughout Mulroney’s first 
term in office (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 44). Negotiations were very difficult and as late 
as the summer of 1987 they seemed doomed to fail103. Because of this it was somewhat 
surprising that in October of 1987 the Mulroney government announced that it had 
reached an agreement on a comprehensive free trade agreement with the US. On 
December 11th the full text was released and on January 2nd 1988 Reagan and Mulroney 
signed it (Welch 2005: 197). 
                                                
103 For a concise account of the obstacles and bureaucratic dynamics of the negotiation, see in general 
Doern and Tomlin (1991) and Merkin et al (1996). 
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Free trade was to capture the public’s imagination, but at around the same time 
Mulroney was making strides on the more mundane constitutional issue as well. As he 
had promised national reconciliation, Mulroney undertook to bridge the divide between 
Quebec and the rest of Canada by initiating a negotiation between the federal government 
in Ottawa and the premiers of all regions, including Quebec. Negotiations lasted 
throughout Mulroney’s term of office and produced the Meech Lake Accord (MLA) in 
April of 1987. This was a comprehensive constitutional package deal that recognized 
Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ within Canada and extended important competences to the 
regions (Westell 1989: 4-5). The MLA served the goal of imposing a wholly anti-
Trudeau solution to the question of national unity. Its focus ceased to be the central 
government, and instead shifted to an idea of unity between provinces, regions and 
communities brokered through political elites. Since it enjoyed the unequivocal support 
of a new federalist government in Quebec, the MLA seemed to be the last best hope for 
Canadian unity and for that reason it was supported also by the Liberals and the NDP, 
despite these two parties’ traditional centralist and civic Canadian nationalism104. 
With the FTA and the MLA, Mulroney had by the end of 1987 two concrete policy 
proposals to show. Both reflected the preferences of the main political identities 
institutionalized within the PCs and the party’s position within the axis of competition. 
Yet only one, free trade, became an object of partisan competition, even though the MLA 
was also a departure from previous established conceptions of Canadian nationalism. As 
we will see, foreign policy had a much better chance of not only matching the policy 
preferences of different political identities, but also of practically supporting a new 
constitutional arrangement as well. Conversely, for the opposition, the FTA was a 
convenient symbolic issue with which to seek to preserve the old ideological axis of party 
competition. 
The new FTA immediately became the object of close scrutiny in the Canadian 
media and public. Generally it was a very far-reaching document that included provisions 
holding the prospect for a thorough restructuring of the Canadian state and economy. 
Apart from gradual tariff elimination in various manufactured products, there were three 
important novelties that set this agreement apart from other similar agreements, as well as 
some of the key provisions of GATT at the time. First, the FTA liberalized many 
important sectors of agriculture and energy, a key demand of the Canadian Prairie West 
provinces that now saw the huge market to the south open up to them; second, the FTA 
liberalized services, one of the first trade agreements to include such a provision 
(Clarkson 2002: 51); and finally, third, the FTA was to establish special binational 
conflict-resolution panels that would produce binding verdicts on any differences arising 
over the implementation of the FTA (Merkin et al 1996: 259; Welch 2005: 204)105.  
                                                
104 On the Meech Lake Accord, see among others Vipond (1989). 
105 On the importance of the dispute-resolution panels as significant novelty of the agreement, see Winham 
and DeBoer-Ashworth (2002). For a presentation of the main provisions of the treaty, as well as their 
implications for Canadian economy, see Doern and Tomlin (1991: 70-99). 
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Even during the negotiation stage, the FTA had caused abrupt cleavages within 
Canadian society. Reminiscent of the intense days of national debates in the 1960s, 
Canadians of all stripes had come together to combat or support the new trade agreement. 
The most prominent supporter of the FTA in the public sphere was Canadian business, 
and particularly the Toronto financial establishment that had graduated from a stance in 
favor of protectionism; new Quebec political and economic elites, primarily centered in 
Montreal; farmers, particularly in the West; most economists in academia, as well as 
policymakers with links to the above groups. Pitted against them was a colorful alliance 
of churches (especially the Catholic Church of Canada)106, feminists, intellectuals and 
publicists with links to old nationalist organizations, unionists, especially in Ontario, and 
various grass-roots organizations with socialist and progressive leanings (Doern and 
Tomlin 1991: 208-222; Welch 2005: 199-200).  
Despite this polarization within Canadian society, the FTA escalated into an issue of 
partisan competition only gradually and in conjunction with the tactical evaluations of 
party leaders. Based on the authoritative endorsement of free trade by the Macdonald 
Commission, Mulroney framed the FTA as a policy initiative that was better serving the 
cause of Canadian independence, economic prosperity and access to international 
markets for Canadian products than the traditional mix of multilateralism and 
protectionism. As an international treaty, the Canada-US FTA was to pass through 
Parliament where the PCs had an overwhelming majority. Yet ratification of the FTA was 
to go through a roller coaster that few had foreseen when the first provisions of the 
agreement became public. 
As the party of committed internationalists like Lester Pearson, pro-US politicians 
like Laurier and King, and progressive nationalists like Trudeau  the Liberals were 
expected to be split on the question of free trade (Clarkson 2005: 155). Despite their loss 
in 1984, however, they still identified as a national party with the potential and duty to 
bridge the linguistic and the class cleavage. They had close links to the business sector 
that had grown to support free trade, yet they were also close to social strata that looked 
at a strong central government as a source of policies for economic and social integration. 
At the same time, they were also a party in disarray after going into opposition for the 
first time in 20 years. Continentalist and nationalist ideas were lurking within the party, 
and, if anything, it was thought that John Turner, with his ties to the business community 
and his effort to differentiate himself from Pierre Trudeau, would be close to the idea of 
free trade (McDowall 1994: 112; Welch 2005: 200). Yet the exact opposite is what 
happened. 
Shortly after the publication of the elements of the agreement, John Turner did what 
many thought was the unexpected and came all out against free trade (Doern and Tomlin 
1991: 230-233). The FTA was not promoting a reformulation of Canadian interests but 
was actually hurting these very interests by surrendering Canadian sovereignty to a 
                                                
106 On Canada’s Catholic Church’s left-wing turn after World War II, see Lipset (1990: 88). 
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continental framework dominated by the Americans and by diluting the distinct Canadian 
nature of governance symbolized in an advanced welfare state. In essence Turner thought 
that discussion about FTA was not about two contending interpretations of a commonly 
understood Canadian interest, but about two different understandings of what Canada is 
and wants altogether (Clarkson 1989: 33-34). In summer of 1988 John Turner put his 
strategy into practice by ordering the Liberal members of the Senate to block ratification 
of the FTA (Clarkson 2005: 145). Faced with institutional deadlock, Mulroney had no 
option but to call elections for November 1988 with the express goal of getting the FTA 
ratified.  
The elections of 1988 were the first in Canadian history to be dominated so much by 
a single issue. Free trade became the obvious tangible stake of the election107. Voting for 
the PCs meant endorsing eventual ratification of the agreement. Turner on the other hand 
had vowed to ‘tear up’ the agreement. Amidst all the apocalyptic talk about the dangers 
the FTA presented to Canada’s independence and its ability to sustain distinct 
socioeconomic policies, Turner’s opposition to free trade was more nuanced. Being a 
governing party, the Liberals had to balance their opposition to the FTA with a 
constructive policy of Canada-US relations that also appealed to wider segments of the 
Canadian population than the core anti-free trade constituency (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 
232). Paradoxically, this nuanced position was linked more with a principled anti-free 
trade position than the one of the NDP, which tried to embed its complete rejection of 
any economic integration scheme with the United States within a general message of 
economic justice and good governance. In terms of foreign policy, the major departure 
for the NDP was its assurance not to institute Canada’s promised departure from NATO 
in its first term in office (Whitehorn 1989: 46-49; Doern and Tomlin 1991: 233-235).  
As the campaign kicked off the Tories were in a position of inherent strength108: 
Their standing in the polls had improved markedly thanks to the MLA, which had won 
praise from all sides of the political and linguistic divide, and the FTA, which at the time 
of signing had the support of half of the population (more than enough for a party to win 
a parliamentary majority in a first-past-the-post system) (Johnston et al 1992: 144-145). 
This pattern was radically upset by the televised Anglophone debate between the three 
party leaders. Most expected Ed Broadbent to capitalize on his party’s strong standing 
and secure NDP’s place as a big player. However John Turner surprised everyone again. 
He forced a heated exchange with Mulroney on the issue of free trade that framed the 
FTA as a choice between an independent Canada and a province of the USA. Mulroney 
caught up with the challenge and the result was a relentless back and forth on the 
                                                
107 As has been argued, very rarely in Canadian history has a single issue dominated so much a campaign as 
did the FTA in 1988: 89% of the voters cited free trade as the most important issue of the election (Maser 
1989: 55; Clarke et al 2000: 55) – not only that, but the FTA was not a valence issue, i.e. an issue where the 
goals were widely shared among all parties but where they disagreed on the methods (e.g. the economy), 
but a substantial issue, a question of ‘for’ or ‘against’ (Pammett 1989: 122-124; Clarke and Kornberg 1992: 
39; Clarke et al 2000: 54-55). 
108 For a concise account of the campaign period, see Johnston et al (1992: ch. 1). 
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meaning of the FTA for the future and character of the country (Maser 1989: 62-63). In 
this way the debate became a turning point of the campaign. It turned the FTA from a 
policy issue into a monumental decision of different visions about Canada, and it 
established the Liberals as the sole serious standard-bearer of nationalism in the Canadian 
campaign.  
The immediate result of the debate was an upheaval of the patterns of the campaign. 
Opinion polls showed an explosion of Liberal support that catapulted them to first place 
(Johnston et al 1992: 27-28). The NDP again clearly became the third party of Canadian 
politics. The Tories were shaken out of their complacency and Mulroney was forced into 
a more aggressive and symbolic defense of the FTA (Clarkson 2005: 150). Turner 
delivered with even more vehemence his opposition to the FTA as a contradiction to 
Canada’s basic interests of independence and unity109. However Turner’s message started 
to become stale and it offered no viable alternative. The result of the elections did not 
look much different than what would have been considered possible two months before, 
however the dynamics of the campaign brought about a much more intense discussion on 
the FTA and its linkage with the Canadian model of union and the nature of Canadian 
nationalism. 
 
Table 10 
Canadian General Election 1988 
 Parties	   Vote	  Share	   Seats	  Progressive	  Conservatives	   43.0	  %	   169	  Liberals	   31.9	  %	   83	  New	  Democratic	  Party	   20.4	  %	   43	  Others	   4.7	  %	   -­‐	  Total	   100	  %	   295	  
 
Adapted from Martin (2005) and www.elections.ca 
 
The outcome of the 1988 election seemed to usher in a new era of systemic patterns 
of competition. The binary pattern seemed to sustain its challenges, as the NDP was 
safely coerced into the left corner of the party spectrum and proved unable, even under 
the most favorable circumstances, to present itself as a valid alternative for government 
                                                
109 Most typical is the now infamous anti-FTA commercial of the Liberals that showed two trade 
‘negotiators’ erasing on a map the borderline between Canada and the US (Krause 1989: 22; Welch 2005: 
205). 
 
 
 113 
office. Yet the elections also seemed to redefine the meaning of the anchor around which 
this essentially binary competition revolved. Party strategies had turned the issue of 
economic relations with the US, and the contestation of the meaning of Canadian goals 
like independence and prosperity, into a question of two contending visions of national 
unity. A unitary vision of a Canada identified with visible federal policies versus a 
decentralized vision of economic power delegated to the market and political power 
delegated to the provinces. Even though the FTA had been presented as an ideological 
issue of pan-Canadian interest, the victory of the Tories ensured that the issue was used 
for the creation of a new normative definition of national unity. Coupled with the MLA, 
the FTA had brought about the breaking down of a unitary language of politics in 
Canada. The PC coalition seemed to bridge both the regional and the linguistic cleavage, 
however for the first time in history a governing party was doing this without a firm 
foothold in the normative center of Canadian politics, Anglophone central Canada 
(Johnston et al 1992: 110). In 1988, with the FTA sanctioned in the ballot box and the 
MLA on its way to ratification by provincial parliaments, it seemed like Mulroney had 
built a formidable coalition.  
 
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND 
DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION 
 
The free trade story of the 1980s begins in the 1960s, when two important 
realignments in the party system took place. The first one considered the change of the 
relationship between the main parties and the regional cleavage. Up until then, the 
Liberals were the main beneficiaries of the votes and seats of the two regional extremes 
of the country, the West (British Columbia and Prairies) and Atlantic East (Maritime 
provinces). Since the 19th century, the West had been alienated from the Tories, the then 
established and founding party of Canada identified with a tariff policy that forced the 
Western provinces to consume expensive manufactured products from Central Canada 
and to trade its agricultural products with the rest of Canada without any price supports. 
With the election of John Diefenbaker of Saskatchewan as leader of the opposition, the 
Tories at once became the party of discontent. After the Diefenbaker years, the West 
largely lent its support to the Tories (Johnston et al 1992: 56-59). 
The second key development of the 1960s concerned the Quiet Revolution in 
Quebec, which brought to the foreground the linguistic/ethnic cleavage. The nationalist 
elites that sprang out of the Quiet Revolution eventually split into a federalist and a 
separatist faction during the 1970s. In electoral terms the Quiet Revolution did not 
change much in national politics – Quebec remained a bastion of Liberal support. This 
support, however, put different kinds of demands on the Liberals and the Canadian party 
system altogether. As the character of the linguistic cleavage changed, and Quebec’s 
problem transformed from one of cultural/religious peculiarity to one of nationalistic 
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awakening, any party’s fortunes in Quebec and its claim to status of guarantor of national 
unity were dependent on its delivering on the issue of the constitutional structure of 
Canada. 
In the new party system formed in the 1960s, and which continued into the early 
1980s, the Tories were in a position of structural weakness. The creation of the pro-free 
trade coalition of the 1980s can be traced to the dimension of competition that 
condemned the Tories in the party system of the 1960s and 1970s and their concurrent 
effort to energize cleavages that might push them out of this predicament. In effect, the 
signature policies of Trudeau’s Liberals (bilingualism and multiculturalism, state 
intervention, economic protectionism and anti-American foreign policy) created such 
adverse forces among the Conservatives that the free trade coalition of the 1980s can be 
considered as much as a Mulroney creation as a Trudeau one. 
As we have seen, Trudeau’s project had an inescapable international dimension. It 
was taking place in an era of vexing discussions about US involvement in the Canadian 
economy. Trudeau’s nation-building project was galvanized by targeting US investment, 
as for example with the creation of FIRA in the mid-1970s. Trudeau reversed the 
traditional decentralisation of Canadian liberalism and instead identified the creation of a 
new progressive Canadian identity with an activist welfare state and a rebalancing of 
Canadian federalism (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 17). The traditional Liberal brokerage 
gave way to a conscious divisive strategy on behalf of Trudeau along the regional 
cleavage (Cooper 2002: 104). Trudeau matched his grand constitutional project with an 
endorsement of the Third Option, and instituted the NEP, which allowed the central 
government to harness the rich energy resources of the West (especially Alberta). All of 
these policies were deemed essential for Trudeau’s program, reflected the position of his 
party along the main cleavages, galvanized his coalition, but also deeply insulted the 
West, heightened tensions with the US and resulted in a policy of high deficits, high 
inflation and passionate politics that deepened the ethnic and regional divides. 
The Tories gradually adjusted their opposition strategy according to their position 
within the new axis of competition. First came Trudeau’s multiculturalism: Even though 
the Tories ascribed to bilingualism as recognition of the new self-awareness of Quebec, 
they remained committed to a view of society that was more akin to the ‘traditional 
Canadian mosaic’ – meaning that different groups and communities had to be respected 
and represented as distinct entities (Christian and Campbell 1974: 109). This old-
fashioned conservatism was matched with the PCs’ new identification with periphery 
interests: while the Liberals turned from a party of the provinces into a party of central 
government, the Tories made the opposite move from a party of central authority into a 
party of the provinces and the geographical extremes (Gibbins 1988: 336).  
The state activism, economic protectionism and centralism of the Trudeau years 
were seen as a divisive mix that increased the distance between central Canada and the 
periphery. The PCs for example opposed the NEP, a veritable symbol of Trudeau’s bias 
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against the West. Even though they were not yet ready to renounce the National Policy 
(another key Western demand), they had however started moving now against principled 
protectionism. Another interesting reversal was that, whereas they had always been the 
party of the Imperial connection, the PCs positioned themselves against Trudeau’s anti-
American overtones (Johnston et al 1992: 67-68; Martin 2005: 162). Finally, knitting all 
these policy reversals together, in the early 1980s the PCs followed the path of other 
conservative parties in the Anglo-Saxon world. With state activism and protectionism 
clearly failing to stave off a recession in the early 1980s, the Tories focused on a message 
of economic renewal with more emphasis on the market and liberalization of the 
economy (Smith et al 1988: 48-49). 
When Brian Mulroney became leader of the PCs in 1983 then, the party already had 
a general anti-Trudeau agenda in place. The Tories, however, were still significantly 
inhibited on the linguistic cleavage. The Liberals continued to base their sustained first-
and-national-party status on solid Quebec majorities in national elections. Mulroney won 
the Conservative leadership contest on an explicit promise to deliver Quebec110. In this 
way, the PCs now had a credible alternative to the Liberals on the national question that 
also fell in line with their position on the other cleavages (decentralism and smaller role 
of the state): By promising a vague ‘national reconciliation’, Mulroney courted Quebec 
separatists with the promise that he could give them a different accommodation model 
within Canada than Trudeau’s individualist multiculturalism (Robertson 1985: 27).  
By the mid-1980s the party system dynamics and partisan adaptation strategies had 
brought about a realignment of expression of cleavages within parties that made the 
Conservatives a formidable free trade coalition. They were now a party with a neoliberal 
agenda of economic reform. They were now also a party with an ideological affinity for 
better relations with the US, something which made not only political but also economic 
sense. US trade and investments were supposed to supplant statist activism as a motor of 
economic growth (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 29-30), and were especially appealing to the 
Western part of the country. State downsizing meant increasing the role for the provinces, 
which also meant bigger incentives for each province to explore North-South economic 
links. This rebalancing of center-province relations also spoke to Mulroney’s vague 
project of ‘national reconciliation’, as it held out the prospect of incorporating Quebec as 
a separate quasi-state entity in a new constitutional arrangement (Johnston et al 1992: 72-
73).  
Already in 1984-85, free trade seemed like a project that was perfectly consistent 
with the ruling coalition’s rooting in all major Canadian cleavages (socioeconomic, 
regional, linguistic) and with this rooting’s commensurate domestic policy vision of 
economic growth and a new model of national integration. Yet Mulroney had been 
                                                
110 ‘There are 102 ridings in the country with a Francophone population over 10 per cent. In the last 
elections the Liberals won 100 of them, we won two. You give Pierre Trudeau a head start of 100 seats and 
he’s going to beat you 10 times out of 10’ (quoted in Johnston et al 1992: 170). 
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elected as leader of the PCs on an anti-free trade platform. For a year in office he 
oscillated even though Trudeau had experimented with sectoral free trade before him 
(Doern and Tomlin 1991: 23). The Tories were always the party of the National Policy, a 
party of national integration that was traditionally afraid of continental integration. 
Mulroney could have moved towards free trade from the beginning but balked. On the 
other hand, he did not need to do so either – free trade promised to be a divisive issue, as 
it had always been in Canadian politics (Welch 2005: 201). What finally made him 
change his mind?  
The decisive point is generally acknowledged to be the publication of the Macdonald 
Report in late 1985 (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 24). One year into his reign, his 
government was marred by scandals and signs of incompetence. They had been elected in 
an historic landslide in 1984 on a general mandate of economic reform and national unity 
that seemed to have the approval of every major Canadian social group (McDowall 1994: 
109). Until 1985 Mulroney had nothing to show for all this. The Macdonald report 
changed everything. First and foremost, the report provided a national argument in favor 
of free trade. It countered the established orthodoxy that free trade was detrimental to 
Canadian independence. Instead, by holding out the prospect for more economic growth 
and a more equitable distribution of benefits to all provinces, free trade was deemed by 
the Macdonald report to be able to practically support the two key aspects of the 
Conservative vision of domestic reform: a stronger economy, and a new model of 
decentralized national integration (Welch 2005: 199). The report was also a powerful 
instigator within the North American framework of emerging ideas about regional 
integration as a response to trends around the world (Marchildon 1994: 10-11). 
In the summer of 1985, with the findings of the Macdonald Commission now final 
and public, Mulroney was quoted as saying that he would use free trade to beat Liberal 
opposition leader John Turner (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 29). Free trade spoke to acute 
party systemic pressures on the Conservatives. Their strong national mandate from 1984 
was proving to be an illusion. The Mulroney coalition was no natural agent of national 
integration like the Trudeau one (Johnston et al 1992: 36). Instead, by virtue of its 
position on the regional and linguistic cleavages, it was dependent on the two Canadian 
regions most afar from each other on constitutional matters. Apart from a common 
aversion to strong centralist policies, the West and Quebec were bitterly divided on 
multiculturalism, social outlook and constitutional preferences (Robertson 1985: 35-36). 
But there was one issue the two Conservative pillars could agree on: free trade 
(McDowall 1994: 110-111). The West had graduated from an agrarian region dependent 
on price support in the 1960s, to a region aggressively looking for markets for its 
agricultural products and its energy resources (Gilpin 1974: 866). Quebec had gone from 
a closed clericalist and agrarian society in the 1950s to a modern sophisticated economy 
with interest in closer integration with the continental market.  
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Given the inherent instability of this coalition, free trade promised not only to stitch 
together the West and Quebec as the two most free trade-friendly regions, but also to alter 
the stakes of competition altogether by giving teeth to the as yet vague project of 
‘national reconciliation’. By choosing to identify his coalition with all-out free trade with 
the United States, Mulroney was essentially opting for the building of a ‘hyper-
brokerage’ coalition between the social and constitutional extreme regions of Canada 
(Cross 2002: 117). In this way, the PCs were not moving along the existing axis of 
competition; in effect they were aiming to yet again reformulate the normative anchor of 
party competition. A pan-Canadian civic and ideological vision of politics had served the 
Liberals in the past. Now the Conservatives were looking to benefit from their ability to 
deliver on the question of which party could mediate better between distinct regional 
interests.  
In 1987 the two signature policies that would come to define the first term of 
Mulroney’s government had been formulated. The Meech Lake accord codified the 
constitutional preferences of the Tory coalition: increased powers for the regions, an 
elected Senate (both Western demands) and a ‘distinct society’ status for Quebec. All of 
these policies served the basic cleavage-informed preferences of the Tories: downsizing 
of the federal state, group-based integration of regional demands and quasi-statehood for 
Quebec. However consistent with Mulroney’s vision of group-based negotiated 
federalism, of which his own party would be the broker, these policies pitted the West 
against Quebec in many ways. In late 1987 this contradiction could be resolved with the 
unveiling of the external complement of this domestic arrangement: the Canada-US FTA 
(Johnston et al 1992: 105-107). With Meech Lake and FTA the Tories were now firmly 
redefining the stakes of party competition on a regional basis in accordance with the 
political identities institutionalized within them. Once prisoners of binary competition, 
they were now hoping to see foreign policy make them beneficiaries of it. 
By the same token, Liberal opposition to the FTA and the use of free trade as a 
differentiating marker between the two parties only became conceivable when the issue 
was seen impacting on the systemic organizing order of party competition. John Turner 
had preempted Mulroney’s redefinition of the question of national unity by supporting 
the MLA (as the NDP had done as well for the same reasons). Yet this decision was far 
from uncontroversial within his own party, as members of the Trudeau-ite wing (and 
among them, Turner’s competitor for party leadership, Jean Chretien) were 
uncomfortable with this policy of fragmentation of the civic identity of Canadians 
(Clarkson 1989: 31; Maser 1989: 60). But Turner could hope that by neutralizing the 
constitutional issue, party competition would focus on issues of performance and 
efficiency of the government. The FTA presented a new danger to the Liberals – and a 
bigger opportunity to Turner: it threatened to institutionalize a language of regional 
brokerage and provincial opportunities as the stake of political competition, thus 
inhibiting ideological parties identified with centralist, pan-Canadian policies. The 
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opportunity for Turner was that opposition to the FTA could unite his party behind the 
effort to reenergize the progressive and protectionist coalition of the 1970s and so 
resurrect the language of unitary pan-Canadian politics that had served Trudeau in the 
past (Clarkson 2005: 145).  
 
FTA, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW 
DIMENSION OF COMPETITION 
 
The choice for complete free trade with the United States represented a major change 
in the patterns of Canadian foreign policy. Not only did it break with the orthodoxy of 
foreign policy that had reigned until that point, but it also went way beyond any 
alternatives had been hitherto proposed – such as sectoral trade integration. Such a 
change would not have a chance to be successfully implemented if it did not prove to be a 
viable reformulation of the institutionalized interests that Canadian foreign policy was 
preserving, namely independence and commercial prosperity. Yet, normative 
reevaluation of these interests reinforced an agenda of domestic reform: the prospect of 
the FTA was in close congruence with an integrated policy set aimed at domestic 
rebalancing between the central government and the provinces, and between the state and 
the market (Clarkson 2005: 163). In this way, the content and the timing of the FTA, as 
well as opposition to it, cannot be understood in isolation from the domestic preferences, 
interests and combinations of the political identities partisan actors represented.  
The main change lay in the incorporation of Québécois interests in a governing 
coalition on a completely new basis than what it had been until then. Mulroney’s promise 
of national reconciliation sounded welcome but vague in most parts of the country, but in 
Quebec it had a very specific meaning: Mulroney drew the main bulk of his support from 
elites lured by the promise of a constitutional arrangement that would guarantee a 
separate collective recognition of Quebec within Canada – an anathema to Trudeau’s 
individualistic concept of Canadian nationality. The Francophone pillar of the Mulroney 
coalition matched this new idea of Canadian unity with specific continentalist preferences 
in economic policy: the United States was both an attractive market and the framework of 
North America was deemed less constraining for the development of Québécois identity.  
Mulroney tried to bridge all these different domestic preferences in the MLA: the 
accord gave Quebec the ‘distinct society’ status its political elites (both separatist and 
federalist) so much craved, while it extended powers to the provinces, thus satisfying the 
demands of resource-rich Western provinces like Alberta. Yet the MLA was only a 
temporary solution for Mulroney. It essentially codified two contradictory sets of 
domestic preferences, as the West despised the preferential treatment Quebec had been 
receiving all these years. Furthermore, the MLA was endorsed by the Liberals as well as 
by the NDP, thus its value as a marker of Mulroney’s achievements was neutralized. Free 
trade with the United States, however, promised to solve both of these predicaments. The 
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publication of the Macdonald report must be seen in a party-competition context as the 
turning point in which Mulroney saw the emergence of a new normative anchor of party 
competition and the strategic retreat of the PCs around two limited but reliable pillars of 
support (Quebec and the West) as the solution to the question of heterogeneity within his 
coalition (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 227). From late 1985 onwards, the PC coalition was 
no longer an alternative manager of Canada’s problems, but the arena within which a 
completely new evaluation of these problems (both domestic and foreign) was being 
made. This transformation was complete by late 1987, when both the MLA and the FTA 
were finalized: the FTA promised to embed the new model of Canadian federalism 
within a framework that offered more opportunities to the provinces.  
Once the election campaign of 1988 started, the Tories framed free trade as being 
part of a general theme of ‘change’. ‘Managing change’ was to be the main characteristic 
of both the PCs and Mulroney personally. On the one hand, it pointed to past 
achievements such as strong economic growth and constitutional harmony. On the other 
hand, and most importantly, it portrayed a future of opportunities for a united and 
prosperous Canada. It was obvious that the FTA was presented as an achievement as 
much as the Meech Lake accord, both proofs that ‘the party had the vision, a leader and a 
team capable of meeting domestic and international challenges’ (Krause 1989: 16). 
Conservative advertising became more partisan after the polarizing Anglophone debate, 
however the general framework of packaging the FTA within a consistent setup of policy 
successes and governing principles for the future of Canada was maintained. The link 
between FTA and Meech Lake was the guiding principle of the Tory campaign 
throughout: Mulroney’s achievement and promise was a Canada that was ‘united’ and 
‘prosperous’ (Maser 1989: 56).  
John Turner’s decision to tie his and his party’s fortunes to the opposition to free 
trade should not necessarily be seen as an a priori inescapable outcome. Turner himself 
oscillated before reading the FTA, reaching the conclusion that it was bad for Canada and 
framing it as a threat to Canada’s distinct identity and independence. For Turner, 
opposition to the FTA offered the opportunity to preserve the normative anchor of 
national unity that had allowed the Liberals to dominate Canadian politics for most of the 
20th century. As long as these were the stakes of the normative anchor of national unity, 
the Liberals’ position of strength was assured. The link between the FTA and a new 
model of national unity meant that Turner could frame opposition to free trade as part of 
a distinct vision of national unity. 
John Turner addressed many problems at once with his decision to vocally oppose 
the FTA. He addressed his perceived leadership deficit, he united his party and he chose 
an issue that promised to put the Tories in the defensive and yet again corner the New 
Democrats on the left. Turner’s decision after 1984 to break with Trudeau’s nationalist 
legacy was expressed in his agreement to the Meech Lake accord and the attribution of 
‘distinct society’ status to Quebec (Clarkson 2005: 138-139). This was a conscious 
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decision on behalf of a party whose strength had always been to bridge the two linguistic 
communities, however it also was very divisive within the party (Johnston et al 1992: 
106). After 1984, and Mulroney’s sweep of Quebec, dealing with Quebec as a distinct 
political entity was the new rule of the game. Turner recognized this, however his 
decision was not well received by the proponents of the old policy of multiculturalism 
and bilingualism who opposed any special status for Quebec – most notably, Trudeau 
himself (Westell 1989: 5). Agreeing to Meech Lake was Turner’s hope that he could 
neutralize Mulroney’s advantage on ‘national reconciliation’ (Johnston et al 1992: 249). 
On the other hand, the cleavages represented within the Liberal party also bore the 
seeds of opportunity: Liberal identifiers were far less divided on commercial policy, 
where both Québécois and non-Québécois ones were consistently more anti-US than 
Conservatives; and on economic policies, where they were both close to fairly centrist 
positions (Johnston et al 1992: 102-104). If with Meech Lake Turner had conceded that 
the game was played on Mulroney’s terms, free trade promised to reenergize an axis of 
competition defined by socioeconomic matters and put forth a discussion about Canada 
that would supplant the interpretation of the question of national unity as successful 
brokerage among regions with one as the creation of an acceptable civic socioeconomic 
identity, slightly to the left of centre (Clarkson 2005: 145). The fact that opposition to the 
FTA placated nationalists within the party and could rally it behind Turner was a further 
proof of how the issue served the Liberals’ systemically defined goals (Doern and Tomlin 
1991: 231-232). The hope was that on an issue where the public was almost equally 
divided (Johnston et al 1992: 107-108), the Liberals would deconstruct the Tories’ self-
image as guarantors of national unity and neutralize the effect of the NDP from the left.  
In this vain, the Liberals, made the link between free trade and domestic policies 
explicit. For the Liberals the FTA represented a direct threat to everything Canada stood 
for and an identity that was by and large created by the Liberals themselves during their 
long years in power. The Liberals identified the threat to Canada’s welfare state and 
social programs such as the comprehensive health insurance system and other provisions 
(Young 1989: 52-53; Johnston et al 1992: 154-155). Opposition to the FTA was part of a 
generally progressive electoral platform that included among others tough new 
environmental laws, new tax policies and tax breaks on mortgages (Maser 1989: 56). The 
Liberals identified the main differences between Canada and the United States with 
socioeconomic issues, and thus the FTA served to renew the Liberals’ old winning 
strategy of identifying socially progressive policies with a pan-Canadian vision of 
Canadian nationalism and civic identity: 
 
‘The Mulroney trade deal will fundamentally alter our way of life. The Mulroney 
trade deal endangers our social programmes and regional development programmes, 
and sacrifices our farmers, our industries, our fishermen, our miners, our lumber 
workers, our auto workers and our textile workers to satisfy Brian Mulroney’s desire to 
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fulfill the American dream. I will not let Brian Mulroney, by a stroke of the pen, sell out 
our sovereignty, our national heritage, our distinctive cultural identity […] [A] vote for 
the Liberal party is a vote for a stronger, fairer, more independent, unique, strong, proud 
Canada’111. 
  
The Liberals’ pattern of opposition did not only reflect their old policy commitments 
to the expansion of the Canadian state, but also their identification with a Canadian 
identity that spans provincial borders and is based on a clear-cut demarcation from the 
United States. Essentially, the Liberals attempted to shift the debate along the old axis of 
competition that had served them so well in the past. Opposition to the FTA was an 
accurate reflection of the Liberals’ position on the axis of competition. Just as the FTA 
promised to stitch closer the Tory coalition, Turner hoped that opposition to it would 
reenergize the coalition of voters that was in favor of a visible central government, of the 
welfare state and of a unitary conception of Canadian identity. For a party associated so 
much with Canada’s existing social and economic arrangements, a change in foreign 
policy of this magnitude represented an important threat because it would alter the terms 
of domestic debate altogether.  
For the NDP the FTA also represented a threat to the normative anchor of unitary 
ideological politics the party was moving along. Indeed, the FTA was a bad issue for the 
party on many accounts. As an issue that redefined the question of Canadian unity into a 
question of communitarian and geographical brokerage, it inhibited the NDP, which was 
historically weak in Quebec and had always sought to suppress agrarian Prairie populism 
under an ideological socialist message. As an issue that could cause a nationalist backlash 
amongst progressive, anti-American Canadians, it threatened to galvanize polarization 
between Tories and Liberals and to leave the NDP as a third-rank afterthought (Doern 
and Tomlin 1991: 234). In other words, the FTA threatened to create a new language of 
politics that would leave the NDP structurally weakened – but defending the language of 
pan-Canadian nationalism also threatened to strengthen the Liberals as the more effective 
standard-bearer of progressive Canadian identity (Johnston et al 1992: 108-109). 
Between the two, the NDP, which had already accepted the MLA and so had already 
made an effort to break out of its linguistic and class fortress, chose to follow a middle 
course of a message of ideological renewal hoping to capitalize on its leader’s positive 
image. To be sure, the NDP made the argument that the FTA threatened Canada’s 
national character, but it tried to use the issue of free trade as a link to other issues it felt 
it had an advantage on (such as the environment or healthcare) (Whitehorn 1989: 48).  
When it became obvious that the FTA had become the main issue, the New 
Democrats had little choice but to identify with the ‘no’ side and take recourse to their 
old nationalist and pan-Canadian identity. They began calling the Tories the party of Wall 
Street and faithful servants of American interests that were diluting Canada’s distinctive 
                                                
111 Turner’s speech blueprint, quoted in Maser (1989: 58-59). 
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characteristics, and in a desperate effort to escape the Liberals’ shadow they identified 
Turner with Bay Street (the Canadian Wall Street in Toronto) as well. In this way, the 
NDP was reinvigorating the old link between progressivism and nationalism it 
traditionally embodied. At the same time, however, once it resorted to this it became 
obvious that its dreams of breaking out of its bastion in the left were over: 
 
‘The priorities of John Turner and Brian Mulroney are the same – they are the 
priorities of Wall Street or Bay Street. The priorities of New Democrats are your 
priorities’ 112. 
 
The dynamics of the campaign and Turner’s successful bid to polarize over the 
question of the FTA as a choice of a model of Canadian unity left the NDP with even less 
of a prospect of breaking out of its structural position on the left of the socioeconomic 
axis and on the English side of the language divide. Trying to preserve the existing 
normative anchor of pan-Canadian ideological politics by defending Canadian 
progressive identity was the best defensive strategy available. 
The translation of the issue of free trade into a value and question of the model of 
national unity impacted the alignment of identities through political parties and, 
consequently, the direction and meaning of party competition. By being framed 
deliberately by partisan actors as a choice between a Canada of provinces and 
communities, or a unitary and centralist Canada, the FTA cemented, accelerated or halted 
specific alignments of political identities within parties, thus giving rise to a new 
language of politics.  
The interaction of the free trade issue with the new normative anchor of brokerage 
politics became sharply evident in the election campaign – revealing the Tories’ strength 
in their devoted power bases but also foreshadowing the fragility of their coalition. The 
intense back-and-forth between nationalist Quebecois PC politicians like Lucien Buchard 
(later leader of the separatist Bloc Quebecois) and Ontario Premier David Peterson of the 
Liberals highlighted the advent of regional politics and the clear geographical 
underpinnings of the free trade issue. Whereas Buchard called the FTA a chance for 
Quebec that threatened to be denied by the negative stance of selfish Ontario (Martin 
1994: 158-159), Petersen himself accused Buchard of plotting the disintegration of 
Canada (an allusion to the latter’s pro-sovereignty stance in the 1980 referendum). ‘I 
think it’s destructive to the fabric of this country to pit region against region’, he said 
(Maser 1989: 66). Buchard’s region-centric viewpoint was undoubtedly shared by 
Westerner Canadians as well, whereas Peterson expressed the typical pan-Canadian 
identity prevalent in Ontario. Alberta premier Lougheed struck similar tones in his 
support for free trade. Also engaging with Peterson, he made the point that a rejection of 
free trade because of Ontario’s denial would fatally harm national unity. In his view, the 
                                                
112 Broadbent in Toronto, quoted in Maser 1989: 71. 
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FTA represented the best chance for the Canadian periphery to take part in national 
wealth as much as Central Canada, a point made by the Macdonald Commission as well 
(Doern and Tomlin 1991: 52)113. As for Mulroney himself, his image as a guarantor of 
national unity would not allow him to engage in petty region-bashing; yet, he did not fail 
to point attention to Ontario’s export-led growth and the apparent inconsistency with that 
province’s elites’ opposition to the FTA (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 227): 
 
‘Prosperity means the same thing in Alberta as it does in Quebec […] Mr. Turner 
wants to isolate Canada, to have us alone and vulnerable in a changing world. We have a 
plan to secure your future, to build a stronger, more sovereign Canada’114. 
 
Quebec was the crucial battleground for the attainment of Mulroney’s set of goals, 
and there the dynamics of the connection between Meech Lake and the FTA were the 
most evident. Liberal Premier Bourassa went out of his way to support Mulroney, not 
only due to the links of the Quebec Liberal Party with the Quebec business class, but also 
due to his willingness to see the Meech Lake accord, which granted Quebec the much 
craved ‘distinct society’ status, implemented. Quebec sovereignists on the other hand 
were already part of the Mulroney coalition since 1984, as in him they found a possible 
alternative to Trudeau’s policies. This allowed the Parti Quebecois to actually overcome 
the resistance of affiliated trade unions against the FTA and throw its lot behind the 
agreement. The interplay between free trade and the question of national unity becomes 
even clearer if one compares the attitude of Quebec with that of Ontario, a province with 
similar patterns of economic links to the United States but which went against the FTA as 
a policy threatening Canada’s existence115. The result was an even greater win for the 
PCs in Quebec, despite losing support everywhere else in the country – clearly free trade 
allowed them to harness support from both sides of the main cleavage within Quebec.  
Not exactly the outcome of principled personal beliefs, the undercurrent of Ontario-
bashing seemed to stem naturally from the exigencies of Mulroney’s strategy of bridging 
divergent regional interests. The conclusion was inescapable: free trade was bound to rely 
on and further enhance a province-based view of Canadian politics. Mulroney did not fail 
to draw a direct link between Meech Lake and the FTA. In Montreal for example he 
stated that a Liberal government would ‘kill’ both accords, thus establishing yet again the 
                                                
113 In 1991 Macdonald himself justified free trade on national-unity grounds as well, pointing to the way 
trade in energy placated the West after the divisive policies of Trudeau that sought to divert rents of energy 
resources from the US to Ottawa (Macdonald 1991: 157). 
114 Quoted in Maser (1989: 72). 
115 For an exciting account of the way political forces inside Quebec treated the free trade issue, see Martin 
(1994). He sees the eventual bipartisan consensus in favor of free trade as the result of interaction between 
economic interests represented by the two main Quebec parties and their different views on Quebec 
nationalism. Differently than what happened in English Canada, in Quebec the national/linguistic cleavage 
actually suppressed contestation of the FTA. As Martin writes, ‘from the point of view of Quebec 
nationalism, the Meech Lake Accord and free trade must be understood in tandem’ (ibid: 159). 
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practical and conceptual connection between the two agreements (Maser 1989: 68). This 
strategy was controversial but effective: Pammett’s data (1989: 126-127) revealed clear 
regional patters of support for the FTA, and showed that the two provinces where the PCs 
won decisively (Alberta and Quebec) were also the ones where the FTA was the most 
supported and was considered the most important issue. Pammett also shows (ibid: 124) 
that among the voters who cited free trade as the most important issue, the PCs net lost 
8.3% among vote-switchers, but maintained a huge advantage among voters who stuck 
with their 1984 party choice. The net result was the PCs retaining a solid plurality among 
FTA issue voters. The combined effect of these two developments points to the 
importance of the FTA as a polarizing issue that contributed to the erosion of the huge 
Tory majority of 1984, but also galvanized PC support around a hard pro-free trade core 
centered in Quebec and the West. 
 
Table 11: Quebec results in 1984 and 1988 with difference,  
Canada and English Canada 1984 and 1988 seat results Parties	   Quebec:	   1984	   1988	   Difference	   Canada	  1988	   English	  Canada	  seats	   1984	   1988	  PCs	   Seats	   58	   63	   +5	   169	   	   153	   106	  Vote%	   50.2	   52.7	   +2.5%	   	   	   	  Liberals	   Seats	   17	   12	   -­‐5	   83	   23	   71	  Vote%	   35.4	   30.3	   -­‐5.1%	   	   	   	  NDP	   Seats	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   43	   30	   43	  Vote%	   8.8	   14.4	   +5.6%	   	   	   	  
 
Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca 
 
Table 12: Elections results in the Western Provinces, 1984-1988 	   BC	   AB	   SK	   MN	   Total	  West	   Dif.	  Parties	   	   1984	   1988	   1984	   1988	   1984	   1988	   1984	   1988	   1984	   1988	   	  PCs	   Seats	   19	   12	   21	   25	   9	   4	   9	   7	   58	   48	   -­‐10	  	   Vote%	   46.6	   35.3	   68.8	   51.8	   41.7	   36.4	   43.2	   36.9	   	   	   	  NDP	   Seats	   8	   19	   -­‐	   1	   5	   10	   4	   2	   17	   32	   +15	  	   Vote%	   35.1	   37.0	   14.1	   17.4	   38.4	   44.2	   27.2	   21.3	   	   	   	  Liberals	   Seats	   1	   1	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   1	   5	   2	   6	   +4	  	   Vote%	   16.4	   20.4	   12.7	   13.7	   18.2	   18.2	   21.8	   36.5	   	   	   	  Total	   	   28	   32	   21	   26	   14	   14	   14	   14	   77	   86	   +9	  
 
Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca 
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The results of this strategy were evident in Ontario, the industrial heartland of 
Canada, the cradle of the National Policy and the hub of the diverse, urban, welfare-
minded and immigrant strata that formed the pillar of the nationalist coalition of the 
Liberals in the 1970s (Gilpin 1974: 861-862). Despite falling victim to Mulroney’s 
charms in 1984, by 1988 the Liberals were back on course to claim prominence in the 
province as they had before the Tory tide. The polarization over free trade may have split 
the anti-free trade vote between the Liberals and the NDP, but Turner’s strategy had 
reinvigorated traditional pro-Liberal strata and the party had found its own pillar of 
support in the emerging party system of regional brokerage (Johnston et al 1992: 192). 
Indeed, Ontario’s opposition to free trade was almost beyond belief, given the province’s 
vibrant economic fortunes at the time. This was further proof of the interaction between 
region, economy and the national question in structuring the response to the free trade 
issue. Despite the endorsement of NAFTA by the Liberals in the 1990s, their protracted 
electoral dominance and their claim to national party status was based on their strength in 
Ontario, itself a product of Turner’s nationalistic campaign (Johnston et al 1992: 252; 
Carty et al 2000: 78). 
 
Table 13 
Election Results in Ontario, 1980-1988 and Vote Share Average, 1993-2000 Parties	   1980	   1984	   1988	   Average,	  1993-­‐2000116	  Liberals	   Seats	   52	   14	   43	   	  Vote%	   41.9	   29.8	   38.9	   51.3%	  PCs	   Seats	   38	   67	   46	   	  Vote%	   35.5	   47.6	   38.2	   37.9%	  NDP	   Seats	   5	   13	   10	   	  Vote%	   21.8	   20.8	   20.1	   8.3%	  
Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca 
 
The FTA saga left all three major Canadian parties much more regionalist in nature 
and appeal than they had ever been – and this reflected a thorough redefinition of the 
stake of national unity as a structuring question of party competition. Mulroney’s 
decision to embed his constitutional vision within a wider discourse of a new political 
economy and balance between state and market, federal and provincial governments, and 
Canada and the United States, turned the PCs into a party of the regional and linguistic 
cleavage, but with shallow grounding in the geographical and normative center of 
Canadian nationalism – the first winning coalition of its kind (McDowall 1994: 93). 
                                                116	  Column	  data	  adapted	   from	  Martin	   (2005:	  168)	  and	  refer	   to	   the	  1993,	  1997	  and	  2000	  elections.	  PCs	  share	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  PC	  and	  Reform/Alliance	  average	  in	  Martin’s	  table.	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However, in 1988 this seemed to make perfect tactical sense. With the FTA ratified and 
the MLA accepted by all sides of the political divide, Mulroney seemed to have realigned 
the party system towards a normative anchor of brokerage between distinct regional 
interests, whereby success would be defined by the ability of parties to balance and 
harness the concrete support of political identities on a collectivist basis.  
The success of Mulroney’s rationale was evidenced in its effects on the patterns of 
support of the Liberals and the NDP, two parties that strived to define the stake of 
national unity in ideological, pan-Canadian terms. The Liberals’ stress on national 
identity as a unitary concept turned them into a party of central Canada, the cradle of 
Canadian nationalism and the point of reference against which the linguistic and regional 
cleavage were being mobilized. The NDP’s effort to subsume the FTA issue under a 
general populist message of integrity reflected the party’s effort to break out of the 
extremes it occupied on the class and linguistic cleavage, being primarily a party of trade 
unions and English Canada. Yet polarization over the FTA meant that the NDP was also 
left with a more regionally focused pattern of strength than ever before (agrarian Prairies 
and industrial Ontario). The FTA made both parties campaign on a non-particularistic, 
pan-Canadian, ideological basis, yet the dynamics of the issue imposed on them an 
adaptation to the new normative anchor of communitarian and geographical brokerage 
(Johnston et al 1992: 254). 
 
FREE TRADE, REGIONAL INTEGRATION, MULTILATERALISM AND 
PARTISAN AGENCY 
 
Being an issue of foreign policy, free trade with the US was to be judged on its 
merits as a viable adaptation strategy to changing international conditions like US 
protectionism, the ongoing stagnation of GATT and the rise of regional integration 
schemes as alternatives to international multilateral trade cooperation. Yet the framing of 
these alternatives that would cue policy responses was not value-neutral. Instead, 
Canadian political parties read different normative imperatives into these structural 
conditions according to the dimension of competition they sought to bring about or 
preserve in order to make new policies possible – or block them. In this way, partisan 
agency of translating international structural developments into domestic discourses 
entrenched ongoing realignments of political identities in the party system and played a 
decisive role in the final outcome of foreign policy change. 
The patterns of international argumentation were to a very large extent laid by the 
Macdonald report. The Royal Commission codified arguments in favor and against 
protectionism as the hitherto default policy of Canada towards the US and in this way 
rekindled the old debate between nationalists and continentalists. Both main parties had 
historically flirted with both sides of the commercial policy divide, but arguments about 
Canada’s international environment only aligned along partisan lines once the 
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constellation of political identities cued specific tactical adoptions of specialized and 
technocratic readings of the international environment. In this sense, the Macdonald 
report was very important not only because it offered free trade as an important policy 
initiative to the Mulroney government, but also because it supported it with an integrated 
argumentation that provided a reading of Canada’s international environment congruent 
with a new definition of the stakes of domestic competition. The anti-free trade camp was 
to miss such authoritative readings of the international argumentation throughout. 
For the argumentation in favor of the FTA the Mulroney government relied on a 
reading of this policy as a reaction to inescapable international developments, and more 
precisely the insufficiency of the traditional multilateral framework for ensuring 
Canadian exporters’ access to the US market. Even though it did seek to portray the FTA 
as the catalyst for the creation of a Canada based on national reconciliation and a 
corresponding economic system of downsizing of the federal state, the critical difference-
maker was its ability to link foreign economic policy with important inputs from the 
international environment. This linkage with the international environment made the FTA 
seem both politically unavoidable and value-neutral, and opinion polling showed that 
attitudes towards the issue of access to the American market had the biggest impact on 
how voters evaluated the FTA (Johnston et al 1992: 158-159): 
 
‘Economics, geography, common sense and the national interest dictate that we try 
to secure and expand our trade with our closest and largest trading partner – 
protectionist measures are always self-defeating’ 117. 
 
Indeed, the international dimension was a key part of the process of argumentation 
precisely because the domestic part of the Conservatives’ policy of economic adaptation 
(extended industrial restructuring) promised to be much more painful. Access to the US 
market sounded much more appealing and was also a stronger basis of argumentation for 
a foreign policy initiative (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 34): 
 
‘[Turner’s pledge to scuttle the trade deal would leave Canadians to] hang in the 
wind of American protectionism’ (Mulroney, quoted in Maser 1989: 72). 
 
Arguments like the fact that, without the FTA, Canada would be the only 
industrialized country without guaranteed access to a market of one hundred million or 
more (Johnston et al 1992: 157), created a sense of inevitability of the FTA, against 
which few substantial arguments could be mounted. In this way, the potentially painful 
part of Mulroney’s national reconciliation (the substitution of the integrating role of the 
                                                
117 Mulroney in the House of Commons in September 1985, cited in Doern and Tomlin (1991: 33, 
emphasis in the original). 
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state by the growth-generating role of the market and the provinces) was subdued under a 
discourse of promises for affluence emanating from abroad. 
The Mulroney government argumentation relied on the Macdonald Report precisely 
because it bridged the old divide between continentalism and nationalism. The 
Macdonald Report showed how free trade made sense from a policy point of view, 
because it addressed a foreign policy challenge, and framed this policy proposal within a 
discourse that took into account Canada’s distinct needs and prospects as an independent 
society: 
 
‘The problem is that Canadian tariffs may not be any longer high enough to serve a 
nation-building, protectionist function, but nevertheless may be high enough to allow 
many Canadian producers to avoid the stimulus of world class competition. Thus Canada 
may need to rethink its bilateral relationship vis-à-vis the United States in light of the 
changes that multilateral trade policy has made on that relationship’ (Stairs and Winham 
1985: 9). 
 
Macdonald himself was a person of impeccable nationalist feelings, so his 
recommendation for free trade was devoid of any suspicions about his allegiances. The 
report provided the codification of the pro-US arguments in foreign economic policy in a 
way that made them seem compatible with Canadian independence and the regional and 
international realities in which Canada functioned (Macdonald 1991: 155-156). In this 
way, the government could effectively counter any allegations that the FTA was a sell-
out to the Americans or a harbinger of dissolution of Canada’s economic and social 
policies: 
 
‘[T]he integrationist perspective, while it may be motivated by concerns for nation, 
is not merely a variation of traditional economic nationalism. [I]ntegrationism focuses 
on different policy instruments as means to national ends, with distinctly divergent 
political advocacies […] [T]he economic nationalist’s main concern is the degree of 
American ownership of the economy; for the integrationist it is Canada’s trading 
relationship with the United States’ (Nossal 1985: 82). 
 
At the same time, the report was reassuring since it was claimed that bilateral free 
trade was in fact consistent with Canada’s policy of trade liberalization in the post-war 
era (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 27)118. 
The FTA’s opponents on the other hand did not have so many weapons in their 
hands, precisely because they could not square their preferred policies with persuasive 
                                                
118 Welch (2005: 212-213) also attributes fundamental importance to arguments about access to the US 
market. In his conceptualization, it was arguments about loss-avoidance more than ones of gain-making 
that held the biggest persuasive power. 
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readings of the international situation or of the agreement itself (Winham and DeBoer-
Ashworth 2002: 36). For the Liberals and the NDP a principled multilateralism was all 
they could offer to the debate as an alternative, even though they were distinctly vague in 
terms of detail and relevance. Indeed, GATT had become some kind of a useful fallback 
position for opponents of closer integration with the US without requiring further 
elaboration. After the Macdonald Report, this complacency was no longer enough. The 
burden of proof now lay with the opponents of FTA to show how they intended to 
maintain Canada’s international position in light of a struggling integration in the GATT 
framework and increasing proclivity towards protectionism in the United States, 
Canada’s biggest trading partner. It was very difficult to escape the reality that the 
stalling of GATT in the 1980s was making Canada pay for the trade disputes of others 
and that, because of this, ‘multilateralism […] seemed rather more like a problem than a 
solution’ (Welch 2005: 198). Indeed, nationalists were increasingly associated with 
‘intangible’ arguments and a conscious divergence between spiritual and material goals 
(Doern and Tomlin 1991: 222-224). A contribution to the Macdonald Report 
foreshadowed the patterns of the debate: 
 
‘But in large measure it is because of the pervasiveness, vehemence and durability in 
the Canadian political culture of the emotional ideology of nationalism that bears little 
relation to the material interests of the individuals who hold these sentiments’ (Nossal 
1985: 91)119. 
 
For the Liberals the situation was particularly testing because they had to reconcile a 
passionate opposition to free trade with a probable return to governmental power and so 
management of the relationship with the United States. According to Clarkson, Turner’s 
amazing conversion into an anti-free trade crusader took place because ‘[i]mmediately 
following the publication, early in October 1987, of the FTA’s main outlines, [Turner] 
read it and came to the firm conclusion that it was, in itself a bad deal: Canada’s 
negotiators had given up too much and gotten too little in return’. However, ‘[m]ore 
seriously, it would imperil the country’s survival as the autonomous state he thought it 
had become in the golden age of Turner’s political heroes, Mackenzie King and Louis St. 
Laurent’ (Clarkson 1989: 33-34). In other words, even though Turner may have seen 
practical problems with the FTA, his instincts and needs as well as those of his party 
were to fight this foreign policy issue on the domestic front. Despite explosions of driven 
inspiration, such as the Senate blocking of the law or the Anglophone debate, Turner’s 
inability to offer a viable alternative caught up with him and the Liberals: ‘Rejecting 
advise that he should supplement his flag-waving attacks on free trade by explaining his 
alternative solution, he kept to his one dimensional line that Canada’s survival was at 
risk. Turner carried on his single issue campaign in an emotional bubble […] As the last 
                                                
119 Also see Robertson (1985: 82). 
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two weeks of the campaign wore on, he failed to broaden his attack beyond its narrow, 
one-note range […] or to present the Liberals’ positive alternative to the FTA’ (Clarkson 
1989: 38).  
Opponents of the FTA offered the most coherent theoretical counter-argumentation 
when they made the link between the FTA and Canada’s international identity as a state 
committed to multilateralism. They would shape the foreign policy stake as one between 
multilateralism and openness to the world, and self-limitation in a ‘fortress North 
America’ (Doern and Tomlin 1991: 222). This line of argumentation countered 
Mulroney’s claim that the FTA would open Canada to the world and force its economy 
and people to engage with, and adapt to, exciting challenges. In and of itself this line of 
argumentation sought to accommodate FTA within the general discourse of Canadian 
foreign policy multilateralism. The argument about Fortress North America tried to fill 
the void of foreign policy argumentation by highlighting an alternative stake of foreign 
policy: Canada’s position in the world and how it defines its interests and identity in 
comparison to a strict regional perspective. Yet on this account as well, the government 
had a decisive counter-argumentation, presenting the FTA as falling within the Canadian 
tradition of multilateralism and so being a mere reformulation of the existing normative 
framework of Canadian foreign policy and assorted goals: 
 
‘[T]hat this House supports the negotiation of a bilateral trading arrangement with 
the US, as part of the government’s multilateral trade policy, while protecting our 
political sovereignty, social programs, agricultural marketing systems, the auto industry, 
and our unique cultural identity’120.  
 
Summing up this section, it becomes obvious that the two sides of the free trade 
debate provided normative readings of the international situation affecting Canada’s trade 
relations that corresponded to the version of the normative anchor they wanted to 
energize. The FTA served to link a specific reading of the international situation (most 
importantly the threat of US protectionism) to a specific vision of domestic constitutional 
and economic governance, and so also to support the new definition of the stake of 
national unity that served the unity of the PC coalition. During the election campaign the 
PCs presented the United States as an opportunity and not a threat, and regionalism as a 
needed departure from Canada’s traditional reliance on GATT that, nevertheless, fell 
within the familiar internationalist tradition of Canadian foreign policy. Both of these 
readings of the international situation coincided with the needs of the political identities 
with continentalist preferences (the business sector, Quebec, Western provinces like 
Alberta), helped the PCs harness solid support from them and, by extension, contributed 
                                                
120 Motion offered by the government in the House of Commons, March 16 1987, quoted in Welch (2005: 
200, emphasis added). Already in 1984 the new PC minister for international trade had said he was looking 
to continue discussions on trade relations with the US, but without ‘creating fortress North America’ 
(Doern and Tomlin 1991: 22). 
 
 
 131 
to the establishment of the new normative anchor of national unity based on the increased 
role of the market and the provinces. By the same token, the Liberals and the NDP 
presented the FTA as a policy that was failing to deal with the threats to Canadian 
sovereignty and identity the way protectionism and multilateralism had been doing until 
then. Presenting the US as a threat to distinct Canadian policies and regionalism as a 
negation of Canada’s traditional orientation towards values of the international system 
corresponded with the Liberals’ and the NDP’s effort to maintain the meaning of the 
stake of national unity as being the creation of a progressive civic identity supported by 
an enabled central government. Ironically this strategy earned the Liberals a firm 
foothold in the province most identified with mainstream Canadian nationalism, Ontario, 
thus making them as much a regional party as the PCs and so validating the emergence of 
a new fragmented competition of party politics.  
 
EXCURSUS: THE ELECTIONS OF 1993 AND FREE TRADE 
 
To attribute the breakdown of unitary party politics in Canada in the historic 1993 
elections to foreign policy is a very counterintuitive proposition indeed. After all, the 
FTA had subsided as an important issue in voter evaluations almost to the point of 
disappearance by 1993 (Clarke et al 2000: 137). Instead, these elections were determined 
by a lethal mix of economic recession, general antipathy towards elitist politics and 
constitutional deadlock that exacerbated regional political identities, which in the end 
broke through in the party system (Lemco 1995). Yet the FTA election of 1988 is 
generally considered to be a crucial step in the long chain of events that led to the 
collapse of national politics in Canada in the period of 1984-1993. If anything, this is also 
a counterintuitive conclusion if we consider that the elections of 1984 produced a 
national result if there ever was one and that the FTA was an issue that captured the 
imagination of the whole nation, over regional, linguistic and class barriers. But, if we see 
the 1993 result not as a breakdown of politics, and rather as a further development of the 
normative anchor of regional brokerage created in 1988 thanks to the FTA feud, then the 
importance of foreign policy and the impact of Canada’s international and regional 
environment on domestic politics become more evident (Doran 1994a: 3-5).  
The elections of 1993 are unique in the history of electoral politics in mature liberal 
democracies (Mair 1997: 218-219). They produced a parliamentary majority for the 
Liberals, but apart from that nothing was familiar. The PC and NDP support was 
decimated by the emergence of two region-based parties: The Bloc Québécois was a 
party running only in Quebec with the explicit aim of promoting secession and 
independence of the province. The Reform Party mobilized exclusively on the 
regional/peripheral cleavage, expressing itself as a party of Western discontent with a 
populist and neoconservative bent121. Both parties essentially deprived the Tories of the 
                                                
121 For the origins and first years of BQ and Reform, see Carty et al (2000: ch. 3). 
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geographical foci of their strength, thus bringing about one of the greatest defeats a 
governing party has ever suffered in the history of electoral politics. Reform’s 
monopolization of the Western agenda also hurt the NDP, which lost official party status 
in the House as well. All in all, the Canadian party system had been transformed from a 
system of nominally ideological parties striving to bridge cleavages and to unite the 
country into a system of particularist parties thriving on the exacerbation and 
intensification of these cleavages (Carty et al 2000). 
 
Table 14 
Canadian General Election 1993 
 Parties	   Vote	  Share	   Seats	  Liberals	   41.2	  %	   177	  Bloc	  Quebecois	   13.5	  %	   54	  Reform	   18.7	  %	   52	  New	  Democratic	  Party	   6.9	  %	   9	  Progressive	  Conservatives	   16	  %	   2	  Others	   3.7	  %	   1	  Total	   100	  %	   295	  
 
Adapted from Martin 2005 and www.elections.ca 
 
Free trade can be seen as an important contributor of this party system change in 
three different stages. The first stage is the one with which this chapter has been 
concerned: the translation of the challenges Canada’s international commercial policy 
was facing into two distinct visions of domestic governance and national unity, under the 
guise of support and opposition to the FTA, allowed the institutionalization of a new 
normative anchor of party competition that legitimized the uniform expression of 
communitarian and regionalist interests in party competition and their brokerage as the 
new meaning of national unity. Political parties were now judged on the supreme task of 
maintaining national unity according to their ability to accommodate particularist 
interests represented in solid fashion: Quebec’s constitutional status, the West’s 
economic grievances etc. The finalization of the emergence of this new normative anchor 
became even more evident in the 1988 results of two parties that claimed an ideological 
and pan-Canadian profile. Both the Liberals and the NDP came out of these elections tied 
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to specific regional fiefs that happened to coincide with their positions on the class, 
regional and linguistic cleavage. In this sense, 1993 was not so much a break as a 
continuation of 1988: the party labels under which regional and linguistic interests were 
expressed had changed, yet the logic of party competition as an expression of 
particularistic and disjointed political identities had already been established in the FTA 
election. Free trade, with its promises of more just economic accommodation between 
provinces and downsizing of the capabilities of the central government, can be said to 
have contributed conceptually and practically to the dismemberment of universal, 
ideological politics in Canada. 
Yet the breakdown of the Tory coalition, the main beneficiary of the new normative 
anchor and the epicenter of the new party system, was a largely unexpected outcome. The 
beginning of the end of the Mulroney coalition was the failure of the Manitoba legislature 
in ratifying the MLA before the deadline in 1989, thus leading to the collapse of the 
agreement. Mulroney spent most of the rest of his term trying to broker yet another 
constitutional deal, leading to the signing of the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. 
Charlottetown was put to a referendum the same year and was resoundingly rejected, 
despite endorsements by all three main national parties. The main beneficiaries of the 
Charlottetown campaign were the BQ and Reform, both parties that decided that the 
constitutional brokering by established parties and elitist politics could not accommodate 
the needs of Quebec and the West anymore (Carty et al 2000: 39 ff; Clarke et al 2000). 
Telling is that Charlottetown was approved only in Ontario, the geographical, historical 
and ideological point of reference against which the regional and linguistic cleavages 
were being mobilized. 
How did the FTA affect this painful erosion of the Mulroney coalition? Here work 
on public opinion offers insight into potential mechanisms of influence of foreign policy 
on electoral change. It turns out that the constitutional events of 1989-1992 expressed as 
much as they reinforced, a mounting sense of general public discontent with party 
politics, primarily due to worsening economic conditions and disapproval of the 
government’s performance. To the extent that the FTA was associated with economic 
malaise (Macdonald 1991: 159), and the Mulroney government was in turn identified 
with the FTA, free trade can be said to have contributed to the erosion of public support 
for the PC government122, which in turn fed a general discontent with politics and 
accounted for a big part of the negative vote to Charlottetown. Especially the effect of the 
economy, and indirectly of attitudes towards free trade, seems to be decisive in the 
Charlottetown ‘no’ (Clarke and Kornberg 1994) that paved the way for the Bloc and 
                                                
122 According to work done on opinion polling at the time, the FTA lost salience rapidly after 1988 (a sign 
of its successful institutionalization) (Clarket et al 2000: 37, 300) but remained an important background 
condition that contributed to the Tories’ unraveling. Being an issue of economic nature, the FTA was 
partially attributed the blame for the recession that plagued the Canadian economy after 1988. Whereas 
shortly after the 1988 election 50% of the population supported the FTA, by 1992 that support had fallen to 
35% (Clarke and Kornberg 1994: 950). Since the Tories were identified with the FTA, that policy change 
contributed to the erosion of their standing (Clarke et al 2000: 77-79, 84-85). 
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Reform’s success in the following year (Clarke et al 2000: 197; Martin 2005: 170)123. In 
1991-92, amidst a deep economic recession, free trade seemed like another initiative of a 
political system that had failed miserably in reaching the goal of national unity. This can 
be seen as the second stage in which foreign policy contributed to the 1993 result. 
The third stage of the impact of foreign policy in 1993 also reveals important 
continuities with 1988 as the year in which the fate of national politics in Canada was 
sealed. The FTA was not a salient issue in these elections. Interestingly enough, however, 
it formed an important part of the Liberal manifesto at the time. Indeed, shortly after their 
decisive victory in 1993, the Liberal government of Jean Chretien embarked on a policy 
of deeper regional integration by enthusiastically signing up to NAFTA (Welch 2005: 
208). The elections of 1993 again left the Liberals as the sole party with the claim to 
national status and unifier. But the national-party status the Liberals enjoyed after 1993 
relied more and more on their ability to build majorities in Ontario, the cradle and 
normative epicenter of Canadian nationalism (Carty et al 2000: 82; Wearing 2002: 158-
159) – indeed, Liberal dominance in Ontario was established thanks to Turner’s 
nationalist campaign in 1988. Yet the Liberal program of 1993 saw in free trade an 
established and viable economic project within which to embed a policy of economic 
renewal based on further liberalization of the economy and a further strengthening of the 
market and provincial authorities against central statism (Clarkson 2005: 165). Under the 
Trudeau-ite nationalist Chretien, the Liberals essentially embraced the new normative 
anchor of regionally disjointed political discourse and adapted their policies to fit the new 
definition of the stake of national unity.  
In summation, foreign policy did not seem to play a major role on the threshold 
elections of 1993. Yet the outcome of 1993 was not a momentary event. BQ and Reform 
expressed the breakdown of the PC coalition of 1988, and that coalition was forged by 
foreign policy. The challenges of Canadian trade policy had been distilled by the political 
identities, preferences and tactical needs of partisan actors into a new language of 
competition that centered on brokerage of communitarian interests. This language could 
have sustained unitary politics based on the three main parties, but the breakdown of 
constitutional negotiations in the early 1990s sealed the faith of the main bearer of the 
new language of politics, the PCs. The Liberal party of 1993 was a specimen of 
successful accommodation to a new language of politics created partly by foreign policy, 
and their continued dominance until the mid-2000s was further reinforced by a new mix 
of regional integration (NAFTA) and distinctly Canadian multilateral diplomacy. Yet 
even this dominance bore the imprint of the politics of regional brokerage cemented by 
the FTA election of 1988, as Liberal success hinted not on bridging but on intensifying 
main cleavages (regional, linguistic/national and increasingly class) all at once. The party 
system of 1993, a unique occurrence among liberal democracies, was a surprising break 
                                                
123 For the importance of constitutional issues in the creation of Reform, see (Laycock 2002: 132-133). 
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from the past only to those who had failed to see the effects of foreign policy on domestic 
politics in 1988. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The elections of 1984 seemed to perpetuate the binary competition of a party system 
made up of ideological parties tackling issues of pan-Canadian interest. The PCs won in a 
landslide that reflected the wish for change of the Canadian electorate. These elections 
were considered to be very important at the time, but merely for the fact that the existing 
language of politics (the normative anchor of national unity) favored a different party 
than the Liberals. This was a very important change to begin with, but it could not be 
seen as more than an electoral reversal within the same patterns and logic of party 
systemic competition. Yet the Tory coalition was not made up of a vast majority of a de-
aligned electorate. The PCs had clear bases of support within important political 
identities of Canadian politics, social groups that chose the Conservative party on the 
basis of policy and ideological preferences. The Western provinces, reflecting the 
regional cleavage, were already a reliable partner of the PCs since the 1960s, while the 
election of Brian Mulroney as PC leader in 1983 reflected the rather crude pragmatic 
ambition to finally make the party electable in Quebec. This led to creation in 1984 of a 
novel coalition in Canadian politics: for the first time a governing party was primarily 
dependent and responsive to two different political identities that were mobilized against 
the historic, geographical, normative and economic center of traditional Canadian 
nationalism (McDowall 1994: 93).  
For as long as Mulroney’s government was functioning under the premises of pan-
Canadian politics, trying to project a general vision of change and reform, it failed to 
produce any distinct policies and performed badly in opinion polls. Especially in foreign 
policy, Mulroney sought to improve the hardened relationship with the United States and 
was quite successful in bringing about symbolic changes; yet free trade did not figure 
anywhere on the agenda. Led by a Prime Minister who had won the party leadership on a 
pledge against free trade, and was elected on the strengths of a party system that had 
institutionalized the mix of multilateralism and protectionism as accepted values of 
Canadian interest, the PC message of change did not extend to the field of international 
commercial policy. Following the powerful adage of Canadian politics since 1911 (that 
free trade is an electorally toxic issue), the PCs were conforming to the established 
patterns of party competition and this (yet again) trumped the preferences of 
continentalist political identities in Canada. 
The decisive moment seems to be the publication of the Macdonald report in mid-
1985. It not only provided Mulroney with an elaborate economic justification of free 
trade on a seemingly bipartisan and technocratic basis, but it also showed how free trade 
served Canadian independence and, by giving opportunities for more equitable economic 
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development between provinces, assisted the development of a new constitutional design 
– a key promise of Mulroney under the header of ‘national reconciliation’. With the 
publication of the Macdonald report, Mulroney saw an opportunity to realign party 
competition according to the mix of preferences promoted by the main political identities 
represented in his party. With the negotiations of the FTA being finalized a mere six 
months after the conclusion of the widely accepted Meech Lake accord, the PC 
government now stood for a completely new set of ideas about domestic governance in 
Canada – and this governance was reflected and embedded in a foreign policy initiative 
that supported it practically and theoretically.  
Party system dynamics had already aligned pro-free trade political identities in a 
conducive way for the expression of a coherent free trade vision, but this expression only 
took place once the argumentative framework of party politics started being structured 
around a new potential meaning of the stake of national unity: brokering among 
communities instead of individualist civic nationalism. Only under such important 
systemic dynamics does a new foreign policy become intellectually possible. As the feud 
over the FTA became a struggle of imposing a new axis of competition, or maintaining 
the old one, it also served to make the initial realignments of cleavages permanent and 
systemically relevant. The 1988 FTA election made the broad loose coalition that brought 
Mulroney to power a more limited assembly of two essential pillars of support. Indeed, 
whereas the Tories lost almost everywhere in the country, they retained solid support in 
places where the FTA was considered both very important and very positive (Alberta and 
Quebec).  
The imposition of a new normative anchor of party competition seemed to 
strengthen the traditional binary pattern of the Canadian party system. The FTA had 
staved off the rise of the NDP and renewed the meaning of national unity in a way that 
seemed to match the preferences of the two political identities that were the most 
disenchanted with the normative point of reference of Canadian identity, the West and 
Quebec. With the FTA and the MLA in place, the Tories in 1988 were poised to become 
the new national party of Canada, while the Liberals would be inhibited but still 
competitive in a system of brokerage across regions. However, the old binary system 
failed to absorb and structure the new normative anchor of competition. The 
constitutional events and the economic crisis of 1991-1992 precipitated the collapse of 
Mulroney’s coalition – the FTA played an important mediatory role between public 
discontent and the rise of regional parties. Yet the party system created after 1993 was 
new only in shape; its content and terms of discussion had already been laid down in 
1985 and cemented in 1988. The Liberals dominated this new party system by 
dominating specific sides of the regional, the national/linguistic and the socioeconomic 
cleavage. Their claim to national party status was a function more of the fact that the 
political identities they mobilized coincided with the geographical and economic center 
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of Canada– from the point of view of the West and separatist Quebeckers, the Liberals 
after 1993 were yet another regional party124. 
Party system dynamics do not only explain the creation of a policy. They also 
explain the ideational and institutional reasons for opposition to this policy. As we saw, 
the translation of the challenges to multilateralism and protectionism through the FTA 
into an issue of domestic governance by the Tories allowed them to usurp the role of a 
party of national unity and label the stake of competition according to Mulroney’s 
conception of national reconciliation. If multilateralism had been a pillar of Liberal 
strategy in the 1940s and 1950s, and protectionism the same in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
FTA was threatening to undo this advantage of the Liberals to embed their appeal to 
diverse groups within a coherent policy vision of domestic and international politics. 
Much as the simple realignment of pro-free trade political identities within the PCs could 
not produce pro-free trade ideas before Mulroney envisioned a reformed normative 
anchor of party competition (the solution to his personal image problems and the 
heterogeneity of his coalition), so was opposition to the FTA a function of John Turner’s 
hope that the old meaning of competition (pan-Canadian nationalist vision) could 
reenergize the combination of political identities that had served the Liberals in the past. 
This systemic need explains why the Liberals went against the FTA when so many 
factors pointed to a more nuanced (if not positive) stance. 
As part of the long road from unitary ideological pan-Canadian politics to 
particularistic regionalist fragmented party competition, the FTA and the elections of 
1988 can be seen as one step in the direction of breakdown of party politics. Yet, if 
anything, the FTA put into place new firm alignments between political identities and the 
party system. The PCs may have failed to maintain the pillars of their support, but these 
pillars were forged as political identities with relevant demands within a new axis of 
competition through the FTA election and Mulroney’s tactics. The realignment of the 
West and Quebec were important systemic developments in their own right, but their 
solid expression became a permanent relevant systemic feature through the pains of the 
intense FTA contestation (which by extension also brought about a unitary expression of 
Ontario in party politics). The result was a new equilibrium between a new foreign policy 
and a new normative anchor: FTA was the symbol and pillar of a party competition that 
sought to accommodate divergent regional demands within a new economic and 
constitutional balance.  
                                                
124 Canadian nationalists have explicitly linked regional integration in North America with centrifugal 
forces within Canada. See e.g. Bienefeld (2000). For Sigurdson (1994: 257, 273) the perceived loss of 
autonomy of the central government in Ottawa due to globalization was an enabling condition for the 
conceptual development and success of the peculiar blend of neoconservative, post-modern and regional 
politics of the Reform Party. Reform’s continentalism was more than anything a reflection of its regional 
identity: In their work on attitudes of Reform’s activists, Archer and Ellis (1994: 298-301) found that they 
are most divided on foreign policy and relations with the US. However, the most supportive of closer 
relations with the US were activists from Alberta and British Columbia.  
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The FTA, as a policy initiative with a specific content at a specific point in time, was 
a contingent result that can only be understood when considering the complex nature of 
the interaction between Canada’s international environment (the decline of the 
multilateral solution and its impact on the regional trade setting), and the conjunction of 
the economic and (to some extent) constitutional preferences of two political identities 
that met in a roundabout manner in a mobilized agenda against Canada’s centralist 
political identity. Reflecting the wholesale change of the normative anchor of domestic 
partisan discourse, free trade was institutionalized as part of Canada’s traditional foreign 
policy identity of trade openness, international cooperation and maintaining 
independence through prosperity. The realignment of domestic and foreign policy 
preferences within the party system only makes new foreign policies conceptually 
intelligible and institutionally possible when this realignment has systemic consequences 
for the way political parties interact and the language that structures this interaction. This 
is always a demanding proposition, and it needs to be shown to account for foreign policy 
change more effectively than simpler and apparently more parsimonious explanations. 
It could be, for example, that only the realignment of political identities within the 
party system was in and of itself sufficient to produce the patterns of support and 
opposition to the FTA that became evident in 1988. By the mid-1980s the dynamics of 
partisan competition had significantly changed the profile of the voters the two main 
parties were attracting, with the ostensibly more protectionist Tories moving into a 
discourse of neoliberal reformism and the more libertarian Liberals attracting more and 
more the support of new immigrant, urban and welfare dependent social strata. In terms 
of the regional cleavage, the two parties had also already switched positions since the 
1950s, as the Liberals had become the party of the center of Canadian nationalism and the 
PCs the party of the disgruntled periphery. In terms of the linguistic/national cleavage, 
both parties were against Quebec separatism, but the PCs were able to appeal to more 
sovereignist Québécois who were tired of Trudeau’s bilingual and constitutional policies. 
In other words, the PC coalition that got into power in 1984 was the perfect free trade 
storm, bringing together political identities with strong continentalist agendas. 
However, these important changes within parties should not lead to anachronistic 
readings of the partisan structuring of the free trade issue. Indeed, by 1985 no one could 
have anticipated with certainty that the PCs would embark on a free trade agenda, and by 
1987 no one could have anticipated that it would be the Liberals who would mount a 
passionate patriotic battle against free trade. As an established nation-building party, the 
PCs were still in 1985 seen as a party of the Canadian geographical and normative 
mainstream. Mulroney’s ‘national reconciliation and economic renewal’ had appealed to 
almost everyone, but still had to be filtered into concrete policies. Where he would go 
with them was still an open question. The Liberal party, led by an ex-businessman with 
ties to the increasingly continentalist Toronto business sector, had already tried sectoral 
free trade in 1983 and had shown signs of backtracking from Trudeau’s anti-American 
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views under Turner. Yet both parties surprised the electorate, by staging a passionate 
standoff on an issue that was barely on the agenda a few years earlier. The powerful 
continentalist interests within the PC party only took over once Mulroney decided that his 
constitutional policies had an inescapable link to a new model of Canadian political 
economy – and that free trade actually united the West and Quebec more than 
constitutional issues did. And Turner’s opting for the Trudeau tradition instead of the 
Laurier (or at least King) tradition was a function of his understanding that with free trade 
the very context within which party competition would take place was changing. In other 
words, the constellation of political identities within parties produced new foreign policy 
ideas and opposition to them once it was seen to bring about a thorough reformulation of 
the normative anchor around which partisan competition was structured. 
Concurrently, the systemic pressures on parties and their changing relative positions 
cannot account for the FTA alone. This would be a more powerful explanation of the 
Liberal vehement opposition to the FTA. It is normal to expect a party that found itself in 
opposition after dominating politics for almost 60 years to react abruptly to any policy 
that seemed to go against what it had created. Especially after adhering to the MLA, John 
Turner was in dire need of a differentiating issue that would establish his leadership 
within his own party and pressure Mulroney more effectively. The PCs on the other hand 
were moved into a free trade position by virtue of 20 years of opposition politics. 
Economic liberalism, pro-Americanism and provincial independence became political 
preferences of the PCs almost despite themselves: the sharper Trudeau’s policies became, 
the more the PCs moved against him. But free trade did not come about simply by virtue 
of interaction between parties-as-black-boxes. The Liberals looked back to their tradition 
of emancipatory sovereignty and progressive nationalism, only this time it was against 
the US and not Great Britain. The PCs looked for argumentation in their tradition as a 
unifying party and what they saw as their duty to stitch Canada together as a community 
of communities, thus updating their traditional conservative, communitarian ideology. 
Having now established again what kind of domestic circumstances are needed for 
the creation and successful institutionalization of foreign policies, the question of the 
relationship between these domestic changes and the conditions of international structural 
change surrounding a country (Doran 1994b: 240-241) still remains. The case of the FTA 
suggests that dynamics of party systems are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for 
the emergence of a new foreign policy. As we saw, the impetus for free trade to enter the 
agenda was the Macdonald report that recommended free trade as a response to specific 
threats to Canadian prosperity and trade competitiveness emanating from abroad. The 
failure of GATT and the constant threat of US protectionism created specific theoretical 
and practical challenges to the established tenets of Canadian trade policy up to that 
point. What is more, these structural challenges were decisive in the eventual outcome of 
the FTA contestation, as both sides had to position themselves towards them and use 
them as argumentative resources. The party system dynamics that led to the creation of 
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the Mulroney coalition and the emergence of a new stake of national unity produced new 
policies in constitutional and economic issues anyway; change of foreign policy was 
clearly responding to objective needs coming from the international sphere. 
Could the FTA have come about solely due to the international circumstance facing 
Canada at the time? The collapse of multilateralism and protectionism towards the US 
was clearly a fact of life for Canada. Coupled with the recession of the early 1980s, it 
created a veritable situation of crisis for the Canadian economy and society. Yet already 
in the early 1980s the Canadian political system proved to be blocked from entering new 
avenues of thought in the field of free trade. Trudeau could not go beyond the idea of 
sectoral free trade, even though this was substantially problematic from a practical point 
of view. When Mulroney won the leadership contest of the PCs in 1983, protectionism 
against the US seemed to be a true bipartisan value of Canadian foreign policy. At the 
same time, free trade ideas were never absent from Canadian public discourse or party 
politics, yet they never came close to realization. Even at the times of acute crisis of the 
early 1980s, free trade ideas were identified with political identities of the geographical 
and social fringes of Canadian politics. Something decisive had to change in 1984-1988 
for a complete continentalist foreign policy to take hold of one party and then of the 
country as a viable solution to the crisis of Canadian foreign policy. 
In summation, the realignment of pro-free trade political identities under the PC 
banner was not a simple realignment of the expression of political cleavages in the party 
system. Instead, this realignment was the result of party strategies of adaptation to 
systemic demands of competition and deep social processes. The triumph of 1984 
concealed the fact that the PCs were leading a combination of interests that were 
profoundly uncomfortable with the established tenets of Canadian domestic and foreign 
policies. After the publication of the Macdonald report, the stake of national unity was 
meant to be redefined in order to capture the needs and demands of the different political 
identities of Canadian society. The question was not which party would be able to build a 
set of pan-Canadian policies that would accommodate as many citizens as possible, but 
rather which party could broker the interests of different regional interests in specific 
constitutional and economic policies. Whereas the previous normative anchor that 
revolved around the creation of a unitary civic identity through state activism had 
reinforced protectionism, the new normative anchor created a geographically fragmented 
party system where free trade, as a policy that gave provinces the ability to harness the 
economically promising north-south axis, was one of the few unifying policy initiatives. 
What contribution to the specific case at hand does the argument of this chapter 
make and what do rival explanations of the Canadian FTA decision tell us about foreign 
policy change in general? Of the literature concerned with the FTA, the most compelling 
and overarching explanation is given in the comparative analysis of free trade decisions 
in North America in Marchildon (1994; the same argument is supported in the same 
volume by Doran 1994b: 234-237). The theoretical question guiding their volume is 
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precisely why, when surveying the positions of political parties on free trade in Canada, 
the US and Mexico, one observes that in each country it is usually the parties that are 
least associated with free trade historically that ultimately end up initiating free trade 
decisions. This is indeed an interesting observation, and as we already saw it holds true 
for Canada as well.  
For Marchildon, decisions in favor of free trade are a combination of party ideology 
and government incumbency; government parties tend to succumb to international 
pressures and opposition parties tend to take on the nationalist mantle against economic 
integration. Following this, Marchildon speculates that the Liberals would have pursued 
free trade if they had been in government (and, we are left to assume, the Tories would 
have opposed it). This argument is a variation of a party system argument, since it 
accounts for relationships between parties, and it indeed postulates what could be a very 
common objection to the general argument of this dissertation: that the only party 
systemic dynamic that really matters is a position of a party as government or opposition; 
government parties implement what they must and opposition parties oppose as they 
should. In this view, established traditions and societal commitments of parties matter 
only inasmuch as party leaderships need to invent argumentations that would justify their 
positions with reference to partisan identity.  
As it has been shown, this argument does not match up with the commitments, 
historical trajectories and systemic interests of partisan actors in Canada. Most of all, it 
does not explain how, if external pressures and policy failures do force inescapable 
choices onto governments in favor of free trade, in Canada free trade was only 
implemented years after the country’s commercial policy faced big inconsistencies and 
the economy was stagnating. It may be true that the dynamics of opposition may have 
pushed the Turner Liberals towards a much more principled opposition to the FTA than 
what would have been the case if they were in government. But that is also the point: 
looking carefully at the trajectory of both parties in the Canadian party system, it is 
obvious that the Liberals were in no position to institute an initiative as far-reaching and 
radical as the FTA. By the same token the PCs may not have supported anything similar 
while in opposition, but the FTA in the shape it took was clearly a creation of a specific 
societal coalition united by a common vision of a model of Canadian unity. While 
Marchildon emphasizes the pressures emanating from abroad, he fails to see how the 
interaction of international factors with constellations of the domestic discursive space 
really gives rise to foreign policy change. While he makes an interesting contribution 
towards the direction of incorporating relations between parties (and not just policies of 
individual parties) in analyzing domestic sources of foreign policy, his 
government/opposition view needs to be complemented with a historical and societal 
view of the field within which this dynamic is embedded. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GREECE 1993-2000: RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKEY AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF A CONVERGENT TWO-PARTY SYSTEM  
 
OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENT OF THE CHAPTER 
 
At the end of 1999 Greece instituted a far-reaching change in its foreign policy 
towards Turkey. It accepted allowing the EU to grant Turkey candidate member status. 
The agreement reached in the EU Council in Helsinki included the provision that 
Turkey’s accession procedure would be tied to the process of resolving bilateral disputes 
with Greece and with allowing Cyprus to proceed with its accession despite of the 
island’s division. In many ways, the decision in Helsinki marked a turnaround in Greek-
Turkish relations, which from then on shifted from a cold war dynamic to one of détente 
– if not rapprochement.  
This chapter will trace that change in the ongoing developments that were 
transforming the Greek party system throughout the 1990s. The modern Greek party 
system is characterized by a three-camp structure (Right, Center and Left) and (until 
recently at least) an inescapable tendency towards binary competition between poles that 
bring together or cut through the established camps. The interaction of these two 
structural characteristics has meant that for most of its history Greece has had deeply 
polarized party systems – this polarization also structured rival foreign policy 
preferences. Until the end of the Cold War the party system had institutionalized a 
foreign policy of integration in Western institutions (NATO and EEC/EU) but with 
tensions, and of tension with Turkey but with variations. 
The decision for foreign policy change and its eventual institutionalization across the 
party system sprang out of the activities of reformist leaderships in the two major parties 
(PASOK and ND). These engaged with ongoing societal changes under the level of the 
party system, and managed to reformulate the normative meaning of bipolar competition 
from one between a bourgeois Right and a radical Left pole to one between center-right 
and center-left party-poles pursuing the stake of modernization. Foreign policy change 
was presented as a needed complement to the process of economic rationalization ahead 
of European Monetary Union (EMU), and leaders of the two parties used argumentation 
on the Helsinki decision to impose the goal of modernization over the existing Right-Left 
axis. Convergence over foreign policy was expressed in the creation of a convergent 
party system dominated by two parties with very similar policy and social outlooks, and a 
complete marginalization of the parties to the left of PASOK that still held on to a radical 
populist agenda.  
The decisive point leading to foreign policy change and the eventual 
institutionalization of a new approach in foreign policy supported by a convergent party 
system was the advent of a new conception of party competition within the ruling 
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PASOK party. Modernizers won over the socialist radical party mechanism with the 
implicit promise that policy modernization and Europeanization in economic and foreign 
policy would update the party’s traditional winning strategy as exponent of the Center 
camp under conditions of bipolar competition, and broaden its appeal in line with 
developments in Greek society. Once this happened, the foreign policy change in 
Helsinki became both conceptually possible for the ruling modernizing faction and an 
electorally rewarding strategy for the party as it would entrench modernization as the 
main stake of party competition. The extremely close outcome of the 2000 elections and 
PASOK’s victory validated the new foreign policy approach and imposed PASOK’s 
favored reinterpretation of political competition across the party system. 
 
THE GREEK PARTY SYSTEM: SOCIAL CLEAVAGES, POLITICAL IDENTITIES, 
DIMENSIONS OF COMPETITION 
 
The modern Greek party system is the outcome of the interaction of two deep 
historical cleavages that shook Greece in the 20th century. First was the National Schism 
of 1915, caused by the personal disagreement between King Constantine and Prime 
Minister Venizelos about Greece’s strategy in World War I. Second was the Civil War 
between nation-minded Loyalists and Communists in 1944-1949. The interaction of these 
two cleavages gave rise to a three-way system of Left, Center and Right, which in turn 
informed a polarized version of binary competition (Mavrogordatos 1983b: 17, 1984: 
156). Indeed, interaction between these three camps has always resulted in an inescapable 
binary dimension of competition (Mavrogordatos 1984: 163), and partisan actors’ 
interactions with social cleavages and political issues must be understood within a 
context of imposing their favored normative formulation of binary competition 
(Moschonas 1994: 166; Lyrintzis 2005: 244-245).  
The first crucial turning point in Greek party politics was the National Schism 
between Venizelists and anti-Venizelist Royalists in 1915125. The National Schism 
erupted when Liberal Prime Minister Venizelos disagreed with King Constantine over 
Greece’s place in World War I126. Venizelos wanted Greece to join the Entente and so, 
quite naturally, ally itself with the camp that opposed its two traditional rivals, Bulgaria 
and the Ottoman Empire. Constantine insisted on a policy of neutrality, justified with the 
belief that Germany would win the war and with the need to protect large Greek 
populations still living in the Ottoman Empire. The National Schism represented a bitter 
conflict over the meaning and end-goal of Greek irredentism in the early 20th century. 
Venizelos represented the aspirations of the strong merchant, entrepreneurial and 
financial business Greek middle class that lived in the big cities and ports of the Ottoman 
Empire. Constantine juxtaposed the romantic nationalism of Old Greece, the heartland of 
                                                
125 The best and most concise introduction to modern Greek political history is Clogg (2002). 
126 On the National Schism see, among many, Mavrogordatos (1982). 
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the small Greek kingdom within its pre-1912 borders (Mavrogordatos 1983a: 129), to this 
cosmopolitan vision of Greek nationalism. 
After the National Schism, World War I and a failed campaign in Asia Minor, the 
competition between Venizelists and anti-Venizelists was reformulated as a competition 
between a reformist, progressive and republican camp and a conservative, royalist one127. 
This competition absorbed most significant social cleavages, resulting in the creation of 
two cross-class coalitions but with opposing traits. The Venizelist camp united bourgeois 
strata with interests in market economy and petit bourgeois groups with radical social 
agendas, peasant populations that had benefited from Venizelos’ agrarian reform, and 
(most significantly) the solid voting bloc of more than one million Greek refugees, bitter 
foes of the anti-Venizelists who had first opposed their redemption and then tragically 
mismanaged the military effort with the end result being defeat in the hands of the Turks 
and a massive exodus in 1922. The anti-Venizelist camp comprised more conservative 
and inward-looking interests, such as middle class strata with employment closer to the 
state, small owners and rural populations who were not touched by agrarian reform. 
Along the ethnic cleavage, to the refugees’ Venizelist support the anti-Venizelists 
juxtaposed the solid support of a multitude of ethnic and religious minorities that were 
incorporated into Greece with the military expansion of 1912-1919. The most striking 
differentiating characteristic between these two seemingly similar coalitions were the 
regionally different voting patterns: Anti-Venizelists drew their support from Old Greece 
(today’s southern and central Greece and the Ionian and Aegean islands, the old kingdom 
until 1912), whereas Venizelists from the New Lands (today’s northern Greece, Crete and 
islands in north and eastern Aegean), the regions they had liberated and where most of 
the refugees were settled. 
The politics of the inter-war republic were dominated by the various exponents of 
the Venizelist camp. Venizelos himself returned to active politics in 1928 and led his 
reformed Liberal Party to a huge victory and a four-year rule characterized by a renewed 
emphasis and a rejuvenating urge for the modernization of Greece.  However this project 
crashed as the global economic crisis reached Greece and the economic situation 
deteriorated. After 1932 Greece entered a new period of political instability, the novelty 
of which was the rise of the Communist Party (KKE). Greek Communism upset the 
alliance of the liberal bourgeois and radical petit bourgeois pillars of Venizelism. This 
was skillfully nurtured by the anti-Venizelists who, within a climate of union dissent and 
street riots, presented themselves as the only guarantors of bourgeois normality, while 
Venizelists were framed as soft on Communism. The erosion of the broad Venizelist 
coalition gradually led to the loss of power and in 1936 to the establishment of a royalist 
                                                
127 By far the best account of inter-war politics in Greece is Mavrogordatos (1983a), a truly masterful 
presentation of the strategies, cleavages and ideologies represented within the political identities that arose 
from the National Schism. Information about this period used in this chapter is drawn from him. 
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dictatorship led by veteran officer and politician of staunch anti-Venizelist feelings 
Ioannis Metaxas. 
While the KKE had upset Greek politics already in the 1930s by energizing a 
particular version of the class cleavage, it got its big opportunity for dominance with 
World War II, Greece’s defeat and the Axis occupation of 1941-1944. KKE’s role in 
resistance against the Germans (with the setting up of a broad resistance front called 
EAM) allowed it to propagate a program of radical social reform married with a 
discourse of popular sovereignty and national independence. In this way what was a 
secretive and persecuted party turned, thanks to EAM, into the strongest political force in 
Greece (Moschonas 1994: 164) on the eve of liberation in 1944. However, unlike other 
European Communist parties that used their resistance credentials to facilitate their 
legitimacy and strengthen their electoral fortunes, KKE overplayed its hand, eventually 
leading to an all-out civil war and a conservative backlash. From 1950 onwards, 
democratic politics resumed in Greece and the left was allowed to participate under the 
banner of the United Democratic Left (EDA), a party combining (sometimes uneasily) 
control by the exiled KKE and the non-doctrinaire EAM tradition.  
Following a transitional period, the Greek party system assumed a thee-camp 
structure that has characterized it in some ways until very recently (Moschonas 1994: 
162-163)128. The main cleavage driving party competition was the cleavage of the Civil 
War, pitting the isolated EDA against the loyalist pole comprising the old anti-Venizelist 
and Venizelist camps. The anti-Venizelists were most successful in taking advantage of 
this axis by reinventing themselves into a staunchly anti-Communist Right, entrusted 
with security of the regime, alignment with the US and the West, and economic 
reconstruction. The only conceivable (i.e. allowed) governing alternative would have to 
come from the old Venizelist camp, which was, as in the 1930s, helpless in the face of 
polarization between Left and Right (Pappas 2001: 77).  
The new structure absorbed and energized old and new social cleavages. Perhaps the 
most consequential cleavage of the inter-war period, the ethnic one, was radically 
transformed and mitigated. EDA’s appeal to refugees was closely correlated with their 
place of residence and social outlook (Moschonas 1994: 181), as EDA came to dominate 
the working class suburbs (frequently old refugee settlements) around big cities. ERE 
(the party of the Right) on the other hand inherited the patterns of support of the pre-war 
anti-Venizelist camp but with much greater support among urban strata. Squeezed in 
between were the Venizelist liberal parties, whose twin ideological pillars (bourgeois 
liberalism and social radicalism) were effectively coopted by Right and Left. Perhaps the 
biggest change was the mitigation of the regional cleavage. The old divide between Old 
                                                
128 Most of the information on the post-War democracy in Greece is taken from Nicolacopoulos (2001) 
unless otherwise stated. The particularly successful title of his book, characterizing the semi-authoritarian 
regime of the time as a ‘cachectic democracy’ (I choose here the translation of the title given by 
Spourdalakis and Tassis, 2006: 497), captures astutely the essence of the regime and has gained currency in 
lay discourse as well. A reference work in a language other than Greek is Meynaud (1965). 
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Greece and New Lands was rapidly getting smaller. Especially the experience of the Civil 
War in Macedonia and the presence of Prime Minister Karamanlis (who hailed from 
Macedonia) caused a gradual but visible realignment of North Greece towards the Right 
(Featherstone and Katsoudas 1985: 32), as well as an intensification of the urban-rural 
cleavage between the Right and Left. 
The Right dominated the party system in 1952-1963 effectively energizing the Civil 
War cleavage and its strength within the loyalist pole. However foreign policy 
controversies (see below), constant strains with the para-political power establishment 
(monarchy and security apparatus) and ongoing social changes undermined its 
dominance. Most significantly, from 1961 onwards it had to face a unified Venizelist 
camp, united under the banner of the Center Union (EK), led by veteran radical 
Venizelist politician Georgios Papandreou. The EK was initially created to challenge 
ERE from within the loyalist pole, and to keep EDA (that had made dangerous surges in 
the late 1950s) isolated. But eventually EK came to be seen by the vast majority of its old 
and new following not as an alternative manager of the system but as a bearer of demands 
for democratization and increased social justice, thereby isolating ERE (Moschonas 
1994: 167-168). 
EK was elected into power in 1963 and its government was dominated by exponents 
of bourgeois loyalist politics and the liberal Venizelist tradition. However Papandreou’s 
government was trapped within a system of polarized pluralism (Pappas 2003), between 
the Right’s insecurities about the danger of Communism and the Left pushing for 
reforms. Even more importantly however, the polarization of the party system was 
reproduced within the EK itself, thus reenergizing the old internal inconsistency of 
Venizelism between liberal bourgeois loyalism and radical petit-bourgeois reformism 
(Mavrogordatos 1984: 168; Moschonas 1994: 169-170). In 1965 Papandreou and young 
King Constantine II disagreed over control of the army. In the ensuing constitutional 
crisis, the vast majority of EK’s notables and a group of parliamentarians defected to 
form loyalist governments, with the support of ERE, thus avoiding elections after 
Papandreou’s resignation. The EK, now dominated by a younger guard of radicals and 
progressives lead by Papandreou’s son Andreas, became united with the Left in a 
democratic and reformist front against a loyalist bourgeois pole comprised of the Right 
and the liberal pillar of the old Venizelist camp. It was precisely in order to keep this new 
arrangement from being expressed in the polls that the army moved to institute a junta in 
1967129. 
The seven-year junta interregnum interrupted the process of consolidation of a 
bourgeois Right v.s. radical Antiright normative anchor (Featherstone and Katsoudas 
1985: 39). The first years after the return to democratic rule in 1974 can be seen as a 
period of consolidation both within the three camps and across the party system. The 
                                                
129 For an analysis of the gradual transformation of party competition from a Loyalist-Communist into a 
Right-Antiright axis from a party systemic perspective, see Moschonas (1994). 
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years 1974-1981 were dominated by Karamanlis, who returned from exile in 1974 amidst 
the Cyprus crisis and the collapse of the junta. Karamanlis showed a different face than 
he had during the 1950s, legalizing the KKE, organizing a referendum that abolished the 
monarchy and founding a party, New Democracy (ND), with the outwardly 
characteristics of a moderate center-right party, combining conservative, liberal and even 
social-democratic values (Lyrintzis 2005: 245). More interesting were the developments 
in the old Center camp. Here Andreas Papandreou’s party, the Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement (PASOK), came to dominate various efforts by bourgeois, liberal and 
reformist politicians to create an independent center party with a social-democratic 
tendency. Instead, Andreas managed, with his inflammatory and anti-systemic rhetoric, to 
pick up where the EK of 1967 had left off, bridging the radical centrist tradition with 
EAM’s national resistance and independence ethos. In this way, consolidation within 
each camp was followed by a stabilization of the party system around an emerging axis 
of competition that continued where the junta had once interrupted things 
(Mavrogordatos 1984: 157-161). 
The elections of 1981 were the absolute vindication of Papandreou’s strategy of 
turning PASOK into the main party of an anti-bourgeois, populist, social-radical and 
‘democratic’ pole – and indeed of crystallizing and defining this very pole. PASOK won 
an impressive majority, thus forming the first socialist government in the history of 
Greece. Papandreou’s strategy was all the more successful in that he managed to 
appropriate diverse ideological traditions (the Left’s resistance, the Center’s governing 
reliability, his father’s fight for democratization) and channel them through a rhetoric of 
vehement Antiright polarization (Mavrogordatos 1984: 160-161; Featherstone and 
Katsoudas 1985: 37-38; Kalyvas 1997: 92). Indeed, polarization and presentation of 
PASOK-ND competition as an apocalyptic showdown between an authoritarian Right 
and the ‘people’ became a self-perpetuating strategy of PASOK in the 1980s (Moschonas 
1994: 174-179; Kalyvas 1997). From 1981 onwards, a polarized two-party competition 
between PASOK and ND came to symbolize the new axis of competition, thus gradually 
isolating KKE (Pappas 2001, 2003; Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 508-9, 511). 
Polarization was further increased when ND elected as its leader Constantine Mitsotakis, 
an old minister of EK who had left the party in 1965 to become member of loyalist 
governments. Papandreou and Mitsotakis’ personal hatred, dating back to the crisis of 
1965, animated party competition. Mitsotakis took leadership of ND and promoted the 
party’s ideological renewal, moving it away from the authoritarian conservative origins 
of the Right towards an economically liberal profile, in tune with developments among 
center-right parties in other countries (Alexakis 2001: 107-114).  
During the 1980s PASOK and ND’s competition reflected and exacerbated 
polarization along the socioeconomic cleavage: PASOK was a solidly petit-bourgeois and 
working-class party with strong support among farmers and traditional centers of 
Venizelist or leftist influence, while ND was a predominantly bourgeois, upper-middle 
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class and middle class party with support in traditional rural heartlands of the right-wing 
such as Southern Greece. In this way, each party had become a solid bloc of 
complementary social interests (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 265-266; Vernardakis 2011: 87-
91). While social developments like urbanization were slowly eradicating old 
particularities like ethnic or regional differences, slowly absorbed in a coherent 
socioeconomic axis130, polarization galvanized the strength of the political identities the 
main parties represented and infused policy competition with a heavy ideological 
dimension. Polarization between PASOK and ND on issues of economic liberalization, 
trade union influence, public sector expansion and corruption was accentuated by 
historical references to previous issues of democratization, national independence and 
authoritarianism (Moschonas 1994: 190-191), and an updated practice of clientelism 
(Kalyvas 1997: 99; Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 509). 
Mitsotakis’ strategy to revamp the ideological message of the bourgeois pole 
allowed ND to return to power in 1990. However ND’s government was plagued by a 
small majority in Parliament, and the emergence of the polarizing foreign policy issue of 
the name of the newly independent, neighboring Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, that 
did not allow it to implement its ambitious program of neoliberal economic reform. 
Instead, its stay in power revealed for the first time an ideological rift within the party 
between Mitsotakis’ economic liberals and adherents to the traditional Right-wing 
orthodoxy of the party who made references to Karamanlis’ legacy (Alexakis 2001: 110). 
The rift affected the totality of government policy, with the Karamanlists rejecting 
Mitsotakis’ class-conscious neoliberalism and promoting a more nationalist tone in 
foreign policy (see below) (Keridis 1999: 38; Alexakis 2001: 116-177). In the end, the 
rift within the party over the name issue led to the secession of a small faction under 
Antonis Samaras, the fall of the government in 1993 and the calling of elections that 
PASOK and Papandreou won resoundingly (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 272-273). 
The elections of 1993 were the last elections of the polarized binary competition era 
that had started in 1981. They were also the last elections where the patterns of support of 
the two parties made them ‘mirror images’ of each other in terms of social outlook (ibid: 
273). However the party system, though still dominated by the binary competition 
between PASOK and ND expressing two rival poles of ‘Right’ and ‘Antiright’, was far 
more unstable than before. The crisis within ND reflected important inconsistencies 
within the bourgeois pole that policy polarization with PASOK had only managed to 
                                                
130 From the discussion above it becomes obvious that the main cleavages and political identities in Greece 
are the results of political processes that overlaid social developments, instead of reflecting and responding 
to them directly. This has to do mostly with the particularities of the economic and social development of 
Greece. In what is essentially a fairly homogeneous society of small ownership (Mavrogordatos 1984: 
166), the big political cleavages of the past (National Schism and Civil War) and the stakes they represent 
mobilize coalitions of different socioeconomic outlooks, if not classes (Moschonas 1994: 161, 170). From 
the 1970s onwards, these political identities became infused with a socioeconomic dimension, thus making 
the socioeconomic cleavage the best heuristic tool for the tracing of these identities’ meaning and evolution 
(ibid: 191-195).  
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conceal temporarily. PASOK found itself in an uncertain position due to its leaders’ ill 
health and inability to match the old anti-Right discourse with a policy of economic 
populism anymore (Vernardakis 2011: 3-8). On top of this, a latent axis of competition 
between reformists and populists within each camp started becoming apparent (Tsoukalis 
2000: 41; Nicolacopoulos 2005: 272). Both its rise and the way the big parties absorbed it 
into the existing binary structure of competition can be accounted for largely with 
reference to interactions between the foreign policy preferences of the different political 
identities. It is to these preferences, and how dominant formulations of the normative 
anchor of party competition historically structured them and affected foreign policy 
outputs, that I now turn. 
 
Table 15 
An Analytical Periodization of Greek Party Politics since 1922 
 
Period	   Political	  
Camps	  
Systemic	  features	   Poles	  of	   competition	  
and	   cleavages	  
structured	  
Degree	   of	  
polarization	  
Meaning	   of	  
competition	  
1922-­‐
1936	  
Venizelists,	  anti-­‐Venizelists	   Bipolar	   competition	  between	   two	   party-­‐families,	   fragmentation	  within	  each	  family	  
Venizelists	   v.s.	   anti-­‐Venizelists	  (socioeconomic,	  ethnic	  and	  regional)	  
Small,	   but	  increase	   after	  emergence	   of	  KKE	  
Regime	   form	  (structuring	  other	   issues	  as	  well)	  
1949-­‐
1963	  
Right,	  Center,	  Left	   Bipolar	   competition	  v.s.	   Left,	   competition	  within	   the	   anti-­‐Left	  pole	  
Loyalists	   v.s.	   Left	  (socioeconomic,	  decreasingly	   ethnic	  and	   regional,	  increasingly	  urban/rural)	  
High	   Economic	  and	   political	  system	  
1963-­‐
1981	  
Right,	  Center,	  Left	   Polarized	   pluralism,	  slow	   reformulation	   of	  meaning	   of	   bipolar	  competition,	   varying	  fragmentation	   within	  each	  camp	  
Transition	   from	  Loyalism	   v.s.	   Left	   to	  Right	   v.s.	   Antiright	  (socioeconomic	  absorbing	  urban/rural	   and	  remnants	  of	  ethnic)	  
High	   Economic	  and	   political	  system	  
1981-­‐
1993-­‐?	  
Right,	  Center,	  Left	   Bipolar	   competition,	  consolidation	   of	   party-­‐camps	   Bourgeois	   Right	   v.s.	  radical	   Antiright	  (socioeconomic)	   High	   but	  decreasing	   Economic	  system	  
 
FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES OF POLITICAL IDENTITIES 
 
Since its creation in 1830 and for a century afterwards the Greek state’s sole foreign 
policy goal was the integration of all Greeks and the recreation of a powerful Greek state 
around the Aegean Sea. Apart from this common reference point however, Greek 
nationalism contained many different ideological currents and ideas. The gradual 
consolidation of Athens as the epicenter of Greek nationalism, to the detriment of the 
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Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople after the middle of 19th century, affected the 
relative strength of foreign policy conceptions inside of Greece and amongst Greek 
communities abroad (Veremis 2003: 49-50)131. The dominance of a secular 
understanding of nationalism meant the identification of Greek irredentism with domestic 
modernization, as a prerequisite for the time of military conquest at some point in the 
future, but increasingly also as a goal equally important with territorial expansion and 
liberation of unredeemed Greeks. Rival foreign policy preferences in Greece did not only 
concern irredentism per se, but also contending visions about the way an agrarian society 
could approach the social and economic standards of more developed states. Rival 
visions of modernity can best be detected in foreign policy by surveying the different 
international alliance preferences of the various political identities within Greece132.  
The goal of irredentism (later reformulated, according to circumstances, as 
safeguarding national sovereignty and, after 1974, also as defense of territorial integrity, 
captured in modern Greek public discourse under the moniker ‘national issues’) 
(Valinakis 1989: 16, 19) cuts across the goal of modernization. Generally Greek 
irredentism and its intellectual offspring remain to this day the normative frame of 
reference of Greek foreign policy. The strength of rival modernizing projects is affected 
by the way their imperatives serve the goal of national integration, independence or 
territorial integrity, and political identities promoting specific modernization plans of 
Greece can tap on the normative argumentation of national integration (or defense 
thereof) to support their visions of domestic society133. Whereas modernization projects 
can take on many guises, for most of Greece’s history, and especially since 1922, the 
point of reference has been Western/European inspired modernization (functioning 
democracy, rationalized economy etc.). Contestation of the foreign policy goal of 
modernization then usually takes the shape of a competition between a liberal (claiming 
for itself the term ‘modernizing’) and an anti-Western (sometimes self-proclaimed 
‘patriotic’) intellectual wing. In this way, one can see the (Western) modernist / (anti-
Western) traditionalist cleavage on the conception of the Greek nation and the meaning 
of Greek irredentism run through the history of Greek nationalism (Valinakis 1989: 18; 
Heraclides 2007: 52-54), from the Athens-Patriarchate antagonism in the 19th century to 
today’s strains in Greece’s relationship with Europe.  
The National Schism had at its core a foundational question of foreign policy: the 
exit to a war. For both Venizelists and anti-Venizelists, rival visions of Greek irredentism 
coincided with different visions on the content and pace of Greek modernization. 
Especially for Venizelos, territorial expansion was a prerequisite for (and not just the 
                                                
131 A short summary of this process, with a thick literature catalogue, is given in Heraclides (2007: 48-54). 
The reference work on the dialectic between religion and Enlightenment in the early stages of Greek 
nationalism is Kitromilides (2000). 
132 On Greece’s strategic alliance dilemmas, see Tsakonas (2010: 31). 
133 To paraphrase Kyrkos Doxiades (cited in Moschonas 1994: 196), matching ideological goals with a 
national (i.e. foreign policy) discourse is a prerequisite for political dominance. 
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outcome of) a process of domestic modernization134. The inter-war party system 
dominated by Venizelists reproduced and institutionalized Venizelos’ essential foreign 
policy preferences that would lead to close alignment with the Western powers as a 
guarantee for security and economic and political modernization (Valinakis 1989: 60).  
The civil conflict of the 1940s was a clash of international orientation as well. The 
loyalist pole’s unequivocal pro-Western orientation reflected the will to maintain the 
outcome of the Civil War and stave off Communism. Greek irredentism, now mutated 
into Greek nationalism, was an important part of the ideology of the semi-authoritarian 
post-Civil War democratic regime, as it highlighted KKE’s patronage from Greece’s 
enemies in the Balkans, hence the self-description of loyalists as being ‘national-minded’ 
(Moschonas 1994: 164-165). KKE’s perceived ‘anti-national’ policies reinforced the 
ideological purge of leftists (ibid: 195). As the ideological differences of the Cold War 
intensified traditional competition of rival irredentisms in the Balkans, Greek foreign 
policy identified the country’s northern neighbors as the key danger to its security 
(Valinakis 1989: 45-47). Instead, relations with Turkey, now a NATO ally, were cordial 
(Veremis 2003: 111-113). The party system of the 1950s, dominated by the loyalist pole 
and the Right camp, also institutionalized a firm policy of Westbindung, first with NATO 
and then with the EEC (Loulis 1984: 376). In permanent opposition and suppressed, EDA 
could only present a policy of neutralism and pacifism (Valinakis 1989: 46). 
The strains in the coherence of the loyalist pole coincided with the strains on this 
equilibrium of foreign policy. The cause was the Cyprus question, the last major issue of 
Greek irredentism. The demand of Greek Cypriots for unification with Greece animated 
the Greek public and, nominally, all Greek parties were committed to it (Veremis 2003: 
113-115). However, the Right-wing government of Karamanlis at the time could not 
ignore the fact that this demand ran against the interests of the colonial power, Great 
Britain, another NATO ally. In this way, Cyprus fundamentally tested the ability of the 
Right to normatively link the foreign policy goals of nationalism and domestic capitalist 
modernization, expressed through unequivocal integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions 
(Loulis 1984: 376-377, Valinakis 1989: 72-81).  
The long transitional period between 1963 and 1981, interrupted by the junta of 
1967-1974, completed the transition from a party system polarized around the dividing 
line of the Civil War to a party system divided between bourgeois and radical-populist 
poles. The big beneficiary of this transition, Andreas Papandreou, initially relied heavily 
on foreign policy to embed his emancipatory, nationalistic and resistance discourse. 
Andreas’ clear-cut positions on foreign policy, combining anti-Americanism, anti-
Westernism, Non-Aligned and Third World sympathies, dependency theory and anti-
Turkish feelings framed within an ideological socialist discourse (Loulis 1984: 378-379; 
                                                
134 See especially here the passage ‘The National Schism as class conflict’, studying the socioeconomic 
dimension of the creation of the Venizelist and anti-Venizelist political identities in Mavrogordatos (1983a: 
127-130). 
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Heraclides 2007: 142), were instrumental in his success in bringing together the political 
identities of the EAM Left (with its resistance tradition) and the radical Center (with its 
Venizelist tradition of emancipatory and progressive nationalism) (Mavrogordatos 1984: 
160; Moschonas 1994: 196). If the first party system of the new republic (1974-1981) can 
be characterized as being polarized (Pappas 2003: 105-106), then foreign policy was the 
field where this could be noted most obviously (Kalyvas 1997: 83, 85).  
After 1974, Karamanlis made accession to the EEC the overarching goal of his 
government. His decision to anchor Greece in Europe must be seen as part of an 
overarching concept of Greek society and economy, congruent with the loyalist pole’s 
and the Right’s willingness after the war to underpin liberal democracy and economy 
domestically with strong alliances to the West externally (Economides 2005: 476; 
Tsakonas 2010: 41). Many were hoping at the time that Greece’s entry would help 
Greece more effectively counter the threat from Turkey (now seen as more dangerous 
than Balkan Communist neighbors) (Valinakis 1989: 244; Heraclides 2007: 79; Tsakonas 
2010: 33)135. Instead, Karamanlis followed a policy of negotiation, lessening tensions 
with Turkey precisely because he did not want strained Greek-Turkish relations to be an 
excuse for the EEC to prevent Greece from joining (Valinakis 1989: 248; Heraclides 
2007: 109-111, 135).  
PASOK was elected into government in 1981 with pledges to take Greece out of the 
EEC and NATO (Loulis 1984: 379-380; Tsardanidis 1998: 297). Neither occurred, 
however Papandreou initiated a policy of obstructionism and maverick positions in both 
institutions. In Greek-Turkish relations, Papandreou abandoned Karamanlis’ efforts to 
maintain some points of contact with Turkey and froze all negotiations. PASOK’s 
position, reflecting the party’s populist nationalism, was that Greece and Turkey did not 
have any issues to discuss. Eventually, by the late 1980s, PASOK came around to the 
view that Greece only recognized one bilateral issue with Turkey, the demarcation of the 
continental shelf, and that the only way for this to be resolved was through recourse to 
the ICJ in The Hague (Tsakonas 2010: 46-47). Papandreou’s foreign policy became 
renowned for its unpredictability and resulted in Greece’s isolation within the EEC and 
NATO and the rise of tensions with Turkey136. In this way, Papandreou’s foreign policy 
                                                
135 Starting in 1973 (before the Cyprus invasion) Turkey gradually developed a broad palette of ‘issues for 
negotiation’ concerning sovereignty in the Aegean on land, sea and air. By the mid-1990s the issues Turkey 
considered ‘open’ were: a) The demarcation of the continental shelf, b) demarcation of territorial waters, c) 
demarcation of air space and operational control over the Aegean, d) militarization of Eastern Aegean 
islands, e) sovereignty over specific islands and islets. Whereas Turkey’s traditional position always was 
that Greece and Turkey should discuss these matters and resolve them through negotiations, Greece has 
steadily denied any linkage, has supported adjudication by the ICJ and, as we will see, ended up 
recognizing the continental shelf as the only problem (Athanassopoulou 1997: 77). For a thorough 
presentation of the legal parameters of these issues and an effort to present ‘both sides of the story’, see 
Heraclides (2007: 217-382).  
136 On Papandreou’s foreign policy see generally Huliaras (1989) and Valinakis (1989: 187 ff) and for 
commentary on the first period Loulis (1984). 
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cemented the link between anti-Westernism and the irredentist/nationalist pillar of Greek 
foreign policy (Kalyvas 1997: 87; Heraclides 2007: 140-141). 
The complete polarization between PASOK and ND in the 1980s in terms of social 
outlook (Kalyvas 1997: 89) and domestic policies was also reflected in differences of 
foreign policy preferences. Now a coherent bourgeois conservative-liberal party, ND 
presented itself as the European party, highlighting the importance of Greece’s belonging 
to all the important international institutions of the West. It opposed Papandreou’s 
foreign policy adventurism with its policy of pro-Europeanism and prudence vis-à-vis 
Turkey (Tsakonas 2010: 48). In many ways, the Greek party system domestically 
continued reproducing the Cold War division, which since the 1950s had concurrently 
also favored the Antiright pole that could claim, as PASOK did, that a fundamentalist 
Western orientation inhibited the ability of Greece to promote its traditional national 
interests137.  
ND’s and Mitsotakis’ ascent to power coincided with the end of the Cold War, the 
fall of Communism and the outbreak of war in the Balkans. The explosion of the 
Macedonia name issue among the Greek public added a new dimension to the irredentist 
pillar of Greek foreign policy, as Greece found itself entangled in a potentially explosive 
Balkan imbroglio. Whereas a pro-Western consensus seemed to emerge between the two 
parties, with PASOK’s gradual conversion to more orthodox social-democratic positions 
in economic matters (Lyrintzis 2005: 247), the name issue created a new tension between 
Greece’s commitment to the West (and by extension the domestic policies that such a 
commitment entailed) and the newly salient exigencies of its irredentist-cum-nationalist 
heritage. Whereas Mitsotakis strove to find a diplomatic solution to the name issue within 
a European framework (Economides 2005: 483), a broad coalition from the whole of the 
party spectrum pushed him to an intransigent position that eventually cost him his place. 
This difficult situation also sabotaged Mitsotakis’ efforts at rapprochement with Turkey 
(Heraclides 2007: 161-164) 
Even more interestingly, the name issue energized a tension around the irredentist 
pillar of Greek foreign policy that cut through all main political identities. In the ruling 
ND, it underpinned already existing differences between liberals and Karamanlists on 
economic policy, thus causing the first rift within what seemed like a homogeneous 
bourgeois pole. On the Left it contributed to the division between a staunchly anti-
European and increasingly nationalist KKE and a reformist, pro-European and moderate 
party of the reformed Left. In PASOK, it exposed the fading glory of Papandreou’s 
                                                
137 Whereas polarization over foreign policy was an integral part of Papandreou’s strategy of consolidating 
a binary competition between a Right and an Antiright pole in the 1960s and 1970s, it receded markedly 
when PASOK came to power. Indeed, some authors emphasize the decrease of importance PASOK laid on 
‘national issues’ (Moschonas 1994: 196-197) and continuities of foreign policy behind sensationalist 
initiatives by Papandreou (Valinakis 1989: 193-196). For an account emphasizing more the elements of 
rupture and tension on Greek-Turkish relations under Papandreou, see Heraclides (2007: 140-160). 
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populism138. Papandreou’s political agency since the 1960s and the dynamics of party 
competition in the 1970s and 1980s had made the interaction between the two pillars of 
foreign policy be crystalized in two coherent approaches, what could be called liberal 
pragmatism and populist nationalism; for the first time in the early 1990s these seemed 
not to strengthen existing cleavages between political identities, but to cut through them 
and create cross-camp coalitions (Keridis 2001: 2). 
In summation, different political identities have always cued coherent foreign policy 
preferences according to their preferred visions of domestic society. In the same way that 
political identities crystalize societal cleavages (like the socioeconomic one), they also 
impinge foreign policy preferences on the different social forces that are identified with 
them. Since the 1980s, for example, one can say that the foreign goal of Western 
modernization has been prioritized among the middle class strata that identified with the 
bourgeois pole, whereas the petit bourgeois and working class following of the Antiright 
pole was galvanized by an emphasis on Greek irredentism and its contradictions with 
Westbindung139. From 1981 onwards, PASOK’s dominance of the party system had 
institutionalized a hostile policy towards Turkey and a difficult relationship with Europe 
(Lyrintzis 2005: 249). ND on the other hand was the party of bourgeois ‘responsibility’ at 
home and abroad, yet once in power it found itself bitterly divided. In 1993-1996 these 
policies seemed further entrenched by the confusion caused by the end of the Cold War. 
That within a few years Greece was to implement a completely new policy of 
rapprochement with Turkey was a surprising outcome by any account.  
Table 16 
An Analytical Periodization of Greek Foreign Policy since 1922 
 
Period	   Poles	   of	  
competition	  
Polarization	   Foreign	   policy	  
outputs	  
towards	  
Turkey	  
Foreign	   policy	  
outputs	  
towards	   the	  
West	  	  
Degree	   of	  
contestation	   of	  
foreign	  policy	  
1922-­‐
1936	  
Venizelists	  v.s.	   anti-­‐Venizelists	   Low	   but	  increasing	   Rapprochement	   Alignment	   with	  Western	   powers	  (mainly	  England)	  
Low	  (institutionalization	  of	  Venizelist	   foreign	  policy)	  
1949-­‐
1963	  
Loyalists	   v.s.	  Left	   High	   Alliance,	  deterioration	  after	   1955.	  Issue:	  Cyprus	  
Western	   camp,	  NATO	   High	   (Cold	   War	  division	   reproduced	  domestically)	  
1963-­‐
1981	  
Loyalists	   v.s.	  Left	   to	   Right	  v.s.	  Anti-­‐right	   High	   Deterioration,	  almost	  complete	  rupture	   after	  1974.	   Issues:	  
Western	   camp	  but	   increasingly	  contested,	  substitution	   of	  US	  for	  Europe	  
High	   (contested	  anchoring	  in	  the	  West,	  relations	   with	   Turkey	  cutting	  across	  alliance	  strategies)	  
                                                
138 On PASOK’s Macedonia name issue policies, see Tsardanidis (1998: 312-313). 
139 See the survey of ND and PASOK elites in 1993 presented in Vernardakis (2011: 14-15). 
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Cyprus,	   after	  1974	  Aegean	  	  
1981-­‐
1996?	  
Right	   v.s.	  Anti-­‐right	   High	   but	  decreasing	   Varying	  degrees	   of	  tension.	   Issues:	  Cyprus,	  Aegean.	  
Anchoring	  in	  the	  West	   but	  contested,	  preferring	  Europe	  over	  US	  
High	   but	   decreasing	  (PASOK	   not	  tempering	   with	  NATO/EEC	  membership,	  institutionalization	   of	  a	   policy	   of	   tension	  with	  Turkey)	  
 
THE FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE 
‘EUROPEANIZATION’ OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS 
 
At the December 1999 EU Council in Helsinki, Greece lifted its objections to 
granting official candidate status to Turkey. The Council conclusions included specific 
provisions about Turkey’s obligations towards membership, most importantly decoupling 
Cyprus’ accession course from the political problem on the island and committing Turkey 
(and Greece) to bilateral negotiations about sovereignty issues of the Aegean until 2004, 
after which recourse to the ICJ would be made for issues on which no agreement had 
been reached (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7; Tsakonas 2010: 92-93).  
The Helsinki Council constituted the most significant and high-profile foreign policy 
change of Greece in almost 20 years on two counts: First, it introduced a much different 
view of how Greek foreign policy juggled the challenges of dealing with Turkish 
demands on the Aegean (and Cyprus) and the opportunities offered by membership in the 
EU (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7-8). Helsinki introduced a bold concept that saw 
in Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations the best way for Turkey to reform itself 
and mitigate its demands, and for Greece to find a new standing among its European 
partners. Second, Helsinki institutionalized a more daring approach in the management of 
Greek-Turkish relations. Even though nominally Greece remained committed to its 
position that the only issue in the Aegean concerned the continental shelf, which should 
be judicially resolved (a position formulated in the 1980s, as a Papandreou corrective to 
Karamanlis’ policy of contacts with Turkey in the 1970s) (Athanassopoulou 1997: 77), in 
Helsinki the PASOK government of the time essentially invited  the pressure onto Greece 
to seek a universal arrangement with Turkey on all matters in the Aegean (Tsakonas 
2010: 19). The gamble was that this new approach in Greek-Turkish relations would 
institute a negotiation process in which, thanks to constant EU control on Turkish reforms 
and Cyprus’ open road to accession, Greece would keep tight control on Turkish 
demands. 
The end of the Cold War as well as huge transformations in the Balkans upset the 
equilibrium of Greek foreign policy up to that point. The polarization in the party system 
between the bourgeois Right and the radical Antiright (whether latent as in the 1960s and 
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1970s or obvious as in the 1980s) had produced a policy of deepening Greece’s 
integration with the West (culminating in the 1981 EEC accession) (Couloumbis 2000: 
376), and a policy of ‘countering Turkey on all levels and by all means’ (Valinakis 1989: 
196). Despite the contradiction between these two policies (and its exacerbation through 
the fact that the party system reproduced them as opposition between the opposing poles), 
the Cold War framework offered opportunities for partial relief of this tension (evidenced 
in the improvement of Greece’s relations with the Eastern bloc both under Karamanlis 
and Andreas Papandreou or the ability of NATO and the US to mitigate Greek-Turkish 
tensions) (Economides 2005: 474, 479). Instead, the end of the Cold War added a 
northern dimension to Greece’s security predicament from the east, 15 years after the 
country and all major political forces had agreed that the Balkans were a more or less 
stable parameter in Greece’s planning (Tsardanidis 1998: 303; Ifantis 2004: 248-250; 
Economides 2005: 478-479). 
Whereas Papandreou’s term in 1993-1996 was relatively moderate in terms of 
economic measures, his foreign policy towards Turkey retained its antagonistic nature, 
mostly evident in the creation of a Joint Strategic Doctrine with Cyprus (Heraclides 2007: 
165). Greek-Turkish relations, severely burdened by a protracted state of crisis in both 
countries’ politics, slowly escalated to confrontation, leading up to the Imia crisis (when 
Greece and Turkey faced off over sovereignty of some disputed islets on their Aegean 
Sea borders, a severe military crisis defused only after direct American mediation), a 
mere month after Papandreou had dramatically resigned from his hospital bed and a self-
styled modernizer with an expressed willingness to improve Greek-Turkish relations, 
Costas Simitis, had taken over as Prime Minister. The crisis revealed that the nascent 
modernist/populist cleavage now also ran through PASOK, as Simitis found his 
management of the crisis blocked by disagreements with key ministers, some of whom 
had challenged him for the post of Prime Minister and were claiming the nationalist 
heritage of Papandreou (Athanassopoulou 1997: 79).  
Simitis became leader of PASOK in the dramatic party convention of the summer of 
1996, directly calling snap elections for September 1996. Greek-Turkish relations were a 
relatively salient issue in the elections (Athanassopoulou 1997: 86-88), with ND leader 
Miltiades Evert (who had succeeded Mitsotakis after the 1993 elections) using a 
nationalist discourse to accuse Simitis of accepting Turkish hostility in the Aegean. 
Simitis defended his policy by linking traditional Greek positions about sovereignty and 
rights in the Aegean with a pragmatic approach and the need to support Greece’s 
positions diplomatically140. PASOK won the elections of 1996 against ND handsomely, 
even though it lost votes to the Left and saw a split party claiming Papandreou’s legacy in 
domestic and foreign policy, DIKKI, enter the parliament as well. ND lost votes but at 
                                                
140 Simitis-Evert electoral debate ahead of the 1996 election, excerpts available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQEIOwMHMkw. 
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least saw the breakaway party of Samaras (POLAN) fail to enter Parliament 
(Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276).  
The march towards Helsinki was long and arduous for Greek-Turkish relations. 
Overall bilateral relations improved in the years following Simitis’ electoral win, but not 
without setbacks. For Simitis and his team the problem was that, for reasons of internal 
party politics, many prominent members of the populist Papandreist wing still held 
important cabinet posts and controlled key PASOK organs. The result was that Simitis 
faced the most hurdles in his effort to normalize relations with Turkey in his own party. 
He clashed with his ministers of defense, both of whom had been rivals in the 1996 Prime 
Minister election, over the implementation of the Joint Defense Doctrine and the 
stationing of defensive missiles in Cyprus, in the end imposing a compromise solution 
and moving the missiles to Crete (Athanassopoulou 1997: 96; Heraclides 2007: 176-177). 
In 1997, during the NATO summit in Madrid, Simitis signed a declaration with Turkey 
committing both countries to a peaceful resolution of ‘all legitimate differences in the 
Aegean’. This raised voices of dissent within PASOK, both in the government and the 
parliamentary group, as it went against Greece’s official position that there was only one 
difference in the Aegean, the continental shelf, and that the only solution was juridical 
adjudication, not negotiations (Athanassopoulou 1997: 93-94; Heraclides: 175-176; 
Tsakonas 2010: 69-70). 
In early 1999 bilateral relations were shaken again when Turkish secret agents 
abducted Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan from the Greek embassy in Kenya, thus 
revealing a broad clandestine network within the government that had undertaken to 
foster him in Greece. The crisis caused Theodoros Pangalos (a modernizer but also anti-
Turkish politician) to be dismissed from the post of foreign minister and the rise to the 
post of George Papandreou (son of Andreas), fellow modernizer of Simitis and a 
politician known for his US sympathies (Tsakonas 2010: 73). With the modernizers now 
in firm control of the foreign ministry, Greece proceeded to a more active stabilization of 
relations with Turkey. Finally, the government was particularly assisted in this through 
developments in Greek public opinion, especially after two earthquakes hit Turkey and 
Greece and caused an outpour of sentiment on both sides in September 1999 (Heraclides 
2007: 181-182, 190-191; Tsakonas 2010: 75). 
The Helsinki Council decisions were the result of an intense diplomatic and 
negotiating procedure between Greece, Turkey and the EU member-states. Greece had 
previously used its veto rights in the EU in order to block or hamper developments 
towards closer links between Turkey and the EU. In other words, Greece had always held 
a reactive view of EU-Turkish relations: Turkey was to be punished for previous actions 
and forced into better behavior through Greece’s strength (Tsoukalis 2000: 47; Tsakonas 
2010: 48-51)141. This policy strained Greece’s relations with many pro-Turkish member 
                                                
141 Previously Greece had vetoed an EU aid package to Turkey right after Imia (early 1996) and the 
inclusion of Turkey in the list of candidate countries in late 1997 unless certain conditions were met. The 
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states (Athanassopoulou 1997: 80-81), but also allowed others to hide behind Greece’s 
veto and avoid hard decisions on Turkey’s accession procedure (Heraclides 2007: 178; 
Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 7).  
The time, in 1999, was particularly ripe for a new policy as the EU discussed its 
enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe. This moment offered Greece a 
particularly interesting timing, as it was in a unique position to link the demands of 
Turkey with the accession process of Cyprus – a particularly contentious matter in the 
EU, since many did not like the idea of a divided Cyprus entering the EU and thus the 
political problem of the island becoming Europeanized (Tsakonas 2010: 83-85). In 
Helsinki Simitis forced his hand by threatening to veto the whole enlargement if Cyprus 
were not included. The EU consented and pressured Turkey to accept the final 
arrangement in the Council conclusions (Heraclides 2007: 195-196; Tsakonas 2010: 91-
92). At once, Greece had brought the relations in the triangle Greece-Turkey-EU to a 
completely new basis. Turkey was to be monitored by the EU not only for its domestic 
reforms (which were hoped to create a more democratic, and hence more peaceful 
Turkey) but also for its conduct towards Greece and Cyprus. For Greece, the price was 
the acceptance that bilateral issues were subject to negotiations, which meant that 
compromise solutions would include arrangements on issues that Greece officially did 
not ‘recognize’ (Tsakonas 2010: 94-95). 
The Helsinki decisions became the object of intense public scrutiny in Greece. As 
was the case with the Macedonia name issue, fault lines seemed to run through parties as 
much as they divided them. The crucial difference, however, was that after three years of 
Simitis government, where the goal of entry into the Euro zone had become the cardinal 
goal of economic policy and widely accepted by the Greek public (Vernardakis 2011: 26, 
39), the liberal pragmatist interpretation that a Europeanized foreign policy could equally 
(if not better) serve Greece’s goals vis-à-vis Turkey became dominant. This was 
particularly the case within PASOK, where Simitis had consolidated his position, and 
with elections approaching, few of his Papandreist foes were in the mood to challenge his 
leadership and become a nuisance in the party’s reelection campaign (Tsakonas 2010: 96-
97).  
ND and its new leader, Costas Karamanlis (nephew of Constantine Karamanlis), 
were in a particularly tricky position. Modernizing the image of the party was considered 
the prime goals of the new leadership, elected in 1997 (Pappas and Dinas 2006: 483-484). 
A major part of this was reenergizing ND’s traditional identification with Europe and 
making the party the pillar of pro-Western orientation and domestic modernization once 
again. However, this narrative had been successfully appropriated by Simitis’ PASOK; 
Helsinki seemed to vindicate Simitis’ policy at least in the sense that that a policy of 
                                                                                                                                            
fact that between the January 1996 and December 1997 vetoes the Madrid agreement took place is a 
testament to the non-linear course of events in Greek-Turkish relations at the time. Most of the instability 
resulted from Simitis’ uncertain position within PASOK. For an account see Athanassopoulou (1997) and 
Heraclides (2007: 165-178). 
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Europeanization and interest promotion in Greek-Turkish relations and Cyprus was 
conceptually possible. This left little room to ND on the European aspect of the 
argument, but it could be open to legitimate criticism on the extent to which Greece’s 
long-standing interests were indeed served by Helsinki. Whereas ND had also returned to 
an official position of loosening of tensions with Turkey as well, the implication of its 
foreign policy criticism could be that, whereas Europeanization was an important goal, it 
did not justify backtracking on basic interests by all means (Heraclides 2007: 198, also fn 
46; also see Molyviatis 2002).  
The problem for Karamanlis was that some of the most coherent defense of Helsinki 
came from within his own party – and most predictably from so-called ‘liberals’, 
exponents of a bourgeois conception of the party and defenders of its identity as a 
coherent bourgeois pro-European pole. Most prominent among them was ex-Prime 
Minister and President Emeritus of ND Mitsotakis, who praised the Helsinki agreement 
as a pragmatic approach that reconciled Greece’s interests in bilateral relations with the 
need to remain close to Europe. Mitsotakis’ finance minister and neoliberal ideologue 
Stefanos Manos, and Mitsotakis’ daughter and ND heavyweight Dora Bakoyannis also 
praised the agreement, thus increasing the sense of cacophony within the broad center-
right (Heraclides 2007: 198, fn 44; Tsakonas 2010: 98). 
Helsinki was a flagship policy of the Simitis government on the way to the next 
parliamentary elections – normally due in the fall of 2000, but called early for April 
2000. Even though foreign policy as such did not figure highly in the pre-electoral 
agenda, Helsinki was an example of Simitis’ pragmatic approach to politics and his 
unequivocal commitment to modernization and the goal of accession to the Eurozone. 
PASOK’s electoral campaign centered on the question of experience and of which of the 
two parties had the most coherent concept for the country. In this respect, Helsinki was 
one policy area where ND could be presented to be incoherent and unreliable vis-à-vis 
PASOK’s clear-cut conception and managerial capabilities. ND on the other hand 
neutralized foreign policy as a campaign issue by emphasizing its own identity as the 
European party par excellence, its support for Cyprus’ European accession and for 
normalization with Turkey, and for better relations with the Balkan countries (2000 ND 
Foreign Policy Programme). 
The elections of 2000 were extremely closely contested. As in Greece the electoral 
law essentially secured an absolute majority of seats to the first party142, PASOK’s and 
ND’s competition became a dead heat. Despite PASOK enjoying numerous advantages 
as a governing party (control of governmental services, better access to the media, 
milking Simitis’ standing as the most suitable Prime Minister in opinion polls), ND 
almost managed to upset it and beat it to the first place. In the end, PASOK won the 
                                                
142 Since 1958 all Greek elections have been held under varieties of a ‘strengthened proportionality’ system. 
The goal of this system has been to allow the first party to form a parliamentary majority and, by 
implication, to increase the effect of bipolarity in the party system (Mavrogordatos 1984: 163). Since 1993 
all electoral laws of this variety contain a 3% entry clause to Parliament. 
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election with just 1% of the vote more than ND. Both parties increased their appeal and 
combined they polled 87%, thus reversing the tendencies of weakening the bipolarity that 
had become evident in 1996. The big loser of the elections was the Left, and especially 
DIKKI that had failed to enter Parliament (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277).  
Even though foreign policy was not the big determinant of the election outcome, we 
can still ponder how ND would have altered the plan laid down in Helsinki had it won the 
elections. Instead, PASOK’s victory meant that ND hastily accepted PASOK’s policies 
and they were thus institutionalized as part of Greek foreign policy identity. Greece’s 
European link, the need to secure membership in the Eurozone, and normalization with 
Turkey. The new balance between the modernist and the irredentist pillar of foreign 
policy – i.e. the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish relations and the prioritization of 
Greece’s Western ties over a principled pursuit of the maximum goals in bilateral 
relations with Turkey – became institutionalized by virtue of PASOK’s victory. In this, as 
in many other respects, the party system had entered a period of irreversible policy 
convergence between the two main parties (Lyrintzis 2005: 254).  
 
DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: CLEAVAGES, PARTY STRATEGIES AND 
REFORMULATION OF THE DIMENSION OF COMPETITION 
 
The foreign policy change recorded in Helsinki was the visible expression of a deep 
realignment within the party system, of the relationship between the main political parties 
and the reformulation of the normative anchor of party competition. The fact that Greece 
decided to combine the imperatives of Europeanization and pursuit of differently 
stratified national goals was in and of itself an impressive evolution given that just a few 
years earlier Greek foreign policy was functioning under premises of antagonism with 
neighbors and defiance towards Europe. It can however be compared with the equally 
impressive evolution of the binary competition between PASOK and ND from one of 
apocalyptic polarization, until the early 1990s, to one of policy convergence and 
loosening of the differences of their social outlook at the end of the decade. Foreign 
policy change was both the outcome and, to a certain extent, a condition for this 
evolution of the bipolar party system from political and social polarization between 
opposing poles into a convergent competition between very similar parties. 
The era of polarization between PASOK and ND finished essentially with the 
elections of 1993, the last ones contested by Papandreou and Mitsotakis. These would be 
the last elections where two coherent blocs of divergent class and social outlooks faced 
each other. ND suffered a defeat, a breakaway party formed over the single issue of 
Macedonia managed to enter Parliament and Mitsotakis, was forced to stand down. The 
Macedonia name issue exacerbated the division within ND as the main bourgeois party 
between conservatives, claiming the legacy of Constantine Karamanlis and, through him, 
of the anti-Venizelist camp, and liberals claiming the bourgeois-modernizing legacy of 
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Venizelos, mostly coalesced around Mitsotakis. That division was total, in the sense that 
it pitted two coherent policy visions that spanned economic and foreign policy (Pappas 
and Dinas 2006: 487). Karamanlists matched an aversion to Mitsotakis’ class-conscious 
neoliberal policies with a nationalistic posture on the Macedonia issue. Without 
distancing themselves from Europe (which was Karamanlis’ greatest legacy after all), 
they seemed to favor policies that only hardly fit in with the imperatives of Greece’s 
economic rationalization and convergence of foreign policy with Europe. The pinnacle of 
the Karamanlists’ influence came when their leader, and bitter rival of Mitsotakis, 
Miltiades Evert was elected as leader of ND. Evert proceeded to radically alter the party’s 
course by vocally distancing himself from the record of the Mitsotakis government in the 
economy, while it heightened its nationalist rhetoric in foreign policy (Vernardakis 2011: 
210-211). 
 
Table 17 
The Last Elections of an Era: The Elections of 1993 
 Parties	   Votes	  %	   Seats	  PASOK	   46.9	   170	  ND	   39.3	   111	  POLAN	  (ND	  breakaway)	   4.9	   10	  KKE	   4.5	   9	  SYN	  (reformed	  left)	   2.9	   -­‐	  Others	   1.5	   -­‐	  
 
Even though PASOK won easily in 1993 and Papandreou returned triumphantly to 
power, he was not the same man as he had been in the 1980s. PASOK embarked on a 
policy of fiscal consolidation much like Mitsotakis had (Lyrintzis 2005: 246). The only 
thing that was left to remind anyone of the party’s 1980s radicalism was a nationalist 
overtone in the foreign policy towards FYROM and Turkey. But even then, the party had 
graduated from the years when the framework of the Cold War allowed foreign policy 
adventurism. Just as Karamanlis had in the 1970s, PASOK was discovering Europe as a 
possible alternative locus of foreign policy (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 500-501).  
The 1993-1996 period is considered a transitional period for the Greek party system 
(Vernardakis 2011: 3-6). The Greek public started presenting visible signs of fatigue with 
party politics. Ideological self-placements on the Left-Right scale, reflecting historically 
the coalescence of voters around the three camps rather than ideological preferences, 
started presenting less polarization, and the appeal of parties (despite still strong degrees 
of partisan attachment) withered away (Mavris 1997: 179-182; Pappas 2001: 92-93; 
Vernardakis 2011: 165). In this climate, the conditions for increased voter volatility 
between political parties were created. This in turn created receptivity among the public 
for new ideas and the conditions for partisan actors to promote coherent policy visions 
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more efficiently (Alexakis 2001: 119-121). Both made the position of what had seemed 
like pervasive and systemically entrenched populism precarious. 
Papandreou’s ailing health precipitated a government crisis and a months-long 
thriller about his succession throughout 1995. A constellation of institutional and 
strategic factors arose then to favor the relatively small faction of the modernizers within 
PASOK to take over around Simitis. While hospitalized since the end of 1995, 
Papandreou finally agreed to step down as Prime Minister, while retaining his post as 
PASOK leader. This meant that the new Prime Minister would be elected from PASOK’s 
parliamentary group, thus giving the winner an important head start in the race to lead the 
party as well (Vernardakis 2011: 241). Despite the fact that all three of Simitis’ 
opponents were renowned political heirs of Papandreou’s economic populism and 
nationalism, he managed to carry the vote and be elected Prime Minister in January 1996.  
The importance of party system dynamics for this development becomes evident if 
one considers that Simitis’ surprise victory was to a large extent attributed to PASOK’s 
MPs calculation as to who would be better able to lead the party to victory against ND 
(Keridis 2001: 7). With Papandreou’s populism now more effectively represented by 
Evert, a continuation with Papandreou’s ideology would threaten to force PASOK to 
compete in a crowded field with uncertain results (Mavris 1997: 182-183; Vernardakis 
2011: 242). Simitis instead promised a coherent modernization plan across the board that 
would allow PASOK to outflank ND in its game (Europe and the rationalization of the 
economy) and to bring the party closer to the catch-all, cross-class tradition of 
Venizelism that had briefly characterized PASOK at the time of its impressive victory in 
1981 (Mavrogordatos 1983b; Vernardakis 2011: 21, 26). Simitis’ modernization project 
envisaged a thorough restructuring of the economy along neoliberal lines (Spourdalakis 
and Tassis 2006: 503-504), which in turn was packaged in a new grand design for 
Greece’s convergence with Europe (symbolized as the entry in Economic and Monetary 
Union as the ultimate goal). ‘Modernization as Europeanization’ challenged almost all 
established policy preferences of PASOK and its identity as representative of the radical 
Antiright pole of Greek politics. But Simitis also promised to make PASOK more 
appealing to a big part of a reform-minded middle class (the younger parts of which had 
been created due to PASOK’s generous welfare policies of the 1980s) that was 
unrepresented under the current constellation of the party system (Keridis 2001: 7-8; 
Vernardakis 2011: 38-39). 
Simitis’ strategy was eventually vindicated with his win in the party convention in 
the summer of 1996 against his main Papandreist foe and in the elections of September 
1996 against Evert. These elections were notable for the marked decrease of polarization 
it brought between the main parties, increased voter volatility that spanned all three 
political camps and, as a result of Simitis’ win within PASOK, the creation of a PASOK 
breakaway party claiming Papandreou’s legacy (DIKKI) and an increase of the vote for 
the two leftist parties, KKE and the Coalition of the Left (SYN) (Mavris 1997: 184-186; 
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Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276). In all, the 1996 elections produced an interesting change in 
the outlook of the social coalitions supporting the two main parties. Simitis’ promises of 
modernization and Europeanization attracted a substantial part of the middle class (and 
even the upper middle class) audience from ND. It was enough to make up for losses to 
the Left that exclusively came from PASOK’s lower strata audience. Evert’s populism on 
the other hand allowed ND to retain its support among lower-income strata (Mavris 1997: 
186-193; Vernardakis 2011: 102-106).  
 
Table 18 
Transition and Uncertainty: The Elections of 1996 
 Parties	   Vote	  %	   Change	  over	  1993	  %	   Seats	  PASOK	   41.5	   -­‐5.4	   162	  ND	   38.1	   -­‐1.2	   108	  KKE	   5.6	   +1.1	   11	  SYN	   5.1	   +2.2	   10	  DIKKI(PASOK	  breakaway)	   4.4	   +4.4	   9	  POLAN	   2.9	   -­‐2.0	   -­‐	  Others	   2.4	   +0.9	   -­‐	  
 
With the elections of 1996 the two parties, distant heirs of the Venizelist and anti-
Venizelist political identities and structural positions in the party system, rediscovered 
their cross-class appeal that had previously characterized Greek politics for most of the 
time before the advent of ideological polarization in the 1980s (Keridis 1999: 36). In a 
roundabout way, the Right camp was slowly reverting to its traditional identity as home 
of conservative and protectionist groups, while PASOK, as a continuation in the policy 
space of the centrist camp, was putting back together a dynamic coalition of both liberal 
modernizing and petit-bourgeois radical elements (Nicolacopoulos 1997: 205-207). 
These results were both an opportunity and a risk for Simitis as the rise of the Left made 
PASOK dependent on the success of modernization, but it also meant that lagging 
progress would raise impatience with the traditional PASOK mechanism. Even though 
the memory of the Imia crisis was still fresh in the minds of Greeks in 1996, enough so as 
to force Simitis to maintain a hard line electoral discourse, the electoral result essentially 
put in place a coalition that could be kept together only if PASOK delivered on its 
expressed goals of modernization and Europeanization (Athanassopoulou 1997: 87-88; 
Mavris 1997: 195). This was far from a certain prospect given the party’s internal 
composition and unease among most cadres with the prospect of PASOK abandoning its 
role as the leading force of an anti-bourgeois pole. 
Policy confusion reigned in ND after the 1996 defeat, and it was resolved only with 
the election of a youthful leader, Kostas Karamanlis, in 1997. Karamanlis sought to 
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rationalize the party’s turn towards populism under Evert. Faced with Simitis’ consistent 
vision of modernization and Europeanization that threatened to take over ND’s traditional 
flagship policies, Karamanlis decided to build on Evert’s inroads into the petit-bourgeois 
vote in order to highlight the hardships emanating from Simitis’ policy, while he 
unequivocally committed his party to EMU and the European orientation, criticizing the 
government on the practicalities and tactics of this policy (Alexakis 2001: 118). This 
policy of ‘triangulation’ (pressuring PASOK both from the right and the left) sought to 
make ND a cross-class coalition of pro-European middle-class and disenchanted radical 
strata, a task greatly dependent on Karamanlis’ personal charisma (Pappas and Dinas 
2006: 491)143.  
The bumps and lags in the implementation of the new Europeanized foreign policy 
coincided with the struggles Simitis and the modernizers faced with the implementation 
of their domestic program (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 14). Throughout 1997 
structural reforms were hard to implement (Vernardakis 2011: 46) and, after Karamanlis’ 
election as leader of ND, PASOK was constantly lagging in opinion polls until the Fall of 
1999 (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277). PASOK lost the 1998 municipal elections and the June 
1999 European elections – which also meant the first victory of ND in a decade (Pappas 
and Dinas 2006: 482). These last elections appeared to cement the process of 
fragmentation of the party system, as PASOK and ND won less than 70% of the votes 
combined, and the parties of the Left won 21%. Even though this percentage was more 
striking theoretically than it was politically relevant (due to the very different ideological 
baggage of the parties of the Left), it still signaled how precarious the reconciliation of 
PASOK’s radical heritage and new policy orthodoxy was – and by extension, the risks 
entailed for a party reliant on exploiting its central position in the party system increased 
substantially (Vernardakis 2011: 58-60). 
In summation, calling the 1993-1996 period ‘transitional’ today, as Vernardakis 
does, is accurate but constitutes an ex post facto reading of party systemic developments. 
From a contemporary viewpoint, the transitional period continued in many ways beyond 
the 1996 election. PASOK’s problematic implementation of its new foreign policy in 
1997-1998 could very well be attributed to the uncertain position of Simitis and his team 
within PASOK and Greek society in general (Athanassopoulou 1997: 98) and the 
difficulty of the party to absorb the policy changes and the new strategy they entailed. In 
other words, the 1996 coalition Simitis had created was rather precarious, as was his 
ambition to make modernization the new normative anchor of party competition. While 
ND had reverted to a pro-European policy of modernization and economic rationalization 
as well, PASOK was in danger of losing its main strategic advantage, which was its 
dominance of the majoritarian radical populist pole of the Right-Antiright axis that 
structured Greek politics. The successful normative reformulation of the stakes of this 
                                                
143 ND’s electoral strategy was the brainchild of John Loulis, Karamanlis’ chief communications advisor 
(Vernardakis 2011: 54). See Loulis (2004). 
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axis (which would allow PASOK to update its traditional policy of exploiting its center 
position while maintaining the bipolar character of party competition) (Mavrogordatos 
1984: 161; Moschonas 1994: 176-177) and the implementation of a new foreign policy 
would prove to be mutually constitutive processes. 
 
HELSINKI, VISIONS OF DOMESTIC SOCIETY AND THE NORMATIVE 
REFORMULATION OF BIPOLAR COMPETITION 
 
The decision of Greece to consent to the EU giving Turkey candidate member status 
in Helsinki in December 1999 was a major departure, not only from what had been up 
until then established orthodoxy of Greek foreign policy, but also from the most 
advanced proposals for negotiation and moderation that had existed before. Whereas the 
basic goals of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey remained unaltered (as bequeathed 
from the long tradition of irredentism and nationalism), i.e. retaining the territorial 
integrity of Greece in the Aegean and ensuring the security of the Republic of Cyprus 
while promoting reunification of the island (Tsakonas 2010: 53), there was a thorough 
reevaluation of the values and means to achieve those goals (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 
2010: 9). The new logic of relations with Turkey, encapsulating the idea that 
improvement of relations, more communication and embedding of bilateral differences 
and the Cyprus question within a European framework, served precisely the strategic 
goals the previous policy of adversity had failed to address. This new logic also reflected 
PASOK modernizing wing’s consistent project of ‘Europeanization’: liberalization and 
rationalization of economy domestically, and anchoring of Greece in the core of 
European integration, chiefly the EMU (Keridis 1999: 45-46; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 
2010: 9-10). From this it becomes evident that for the Simitis government domestic and 
foreign policy goals were closely interlinked (Tsakonas 2010: 54-55), and in this way the 
patterns of opposition and support for Helsinki reveal an emerging axis of competition 
around the project of Europeanization of Greek society and politics. 
The rise of new foreign policy ideas within the PASOK government, the ruling party 
at the time, as well as Greek society at large cannot be divorced from the concomitant 
rise of the twin concepts of ‘modernization’ and ‘Europeanization’ as main goals of 
PASOK’s economic and social policy. Indeed, in many ways the main determining battle 
was not between PASOK and its opponents, but between the two big camps that had been 
crystalized during the protracted crisis of succession of Andreas Papandreou in the end of 
1995 and early 1996 (Tsardanidis 1998: 304-305). During his first three years in the 
leadership of PASOK (1996-1999) Simitis had to constantly strike a balance between his 
own proclivities towards liberal policies and a pragmatic foreign policy, and the 
representatives of the rival wing of Papandreists (Athanassopoulou 1997: 84, 86). This 
split went beyond personal ambitions or even ideological differences within the same 
party; deciding in favor of one or the other direction was also a choice between a 
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perpetuation of the Right-Antiright axis of competition (Kalyvas 1997: 93-94) or a 
reformulation of it by allowing the modernization-populism latent axis to overlie it.  
The sudden rise of the Helsinki conception of foreign policy goals was so rapid in 
the second half of 1999 (Heraclides 2007: 194; Tsakonas 2010: 75) that it can only be 
compared with the equally rapid consolidation of the modernizing project within the 
government itself (Tsakonas 2010: 77) and a recovery from two years of lagging 
economic reforms and poor showing in the opinion polls. The impressive improvement of 
relations with Turkey after September 1999 was perhaps the most vital element of this 
sturdy return from the brink of failure: it captured in a highly emotive policy initiative 
both Simitis’ bold approach towards Greece’s problems and his ability to play a game of 
high stakes and win144. Indeed, the time of the Helsinki Council was also seen as the final 
turning point after which PASOK was in the driver’s seat, being trusted by the public 
opinion on two issues that seemed to resonate positively (EMU and foreign policy) 
(Kathimerini, 16/12/1999b; Vernardakis 2011: 26). This parallel process of the 
consolidation of the modernizers’ agenda inside PASOK made the decision to initiate a 
sensational foreign policy change in Helsinki institutionally and politically possible. In 
hindsight, Simitis himself has admitted that securing his position within PASOK and 
projecting his goals on the party’s agenda made a crucial difference for the pursuit of 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement to its logical extent (Tsakonas 2010: 77).  
In turn, Helsinki became a policy initiative that promised to complete an important 
systemic change. PASOK’s electoral strategy of the past was based on an anti-Right 
polarizing rhetoric that established the party as the main expression of the ‘democratic’ 
pole (thus usurping the strength of the Left) while it attracted the support of voters of the 
Center camp still mobilized by an anti-Right ethos. By identifying PASOK with the 
modernizing side of the latent cross-party modernizing-populist cleavage (Keridis 1999: 
45), and by redefining the meaning of ‘progressivism’ as against conservative forces of 
stagnation (Lyrintzis 2005: 251; Vernardakis 2011: 21), PASOK could reinvent the 
meaning of anti-Right strategy and complement it again with a centrist strategy – this 
time towards new middle class, non-ideological strata looking for efficient governance 
and economic rationalization (Vernardakis 2011: 9-10, 38-42). Once the modernizing 
faction imposed its agenda, and by extension this new particular reading of the party’s 
structural position, within PASOK during the fall of 1999, a policy initiative that would 
cement the party’s new dual identity and reshape the party system accordingly became 
both possible and desirable. Given that foreign policy successes like the ‘earthquake 
diplomacy’ had played a major part in the consolidation of the modernizing agenda 
within PASOK, foreign policy could be such a policy initiative.  
                                                
144 It is characteristic that, whereas Helsinki was met with huge popular approval in December 1999, in 
October 1999 50% of the population still were claiming in opinion polls to be against lifting the veto on 
Turkey (Tsakonas 2010: 216, note 309). 
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Just as Simitis had to fight, first and foremost, within PASOK to consolidate 
modernization, and by extension Europeanization of foreign policy, as the unequivocal 
policy of the party, ND only found its place within the new dimension of competition 
gradually and after it had healed some of the wounds left behind from the painful division 
between conservatives and liberals. While the party’s new youthful image brought it back 
from the wilderness (as evidenced in its victories in the 1998 prefectural and 1999 
European elections), by late 1999 ND was trapped in an awkward position as it had to 
practice opposition against policies with which it agreed with in essence. Karamanlis 
opted for a persistent strategy of proposing better means towards the same goals, while 
promising to mitigate some of the consequences of Simitis’ one-minded policies. This 
pattern was to repeat itself in foreign policy as well: whereas Karamanlis’ strategy of 
turning ND back to the essential modernizing bourgeois image the Right enjoyed under 
Karamanlis the elder and Mitsotakis also went through an emphasis on the need for 
improved relations with Turkey and moderation in foreign policy, the need to placate 
populist nationalists inside the party and expand the party’s appeal to popular strata 
threatened by modernization also dictated a critique of initiatives that seemed to run away 
with Europeanization to the detriment of firmly defined Greek positions. 
The imposition of modernization as PASOK’s main policy also caused a movement 
on the Left of the party, the sum result of which was the increase of the self-demarcation 
of the parties of the Left from what they presented as an undifferentiated bipolar block 
committed to neoliberalism and austerity. With PASOK turning slowly into a more 
bourgeois party, the parties of the Left tried to claim for themselves the role of genuine 
representatives of the Antiright side of the old normative anchor. In this context, they 
were also maintaining the main foreign policy rhetoric of the radical populist pole about 
sovereignty, independence and unwillingness to yield Greece’s rights for the cause of 
European or Western integration (Keridis 1999: 48). 
In summary, the patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki captured the 
establishment of a new meaning of bipolar competition by late 1999 with accuracy. This 
new meaning was the result of the persistence of the existing Right-Antiright axis that 
separated PASOK and ND and informed a big part of their social outlook still, and the 
interaction of this axis with the new cleavage between modernizers and populists that 
seemed to cut through the old leftist radical pole, separating PASOK from the other 
parties of the Left145. Foreign policy is an accurate marker of this emerging axis in that 
not only is a big part of the differences between modernizers and populists attributed to 
their differences on Europe, but this cleavage first became evident during the foreign 
policy controversies of the early 1990s, when differences on the Macedonia name issue 
cut through ND, PASOK and the Left.  
                                                
145 On the persistence of the Right-Antiright axis vis-à-vis the crosscutting modernization cleavage, see also 
Moschonas (1994: 202). The same author of course accepts that this axis can be reformulated or updated 
through interaction with other cleavages (ibid: 208-210). 
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Consequently, from mid-1999 onwards there was an undergoing process for the 
establishment of a ‘convergent two-partyism’ (Vernardakis 2011: 57) between PASOK 
and ND, with both parties manipulating the old as well as the new axis of competition: 
PASOK would energize the anti-Right rhetoric of the past in order to compensate for the 
hardships associated with the austerity it was imposing, whereas ND would seek to 
combine modernization with social justice in an effort to bridge the old bourgeois-radical 
divide (the results of this strategy had already become evident in the elections of 1998 
and 1999, Alexakis 2001: 122-123). The victims of this strategy were the parties of the 
Left, whose anti-modernization and nationalistic discourse ensured them their isolation 
from the vast pro-European bloc without allowing them to counter either the dominance 
of PASOK within the Left-radical pole or ND’s successful inroads into it. The heated 
foreign policy discussion of December 1999 was one important stop in the course of 
revitalization of bipolar competition around the stake of modernization between 1996 and 
2000. 
The domestic program of PASOK, practiced since 1996 but only raised to the status 
of unequivocal identity of the party from 1999 onwards, was summarized under the 
buzzword ‘modernization’. It included a program of privatizations, market liberalization 
and a balancing of the state budget. Given the neoliberal nature of this specific 
interpretation of modernization, which had proven already very divisive during the 
Mitsotakis term (1990-1993), Simitis needed a more inspirational and unifying theme 
within which to embed his program. Just as Karamanlis had in the 1970s, Simitis found it 
in Europe. ‘Europeanization’ became the inseparable element of his program of 
modernization, with domestic neoliberal reforms presented as needed for Greece to enter 
the EMU. Greece in the hard core of Europe became the overarching goal, and all other 
policies (domestic and foreign) had to serve it (Tsardanidis 1998: 315; Kranidiotis 2000: 
32; Economides 2005: 481-482; Heraclides 2007: 184). Europeanization itself was a very 
powerful and persuasive concept precisely because it appealed to dynamic constituencies 
in politics, the media and academia (Lyrintzis 2005: 251; Vernardakis 2011: 38-42).  
The government spent most of December justifying the decision in Helsinki and 
establishing the link between the normative redefinition of Greek foreign policy priorities 
(if not goals) and the practical imperatives of domestic modernization. The decision to 
put the relationship with Turkey on a completely different footing was presented as a 
crucial step of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy that portrayed the country’s 
willingness to embed its political culture within a European framework (Kranidiotis 
2000: 35). Improving relations with Turkey was supposed to portray the ability of the 
Greek political class, society and institutions to absorb European norms of behavior 
ahead of Greece’s entry into the EMU (Keridis 2001: 13; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 
2010: 14-15). The government’s success in tying Turkey’s future behavior to European 
conditionality standards served as an insurance that Greek foreign policy would see the 
EU as the sole framework for bilateral relations in the future (Tsakonas 2010: 96-97). On 
 
 
 170 
a more practical basis, improvement of bilateral relations promised to support the project 
of budgetary consolidation by allowing the lowering of defense spending, one of the 
largest burdens in the state budget since the deterioration of bilateral relations after the 
1970s that had to decrease if Greece were to reduce its deficits ahead of joining the EMU 
(Couloumbis 2000: 382; Heraclides 2007: 173-174; Tsakonas 2010: 62-64). In this way, 
Helsinki aggressively put the stake of ‘Europeanization’ in the epicenter of political 
competition. The popularity of this concept among Greek public opinion (Vernardakis 
2011: 26, 39) was expected to positively affect the more specific agenda of economic 
liberalization and rationalization. 
The Helsinki Council and its effective packaging within the Europeanization 
discourse and the goal of the EMU caught ND off guard. From the beginning, Karamanlis 
was bound to follow where Simitis was going: PASOK had effectively appropriated the 
cause of bourgeois transformation of the economy and society, thus depriving Karamanlis 
of the main instruments of his conscious effort to bridge the Karamanlist and liberal 
wings of his party. The opposition strategy of ND foresaw a rediscovery of the party’s 
pro-European profile and its commitment to liberalization of the economy, and in this 
way there was not really much to say about the government’s goals towards EMU and 
modernization. By the same token, improving relations with Turkey had traditionally 
been the prerogative of ND governments and a historical trademark of the Right camp as 
it tried to secure Greece’s Western anchoring since the 1950s146. The transformation of 
ND’s profile also meant then that the party was devoid of effective opposition arguments 
against Helsinki, as it also understood that improving relations with Turkey was an 
important precondition for closer anchoring to Europe (Heraclides 2007: 198; Tsakonas 
2010: 98).  
The analogy of the opposition tactics of ND in domestic and foreign policy 
accurately captured Karamanlis’ desire to make ND the party of ‘the middle ground’, a 
term introduced by him and which was meant as an ideological synthesis that would 
bridge the Right’s cross-class collectivist tradition, the updating of this tradition through 
his uncle’s pro-European modernization, and the more aggressive class-based bourgeois 
liberalism of the liberal wing of the party. This concept could bridge ND’s essentially 
pro-European neoliberal economic program with a more caring discourse towards 
modernization’s losers. By the same token, ND’s opposition to the Helsinki decision 
represented the effort of Karamanlis to update the bourgeois pole’s traditional moderation 
in foreign policy with a renewed emphasis on the concerns of the more radical/populist 
social strata, about Turkish aggression and Greek independence and territorial integrity: 
 
‘The sloppiness and experimentalism with which dialogue with Turkey is attempted 
today, is a serious cause for concern. It should not be forgotten that the institutional and 
                                                
146 Indeed, as evidence of ND’s fragmentation in the debate, parts of the liberal-conservative press tried not 
to discredit Helsinki, but to actually claim it for ND. See Eleftheros Typos (13/12/1999). 
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social structures of Turkey are chronically unstable. This makes on the one hand Turkey 
unable to express a strong political will for its true Europeanization, and on the other 
hand weakens its credibility as an interlocutor’ (The Government Program of New 
Democracy, March 2000: 31). 
 
Conversely, a typical exponent of the bourgeois liberal wing of the Right-wing camp 
(but not a member of ND anymore), Stefanos Manos praised the agreement, not only as a 
foreign policy choice that ‘served national interests’ but also because a rapprochement 
between Greece and Turkey would open up opportunities for Greek business in Turkey. 
In this way, ‘Hellenism would again reach its historical limits of action’ (in.gr, 
11/12/1999a). Manos’ argumentation then presented a foreign policy choice as an 
opportunity for economic growth in Greece, thus bringing up memories of Venizelos’ 
rationale for the rapprochement with Turkey in the 1930s.  
Immediately after Helsinki, the government’s fortunes seemed to have turned 
dramatically, so much so that it was a foregone conclusion that Simitis would call snap 
elections before the October 2000 expiration of his term. He indeed did so, calling 
elections for April 2000. The campaign period revealed that for the first time the two 
parties were so close in policy terms – yet this similarity also meant that they were 
running neck and neck to capture first place. Both parties agreed on the fundamental goal 
of EMU and what this entailed (reduction of deficits, reduction of inflation, market 
liberalization etc.) (Lyrintzis 2005: 254); yet a difference of approaches was still 
discernible. Where PASOK’s links with public sector unions and a class of state-reliant 
businessmen meant that the party’s modernization did not go beyond fiscal consolidation 
and deregulation of a few key sectors (like banking) (Vernardakis 2011: 43), ND 
emphasized its commitment to more thorough structural changes and a focus on private 
enterprise (Lyrintzis 2005: 245; Vernardakis 2011: 54).  
Helsinki was a marginal issue in the election campaign, reflecting the essential 
agreement of the two major parties on the key issue of Greece’s international orientation, 
the effort to be part of ‘hard core Europe’. Karamanlis, in particular, was hoping to keep 
out of public discourse an issue that had proven Simitis’ statesmanship and had 
contributed to the consolidation of the modernizing faction within PASOK and public 
opinion. The dominance of the economy did not allow PASOK to make Helsinki a proper 
issue of the electoral campaign, however foreign policy was always in the background 
reminding of Simitis’ ability to link the domestic with the international imperatives of 
Europeanization. Simitis himself had called Helsinki ‘the happiest moment of his first 
term’ (Rizospastis, 4/4/2000) and a month before the elections dedicated the introductory 
speech of his pre-electoral press conference to Helsinki and foreign policy. The leitmotiv 
of Simitis and PASOK was that Helsinki demonstrated the government’s ability to 
incorporate European norms and bring Greece closer to Europe while serving long-
standing Greek interests: 
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‘The first central goal [of our foreign policy] is the further strengthening of 
Greece’s position and role in the EU […] With our entry in the common currency, the 
euro, we ensure the equal position of Greece within the strongest group of member-states 
[…] Our strategic goal is to promote the process of overcoming problems in Greek-
Turkish relations by taking full advantage of the decisions of the Helsinki Council. I don’t 
have to add that after Helsinki Greek-Turkish relations are in a completely new 
framework. Greece’s argument and support in its relations with Turkey are the values of 
the Union […]’147. 
 
In this way, if anything, Helsinki contributed to the general image of capable 
management and reliability which PASOK cultivated for itself and the argument that ND 
was too inexperienced to take over at a delicate time for Greece’s EMU prospects. 
Indeed, the split between the Karamanlist and the liberal wing within the ND became the 
topic of a campaign ad for PASOK, thus highlighting that ND was not ‘ready’ to lead the 
country and that a loss of PASOK would put Greece’s European convergence policy in 
peril148. ND’s perceived inexperience and populism were a recurrent theme of PASOK’s 
campaign: 
 
 ‘I ask you, does Greece’s international position compare with its international 
position in 1996? Today we are a country with strength, with status, with voice. Today we 
are a force of peace in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. Where would we be if we 
had heard the cries of the opposition’149? 
 
Just as the patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki revealed a growing 
tendency of convergence between the two main parties, with PASOK’s unequivocal 
commitment to Europeanization and ND’s enhancing of its economically liberal message 
with more populist undertones, so did Helsinki contribute to the eventual marginalization 
of the forces to the left of PASOK as they were left alone defending a populist nationalist 
stance that highlighted the contradictions between Greece’s national goals and its 
European orientation. For DIKKI, a PASOK offshoot with the declared goal of 
continuing the Papandreist revolution of the 1980s in domestic and foreign policy 
(Keridis 2001: 9), Helsinki was understandably an important cause. DIKKI expressed its 
absolute disagreement with Europeanization in both domestic and foreign policy, citing 
dangers for the standing of the Greek popular classes and the independence and 
sovereignty of the Greek state.  
                                                
147 Simitis speech in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000, 
29/3/2000. 
148 Ad accessible at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLvE5kmvG7U&feature=related. 
149 Simitis speech at PASOK’s major electoral rally, Athens, April 7 2000. 
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KKE’s position was also revealing of the party’s strategy after the fall of 
Communism and the 1993 electoral debacle. KKE slowly started complementing its 
ideological rigidness with an idiosyncratic blend of nationalism and authoritarianism – 
what Lyrintzis (2005: 256) has called ‘nationalist-populism’ and Marantzidis (2009) has 
accurately described as a new ‘ethnopopulism’ (also Vernardakis 2011: 299-301). In 
foreign policy terms, this meant supporting positions that fell squarely within the Greek 
populist nationalist tradition such as anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism in general 
(which it had supported already since the 1970s and 1980s, Heraclides 2007: 160), and 
seeing Helsinki both as a policy underlining Greece’s anchoring within a neoliberal 
capitalist EU and as a policy sacrificing Greek rights for the sake of Western orientation.  
Helsinki caused the most interesting developments in the party of the reformed Left, 
the Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN). SYN had started off as a self-conscious pro-
European reformist party of the Left. This meant that the rise of Simitis within PASOK 
placed enormous pressure on the party, with many cadres leaving altogether to join 
PASOK. Those who stayed squabbled between a modernizing/center-left faction and a 
post-communist/radical faction (Vernardakis 2011: 276-283). Predictably, Helsinki 
divided SYN precisely along these lines also reflecting different approaches towards 
modernization. The moderates supported Helsinki as another step in the Europeanization 
of Greek foreign policy and polity in general, whereas the leftists had a position closer to 
the one of the other Left-wing parties, seeing the agreement as a concession to Turkey 
and a threat to Greece’s independence. The president of the party (himself a moderate) 
had to verbally balance these two views, but the cacophony increased the sense that SYN 
was basically two parties in one, split neatly on almost every aspect of domestic and 
foreign policy (To Vima, 10/12/1999 and 12/12/1999). Nevertheless, the party generally 
portrayed a profile more associated with moderation and pacifism than the belligerent 
DIKKI or the revolutionary KKE (To Vima 11/12/1999).  
The 2000 election results reflected the rise and consolidation of a renewed two-
partyism around a reformulated normative anchor. PASOK managed to narrowly beat 
ND by almost 70000 votes to the first place and form a government with a 6-seat 
majority in parliament. The results reflected a huge majority in favor of the basic decision 
for Greece to enter the euro-zone (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277).  
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Table 19 
Resurgent Two-Partyism: The Elections of 2000 
 Parties	   Vote	  %	   Change	  over	  1996	  %	  
Seats	  
PASOK	   43.8	   +2.3	   158	  ND	   42.7	   +4.6	   125	  KKE	   5.5	   -­‐0.1	   11	  SYN	   3.2	   -­‐1.9	   6	  DIKKI	   2.7	   -­‐1.7	   -­‐	  POLAN	   -­‐	   -­‐2.9	   -­‐	  Others	   2.1	   -­‐0.3	   -­‐	  
 
Even more impressive is the post-election analysis of the two parties’ social 
outlooks. The consolidation of modernization as the new official ideology of PASOK 
allowed the party to make impressive inroads towards middle-class and, to some extent, 
upper middle-class social strata, which had been almost exclusive property of the 
bourgeois Right pole until then. This, together with the party’s sustained dominance of 
the working class and petit bourgeois vote thanks to the existence of the always-vocal 
Papandreist wing, allowed Simitis to complete the construction of a cross-class coalition 
that had started in 1996. Here foreign policy was important in a rather unlikely way: 
While foreign minister Papandreou was a devoted modernizer, his defense of Helsinki 
offered Simitis valuable credibility in the eyes of Papandreist nationalists and populists 
within PASOK. The reason was apparently that Papandreou was seen as the keeper of his 
father’s nationalist legacy. In this way, his argumentation actually made Helsinki a 
further uniting factor of PASOK’s new coalition when it could also have been divisive 
(Tsakonas 2010: 78, 96). 
ND on the other hand improved its position in relation to 1996, but this increase of 
votes was not the result of linear movements. Instead, increased volatility, which after 
1996 had become an entrenched phenomenon of Greek politics (Nicolacopoulos 2005: 
276), meant that ND had lost many upper middle-class votes to PASOK, but also that it 
was able to compensate them with impressive (for its standards) penetration of the petit 
bourgeois, working class and farmer vote (Vernardakis 2011: 113-119 and elsewhere). 
The success of ND’s socially conscious discourse against PASOK’s fundamentalist 
program of modernization was evident, for example, in that it managed to attract as many 
votes from populist leftist DIKKI as PASOK did150.  
                                                
150 For an analysis of electoral flows between parties in the elections of 2000, see Zafiropoulos (2001). His 
analysis reveals that increased individual voting volatility continued being a pervasive phenomenon of the 
Greek party system after 1996. Very interestingly, ND presented an equally formidable ability as PASOK 
to attract votes from DIKKI, SYN and even KKE, while PASOK attracted many of the votes that had gone 
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Table 20 
From Social Blocs to Electoral Alliances 
Estimation of party strength in selected urban prefectures by socioeconomic area in the 
1993, 1996 and 2000 elections 	   PASOK	  
93	  %	  
ND	  
93	  %	  
PASOK
>ND	  
93	  %	  
PASOK	  
96	  %	  
ND	  
96	  %	  
PASOK
>ND	  
96	  %	  
PASOK	  
2000	  %	  
ND	  
2000	  %	  
PASOK
>ND	  
2000	  %	  
National	  
Result	  
46.9	   39.3	   +7.6	   41.5	   38.1	   +3.4	   43.8	   42.7	   +1.1	  
Upper	  
Middle	  
Class	  
Areas	  
18.0	   70.0	   -­‐52.0	   28.6	   50.3	   -­‐21.7	   35.3	   52.5	   -­‐17.2	  
Middle	  
Class	  
Areas	  
N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   37.6	   36.1	   +1.5	   42.6	   40.3	   +2.3	  
Petit-­‐
Bourgeois	  
Areas	  
N/A	   N/A	   N/A	   39.3	   30.1	   +9.2	   43.7	   34.8	   +8.9	  
Working	  
Class	  
Areas	  
52.5	   26.5	   +26.0	   42.7	   26.6	   +16.1	   46.4	   31.9	   +14.5	  
 
Source: Adapted from Vernardakis (2011: 98-99, 113-115)151. 
 
These data reveal that the strategies of the two biggest parties now allowed them to 
manipulate the old Right-Antiright axis and the new populism-modernisation cleavage in 
order to build cross-class coalitions around the normative anchor of domestic 
modernization and Europeanization. Both parties had their traditional social and 
geographic strongholds (PASOK remained stronger among its traditional petit bourgeois 
clientele and ND did as well among its upper class following), thus to a certain extent 
maintaining the old Right-Antiright division – especially exploited by PASOK when it 
reverted to its polarizing discourse to energize its petit bourgeois following. But party 
strategies and the manipulation of the modernizing-populist cleavage also allowed the 
two parties to bridge the traditional Left-Right division – essentially exchanging votes in 
each other’s strongholds to create cross-class coalitions with similar outlooks 
(Vernardakis 2011: 164). While the Right-Left axis remained a strong marker of voters’ 
and parties’ self-placement (Vernardakis 2011: 173-174), and the modernization axis was 
                                                                                                                                            
to POLAN (ND’s breakaway party) in 1996. This data show that the robust two-partyism established after 
2000 relied on both big parties’ ability to find votes all over the political spectrum and all over the 
socioeconomic sphere.  
151 Vernardakis’ Greek terminology of the social strata is translated literally as ‘upper class, ‘upper middle 
class’, ‘middle class’ and ‘working/popular class’ respectively. 
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effectively suppressed due to PASOK’ and ND’s agreement in principle on Greece’s 
European course, the party strategies of modernizers within PASOK and Karamanlis 
within ND led to the emergence of a renewed robust two-party system. 
The new normative anchor of bipolar competition straddling, while not completely 
eliminating, the old division in a bourgeois and a radical pole only arose gradually. This 
reevaluation of the stakes of competition – which party can better manage modernization 
while retaining a degree of welfare for the people (Keridis 1999: 33) – was conceptually 
underpinned by a reevaluation of Greece’s place in its region and its strategy towards 
Turkey. Foreign policy successes supported the process of consolidation of the Simitis 
team within PASOK, and Helsinki was the final step in the consolidation of 
modernization and Europeanization as the stake of party competition (Blavoukos and 
Bourantonis 2010: 14-15). Patterns of support and opposition to Helsinki closely 
corresponded to PASOK’s and ND’s efforts to build broad cross-class (if somewhat 
colorless) coalitions, with the modernization of the economy as a point of reference 
(Nicolacopoulos 2005: 277; Pappas and Dinas 2006: 482; Vernardakis 2011: 160-163). 
The slight tilt towards populism in ND’s economic discourse (Tsoukalis 2000: 41) was 
matched with a slight tilt towards the nationalism pillar of foreign policy in the party’s 
critique against Helsinki. In sum, foreign policy change was the result of the rise within 
PASOK of a new conception of party competition that created new patterns of interaction 
among parties – and effective argumentation in favor of this foreign policy change with 
regards to visions of domestic society completed the transition to the new normative 
anchor in both main parties. Being a foreign policy issue however, Helsinki had to be 
justified with reference to international systemic requirements on Greek foreign policy – 
especially towards a public with historically high (and sometimes passionate) interest in 
foreign affairs.  
 
THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND PARTISAN AGENCY: HELSINKI AS A LINK 
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC REALIGNMENT 
 
The end of the Cold War, Turkey’s new strategic ambitions (as evidenced in its role 
during the Gulf War and in a new security partnership with Israel) and newfound regional 
aspirations, the collapse of the Balkans and the disagreements between Europe and the 
United States about the management of these new realities caught Greece completely off 
guard (Tsoukalis 2000: 44-45; Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 8). The Macedonia 
name issue captured a wider social reality in Greece in an intense way. It captured the 
inability of the party system and the public to reconcile this radically changed regional 
environment with Greece’s twin foreign policy pillars of belonging to Europe and 
defending territorial integrity and independence. Seen as an issue of reverse defensive 
irredentism, Greek concerns over Macedonia painfully portrayed that in the post-Cold 
War environment Greek foreign policy had lost its equilibrium between the demands of 
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modernization and Western integration, and defense of the country’s irredentist gains and 
integrity (Keridis 2001: 11; Economides 2005: 479-480). The collapse of the Mitsotakis 
government was a stark instant of this uncertainty over Greece’s international orientation 
energizing political identities that cut through existing political alignments. 
Relations between Greece and its neighbors continued to deteriorate under a spiral of 
rival nationalisms throughout the mid-1990s, culminating in the fateful Imia crisis of 
January 1996. The consensus among Greek foreign policy analysts is that this crisis, 
taking place merely days after Costas Simitis had taken over as Prime Minister, prompted 
a thorough reevaluation of Greece’s foreign policy priorities, mostly the degree of enmity 
in bilateral relations with Turkey (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010: 10). However, the 
Imia crisis was revelatory of structural processes that had plagued the region for some 
time already (Tsakonas 2010: 34-40). This point of crisis allowed for a different reading 
of the post-Cold War framework and Greece’s membership of the EU as opportunities, 
not constraints on its achieving the basic goals of foreign policy.  
The EU Council decision of Helsinki in December 1999 allowed the government to 
finalize and project on the Greek public its own version of the new strategic environment 
Greece was facing. In this way the modernizer reading of Greece’s post-Cold War 
international environment translated international structural imperatives into domestic 
partisan competition and supported the creation of a powerful modernizing pole in the 
Greek party system around PASOK, which in turn propagated and institutionalized a new 
understanding of foreign policy goals.  
In the modernizers’ discourse, the apparently unruly international environment of the 
post-Cold War era was presenting a multitude of opportunities for Greek foreign policy 
and not necessarily threats (Tsakonas 2010: 54). This was a position that had first 
surfaced within the liberal wing of the Mitsotakis government but was never carried 
through due to the division within ND and the Papandreou victory of 1993. This 
discourse started resurfacing again after 1996, first from within the system of ideological 
and academic justification of Europeanization that took advantage of the Imia crisis to 
present its view as a viable alternative to the adversarial policy of the past. The 
institutionalization of this view of Greece’s international environment (which could be 
summarized in the view that adversarial foreign policies did not help Greece fulfill its 
traditional foreign policy goals while pulled it away from Europe) proceeded gradually 
with the consolidation of the modernizing agenda within PASOK (Athanassopoulou 
1997: 89-91). 
The justification of Helsinki was based on an aggressive propagation of the link 
between Greece’s traditional foreign policy goals – defense of territorial integrity and 
independence – and its sustained presence within Europe. According to the government 
argumentation of the time, the Helsinki decision filtered the new international 
circumstances surrounding Greece into a European framework that allowed the country 
to promote its goals more efficiently: 
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‘Greece is a European, a Balkan and a Mediterranean country […] [The] PASOK 
government capitalized on this triple identity of the country […] The basic goal of 
foreign policy is the maximization of Greek interests by turning the country into a 
significant force of peace and stability, development and cooperation in the European 
and regional system’152. 
 
Especially the part of the agreement on Cyprus was promoted as an example of the 
congruence between Europeanization of Greek foreign policy style and priorities and 
long-term goals. Helsinki ensured that Cyprus’ accession procedure would be decoupled 
from resolution of the political problem of the island, thus disarming any doubts about 
Cyprus’ accession among Europeans and neutralizing Turkish opposition. The exchange 
given (Cyprus’ and Greece’s pledge to work intensely for a solution before entry into the 
EU and the granting of a candidate status to Turkey) was considered reasonable since 
Turkey would have to modify its intransigent position on Cyprus in order to capitalize on 
its candidate status. Europeanization of Greek-Turkish bilateral relations is also shown to 
be supportive of a more refined conceptualization of Greek national interests 
(Economides 2005: 484). It was supposed to force European norms on Turkey, thus 
substantially reducing Turkish aggression and increasing Greek security, as well as create 
a framework for negotiations between the two countries that was effectively controlled by 
Greece (due to its presence inside the EU). Indeed, Europeanization of bilateral relations 
meant that Greece could use the EU as a lever of pressure on Turkey while negotiations 
were underway. In this way, a complex web of mutually enforcing norms, evaluation 
procedures and interest promotion was being created (Heraclides 2007: 197-198; 
Tsakonas 2010: 80-81). 
Helsinki was the more visible example of a general change of style and priorities in 
Greek foreign policy. While a more positive relationship with Greece’s neighbors was 
deemed by members of the Simitis circle positive to the extent that it assisted Greece’s 
course towards EMU (Tsoukalis 2000: 49-50), the government employed an interests-
based argumentation that tried to justify Europeanization with the fulfillment of 
traditional goals of Greek nationalism. This was a testament to the strength of the existing 
normative framework of the conduct of Greek foreign policy since at least 1974. The 
insistence that, however improved bilateral relations would become, Greece should 
maintain a strong military deterrence against Turkey, while (somewhat paradoxically) 
clinging to the familiar mantra that the only difference in the Aegean concerned the 
continental shelf in public (Heraclides 2007: 202; Tsakonas 2010: 99-100), showed that 
even an ambitious reformer like Simitis could only engage with the existing framework 
of Greece’s foreign policy, not alter it completely. Maintaining these elements of the 
                                                
152 Speech of Simitis in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000, 
Athens, 29 March 2000. 
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adversarial view of Greece’s international environment served to placate Papandreists 
within PASOK and to maintain the ability of the party to dominate the radical Antiright 
camp, where nationalism and populism still held appeal (Tsakonas 2010: 97): 
 
‘Our firm positions are well known. Greece does not demand and does not relent on 
anything. Creating relations of cooperation with the neighboring country is absolutely 
desirable as part of a general process for the stability and development of the region. But 
deepening of cooperation needs to take place within the framework of respect for the 
principles of international law and treaties. For the problem of delimitation of the 
continental shelf the road to the International Court of Justice in the Hague is always 
open’153. 
 
At the same time, PASOK’s foreign policy discourse also heavily promoted 
international law as the general framework of policymaking, while modifying them in 
order to make a contribution to world order, peace etc. (Kranidiotis 2000: 31). There 
were elements of rupture and continuity in this, with regards to the matching of domestic 
and foreign policy preferences of PASOK. On the one hand, PASOK’s constant 
references to the UN and international institutional order was a continuation of the 
discourse of Europeanization which sought to link the different arenas of Greek foreign 
policy (i.e. Balkans, Turkey, Middle East etc. that were not part of the EU). In this way, 
this discourse also served the goal of expanding PASOK’s appeal domestically to the 
groups who saw benefits from a change of style in Greek foreign policy that brought 
Greece closer to Europe and Western normality154: 
 
‘Greek foreign policy supports the principles of democracy and respect for 
international law, the enhancement and development of human and social rights. It is a 
policy that starts from the principle of respect of borders and territorial integrity of 
everyone. The unrelenting defense of our sovereignty rights. It is a foreign policy of 
principles, morals and rights’155. 
 
The emphasis on international institutions can arguably be connected with a more 
socially liberal outlook PASOK was building for itself, thus reinterpreting the meaning of 
‘progressivism’ in Greek politics, which until then was completely identified with 
                                                
153 Speech of Simitis in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000, 
Athens, 29 March 2000. Also see the references of Simitis to the ongoing buildup of the Greek army and to 
deterrence as a needed complement of the policy of a ‘strong Greece’, here and in his speech in the main 
electoral rally of 7/4/2000.  
154 On Simitis’ foreign policy and ‘Europeanization as normalization’, see Economides (2005: 481-487). 
155 Speech of Simitis in the presentation of PASOK’s program ahead of the elections of April 9 2000, 
Athens, 29 March 2000. The Helsinki conclusions also made a reference to the UN Charter as the 
framework within which resolution of border disputes between candidate and member-states had to be 
made (Tsakonas 2010: 93). 
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economic matters (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006: 503-504). This post-material turn in 
PASOK’s vision of itself as a social-democratic party both domestically and 
internationally was definitely a break from the party’s populist past (Vernardakis 2011: 
172, 181). At the same time, emphasis on international order was also a reiteration of an 
all too familiar element in Greek foreign policy, namely the identification of Greek 
foreign policy goals with ‘law’ and ‘rights’. While this was done in the past in a rather 
impatient way (Tsoukalis 2000: 49), the new approach of the government served to 
embed Greek foreign policy goals within a more nuanced understanding of international 
law and so claimed to be promoting them better. To that extent, as with the interests-
based discourse mentioned above, emphasis on international legality served to bridge the 
party’s old (nationalist and radical) and new (European and bourgeois) self156. 
The interpretation of the international environment offered by ND reflected the 
party’s attempt to find an opposition edge against the government while agreeing with the 
essentials of the Helsinki approach. Reflecting Karamanlis’ strategy of bridging the 
Karamanlist with the liberal wing of his party and a return to the party’s traditional 
moderate stance on foreign policy, ND also promoted a view of the post-Cold War 
environment as one offering opportunities for Greece to pose as a stable democracy in a 
difficult regional environment and to use her position within the EU to shape her 
environment to her liking. This presentation of the post-Cold War environment of Greece 
allowed ND to boost its pro-Europeanization profile, basically by buying into the 
government’s argument that domestic modernization and accession into the Eurozone 
(which had already become ND’s objectives) also went through Europeanization of 
foreign policy. In this respect, ND’s criticism towards PASOK both for Helsinki and for 
its foreign policy in general (e.g. in the Balkans) was mostly a criticism of practicalities 
and, if anything, a criticism of moves not bold enough to take advantage of opportunities 
in the regional environment: 
 
‘Our goal is to turn Greece into an active participant of European developments 
[…] The Greek government formulates foreign policy impulsively, without coherence and 
preparation, and based on circumstances. […] Developments in the Balkans in recent 
years take place in the absence of Greece and congratulations belong to Greek 
businessmen who dared to penetrate new markets in time’157. 
 
                                                
156 This discussion also challenges a certain staple of Europeanization analysis of Greek foreign policy. 
According to this mantra, Greek foreign policy reverted from a language of ‘rights’ in the 1980s and 1990s 
(implying a rigid and quasi-religious understanding of Greek foreign policy goals) to a language of 
‘interests’ with Simitis (implying a nuanced understanding of what Greece really wants and can achieve) 
(Keridis 2001). As analysis here shows, Simitis never completely let go of the legalistic language to embed 
his foreign policy argumentation, just like foreign policy discourse of the past was never divorced from a 
view of interests and rationalism in Greek-Turkish relations.  
157 Karamanlis speech presenting ND’s foreign policy program (in.gr, 15/3/2000). 
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At the same time, ND’s perception and translation of international realities in 
domestic politics also reflected the party’s more eclectic approach towards the concept of 
modernization and Europeanization. The populist legacy of Evert was accommodated 
within a neo-bourgeois policy outlook that combined modernizing and liberal 
fundamentals with a touch of the Right’s traditional cross-class paternalism. Within this 
policy mix (captured in the party strategy of the ‘middle ground’), ND also had to infuse 
its essential foreign policy orientation towards Europeanization of the country’s foreign 
relations with an element of the dominant nationalist populist bent of Greek foreign 
policy that dominated Greek foreign policy since the 1980s. This meant that ND 
combined its essential acceptance of the Europeanization of Greece’s style and priorities 
with a more traditional reading of the dangers accruing Turkey and the need to defend 
Greece’s rights in the Aegean. In the discussion about Helsinki for example, Karamanlis 
accused the government of giving Turkey everything it wanted without asking for a 
tangible gesture of moderation in return: 
 
‘Turkey won immediately important and clear benefits, while Greece, despite it 
strong negotiating position, retreated from stable national positions at the most critical 
moment […] [T]here are no terms in the texts, Turkey has been accepted without any 
specific term’158. 
 
The intellectual deconstruction of Helsinki was then undertaken by Karamanlis’ 
foreign policy advisors, Molyviatis and Valinakis. Writing for the official journal of 
ND’s policy institute in 2002 and summarizing ideas that had already been echoed in a 
more fragmented manner in 1999-2000, Molyviatis (2002) delivered a thunderous 
condemnation of the government’s handlings in Helsinki, basically by reproducing the 
dominant view of bilateral relations since 1974 as ones of mutual distrust and 
competition159: 
 
‘Since 1973 Turkey has set the goal to revise the Aegean Sea regime […] The result 
of this negotiation will be, according to Turkey’s intention, to undermine today’s status 
quo in the Aegean and the establishment of a regime of equal co-sovereignty between 
Greece and Turkey […] Compromise is indeed a frequent method of international 
difference resolution. It is however unacceptable and non-implementable in the Aegean 
[…] [C]ompromise means mutual exchanges, while in the Aegean Greece only has things 
to give and nothing to take’. 
 
Since the beginning then, ND reproduced a more sanguine view of the foreign policy 
challenges facing Greece, recognizing that adjustments were needed in order to rebalance 
                                                
158 Karamanlis speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (Kathimerini, 16/12/1999).  
159 Also see Valinakis (2000). 
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Greek foreign policy with the demand of domestic modernization and alignment with 
Europe, but that these adjustments should stop just before vital Greek interests were 
affected, which were supposed to remain unaltered and unaffected from developments in 
the country’s strategic environment (Molyviatis 2002: 37, 39-41). Despite the party’s 
renewed enthusiasm for Europe, in foreign policy a certain timidity towards Europe and a 
policy of unconditional projection of Greek interests on the European framework 
appeared (Marakis 2000): 
 
‘[ND is] in favor of a European and democratic Turkey [but] the process that starts 
after Helsinki, without real binding terms on Turkey, constitutes a dramatic reversal from 
the careful stance our country has held for 25 years, with the policy of the Karamanlis, 
Papandreou and Mitsotakis governments, and it is very probable that the EU will adopt, 
on our critical national issues, a policy of equal distances between Greece and 
Turkey’160. 
 
Finally, Helsinki offered the parties of the Left the opportunity to develop their own 
foreign policy concepts and readings of Greece’s international environment. These were a 
combination of anti-Westernism, since Europeanization was deemed an unacceptable 
burden on Greece’s interests and abilities to meet them, and inherent hostility towards 
Turkey, reflecting the traditional view of the radical pole in Greek society that Greek and 
Turkish nationalisms were inherently hostile. The ideological justifications differed from 
party to party of course. Whereas DIKKI’s stance against Helsinki was supported by a 
traditional nationalist and populist view of Greek-Turkish relations that emphasized 
Turkish aggression in the Aegean and Cyprus, KKE saw the demand of Europeanization 
on Greek foreign policy as emanating from a US-dominated international environment161: 
 
‘Mr. Simitis has given up on the basic doctrine of our foreign policy, namely that we 
do not discuss anything with Turkey apart from the continental shelf. With the Helsinki 
decisions […] Turkish demands are legitimized as Greek-Turkish differences, and 
through secret diplomacy, in the absence of the people, the Parliament and the parties at 
that’162. 
 
                                                
160 Karamanlis speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (in.gr, 16/12/1999). Another 
interesting link was the apparent continuity between ND’s policy and Andreas Papandreou’s old dictum 
that any kind of dialogue with Turkey can only start after certain conditions have been met, usually 
concerning Cyprus (Tsardanidis 1998: 301; Heraclides 207: 143); see references to Cyprus and Papandreou 
in Molyviatis (2002: 36-37). On the Cyprus-Aegean Sea linkage, see Heraclides (2007: 70-75). On ND’s 
policy once it became government in 2004, which reflected precisely the doubt that an unfettered projection 
of Greek interests on Europe would be successful, see Tsakonas (2010: 241-263). 
161 KKE Secretary General Papariga speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (in.gr, 
16/12/1999). 
162 DIKKI President Tsovolas speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (Kathimerini, 
16/12/1999). 
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SYN’s view was far more accommodating: emphasizing peace and anti-nationalism 
as its main values and seeing in the post-Cold War environment the opportunity for the 
building of more lasting structures of cooperation within Europe163. This position, 
however, was one of the last victories for the party’s center-left wing, whose eventual 
erosion towards PASOK would continue after the 2000 elections with SYN turning 
increasingly more radical, populist and (in a sense) nationalist thereafter.  
In summation, Helsinki was deemed a success precisely because it was seen as a 
viable policy towards achieving specific goals, and this was achieved by persuasive 
agency on behalf of partisan actors who presented the case that Europeanization of 
foreign policy towards Turkey reconciled the historically difficult relationship between 
the two pillars of Greece’s foreign policy in a new post-Cold War environment 
(Heraclides 2007: 211-212): a pro-Western alignment, and the defense of the gains of 
Greek irredentism and sovereignty164. Helsinki unleashed a thorough reevaluation of the 
style and priorities of Greek foreign policy up to that time, so much so that in the 
elections of 2000 a foreign policy consensus around a completely new axis of 
Europeanized relations with Turkey existed between the two parties for the first time 
(Tsakonas 2010: 98-99). Associating this new policy with positive values like peace, 
cooperation and economic opportunities allowed PASOK to carry the debate over ND, 
which itself was already rediscovering its bourgeois and moderate roots.  
The elections of 2000, institutionalizing for the first time an impressive policy 
convergence in both domestic and foreign policy issues between the two main parties 
(Pappas 2001: 91), and also introducing as a permanent feature a new cleavage between 
the two main parties and the radical Left next to the old Right-Antiright axis, portrayed 
the existence of a broad coalition in favor of Europeanization. A big part of the creation 
of this coalition, however, was due to the intellectual strength of Europeanization, 
presented as an outcome of domestic economic modernization and as a viable strategy 
that allowed Greece to continue pursuing all its foreign policy goals while adapting 
effectively in a new post-Cold War environment (Kranidiotis 2000: 31). In the end, 
partisan agency transposed a new international systemic reality into different options of 
domestic party politics, fundamentally transforming the party system. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The Greek party system was in a state of flux after the elections of 1993. The 
certainties of the previous 20 years, the polarization between Right and Left, and the 
dominance of political life by political dinosaurs like Constantine Karamanlis, Andreas 
Papandreou and Constantine Mitsotakis, all seemed to be coming to an end (Tsoukalis 
                                                
163 SYN President Constantopoulos speech in Parliament in the discussion about Helsinki (in.gr, 
16/12/1999). 
164 For a discussion of the effects of such policy on Cyprus, see Couloumbis (2000: 379-380). 
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2000: 41; Pappas 2001: 91). The bipolar party system established in 1981 seemed unable 
to establish viable alternative programs for the Greek economy and foreign policy. The 
end of the Cold War in the Balkans had opened up a whole new array of foreign policy 
issues and burdened existing ones, with the end effect that Greece was unable to 
reconcile its European orientation and its national foreign policy goals. While party 
identification remained strong amid voters, phenomena of political apathy appeared for 
the first time.  
However, out of this dysfunctional political system dominated by economic and 
political populism, by the end of the decade a rejuvenated two-party system channeling 
political and economic preferences into robust pro-European directions appeared. This 
result was the outcome of a non-linear process of successive developments within the 
Greek party system’s dynamics. Partisan agency energized and engaged with pre-existing 
political identities and managed to rejuvenate the existing bourgeois Right-radical 
Antiright axis of competition by combining it with the cross-party latent modernization-
populism cleavage. As the stakes of both of these axes of competition structured foreign 
policy options as well, the success of party agency to reformulate and then impose a new 
normative anchor of the Greek party system necessarily went through the development 
and implementation of new foreign policy ideas.  
Indeed, the catalyst for the unraveling of the old polarized two-partyism between 
PASOK and ND of the 1980s was foreign policy – the advent of the Macedonia name 
issue – and the successful implementation of a new normative anchor of convergent two-
partyism was only completed with the unequivocal institutionalization of a Europeanized 
foreign policy towards Turkey. The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 was 
the most visible symbol of this foreign policy change, and the patterns of partisan 
opposition and support to it in the ensuing elections of April 2000 (as well as the 
extremely close result of these elections) determined the positions the two major parties 
would take around the reformulated normative anchor. PASOK became a party of 
economic modernization and rationalization with only passing references allotted to its 
socialist identity, and ND returned to its bourgeois liberal roots but with an unmistakable 
hint of nationalist populism as a differentiating trait. Changes in both parties signaled 
their ability to engage with and build on ongoing social changes in order to maximize 
their appeal.  
Party system dynamics, as a combination of parties’ strategies in policy space and 
their engagement with social cleavages, are sufficient to account for the foreign policy 
change that took place in Helsinki. The decisive event was the emergence within PASOK 
of a modernizing leadership around Kostas Simitis, whose election as leader of the party 
and Prime Minister took place against all odds as his Papandreist socialist opponents had 
seemed to dominate PASOK’s agenda until then (Athanassopoulou 1997: 97-98; 
Heraclides 2007: 181). This development can best be understood within the context of 
party competition. With hindsight, Simitis’ election represents a brilliant decision on 
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behalf of PASOK rank-and-file to renew and update the party’s traditional position as the 
centrist party within a three-camp constellation of a bipolar competition between Left and 
Right (Kalyvas 1997: 93-94). Here, the fact that ND had reverted to a populist version of 
its Karamanlist conservative roots under Miltiades Evert seems to have played the key 
role (Vernardakis 2011: 242).  
With the election of Kostas Karamanlis in the leadership of ND in 1997, the final 
stage in the convergence of the party system began. Karamanlis’ opposition strategy 
aimed first and foremost to unite his own party, split as it was between its Karamanlist 
popular Right and its liberal bourgeois wing. Karamanlis’ agreement with the essentials 
of economic rationalization and political and economic convergence with Europe aimed 
at reuniting ND around a project of bourgeois modernization. At the same time, his 
strong opposition to the effects of PASOK’s neoliberal policies gave ND a more social-
conscious profile and allowed it to outflank PASOK from the left – thus also pleasing the 
classless inclusionism of the Karamanlists. In the elections of 2000, PASOK and ND 
squared off, having had the most similar policy profiles in their history. The end result 
vindicated the strategies of both parties, as both PASOK’s inroads into the bourgeois vote 
continued and ND effectively penetrated the lower-income strata for the first time. 
Without shedding its radical left identity, PASOK was rebuilding a strong centrist 
coalition under a bourgeois modernizing outlook akin to the one of Venizelos165; and 
without sacrificing its identity as the bourgeois party of Greece, ND found the cross-class 
appeal of the traditional Right once again.  
In this way, by 2000 the Greek party system had normatively realigned (if not 
structurally) around a new anchor, revolving around the question of which major party 
has the best recipe for achieving the commonly agreed upon goal of modernization and 
Europeanization. While the borders between Left and Right (and historical references to 
these identities) remained intact, this competition was overlaid and rejuvenated with an 
engagement with the question of modernization of the Greek economy and, eventually, 
with the structuring of the modernization-populism nascent cleavage. However, this road 
was not linear, as the narrative in the previous paragraph might suggest. The transitional 
period that started in 1993 lasted in many ways beyond the 1996 election: Simitis’ 
authority within PASOK was always challenged by the Papandreists, his modernization 
program was faced with resistance and his foreign policy was marred by incoherence and 
conflicting agendas between ministers; and Karamanlis only managed to slowly heal 
what seemed in 1996 like a permanent schism within ND from 1998 onwards. For both 
parties, foreign policy was to cement the uncertain social realignments and strategic 
moves of the mid-1990s into permanent systemic fixtures by 2000. In the words of 
                                                
165 It is perhaps more than a coincidence that during Simitis’ term, references and symbolic gestures 
towards Venizelos’ legacy on behalf of the government and the party of PASOK increased impressively. 
The apex was naming the new modern Athens airport after him in 2001.  
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Nicolacopoulos, ‘a possible de-alignment’ had been turned into ‘a slight re-alignment’ 
(Nicolacopoulos 2005: 276). 
To the extent that improving relations with Turkey was an integral part of Simitis’ 
effort to bring Greece closer to Europe, failure in foreign policy threatened to undo the 
whole project of modernization and Europeanization. By the same token, the rapid 
sequence of events in 1999 (from the Ocalan crisis that allowed George Papandreou to 
become foreign minister to the earthquakes) and the strengthening of the modernizers 
within PASOK paved the way for the Helsinki Council, a decision branded as an 
unmitigated success by the press thanks to Simitis’ persuasive argumentation, thus 
establishing modernization as the reference point of domestic political discourse. As the 
prefectural elections of 1998 and the European elections of 1999 had showed, there was 
nothing permanent about the electoral coalition Simitis had put together in 1996. Yet in 
2000 he not only retained it, but expanded it. With the hardships of economic adjustment 
forcing Simitis to adopt an apologetic tone about his domestic policies, Helsinki and the 
merits of Europeanization it symbolized, gave PASOK the triumphant tone it needed for 
its campaign. Vocal populist dinosaurs of the party’s backbenches would take care during 
the campaign to fire up PASOK’s traditional petit bourgeois basis about the dangers of 
the ‘return of the Right’, thus recreating the formidable electoral ‘polarizing centrist’ 
strategy of PASOK (Moschonas 1994: 188) for a new era. 
Foreign policy was equally important for Karamanlis to impose unity on his party 
and modernize the shrinking electoral coalition Evert’s incompetence had relegated ND 
to in 1996. His unequivocal commitment to Europe gave ND the foreign policy unity it 
had enjoyed in the 1970s and 1980s as a liberal bourgeois party, and the acceptance of 
the need for better relations with neighbors realigned ND with the modernist camp of the 
latent cleavage. Helsinki caught ND off guard and energized the internal split of the party 
yet again. However, it also gave the party the opportunity to match its principled support 
of Europeanization with a touch of foreign policy populism and emphasis on Greece’s 
traditional foreign policy identity of reticence and suspicion towards Turkey. This nuance 
matched well with ND’s tactic of triangulation of PASOK, as it complemented its effort 
to approach the working class and petit bourgeois strata, always attracted to economic 
and foreign policy populism. In this way, Helsinki was a cumbersome but needed stage 
through which the updating and expansion of ND’s cross-class identity of 1996 was 
established in 2000.  
The case of Greek foreign policy change (as codified in Helsinki) can be seen as a 
contingent result, a combination of party system dynamics and changes in Greece’s 
international environment. By trying to impose their preferences and making the best of 
systemic parameters of party competition, partisan actors translated the exigencies of the 
new environment of Greek foreign policy into new and contending visions of domestic 
society, realigning party competition according to the divergent readings of Greece’s new 
strategic environment. Just like the Cold War supported polarization in the 1950s 
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between loyalists and leftists and in the 1960s, 70s and 80s between bourgeois and 
radical poles, and just like nationalist and ‘civilizational’ readings of the fluid post-Cold 
War environment (Couloumbis 2000: 378; Ifantis 2004: 255; Economides 2005: 481) 
seemed to realign the Greek party system towards a normative anchor around populism in 
the early 1990s, the imposition of Europeanized readings of Greece’s foreign policy 
challenges in the late 1990s contributed to the establishment of a new normative anchor 
around Europeanization and modernization. Through partisan agency, the post-Cold War 
structural reality was translated into a normatively reformulated bipolar competition. 
The above discussion also addresses the question of whether party system dynamics 
or international structural change were by themselves sufficient conditions for foreign 
policy change. As analysis here has shown, there was a significant time lag between the 
end of the Cold War and the rise of Europeanization as a solution to Greece’s foreign 
policy challenges. This process (which lasted almost a full decade) was only completed 
through adequate developments in the Greek party system. However, domestic party 
system developments could have taken place without foreign policy change. Indeed, 
between 1974 and 1999 the twin pillars of Greek foreign policy (the connection to 
Europe and a policy of controlled tension with Turkey) had survived the existence of a 
polarized multiparty system (1974-1981), a polarized two-party system (1981-1993) and 
a two-party system in flux (1993-1999). Differences between PASOK and ND were 
mostly differences of emphasis: neither PASOK went through with its threats to exit the 
EEC/EU, nor did ND manage to overcome anti-Turkish sentiments and go beyond basic 
contacts with Turkey. Clearly, the post-Cold War environment was posing overwhelming 
strains on Greek foreign policy making, and Helsinki was addressing an obvious 
problem. In sum, domestic and international conditions were each necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for foreign policy change to take place. 
Even though this chapter seems to answer the key questions of the dissertation rather 
well (mutual constitution of foreign policy and domestic party system, the role of 
domestic politics in foreign policy change, party system dynamics as the required kind of 
domestic development for foreign policy change to occur), the question still remains of 
whether it adds to our understanding of this case (and by extension of other similar ones) 
in a significant manner. For the case of this chapter, we can briefly look how 
explanations of this chapter differ from other analyses of the Helsinki decision.  
The most textured analysis is provided by Tsakonas (2010) whose input I consider to 
be very valuable. His idea is that foreign policy change is the outcome of the interaction 
between two kinds of strategic culture: the national culture of a state and the personal 
(‘agentic’) culture of politicians and policymakers. In the case of Greece, the difference 
was the ‘resolution culture’ of Simitis and fellow modernizers who managed to push 
through important changes in a way that, not only reshuffled Greece’s foreign policy, but 
also changed Greece’s culture from being an ‘underdog’ to being an ‘instrumental’ 
culture. In this way Tsakonas tries to position discussions about Europeanization of 
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Greek foreign policy within a wider IR literature bringing together rationalist (realist and 
liberal) and constructivist premises. Discussion of domestic politics is made with 
reference to both institutional factors facilitating imposition of foreign policy change 
(here also see Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2010) and domestic political identity-
formation as a result of foreign policy contestation. 
Tsakonas definitely expands with theoretical ambition the standard analysis of 
Helsinki in Greek literature that focuses on Europeanization and also tries to set the role 
of personalities, like Simitis, within a broader analytical framework. By acknowledging 
the role of domestic politics as a qualification of the way state actors conceive of a state’s 
foreign policy challenges, and by taking party politics as arenas for contestation of 
foreign policies seriously, Tsakonas’ argument is not far posited from the argument 
presented here. However I think that the argument of the present chapter adds 
substantially to Tsakonas’ account.  
First, without delving in long historical debates, it is important to note that Tsakonas 
takes a rather unproblematic view of culture, even though it features so prominently in 
his argument. While agentic culture seems to make all the difference, and is rightly 
identified as a way of influencing strategic culture more generally, national culture is 
seen not as a source of ideas and policies but as a space within which policy 
entrepreneurs act uninhibitedly. The process by which new ideas rise and interact with 
older ones is reduced to simple accounts of policymaking and, in the end, 
institutionalization of new policies is reduced to an unproblematic combination of 
personal agency and socialization from abroad. For example, the persistence of the 
foreign policy identity of ‘continental shelf as the only bilateral issue’ persisted 
throughout the Helsinki years. Clearly this was a powerful identity construction, and, 
despite Simitis’ and George Papandreou’s vocal opposition to ND’s decision after 2004 
to suspend the talks that PASOK had started in 2002 with Turkey under the Helsinki 
framework, it is worth pondering how any agreement with tangible gains for Turkey in 
the Aegean could have been sold to Greek public opinion (Ifantis 2004: 262).  
Second, and related to the above, Tsakonas accepts in a rather unproblematic way 
the premises of rationality and liberal/democratic peace as contained in the research 
theme of Europeanization166, which however only matches other theoretical assumptions 
of his framework (constructivism, norms, identities etc.) with difficulty. A key 
assumption of the Europeanization literature is that states Europeanize their foreign 
policies because it is in their interest to do so – Tsakonas duly jumps on this assumption 
to claim that Helsinki was introduced, and won out the argument, because it was in 
Greece’s interest to put relations with Turkey on a new footing. Tsakonas then asserts 
that an interests-based foreign policy change necessarily would have been implemented 
                                                
166 See here the work of Mark Schimmelfenig among others. Also, the short theoretical discussion in 
Economides (2005: 471-473) applying Europeanization to Greek foreign policy. 
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along the lines of EU’s liberal project, including improving bilateral relations, promoting 
economic cooperation etc., because these were in Greece’s interest anyway.  
Even though this account of Europeanization is supported by Tsakonas with an 
impressive breadth and depth of empirical data, I believe that his focus reveals, if 
anything, the normative and ontological biases of a certain part of academia and 
policymaking community in Greece at the time. Indeed, an interests-based account of 
Europeanization sees foreign policy change as a value-neutral choice of a group of 
leaders with a ‘can-do’ mentality implementing the best available set of norms and 
policies around, namely those of Europeanization. However, PASOK’s Europeanization 
was a coherent modernization project straddling domestic and foreign policies. The 
choice for a specific program of neoliberal adjustment was presented as a choice for 
Europe – policies that portrayed the positive policy impact of a strategy of 
Europeanization (like Helsinki) were then assiduously used to feed support back into 
debates about hard domestic choices like austerity, thus facilitating PASOK’s party 
systemic strategy.  
Again, this problem goes back to the unequal engagement of Tsakonas’ argument 
with the question of domestic culture/identity. Change-minded actors do not only engage 
with domestic structures in an instrumental way (trying to manipulate and escape 
constraints while identifying opportunities) but also become constituted by them as they 
adapt, adjust and reformulate domestic constellations of political identity (Economides 
2005: 488). This, along with political agency, gives rise to perceptions of interests, which 
then inform specific readings of the international situation and promote foreign policy 
changes that feed into change in other policy areas as well (Keridis 2001: 3). An 
unproblematic assumption of pre-given interests of foreign policy runs against a 
conventional constructivist approach, and an a priori acceptance of Europeanization as a 
project of peace and moderation only reproduces specific actors’ readings and usage of 
this project. Without negating Tsakonas’ contribution, the party-system based approach 
used here has accounted better for the constructivist assumption of co-constituted but 
enabled policy actors, while it has problematized the degrees of persistence and change of 
dominant foreign policy identities and perceptions of interest. Put simply, if 
provocatively, Europeanization is what (and when) domestic political dynamics make of 
it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
BEYOND COMPARISON: AN OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND A 
PLAUSIBILITY PROBE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous three chapters applied the theoretical framework developed in the 
beginning of the dissertation in order to highlight the crucial turning points in cases of 
party-based foreign policy contestation and change in three different countries (and 
political systems) during the 20th century. There seemed to be an important addition of 
the theoretical framework developed here to the understanding of each of these three 
cases: as was shown in the concluding sections of each chapter, a party system-based 
view of the process of foreign policy change complements and even rivals established 
accounts of each of these three occurrences of foreign policy change. However, these 
three cases are supposed to yield theoretically relevant and empirically generalizable 
conclusions, and for this reason the narrative in each case followed closely the analytical 
categories identified in the theoretical discussion (according to the methodological 
imperatives of structured focused comparison). This chapter will serve as an addendum to 
the theoretical comparison by collecting and systematizing the empirical insights as they 
arise from the comparison and by complementing the comparative design.  
First, I will discuss some empirical patterns that arise from the comparison. While 
these patterns were not particularly anticipated by the theoretical framework or the 
comparison, they offer a crucial first entry into a discussion of theoretically relevant 
implications of the narratives of the three cases. At the same time, they will also serve as 
an introduction to a more general test of how the framework proposed in this dissertation 
works in other cases of contested foreign policy. 
The deep historical analysis of the three cases of foreign policy change intended to 
translate the theoretical and epistemological assumptions presented in the beginning of 
the dissertation into a research program: only deep narratives can reveal the interactions 
between different analytical categories and the way contingent processes of change 
unfold. In this vein, I have eschewed the parlance of hypotheses and testing, and 
preferred a more modest framework of understanding and unraveling processes (contra 
explaining outcomes and instances). Having said that, I was always very aware of some 
very basic questions concerning the logic of comparison. Firstly, all three cases focused 
on foreign policy change. While it has been recognized that in research designs that test 
theoretical frameworks of necessary conditions (such as the one here) the outcome of the 
various cases can be the same (such as here, where all cases led to foreign policy change) 
(Levy 2008: 9), the question of how (or whether) party politics affects contestation 
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processes that lead to foreign policy stability (i.e. an alternative outcome of the cases) is a 
valid one. At the same time, a question of generalization beyond the cases analyzed here 
is also presented (a small-N problem in methodological jargon). For all the within-case 
insights offered by the theoretically informed narratives, it is important for theoretical 
and empirical relevance beyond the scope of these three cases to show that the theoretical 
framework can travel in place and time within the scope conditions of the initial 
argument (i.e. mature liberal democracies with developed party systems and 
parliamentary systems of government).  
Here I will aim to fulfill both goals (comparative logic and generalizability) by 
engaging in a plausibility probe of the theoretical framework across a number of cases of 
foreign policy change and stability. The idea is that, without delving deeply into 
historical detail and specific processes, this exercise will show that a party system-
focused view of foreign policy contestation in democratic polities accommodates 
logically and analytically the main questions raised in the comparative research. The goal 
will be to show that domestic party politics matter crucially in processes of interaction 
between states and their international surroundings, and that the dynamics of party 
systems absorb and determine whether international pressures will lead to foreign policy 
change or not. Readers with a high degree of familiarity of these cases may detect flaws 
or simplistic generalizations in the narratives provided here. Yet the point of a plausibility 
probe is to offer a first pass to theoretical propositions when time and space are lacking 
for deeper inquiries. Here I use a plausibility probe not as a tool to check the plausibility 
of a theory before engaging in deeper research (ibid: 7), but as a way to see how the 
parallel processes detected in the three cases presented above also become apparent in 
other cases. Looking at cases of foreign policy stability despite changes in the 
international environment of states will allow complementing the comparative framework 
with cases of alternative outcomes, thus highlighting the importance of party system 
dynamics as necessary conditions for foreign policy change even further. 
 
PARTY-BASED FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS OF THE 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
1) Exchange of policy positions between parties  
 
One striking feature in all three cases is that foreign policy contestation and change 
were undertaken by parties holding policy positions that were different than what one 
would expect based on their traditions and historical viewpoints. In the case of Ostpolitik 
in West Germany, it was the two parties that had always prioritized swift reunification 
after World War II, the SPD and the FDP, that changed course to embark on a policy of 
recognition of borders and the DDR regime (in all but name). On the other hand, it was 
the party that had opted for a continuation of division of Germany for the sake of 
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safeguarding a liberal democracy, the CDU/CSU, that viscerally opposed the Ostpolitik 
on the grounds that West Germany was giving up on the goal of reunification. Similarly, 
in the case of the FTA in Canada, it was the party of protectionism, the Conservatives, 
that orchestrated and imposed a comprehensive free trade agreement with the US, while 
the party of free trade, the Liberals, vehemently opposed it. Finally, in the case of the 
Helsinki Council and the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey, it was the party of 
nationalist populism, PASOK, that implemented a comprehensive policy of incentives 
and moderation in Greek-Turkish relations, while the traditional party of bourgeois 
foreign policy moderation, ND, opposed important aspects of the Helsinki strategy. Are 
these impressive changes to be explained by the argument that it is the 
government/opposition dynamic that makes the governing party decide on what course of 
action needs to be taken and the opposition oppose this course of action for the sake of 
being different? Is foreign policy an important policy tool to pursue domestic goals 
beyond ideological commitments? Do parties formulate positions on foreign policy issues 
empirically, without reference to other policy preferences or historical traditions? 
The narrative in all three case studies has shown that partisan preferences on foreign 
policy are determined by a mix of preferences and ideas already institutionalized within 
parties, political identities parties represent or want to attract, strategic calculations cued 
by a party’s position in policy space, and dynamic agency of individuals engaging with 
all the above. True, parties may end up supporting positions that are completely different 
than what they were proposing some time before, but this is not the result of aimless 
wandering or even radical adaptation to new policy circumstances; in both cases, political 
parties would be in grave danger of losing their credibility. For such important policy 
changes to take place, partisan actors need to effectively match a rhetoric that reproduces 
the party’s traditional ideological and party-systemic self-placement, while providing a 
valid argumentation of how a change of policy preferences would improve the party’s 
structural position in party competition. In all three cases, the changing of party positions 
did not take place in a vacuum, but was rather the outcome of long processes whereby the 
foreign policy preferences of various political identities were molded into new policy 
positions under the weight of the exigencies of party competition.  
Indeed, one could make the argument that political parties were remarkably 
consistent with regard to the ideological and structural constraints on their freedom of 
policy improvisation. The SPD always maintained that it was fighting for the 
establishment of more progressive structures of domestic governance of the Western 
Republic, the Tories embedded the FTA within a rhetoric of groups-based national 
reconciliation, and PASOK redefined the meaning of progressivism and anti-
conservatism in Greece from one of economic populism to one of modernization and 
rationalization. In defense of party politics, one can say that, despite constant evolution of 
international and domestic factors affecting policy formulation, partisan actors have also 
felt compelled to (and saw opportunities in) embed normatively new policy ideas into 
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long-standing heuristic schemata, whether ideological (‘our party has always been 
progressive, nationalist, socialist etc.’) or party-systemic (‘our party has always opposed 
the other party, has always been on the left/right side of the continuum etc.’).  
The above discussion has important consequences for the study of foreign policy 
based on domestic politics. It shows that tracking foreign policy preferences solely based 
on (declared) domestic ideologies or rooting in societal cleavages is insufficient at best, 
and extremely risky at worst. Ideologies and the representation of identities acquire 
concrete meaning within a relational context of party competition and accepted terms of 
debate. While being on the left in West Germany in the early 1950s meant to be in favor 
of reunification and of trying to overcome the Cold War barriers within Germany, by the 
late 1960s it came to mean being in favor of overcoming the Cold War division in Europe 
while accepting borders and legitimacy of the DDR regime. To track both of these 
foreign policy positions to SPD’s patriotism, progressivism, association with Protestant 
values and Atlanticism is correct; yet explaining both of these policy positions with direct 
reference to these ideas/identities ex post without reference to processes and surrounding 
institutions does not add significantly to our understanding. In this specific example, it 
was the general axis around which discussions revolved that had evolved in West 
Germany and this in turn informed new interpretations of the same identities.  
A second corollary of the observation that parties had exchanged positions in the 
three foreign policy debates I studied is that apart from the domestic context (dynamics of 
the party system), the second vital component of the discursive framework within which 
new foreign policy positions are formulated is the international systemic constellation, 
usually present in the shape of tangible foreign policy challenges. While shifting terms of 
debate and the reinterpretation of parties’ ideological and societal commitments may 
account sufficiently for policy changes in various policy areas, for foreign policy the field 
is more complex – and more intriguing. On the one hand, foreign policy change needs to 
be shown to respond effectively to an actual problem, a challenge to the state’s 
established equilibrium between its own self-understanding and its place in the world. On 
the other hand, changing international systemic constellations present openings for the 
emergence of new interpretations and the effort of partisan actors to alter the terms of the 
debate in a way that allows favorable reinterpretations of political identity preferences, 
new combinations and the attraction of other identities. As we saw, Cold War détente, the 
failure of the international trade regime and the end of the Cold War in the Balkans all 
presented states with new problems and challenges to their existing policies – but they 
also affected deeply existing constellations of domestic political forces and established 
terms of debate. Partisan actors saw opportunities as much as they saw problems in the 
face of such profound systemic shifts.  
This discussion then must also urge us to go beyond simple accounts of foreign 
policy change that start with policymakers’ understanding of existing foreign policy 
failures and then embarking on determined efforts to change things for the better. First, as 
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we are painfully reminded of every day, policy failure is by no means a guarantee for 
policy reevaluation and change. Second, even if it were correct, such a view condemns 
research to complacency, as it focuses on a rather simplistic account of why change 
occurred, instead of urging us to understand how change took the one or the other form. 
But most importantly, foreign policy change analysis with reference to domestic politics 
and international systemic shifts cannot but account for the interaction of the two.  
For example, to claim that the beginning of the process towards Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement began with the Imia crisis is true, but it is not the whole story, nor does it 
say anything about why Greek foreign policy change took the direction it did, 
culminating in Helsinki. The fact is that Greek foreign policy was demonstratively 
problematic in light of the big changes that were underway in the Balkans, as well as that 
a Prime Minister with well known reformist views, Kostas Simitis, had already been 
elected Prime Minister. If anything, the Imia crisis derailed Simitis’ program, as he had to 
balance between his views and an explosion of nationalism within his own party. In the 
end, it was the ability of Simitis to package his policy views within a viable program for 
the perpetuation of PASOK’s stay in power that allowed him to carry the party and 
implement his policies. In sum, partisan changes of foreign policy preferences are 
profoundly influenced by changing terms of debate domestically and internationally, but 
the way these are translated into new policies is a function of political agency and the 
impact of the imperatives of party competition.  
 
2) Foreign policy ideas do not float freely 
 
A problem related to the practice of tracking foreign policy outcomes backwards and 
in a linear fashion to domestic ideologies, is doing the same with tracking them to 
different foreign policy ideas or ‘schools of thought’. As we saw, in all three cases 
relevant literature had identified divergent cognitive or ideological frameworks that 
allowed domestic actors to make sense of changes in the international environment. In 
this way, parties and partisan actors were divided into Gaullists and Atlanticists in West 
Germany, in nationalists and continentalists in Canada, and in anti-Western populists and 
pro-Western modernizers in Greece. These labels are fairly useful for a researcher to 
classify foreign policy attitudes in a state’s domestic environment (even though one 
should be careful not to attach independent political standing to these foreign policy 
ideas, as in most cases they were assigned to actors by observers and few of those actors 
at the time would characterize themselves using these terms). The problem is that, in and 
by themselves, they tell us very few things as to who and why they do carry these foreign 
policy ideas, as well as how any one of them becomes dominant or fails.  
The comparative analysis has shown that these foreign policy ideas are inseparable 
from the social and political context of domestic politics. As classifying tools of various 
foreign policy preferences, foreign policy ideas are nothing more than the conceptual 
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systemization of preferences that have been cued from domestic political identities. This 
means that the varying fortunes and degrees of influence of foreign policy traditions and 
schools of thought can be understood as a reflection of the interaction between and 
among the political identities that contain them. In other words, foreign policy ideas do 
not float freely, but make their appearance, and influence policy prescriptions, according 
to the political fortunes of their institutional hosts. While it can be shown that these 
foreign policy ideas exert their most influence as systems of thought held by important 
individuals, I would contend that it is more fruitful seeing them as social creations, as the 
expressions of important domestic political identities that in turn affect individual 
thoughts, beliefs and choices of action.  
The above shows that a more critical engagement with the discursive environment of 
foreign policy formation and contestation can indeed yield more interesting results than 
what a simple presentation of one or the other school of thought as more or less suitable 
to the problem at hand. This is the tendency for example when analyzing the foreign 
policy change Greece undertook after years of tension with Turkey and uneasy relations 
with the West (EU and US). The modernization/Europeanization project of the Simitis 
government is presented as the most suitable response to the dead ends of Greek foreign 
policy following the end of the Cold War and the increase of tension with most of 
Greece’s neighbors. Accounts of this foreign policy change tend to ascribe an inherent 
discursive strength to the project of modernization, hence the popularity and eventual 
successful institutionalization of the Helsinki change by the PASOK government. 
However such an approach is not that different from the approach we discussed above 
about foreign policy challenges and solutions: It sees the process of rise and creation of 
new foreign policies as a simple matching of the supply of new ideas with demand for 
solutions. In the case of Greece for example, the discursive dominance of the 
Europeanization approach is seen as a natural outcome in the end of the 1990s, when for 
example an ND government in the early 1990s with a similar agenda of economic 
liberalization and foreign policy moderation was met with intense opposition and 
ultimately failed. Clearly, the strength, resilience and systemic position of institutional 
hosts (in our case, political parties) matters a lot and can account greatly for the different 
degrees of influence of the same foreign policy system of ideas over time.  
The success of Europeanization of Greek foreign policy cannot be divorced from the 
popularity of the project of Europeanization and modernization of the Greek economy 
domestically. Yet this popularity itself was not unrelated to the alignment of political 
identities within policy space on a specific point in time. The fact that modernization was 
carried over by PASOK, a party positioned in the center of the party system and with the 
ability to match a polarizing discourse against ND with a centrist expansionist strategy, 
allowed it to become part of a wider policy set that presumably expressed the new face of 
the ‘democratic camp’ of Greek politics. The fact that the signature policies of 
modernization (economic neoliberalism and foreign policy moderation) had until then 
 
 
 199 
been the prerogatives of the Right, or that this policy served to completely isolate 
PASOK from the parties on its Left, was irrelevant to the extent that the exigencies of 
survival and retaining government office in the end forced party unity on PASOK. 
Coupled with ND’s similar move towards economic modernization and foreign policy 
pragmatism as dictated by the needs of electoral renewal and internal unity, this allowed 
pro-Western modernization to become the dominant paradigm of Greek foreign policy 
thought. The fact that this process was completed almost 10 years after the end of the 
Cold War (the international systemic shift), and three years after the advent of Simitis to 
power (the personnel change) and the Imia crisis (the policy failure), is a good indication 
for the fact that the persuasiveness of ideas is never self-evident or automatic. 
 
3) The time lag between the establishment of favorable domestic political conditions and 
the final emergence of a foreign policy change 
 
Another striking similarity in the process of foreign policy change jumps out in the 
comparison of the three cases we have examined here. In West Germany there was a 
significant time lag between the rise of new foreign policy preferences and their decisive 
propagation on behalf of the SPD and the FDP. While the SPD was the first party to 
formulate a coherent foreign policy alternative in accordance with the spirit of détente, its 
careful electoral strategy forced it not to promote this concept too aggressively. In the 
years of the Grand Coalition, the SPD was forced to limit its foreign policy ambitions in 
light of CDU and CSU obstructionism. While new foreign policy ideas became the main 
message of the FDP ahead of the elections of 1969, the SPD again ran on a platform of 
moderate reformism. The new Ostpolitik then arose rather abruptly the moment the new 
Social-Liberal coalition was created after the elections of 1969. In Canada, while the 
Tories of Brian Mulroney won a resounding victory in 1984, free trade was nowhere on 
the radar of government policy. Despite the fact that the Tories had enjoyed solid support 
in parts of the country that were expected to support a free trade agenda, Mulroney did 
not seem to consider a free trade agreement beyond some ad hoc measures of 
normalization of Canadian-US relations. Also here, the emergence and the veracity of the 
proposed foreign policy change after the publication of the Macdonald report in 1985 was 
impressive given the calm climate of just a few months before. In Greece the situation 
was different in that the Simitis government had a declared goal of loosening of tension 
with Turkey from the beginning, but its endeavors were sabotaged from within PASOK 
and from outside developments. In any event, the decision to lift Greece’s objections to 
the granting of EU candidate status to Turkey was a departure from the declared and 
expressed goals of the government of just a few months before. Unlike the other two 
cases then, Greece is unique in that the government expressed the willingness for a 
certain degree of change long before that change was actually implemented. This did not 
make it easier, however, to go through with its plans.  
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In all three cases, foreign policy change took place rather abruptly, unexpectedly and 
impressively – if not always in substance (Brandt and Simitis at least had made their 
views known before) then definitely in degree. Obviously something had to change 
between the time of the alignment of foreign policy preferences and political identities 
within parties, and the eventual propagation of new foreign policies and their successful 
implementation. I believe that what made the difference in all cases was the ability of 
partisan actors to take the initial social realignments and raise them to the level of 
systemically relevant changes of the meaning of interaction between parties. It was the 
emergence of these new system-level features that made the propagation of new foreign 
policies not only intellectually and conceptually possible, but a self-sustaining electoral 
strategy as well, for some parties.  
In West Germany Ostpolitik became possible only when the two parties that 
supported it, the SPD and the FDP, found their fortunes inextricably tied as partners in a 
coalition that, for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic, did not include the 
CDU. While the elections of 1969 had revealed important social realignments in terms of 
representation of social strata by the three main parties, it was only when a system-level 
change (the creation of a new kind of coalition between the SPD and the FDP) came 
about that the parties found themselves inside a completely new understanding of the 
meaning and stakes of party competition. The precarious nature of the coalition and 
CDU’s unqualified opposition to it made the Ostpolitik a game of high stakes, where 
parties were fighting to determine the very stake of party competition (democratic reform 
or anti-Communism as the political identity of West Germany). Intense propagation of 
foreign policy change was the prerogative of parties that wanted the normative anchor to 
change: before 1969 that was the FDP; for the SPD it was only after 1969, when the 
potential of foreign policy to alter the terms of the debate to its benefit became apparent. 
In Canada the time lag concerned the time between the national landslide of the 
Mulroney Conservatives in 1984 and the emergence of their self-understanding as a party 
representing a radically new region-and community-based understanding of national 
unity and the role of the state. The turning point here was the publication of the 
Macdonald report in 1985, which provided the opportunity to initiate a sensational policy 
measure to a struggling government. The report presented free trade not only as an 
economically viable program, but also as a remedy to the question of unity of the 
Canadian state and nation. Just as Brandt and Scheel had, Mulroney saw in foreign policy 
change a strategy for self-preservation through energizing a new meaning of party 
competition. Whereas the Tories were already representing groups with heavily 
continentalist preferences (the Prairie West and Quebec), they only became the 
champions of these select identities once their foreign policy preferences seemed to align 
with a redefinition of the question of national unity that had historically structured party 
competition in Canada. Just like in West Germany, the systemically relevant change was 
not simple realignments in the patterns of expression of political identities, but the 
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strategic positioning of one party vis-à-vis domestic cleavages and other parties that made 
a strategy of altering the stakes of party competition a needed electoral strategy. Once 
this happened, success of implementing a new foreign policy and electoral preservation 
were mutually reinforcing processes. The election of 1988, with its stark regional 
patterns, reflected the advent of the new normative anchor of Canadian politics.  
Finally, in Greece the foreign policy agenda of the modernizers within PASOK was 
unequivocally put through once Europeanization as a strategy for domestic modernization 
was imposed within PASOK as the most promising strategy to reinvent the party’s 
advantageous positioning in the center of the party system. The time lag concerned not so 
much the imposition of modernization as the stake of party competition system-wide, 
since ND from 1997 onwards ascribed to this goal anyway, as its imposition within 
PASOK proper. Indeed, the split between modernizers and traditionalists within PASOK 
boiled down to two fundamentally different understandings as to what party competition 
in Greece was about: the radical forces of petit bourgeois non-privileged strata against the 
authoritarian plutocracy of the Right (as traditionalists thought), or the forces of social 
and economic progress against the forces of conservative stagnation (as the modernizers 
claimed)? The increasing popularity of Simitis and the concept of modernization in 
public opinion gradually won over the PASOK mechanism in the second half of 1999, so 
much so that Helsinki was warmly welcomed as a much needed complement of 
PASOK’s reinvention strategy. With ND already on board in principle, if not in 
appearance, the new normative anchor was promptly reflected in the elections of 2000. 
The time lags that existed between the initial creation of reformist coalitions and the 
eventual self-perception of these coalitions as bearers of a different understanding of the 
stakes of party competition explain the slow but steady transition from initial policy 
proposals to sensational foreign policy changes. Once the systemic potentials of the new 
coalitions were conceived, partisan actors sought to cement new interpretations of 
political competition that were favorable to their political projects and party fortunes 
through advocating new foreign policy initiatives, and if successful this new meaning of 
partisan competition became institutionalized throughout the party system. Successful 
institutionalization of new foreign policy then signaled a successful transition to a new 
normative, system-wide, anchor of party competition, and in this sense foreign policy can 
be seen as an important determinant of transitions from one stage of party system to 
another. This is another similarity that arises from careful comparison of the cases. 
 
4) Coherence between international and domestic systemic realignments  
 
The comparative analysis of the process of foreign policy change has revealed 
important links between international and domestic politics. In the theoretical chapter I 
claimed that the process of foreign policy change must be seen as an instance of 
translation of international norms into domestic party competition. I believe that in all 
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three cases the analysis of the process of argumentation has shown that the patterns of 
support and opposition to a new foreign policy reproduced specific readings of the state’s 
international systemic environment within domestic discourse. Without claiming that 
foreign policy determined voting patterns in a specific way or that attitudes towards 
foreign policy issues affected social realignments in the party system (statistical methods 
would have been needed for this), I am however making the point that party systems as 
institutional spaces codifying terms of engagement between parties were obviously 
affected by foreign policy and the international system. 
All three cases can be seen as instants of creation of a new equilibrium between 
domestic and international politics, as the party system was structuring policy choices 
and making sense of a state’s foreign policy environment. In this vain we can think of 
Ostpolitik as the process by which the West German party system caught up with détente 
and stopped reproducing domestically the hot Cold War mentality of anti-Communism as 
the stake of party competition. FDP’s exodus from the bourgeois camp and the 
consolidation of democratization and institutional renewal as stakes of party competition 
can be seen here as a rebalancing of the normative anchor of domestic politics with 
international realities, namely the decrease of tension and the loosening of the Cold War 
framework in Europe. In Canada the collapse of the party system of civic nationalism in 
favor of a reformulation of national unity as the balance between regions and 
communities was the domestic expression of Canada’s important move internationally to 
opt for regional trade integration in North America. As North American regionalism 
allowed Canadian provinces to independently explore options for trade integration with 
adjacent US regions, the consolidation of a region-based party system after the 1988 free 
trade elections translated the new international systemic reality of Canada’s trade policy 
into stakes of domestic party competition. Finally, the Helsinki Council and the 
consolidation of Europeanization as a goal for both foreign and domestic policy of 
Greece reflected the country’s adjustment to the post-Cold War regional reality and the 
effort to reconcile defense of essential nationalist goals of foreign policy with a 
fundamental wish to maintain the Western orientation of the country. While the polarized 
party system of Right and Left reproduced within Greece the apparent tension between 
the nationalist and modernizing agendas of Greek foreign policy in the Cold War 
environment, and the party system-in-a-flux of the early 1990s translated into Greek 
politics the exacerbation of this tension in the fluid post-Cold War environment, the 
foreign policy change of the late-1990s appeared to reconcile defense of Greek interests 
in the Aegean with European orientation through a reevaluation of the post-Cold War 
environment and so allowed the convergence of the two-party system around 
modernization. 
Emphasis on party systems reveals in all three cases that, just as foreign policy 
change takes place within some basic elements of continuity, the impact of the 
international system on domestic politics is mitigated by existing party systemic realities. 
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Indeed, one can trace the forces of continuity of foreign policy in the elements of 
continuity of domestic party systems. Despite the realignment of coalition patterns in 
West Germany, the party system retained its basic 2+1 party structure during the 1970s, 
as well as the relative positioning of parties along the right, the center and the left of the 
policy axis. The Ostpolitik controversy affected the meaning of party competition, not the 
structural elements or the binary direction of the party system. Canada’s 2+1 party system 
was violently shaken after 1988, leading to the famous 1993 elections and party system 
collapse, however the fundamental binary direction of competition and the stake of 
national unity as the organizing principle was always considered an ideal, a return to 
which was only inhibited by the inability of parties to align with it. And in Greece the 
foreign policy convergence of the late 1990s served to rejuvenate the bipolar competition 
between PASOK and ND and maintain the party system’s elementary structural features 
and direction of competition for one more decade, albeit within a reformulated normative 
framework.  
Comparative analysis highlights the role of partisan agency in the process of 
translation of international systemic shifts into new meanings of partisan competition at 
home. Careful examination shows that the eventual victory of reformers in all cases – 
self-evident as it may seem today, especially from a standpoint of analyses focusing on 
policy failures and alleged attractiveness of ideas – was not at all assured at the time. The 
Social-Liberal coalition went through a painful series of losses in regional elections in 
West Germany before recovering in time for the 1972 elections, the Mulroney 
government in Canada only took off in opinion polls after three years in power, and 
finally, Simitis’ project in Greece seemed hopelessly pressured between a recovering 
opposition and internal strife in 1998-1999. It was the ability of partisan actors to frame 
foreign policy choices in a way that galvanized winning domestic coalitions, and engage 
with party systemic factors in opportunity structure-like ways, that ultimately determined 
how deep international systemic features penetrated domestic politics. The means to 
achieve this were foreign policy argumentations with firm reference to international 
conditions and persuasive readings of the state’s international environment. 
 
5) A universal process of party-based foreign policy change? 
 
In chapter 1 I proposed an analytical model of party-based foreign policy 
contestation. That model saw this process starting with party system dynamics that led to 
the emergence of new policy preferences on behalf of political parties and, through the 
interplay with specific foreign policy challenges, of new preferences in foreign policy as 
well. Contestation of foreign policy was supposed to be made with partisan actors 
engaging with the institutional structure of the party system. Successful 
institutionalization of new foreign policies also meant the institutionalization of the initial 
party system dynamics into new lasting party system features. A close scrutiny of the 
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three cases here shows that this model accounts for the actual process of foreign policy 
change quite well. Indeed, there seem to be striking analogies between the different 
stages of party-based foreign policy change across cases. The following table summarizes 
this: 
 
Table 21 
A Mechanism of Party Based Foreign Policy Change: Cross-Case Comparison  
 
Stage	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  foreign	  
policy	  change	  
West	  Germany	   Canada	   Greece	  
Party	  system	  
dynamics	  
1961-­‐1969:	   Grand	   Coalition,	  changing	   relations	   between	  parties	   and	   cleavages	  (religion,	  class)	  
1963-­‐1985:	   Realignment	   of	  partisan	   expression	   of	   regional	  and	   lingusitic	   identities.	   The	  West	  and	  Quebec	  meeting	  in	  the	  Progressive	  Conservative	  party.	  
1993-­‐1999:	   Emergence	   of	   the	  modernization/populism	  cleavage	   next	   to	   the	   Right-­‐Left	  axis.	   Rise	   of	   modernizing	  leaderships	  in	  PASOK	  and	  ND.	  
Emergence	  of	  new	  
domestic	  
preferences	  
1969-­‐1972:	   Social-­‐Liberal	  coalition,	   democratic	   reform	  of	   the	   state	   v.s.	   anti-­‐Communism	  of	  the	  opposition	  (CDU)	  
1985-­‐1988:	   PC	   coalition	   turning	  into	   a	   coalition	   of	   ‘communities’	  v.s.	   civic	   nationalism	   of	   central	  Canada	   expressed	   by	   the	  Liberals	  and	  New	  Democrats	  
1999-­‐2000:	  Modernization/Europeanization	  becoming	   the	   stake	   of	   party	  competition	   for	   PASOK	   and	   ND	  leaderships.	   Absorbed	   into	   and	  reformulates	  Right-­‐Left	  axis.	  
Emergence	  of	  new	  
foreign	  policy	  
preferences	  
Ostpolitik	   as	   international	  complement	   of	  democratization	   FTA	   as	   expression	   of	   a	  decentralized,	   region-­‐communitarian	   conception	   of	  Canadian	  nationalism	  
Foreign	  policy	  Europeanization	  as	  expression	   of	   domestic	  modernization	  
Institutionalization	  
of	  foreign	  policy	  
1972	  elections:	  Ratification	  of	  Ostpolitik	  treaties	   1988	   elections:	   Ratification	   of	  FTA	   2000	  elections:	  Victory	  of	  PASOK	  ensures	   institutionalization	   of	  Helsinki	  
New	  normative	  
anchor	  and	  party	  
outlooks	  
Governance	   of	   the	   Federal	  Republic	   beyond	   anti-­‐Communism.	   CDU	   a	   more	  typical	   conservative	   party,	  SPD	   more	   cross-­‐class	   party,	  FDP	  more	  urban	  party	  
Balance	   between	   Ottawa	   and	  provinces.	   1993:	   Collapse	   of	   the	  PC	   coalition	   and	   the	   party	  system.	   The	   Liberals	   sole	  national	   party,	   proliferation	   of	  regional	  parties.	  
Balance	   between	   modernization	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  welfare	  of	  the	  people.	   PASOK	   and	   ND	   acquiring	  very	   similar	   social	   outlook.	  Rejuvenation	  of	  two-­‐partyism.	  
 
What stands out in the above table, and what summarizes the essence of this 
dissertation’s argument, is the important dividing line between stage one and stage two: 
the passage from a simple process of societal realignments beneath the party system that 
do not affect patterns of coalition and opposition, directions of competition and logic of 
interactions between parties, to system-level changes that affect some (or all) of the 
above and profoundly alter the way (first some, then all) partisan actors conceive of the 
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stakes of competition and themselves (the time lag referred to above). In foreign policy 
terms, the first stage is no more consequential than parties promoting new foreign 
policies in an effort to improve their fortunes within the confines of the discursive 
structure of the party system (and the established foreign policy identity of the state in 
question prescribing specific goals and means). The second stage is when foreign policy 
change becomes intellectually possible and institutionally imperative. It becomes 
intellectually possible because the emerging change of the logic of party competition 
energizes different readings of parties’ traditions and the coalitions of political identities 
they have come to represent. Institutionally imperative because within this new logic 
some parties function under new systemic imperatives of competition, and foreign policy 
helps them adapt and bring about reformulations of the meaning of party competition. As 
political agency plays an important role for this passage, foreign policy contestation 
becomes above all a struggle for the imposition of a new language on the party system as 
a whole.  
The importance of this point in time when the passage from simple party system 
volatility into system-wide changes takes place is made evident if we consider short 
counterfactuals in all cases when the passage to a new logic of party competition had 
been halted. What if in West Germany, after the elections of 1969 the formation of the 
Social-Liberal coalition was not possible and CDU was not forced to shed its anti-
Communist identity of the Adenauer era? What if in Canada the Mulroney government 
continued functioning as a pan-Canadian coalition without prioritizing the distinct 
preferences of the geographical and linguistic extremes (West and Quebec) and 
eventually lost their distinct solid support? What if in Greece Papandreists had continued 
to control PASOK and had derailed Simitis’ effort to make modernization the party’s, 
and by extension the party system’s, point of reference? It becomes obvious that in all 
those cases, passage to a new logic of party competition could have been averted, and 
with it foreign policy change. This conclusion allows us to map a specific research 
strategy when looking at cases when domestic dynamics actually halted foreign policy 
change despite overwhelming international systemic pressure for change. We would have 
to look at how party system dynamics persisted below the party system, on the societal 
level, and how the overarching logic of party competition remained intact (be it because 
it withstood pressure from partisan agency, or because no such willingness for change 
existed in the first place), thus blocking the expression and promotion of viable new 
foreign policy preferences. Some of these possibilities will be considered in the short case 
studies that follow. 
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PARTY POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY ACROSS SPACE AND TIME: A 
PLAUSIBILITY PROBE OF THE EFFECT OF PARTY SYSTEM DYNAMICS ON 
FOREIGN POLICY IN SELECTED CASES 
 
Austria: The case of Austria presents an interesting puzzle from a foreign policy 
perspective, that of a non-change of foreign policy when international conditions seemed 
to require it and where domestic conditions allowed it. As is well known, Austria’s 
foreign policy identity is defined by neutrality, i.e. the self-understanding of the country 
that it does not take part in international alliances with military and political ambitions 
other than the UN (Pelinka 2004: 208, 211). While neutrality was a self-imposed 
limitation, Austria’s political class accepted it as a precondition for their state to acquire 
an otherwise independent status after World War II (Schultz 1992: 174; Meyer 2007: 2-
3), and it quickly arose to the level of an essential element of Austria’s national identity 
(Pelinka 2004: 211-212; Wodak and Kovács 2004: 212; Meyer 2007: 6).  
As an expression of Austria’s geopolitical position, neutrality was translated in 
domestic politics as a fundamental foreign and domestic policy consensus. A country 
ravaged by deep historical and ideological cleavages in the inter-war period, Austria 
arose from the disaster of World War II as a state with a consensus-based political 
system. The two arch-enemies of the past, the Catholic-conservative and the labour sub-
cultures, expressed in the People’s Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), 
set up a system of permanent accommodation whereby election results only rubber-
stumped power-sharing between the two parties. This system of division of political 
spoils between the ÖVP and the SPÖ, known as Proporz, distilled the realities of 
Austria’s position as a small open economy in the Western world and a state with a 
specific position between the two Cold War blocs. Neutrality became the external 
expression of the Proporz, as it underlined in the field of foreign policy consensus 
between the two sides (Schultz 1992: 173-175). Left out of the Proporz accommodation 
was the third Austrian political family, the heterogeneous assemblage of anti-clerical and 
anti-socialist liberals (Luther 2000: 427-428).  
However, neutrality was not merely a stable concept but rather a discursive resource 
with which political actors in Austria engaged (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 217). Since 
neutrality’s initial legal formulation left considerable room for redefinitions (Schultz 
1992: 175; Meyer 2007: 3), it was absorbed and structured into party competition 
according to the main dimensions of competition. Following the overarching dimension 
of competition between the Proporz and non-Proporz parties, neutrality was historically 
supported by the ÖVP and the SPÖ as an expression of loyalism and consensus-driven 
politics. Instead, the liberal/nationalist family, under the banner of the FPÖ party, was 
always much more daring in proposals to temper with neutrality (Schultz 1992: 175). 
This dimension cut across the socioeconomic Left-Right axis. In this dimension, 
neutrality was structured in increasing order moving from right to left: the FPÖ, generally 
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considered to be lying to the right of the ÖVP (Luther 2000: 428-429), was the most anti-
neutrality party, expressed particularly in support for closer association between Austria 
and the EEC (Luther 2000: 430). The ÖVP was more daring in tempering with neutrality 
than the SPÖ, reflecting its affinity for the market-based project of European integration. 
For years, SPÖ was particularly identified with the policy of ‘active neutrality’ that 
positioned Austria as an active player of the Cold War context (Schultz 1992: 178; 
Wodak and Kovács 2004: 218). Forces to the left of the SPÖ were the most neutralist, 
reflecting their pacifism and affinity for socialism (Pelinka 2004: 212).  
From the mid-1980s onwards, Austria found more breathing space in engaging with 
the demands of neutrality. On the one hand, the main alternative to strict neutrality, the 
EEC, embarked on a process of closer economic and trade integration that challenged 
Austria’s economic planning (Schultz 1992: 187-189). On the other hand, the strict Cold 
War framework that had served as a note of caution to any efforts to temper with 
neutrality was disintegrating rapidly (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 212). Under these 
conditions, the ÖVP-SPÖ coalition decided in 1989 to apply for EEC-entry (Schultz 
1992; Pelinka 2004: 213). Austria’s elite needed to engage with neutrality, which still 
commanded strong support among the population, and claimed that EEC accession 
allowed Austria to have leverage over decisions that affected it profoundly, hence better 
defending neutrality itself (Schultz 1992: 191). 
The puzzle of the Austrian case consists in the fact that throughout the 1990s 
international and domestic conditions changed in ways that would make neutrality 
obsolete and could have lead to the unthinkable, Austria entering NATO. The end of the 
Cold War was followed relatively quickly by the enlargement of NATO and the 
development of diplomatic and military capabilities by the EU – to which Austria 
acceded in 1995 (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 218). Entry into the EU substantially affected 
the ability of the Proporz parties to reproduce the set of economic policies that underlined 
political consensus in Austria (Luther 2000: 438), while the end of the Cold War severed 
the limitations on the expression of alternative political projects in Austrian politics167. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Proporz parties were governing in a grand coalition 
that was gradually eating away strength from them while parties to the right and left, the 
FPÖ and the Greens, were benefiting (Williams 2000: 138). Especially the rise of FPÖ 
after 1986 under the leadership of mercurial Jörg Haider was stunning (Müller 2000: 191; 
Luther 2003: 137). In this way, the party with the most unabashedly pro-NATO agenda 
was the big winner of the process of dismantling of consensus politics and higher 
ideologization of party competition. Under Haider, the FPÖ moved to fundamentally 
Eurosceptic positions (Pelinka 2004: 213-215), yet it also sought to underline the main 
Proporz-Anti-proporz axis that Haider’s populism was exploiting by presenting itself as 
                                                
167 See the excellent analysis, basically amounting to a strikingly accurate prediction, in Schultz (1992: 
197).  
 
 
 208 
the party of policy innovation (Luther 2000: 437-439) – in foreign policy, this meant an 
unorthodox support for NATO entry (Meyer 2007: 12).  
The importance of foreign policy for the realignment of the patterns of the Austrian 
party system did not only concern the gradual weakening of the Proporz dimension of 
competition, but also the rise of more ideological and adversarial politics around the Left-
Right axis. The support of Haider for NATO accession was particularly puzzling, given 
his keen populism and the unpopularity of what would be the official abrogation of 
neutrality among the Austrian public (Neuhold 2003: 14). Yet it not only served to 
underline the FPÖ ’s distance from the SPÖ and the ÖVP’s centrist policies, but also to 
drive a wedge between them and exploit the ÖVP’s increasing flirtations with a more 
active security policy (Luther 2000: 430; Pelinka 2004: 217). At the same time, the 
Greens had given up on their anti-EU stance after 1995 but retained their fundamental 
support for neutrality (Meyer 2007: 13) while the SPÖ also continued to support 
neutrality as the basis of all discussions on Austria’s foreign policy (Williams 2000: 136-
137; Pelinka 2004: 216-217). In this way, Haider’s active support for NATO can be seen 
as serving important party systemic goals of the FPÖ, namely the infusion of ideological 
adversity in Austrian politics and the realignment between Left and Right, whereby the 
FPÖ would be a needed partner of the ÖVP in government formation (Müller and Fallend 
2004: 803). When, after the watershed elections of 1999, the ÖVP and the FPÖ 
controversially agreed on a coalition under Wolfgang Schüssel (Luther 2000: 432-433), 
security policy seemed to be one of the main points of agreement between the two parties 
(Müller 2000: 193; Meyer 2007: 10-11). How did neutrality survive this seemingly 
overwhelming constellation of factors in favor of Austria’s entry into NATO? 
With the creation of the ‘black-blue’ ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, Austrian politics entered a 
period of marked polarization and confrontation (Luther 2003: 138). The acrimonious 
process of coalition building in 1999-2000 (Müller 2000: 199) had estranged Schüssel 
from the SPÖ (Müller and Fallend 2004: 808-809), while the Social Democrats seemed to 
be closer to the Greens in condemning the presence of the FPÖ in government. Austrian 
media reported on the creation of two rival blocs, a ‘black-blue’ confronted with a ‘red-
green’ one (Müller and Fallend 2004: 818). In policy terms, the two blocs were separated 
in their socioeconomic preferences, with the center-left opposition accusing the new 
government of neoliberal economic and strict immigration policies (Müller and Fallend 
2004: 810-812; Luther 2008: 4). In foreign policy, the new government also tried to make 
its mark according to its general theme of renewal and innovation, and in 2001 it 
submitted to parliament a report on Austria’s new strategic doctrine. The doctrine sought 
to rationalize and absorb the significant changes in Austria’s foreign policy, including 
making contributions to the EU’s military capabilities and partaking in various NATO 
policies short of membership. Yet, neutrality was yet again affirmed as Austria’s 
overarching foreign policy identity (Krüger 2003: 11-12; Meyer 2007: 6-9). By 2002 and 
with the reelection of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition (but with a stunning reversal of strength in 
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favor of ÖVP to the detriment of FPÖ) (Luther 2003: 144), NATO-accession was 
nowhere on the radar (Meyer 2007: 14-16).  
How is the resilience of neutrality to be explained with reference to party politics 
when the consensus-based political system of Austria was shaken to its foundations in the 
late 1990’s? With Austria’s international environment being structured into and 
contributing to the polarization of Austrian politics in two ideological camps, one would 
have expected at least one of the two to pursue the cause of foreign policy modernization 
as an underpinning of domestic reformism (Wodak and Kovács 2004: 239). It is true that 
events like the 1999 NATO Kosovo campaign (Meyer 2007: 5), the rise of the Bush 
administration and the advent of the ‘war on terror’ in the early 2000s contributed to the 
Austrians’ reverting even more forcefully to their familiar neutrality – expressed as 
staying outside of NATO at the very least (Neuhold 2003: 17). Yet other cases in this 
dissertation have also demonstrated that foreign policy change can still advance in the 
face of skeptical (or at least divided) public opinion – indeed, that was the case with all 
three cases we looked at thoroughly to varying degrees. Our theoretical model would 
have expected a government expressing a new normative anchor of domestic politics 
under conditions of international change to see foreign policy as a useful instrument of 
embedding political dominance.  
The answer could lie in the fact that the Austrian party system, despite ideological 
polarization and the dominance of the Left-Right axis in the early 2000s, never shed its 
essential Proporz dimension. Much as Austrian politics seemed to be restructured around 
a bipolar competition that separated the SPÖ and the ÖVP (Luther 2003: 142-143), the 
truth is that each party saw in gains for its own ‘camp’ a means towards a more 
fundamental end, the entry into government under the best possible conditions (Müller 
and Fallend 2004: 822). This end arguably took precedence over the eventual victory of 
each party’s ‘bloc’.  
The resilience of the Proporz /Anti-Proporz dimension was discernible in two ways: 
First, following the elections of 2002, when the black-blue coalition won the majority 
again, Schüssel engaged in coalition talks with all three parties that had entered 
parliament – even the Greens (Müller and Fallend 2004: 804). Given the problems his 
government had experienced in the previous years, the renewal of the coalition with the 
FPÖ was no foregone conclusion for Schüssel. By the same token, the fact that it was 
renewed reflected more the understanding that ÖVP could dominate the new government, 
than that the party felt constrained by some kind of bipolar competition (Luther 2003: 
147; Müller and Fallend 2004: 828). At the same time, while the dynamics of opposition 
had given the image that SPÖ and Greens were close in policy terms, the existence of an 
alternative red-green bloc was more a matter of speculation than reality (Müller and 
Fallend 2004: 826). Indeed, in 2002 and in the subsequent elections of 2006 the SPÖ saw 
in a red-green majority the way to strengthen its position in eventual coalition 
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negotiations – primarily with the ÖVP (Luther 2003: 143; Müller and Fallend 2004: 821-
822, 828).  
The second indication that the Proporz cleavage always lurked underneath the 
suddenly prominent ideological competition was FPÖ’s, and particularly Haider’s, 
helpless proclivity towards populism. The 2000-2006 Schüssel governments never gave 
the impression of being a coherent entity (Müller and Fallend 2004: 832; Luther 2008: 3-
6), mostly because the FPÖ found it difficult (for various reasons) to adapt to the 
exigencies of government. Since populism was the main strategic choice of Haider to 
highlight the failures of Proporz coalitions, its survival after 2000 meant that the FPÖ 
itself was not any more committed to the idea of an ideological competition than the two 
big parties were. Interestingly, among the many shenanigans Haider undertook during 
this time to provoke reactions, foreign policy initiatives were particularly prominent 
(Müller and Fallend 2004: 818-821). The highlight came in 2002, when he twice visited 
the embattled Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, thus also showcasing FPÖ’s final divorce 
from the Atlanticism of the 1980s and 1990s (Luther 2003: 140).  
The above analysis shows that party system dynamics are decisive not only in cases 
of foreign policy change, but also as filters in fending off pressures from abroad and 
embedding foreign policy stability. While changes in Austria’s international environment 
were translated into a new balance between the two dimensions of Austrian politics (with 
ideological contestation gaining to the detriment of Proporz consensus), the dynamics of 
the Austrian party system were never transformed to the extent that Left-Right 
ideological competition completely replaced the proclivity of ÖVP and SPÖ to search for 
governing solutions instead of ideologically-charged coalitions (Müller and Fallend 2004: 
832; Luther 2008: 16). Interestingly enough, the FPÖ itself failed to embed its rhetoric in 
an ideological framework and eventually found it easier to revert to anti-Proporz 
populism. 
According to my theoretical framework, and as shown in the three deep case studies, 
new foreign policy ideas arise under conditions of the rise of new dimensions of 
competition – i.e. when domestic party systems undergo significant changes. The creation 
of the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition could be considered one such change, whereby politics in 
Austria would be structured around a Right-Left dimension and this dimension would 
also organize foreign policy options under a neutrality-anti-neutrality dimension. The 
course of events though showed that this coalition did not signal as much a thorough 
change in the logic of party competition as a relative strengthening of the socioeconomic 
dimension of competition vis-à-vis the old Proporz dimension of competition. To the 
extent that this dimension remained relevant as well, the ÖVP did not seek to entrench 
the bipolar competition of 2000-2006 (Neuhold 2003: 17; Wodak and Kovács 2004: 239) 
and thus alienate potential coalition partners in the SPÖ and the Greens (Luther 2008: 16-
17). Given how cherished neutrality was among the Austrian public (however its actual 
content watered down in practice) (Krüger 2003: 10; Neuhold 2003: 16; Wodak and 
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Kovács 2004: 238), to seek to undo its last vestiges and pursue NATO membership 
would antagonize and, ultimately, galvanize the opposition into a coherent pole of 
alternative governing potential168. In the end, the infusion of new elements (participation 
in CFSP and NATO’s Partnership for Peace) into neutrality (Krüger 2003: 12) closely 
reflected the updating, but not abandonment, of Proporz with elements of adversarial and 
ideological competition.  
 
Australia and New Zealand: The significance of party system dynamics as 
necessary conditions for foreign policy change can be also demonstrated when looking at 
states facing similar international structural exigencies but that instituted different 
responses to them. In cases like these, comparisons would have to differentiate between 
instances of change and instances of non-change and focus on the effect of domestic 
political constellations. An overview of the cases of Australia and New Zealand in the 
1980s and 1990s will be given as an example of comparison between instances of change 
and non-change under similar international circumstances. 
The puzzle here consists of the question of why two states with similar political 
identities, faced with similar changes in their international environment, instituted 
changes in their foreign policies to a very different degree. More specifically, the 
question concerns security policy and the reasons why the seemingly more powerful of 
the two, Australia, resisted very strong pressures from Asia and retained its essential 
security policy orientation towards the USA (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 178), whereas the 
less powerful, and traditionally very reliant on privileged partnerships with strong 
sponsors (first Great Britain and then USA), New Zealand chose in the late 1980s to 
abrogate a defense treaty with the USA. I contend that the discussion about foreign policy 
change in both cases was driven by domestic politics dynamics, and that the final 
outcome in each case (non-change in Australia vs change in New Zealand) was 
determined by the way party competition absorbed and structured different foreign policy 
options. 
For years Australia saw itself as a quintessentially British and Western society 
(Dalrymple 2003: 211). This self-conception of Australia was expressed in a defense 
policy that laid premium on close alignment with Great Britain and, after the onslaught of 
the Cold War, the USA (expressed in the military alliances ANZUS and SEATO) 
(Higgott and Nossal 1997: 173; Wesley and Warren 2000: 14-15), an economic policy 
that was based on access to the countries of the Commonwealth, and an immigration 
policy that prioritized British/European settlers and shut out Asians (Wesley and Warren 
2000: 21). After World War II, this policy set was carried over by the dominant 
conservative Liberal Party, usually in coalition with the rural National Party. Careful 
signs of change started being detected in the 1970s, when successive governments of 
Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) started energizing relations with 
                                                
168 See the summary of parties’ positions on the new strategic doctrine in 2001 (Krüger 2003: 12-13). 
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countries of East Asia (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 171; Gurry 1998: 81-84; Wesley and 
Warren 2000: 22). A decisive change in tone and substance came, however, in the 1980s, 
when an ALP government explicitly tried to reorient the domestic and foreign policies of 
Australia away from its white Anglo past towards a more open and multicultural 
direction. 
The ALP governments of 1983-1996, first under Bob Hawke and later under Paul 
Keating, boldly built on the increasing integration of the Australian economy with its 
regional surrounding and promoted the idea that Australia’s welfare and prominence 
depended on a serious effort to come closer to Asia. Australia needed to make a serious 
effort in order to entrench its ability to profit economically from trade with Asia 
(Dalrymple 2003: 80-81). To this end, the ALP claimed that Australia need not only 
reorient its foreign and trade policies, but also that a thorough reformulation of the 
country’s self-understanding was needed (Gurry 1998: 85). For Australia to portray its 
commitment to Asia, an active policy of multiculturalism at home was required that 
would challenge established views of Australia’s history and society (Higgot and Nossal 
1997: 174-175; Dalrymple 2003: 80). The ALP’s foreign policy activism came hand in 
hand with a policy of restructuring of the Australian economy, away from the sheltered 
protectionism of the past and towards a policy of decreased state intervention and strong 
reliance on exports and international competitiveness (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 387-
388; Wesley and Warren 2000: 22).  
In other words, Australia’s foreign policy under Hawke and Keating was part of a 
consistent reform program that sought to undo many of the communitarian vestiges of 
Australian polity, bringing in a generally more liberal ethos both in the economy 
(liberalization) and society (multiculturalism). Under Keating’s foreign minister, Gareth 
Evans, integration with Asia was elevated to the point of a goal in itself, with policies like 
immigration and education expected to serve it completely (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 
175; Dalrymple 2003: 97-99). It was this apparent abandonment of the West that drew 
Samuel Huntington’s attention in the Clash of Civilizations, whose few pages dealing 
with Australia became a hot topic of discussion there (Dalrymple 2003: 93, 125-126).  
In practical terms, the new turn in Australian foreign policy was reflected in a much 
more active participation in multilateral negotiations between East Asian states. This 
approach was to be a break from classical bilateral relations with each Asian state and 
traditional conceptions of security dangers in Asia (George and McGibbon 1998; Gurry 
1998: 85-86), and it would allow Australia to shape the regional environment as much as 
it would be affected by it (Higgott and Nossal 1997). Indeed, from the beginning 
Australia’s strategy sought to blend elements of continuity with signs of impressive 
change. While under the ALP team Australia’s immersion into East Asia was to be 
unequivocal, at the same time the government sought to shape the framework of regional 
governance by including states beyond the core of Australia’s neighbors in South East 
Asia. Australian actors preferred the term ‘Asia Pacific’ to ‘East Asia’, signaling that the 
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region they tried to integrate into had to include states like New Zealand, Japan and the 
USA (Dalrymple 2003: 88-94).  
The culmination of Australia’s multilateral activism was the creation of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Council (APEC) in 1989, an economic forum bringing together the 
dynamic economies of South East Asia with which Australia enjoyed burgeoning 
economic links, and states like USA and Japan with which it maintained traditionally 
close political and economic relations (Dalrymple 1997: 252; Wesley and Warren 2000: 
22-23; Dalrymple 2003: 82-87). At the same time, Australia maintained a rather pro-
Western (and implicitly anti-Asian) backbone in its security policies (Higgott and Nossal 
1997: 177). The only activity in the security field to match reformism in the political, 
diplomatic and economic fields was the signing in 1995 of a defense treaty with 
Indonesia, Australia’s foremost geopolitical competitor (Dalrymple 1997: 243; Higgott 
and Nossal 1997: 182). Under the enthusiastically pro-Asia Evans, Australia seemed 
ready to continue headlong with its integration into East Asia, even overlooking issues of 
domestic governance and human rights there (George and McGibbon 1998: 401-402; 
Dalrymple 2003: 214-216). 
At this point, however, the course of Australia’s foreign policy was interrupted by 
the elections of 1996, which after 13 years deposed the ALP and brought to power the 
center-right Coalition under Liberal John Howard. Under the Coalition, Australia 
maintained the content of the previous foreign policy – fostering links to Asia as dictated 
by the increasing reliance of the Australian economy there and the opportunity to 
enhance its international standing (Dalrymple 1997: 243; Wesley and Warren 2000: 19, 
fn. 19) – but significantly modified the shape and method of this policy: the new 
government prioritized bilateral relations, thus adding a dose of pragmatism in what was 
seen as an overly idealistic multilateralism under Labor (Dalrymple 1997: 251; Trood 
1998: 185, 190; Dalrymple 2003: 144). In the second half of the 1990s the difference was 
one of degree rather than kind, as Howard insisted that Australia should not be ‘forced to 
choose between its history and geography’ (Dalrymple 1997: 244-245, 252; Higgott and 
Nossal 1997: 178). By this he meant both that Australia should not shed elements of its 
identity for the sake of integrating into Asia, and that relations with Asia could be 
compatible with relations with the West (Higgott and Nossal 1997: 180; Dalrymple 2003: 
151).  
The tone of Australian foreign policy changed even more in the early 2000s, as the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the global war on terror was also translated into Australian 
politics - as adversarial identity politics. Howard decisively aligned Australia with the 
USA on issues like the war in Iraq and the practices of the Bush administration, together 
with a more nationalistic and anti-immigrant rhetoric domestically (McAllister 2003: 
448; Johnson 2007: 200-201). While he verbally never doubted Australia’s commitment 
to close relations with Asia (Dalrymple 2003: 152), by the end of his time in power, in 
2007, Australian foreign policy seemed to have erased most of the symbolic and 
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ideological capital generated by the enthusiastic embrace of Australia’s ‘Asian Pacific 
identity’ by Hawke, Keating and Evans (Kevin 2002). Overall, seen in the long run, a 
clear variance can be detected between more pro-Asian and more pro-Western overtones 
of foreign policy closely following the partisan identity of the government in Canberra 
(Dalrymple 2003: 222). Given the self-understanding of the Hawke and Keating 
governments as reformist and entrepreneurial agents of Australia’s identity and place in 
the world, one can speak of an incomplete foreign policy change, especially in the 
political and security field. 
Compared to Australia, New Zealand’s foreign and security policy underwent very 
tangible changes during the same period. While New Zealand faced quite different 
structural conditions than Australia, and in fact conditions that would make foreign 
policy change particularly costly, it nevertheless proceeded with a thorough reevaluation 
of its defense policy and its relations with the USA. Much like Australia, New Zealand 
had traditionally seen itself as a loyal extension of the British and European presence in 
the Pacific. Yet even more than Australia, a sense of vulnerability due to geography and 
small population, made New Zealand a reliable ally of Great Britain well beyond the 
waning of British appeal. During the Cold War, this was reflected in close alignment with 
the USA, a relationship formalized in the creation of the ANZUS defensive treaty in the 
1950s. Also differently than Australia, New Zealand’s international environment did not 
invite change – if anything, the country lacked significant alternative geopolitical loci, 
unlike Australia (Dalrymple 2003: 133)169.  
Despite these constraints, New Zealand did reposition itself in the waning days of 
the Cold War much more forcefully than Australia. A succession of events throughout the 
1980s led to the gradual disillusionment of New Zealand with its Western allies, 
culminating in the 1987 suspension of military cooperation with USA in the framework 
of ANZUS. The catalyst for this change of security policy was nuclear policy, and 
especially the question of the presence of nuclear-equipped vessels in the Pacific. 
Whereas the government headed by the conservative National Party in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s proved to be staunchly pro-Western within the context of the Cold War 
(Vowles 1990: 87), a new Labour government under David Lange, elected in 1984, 
reversed policy rapidly. The Lange government objected to visits by nuclear vessels in 
New Zealand ports, essentially bringing the whole point of ANZUS into doubt.  
The crisis came to a head in 1985, when French agents blew up a Greenpeace ship 
stationed in Auckland and when the New Zealand and US governments exchanged 
squabbles over the visits of nuclear-equipped vessels (Dalrymple 2003: 76). In both 
cases, the Labour government emphasized the disappointment with the stance of New 
Zealand’s traditional Western allies. The crisis escalated in 1986, when the USA 
                                                
169 Dalrymple (2003: 139) though also contends that ‘New Zealand has a population approximately equal to 
that of Melbourne and its location gives it the comfort of feeling immune from any external threat’. I would 
contend that New Zealand has historically felt much more vulnerable than that, hence its persistent 
historical attachment to the values of the British Empire.  
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suspended its military obligations to New Zealand under ANZUS, and in 1987, an 
election year, when the government declared New Zealand a nuclear-free zone (Vowles 
1990: 81). In the usually harsh words reserved for bitter occasions between former 
partners, the United States government referred to New Zealand as ‘a friend but not an 
ally’. By the late 1980s, and within a matter of a few years, the most loyal outpost of 
Western and Anglo-Saxon solidarity in the South Pacific had completely reversed course. 
This is a clear example of a foreign policy change that contrasts sharply with the 
oscillations of Australia between its Asian Pacific and its Western self170.  
What is striking in both cases of foreign policy activism is the close alignment of 
new foreign policy preferences with corresponding new domestic policy sets. Both in 
Australia and New Zealand new foreign policy ideas were represented by political parties 
that had just entered government after years in opposition, representing new political 
identities of domestic politics and seeking to underwrite their new position of dominance 
with a redefinition of the stakes of political competition. Both in Australia and New 
Zealand, the patterns of contestation of foreign policy reflected closely contestation over 
the rise of new normative anchors structuring party competition and a struggle over 
discursive dominance in domestic competition. I believe that wholesale foreign policy 
change in New Zealand expressed the successful attempt of the Labour Party to redefine 
the stakes of competition, while in Australia the persistence of the essential normative 
underpinning of the party system also meant that ALP’s foreign policy ideas were being 
absorbed in a normative anchor that contained alternatives with significant societal 
support and systemic relevance. 
In New Zealand, the story of the forceful challenge against US nuclear presence in 
the South Pacific starts in many ways in the camp of Labour’s opponents, the 
conservative National Party. Between 1975 and 1984, National was in government under 
the leadership of the charismatic but abrasive Robert Muldoon. For years New Zealand 
had been the most regulated and protected economy among developed countries. It was 
also a devout Western ally, an aspirant British society with important alliance 
commitments to the United States. Muldoon’s period in office was characterized by an 
inflated application of these traditional tenets, i.e. increased government regulation 
(Schwartz 1994: 532; Nagel 1998: 228-229) and a polarizing commitment to the cause of 
the Cold War internationally. While the New Zealand party system, perhaps the last 
perfect example of two-party system in a democratic polity back then, was considered to 
reflect almost entirely a socioeconomic class cleavage between middle class and labour 
(Bean 1988: 304; Nagel 1998: 231-232), Muldoon’s policies and his image meant that 
National became uncharacteristically identified with a kind of working class conservative 
populism. This caused concern among urban middle class voters who would have been 
more comfortable with a more patrician style and a more liberal approach to the 
                                                
170 According to Dalrymple (2003: 76), Hawke had explicitly tried to dissociate his opening to Asia from 
New Zealand’s foreign policy adventurism. He also ‘had no personal liking for Lange’.  
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economy. Muldoon’s defeat in the 1984 election in the hands of Lange’s Labour was due 
in no small part to a defection of precisely this constituency (Vowles 1990: 82; Nagel 
1998: 236-239). 
The new Labour government represented a novel coalition in New Zealand politics. 
As the institutional features of the party system – perfect two-partyism and a first-past-
the-post electoral system – forced societal interests to ally with one of the two major 
parties (Nagel 1998: 225-226), Labour became home to a dynamic group of urban voters 
with post-materialist concerns (Bean 1988: 316; McAllister and Vowles 1994: 387), 
united with Labour by their common disdain for Muldoon’s policies (Schwartz 1994: 
535). These voters had reservations about Muldoon’s social conservatism. They also 
could be more open to calls for reform of the economy along liberal lines (Schwartz 
1994: 547; Nagel 1998: 239-241). The slide of Labour on the socioeconomic axis 
following its engagement with a rising post-materialist cleavage (in essence the opposite 
move to the one Muldoon had instituted for National with his paternalistic protectionism) 
(McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395; Nagel 1998: 233-236) was evident in its economic 
policies. Under the auspices of minister of finance Roger Douglas, Labour implemented a 
radical reform program of deregulation, austerity and trade openness that went against 
established tenets of New Zealand economy (Vowles 1990: 81)171.  
While this reform program spoke to the needs of some of Labour’s new followers, 
the government’s ability to absorb the post-materialist cleavage in the socioeconomic 
Left-Right and redefine the meaning of progressivism in New Zealand politics went 
through a concerted effort to satisfy the progressive proclivities of the new constituency 
of the party (Schwartz 1994: 535-536; Nagel 1998: 246-248). Foreign policy, and 
especially the question of nuclear vessels in the Pacific, was an important proxy of the 
post-materialist cleavage (Vowles 1990: 88; McAllister and Vowles 1994: 389). While 
Labour was very active in social legislation concerning gender and environmental issues 
as well (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 392), it nevertheless found that the nuclear/foreign 
policy issue perfectly captured the concerns of its young urban following. Emphasizing 
this issue could overcompensate for the fact that it was following a basically right-wing 
policy on economics – indeed, it was the only issue that could appeal to both the party’s 
leftist labour traditions and its new libertarian image (Nagel 1998: 255).  
Seen from a narrow perspective, this looks like a standard use of diversionary 
foreign policy: Labour’s victory in the polarizing 1987 elections derived from the 
salience of the nuclear issue and the ability of Lange to harness the support of 
constituencies in academia, intelligentsia and affluent urban districts that were willing to 
overlook the consequences of Labour’s neoliberal economic policies (Vowles 1990: 87-
88; Schwartz 1994: 547; Nagel 1998: 253). Yet from a party systemic perspective, the 
Labour victory in 1987 represented the institutionalization of a new dimension of 
                                                
171 For a presentation of the key aspects of the reform program in New Zealand and Australia (see below), 
see Schwartz (1994: 539-544). For New Zealand also see Nagel (1998). 
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competition (Schwartz 1994: 536), and foreign policy had a decisive role to play in this 
(McAllister and Vowles 1994: 393-395). The redefinition of New Zealand’s self-
understanding demanded by the new security policy was not an afterthought of the policy 
change. Rather, it was a coherent program of domestic reform and the willingness of 
Labour to entrench its reformism within a new normative anchor of party competition 
(i.e. the waning away of the dominance of the class cleavage) (Bean 1988: 320-321; 
Vowles 1990: 89) that made foreign policy change institutionally possible and 
ideologically conceivable. 
In Australia the political/institutional setting differs in some crucial aspects from 
New Zealand. Unlike New Zealand and most other Anglo democracies, Australia uses an 
electoral system that gives strength to two big parties but also allows the significant 
representation of other parties (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395). Following the patterns 
of most English democracies, the main competition in the Australian party system is 
between the conservative Liberal Party, representing middle class interests, and the 
Australian Labour Party, closely affiliated with trade unions (Bean 1988: 320). The 
National Party, in permanent coalition with the Liberals, is the expression of the 
interaction between the regional and the socioeconomic cleavage. The Australian party 
system then is structured under a bipolar competition along the socioeconomic left-right 
cleavage (McAllister 2003: 446), itself absorbing other historical cleavages of Australia 
(Wesley and Warren 2000: 16). After World War II, Australia was run mostly by the 
Liberal Party that implemented a Keynesian policy of regulation, largely in a bipartisan 
accord with Labor (Johnson 2007: 204). Both Australian political parties were also in 
accord about the need to anchor Australia close to the Western bloc of the Cold War 
(Wesley and Warren 2000: 13). Much more than New Zealand, Australia quickly shed 
most of its political and psychological ties with Great Britain172.  
Between 1949 and 1983 the ALP was in the opposition for all but three years. The 
election of Hawke in 1983 though represented the advent of a clearly assertive Labor 
with a coherent reform agenda. Much like the New Zealand Labour Party, Australian 
Labor instituted a far-reaching policy of dismantling of the regulatory structures that had 
governed Australian economy in the past and tried to create the preconditions for 
electoral dominance (Schwartz 1994: 535-536). At the same time, the ALP (traditionally 
a party with reservations towards immigration) became an enthusiastic exponent of 
multiculturalism and of socially liberal policies. Also like its New Zealand brethren, the 
ALP embedded its economically liberal and socially progressive message in an activist 
foreign policy towards Asia. Even more interesting, the Australian party system seemed 
to undergo a similar process of interaction, with Labor eager to absorb the preferences of 
a rising young urban class and to embed its liberalizing economic policies in a new 
                                                
172 However a difference in emphasis always existed. The Coalition was always much more principled in its 
loyalism towards the West, whereas the left wing of Labor was much more outspoken in its criticism of the 
US (Ravenhill 1998: 321).  
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understanding of progressiveness (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 399; Dalrymple 2003: 
74).  
Exactly like in New Zealand, a new approach in foreign policy was not a simple 
response to immediate international structural constraints – Australia’s reliance on the 
Asian market was increasing for years already (Dalrymple 2003: 77-79). Instead, ALP 
interpreted these constraints according to its own position in the party system and 
intensified a change in foreign policy that was a coherent part of a project both of 
opening up the economy to international trade and competition (Schwartz 1994: 531; 
Dalrymple 2003: 80), and of domestic modernization of social attitudes (McAllister and 
Vowles 1994: 399; Gurry 1998: 86). Also like New Zealand, the new foreign policy 
overcompensated for ALP’s neoliberal turn in the economy and gave to its domestic 
reformism a progressive tilt.  
Despite these similarities, there were crucial differences in the party system 
dynamics of the two countries that critically affected the pace and extent of foreign policy 
change in Australia. Due to the opposition strategies of the Liberal Party and the 
existence of smaller liberal parties, the ALP was never able to monopolize and 
completely appropriate the post-materialist vote like New Zealand Labour had done. 
Unlike the National Party under Muldoon, the Liberal Party had never shed its 
quintessentially center-right and middle-class outlook. In this way, it was able to keep 
close track of ALP’s reformism and sustain its appeal towards new urban strata – by the 
same token, the ALP never transformed itself into a coherently libertarian party like 
Labour in New Zealand (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 386-387). The sum effect of this 
was that the post-materialist cleavage was absorbed into the socioeconomic Left-Right 
without supplanting completely the old normative anchor of class-based politics 
(McAllister and Vowles 1994: 395).  
The election of 1996, when Labor finally lost after 13 years in government, portrays 
the limited effect of the new foreign policy on the normative anchor of the Australian 
party system. Coalition’s victory was also an expression of Australians’ unease with the 
speed and ambition of Keating and Evans in repositioning Australia in East Asia 
(Dalrymple 1997: 245; Dalrymple 2003: 135). The dynamics of political opposition had 
made the Liberal Party under John Howard a strong opponent of changing Australia’s 
identity as a Western society. While the need of engagement with Asia was recognized, 
this should not lead to a change of Australia’s traditions and outlook (Gurry 1998: 86; 
Johnson 2007: 199). Analogously, the Liberals’ ability to keep engaged in the values of 
liberalization of the Australian economy (Johnson 2007: 196-197), unlike the 
protectionist opposition of National under Muldoon in New Zealand, also meant that the 
Right in Australia retained access to the post-materialist constituencies (McAllister and 
Vowles 1994: 399). Unlike New Zealand, the normative anchor changed only 
incrementally (McAllister and Vowles 1994: 389-392) and the Liberals maintained a 
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distinctive conservative profile, which underpinned their version of liberalizing economic 
and pragmatic foreign policies. 
The ability of the Liberals to take advantage of the partially redefined normative 
anchor was evident during John Howard’s long and polarizing reign in 1996-2007. While 
his reign was characterized by many pragmatic policies in the field of economy, 
immigration and foreign policy, there was a difference of style, emphasis and atmosphere 
as evident as the one during Hawke and Keating (Dalrymple 2003: 108-109; Johnson 
2007: 200). Elected the same year as the breakthrough of Pauline Hanson’s populist anti-
immigrant party, Howard spoke out more against multiculturalism and the negative 
impacts of a very close association with Asia (Dalrymple 1997: 245-247; Ravenhill 1998: 
324). In 2001, he basically won the election on a hard agenda against Muslim 
immigration and the dangers of terrorism (McAllister 2003: 451-454). All the while he 
cultivated relations with Asia, talk of Australia becoming the ‘sheriff deputy of the USA’ 
in the region increased (Dalrymple 2003: 136).  
The comparison of these two cases allows us to see the importance of party system 
dynamics as prerequisites for the emergence of new foreign policy preferences and 
institutionalization of new foreign policies. In terms of the table presented above, in one 
case (New Zealand) the first stage produced a new alignment of domestic preferences 
under stable party system mechanics and the interest of one party (Labour) in redefining 
what party competition was about and, by extension, the position of New Zealand in the 
world (second stage). In the other case (Australia), changes in the first stage were not as 
systemically relevant as to alter the direction or meaning of party competition – the 
socioeconomic normative anchor of competition was retained and variations in foreign 
policy outputs within a steady framework of defined interests closely followed the 
succession of parties in office. This difference may explain the ultimate difference in the 
extent of changes of security policy between Australia and New Zealand: while Australia 
was under more pressure and had more incentives to unequivocally throw in its lot with 
East Asia, it was the more vulnerable and traditionally subservient New Zealand that 
broke ranks with its powerful partner. To this day, party competition in Australia 
reproduces this essential split over foreign policy and the identity of the country all the 
while governments of both parties pragmatically foster links with Asia, while party 
competition in New Zealand embeds a basic consensus about its identity as a Pacific 
nation.   
 
The Netherlands: An argument that could be made against the model presented here 
is that the foreign policy cases studied were highly salient, political and symbolic, or with 
important domestic outreach and repercussions. In such cases, the logic of contestation of 
domestic issues applies anyway, hence the cases presented here were effectively 
‘domesticized’ and their study does not add to a substantial understanding of how 
specifically ‘foreign’ policy issues become structured. In this way, the argument of this 
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dissertation would not counter effectively two rival viewpoints. On the one hand, there is 
the Blondel and Nousiainen (2000) argument that foreign policy does not fall under the 
premises of party politics at all as foreign policy is too unpredictable to be determined by 
partisan developments. Following this logic, Blondel and Nousiainen would dispute my 
argument with the assertion that ‘hard’ foreign policy issues stay outside of the realm of 
real politics and that this thesis would have to show that it accommodates cases of foreign 
policy change with small domestic ramifications but also important practical 
repercussions in the conduct of foreign policy (that may be less visible and important to 
the voting public). A contrasting argument that also calls into question the exclusive 
focus on highly salient foreign policy issues is made by Hofmann (2009). Her argument 
is that foreign policy issues are being structured according to foreign policy-specific ideas 
that are institutionalized within political parties because they are essentially dissociated 
from the material stake of domestic politics. She then could dismiss the argument of this 
dissertation by saying that the high salience issues I looked at had high material domestic 
repercussions (like the Canadian FTA), so domestic political identities were naturally 
called upon to make sense of them. While she disagrees with Blondel and Nousiainen in 
that she accepts the role of political parties in foreign policy, Hofmann’s argument 
creates the same predicament for this thesis, i.e. it requires a demonstration that political 
identities matter also for low salience foreign policy issues with low redistributional 
impact.  
As an example of depoliticized foreign policy change I look at the new focus of 
Dutch security policy during the 1990s. Traditionally Dutch foreign and security policy 
has been oriented towards seafaring powers, reflecting the needs of the Netherlands’ as a 
country heavily reliant on sea trade. This identity has also informed the need to check the 
strength of states with ambitions to dominate Europe – particularly Germany. Out of this 
the second traditional element of Dutch foreign policy arose, the reliance on neutrality 
and international multilateralism as a counterweight to great power politics. This 
traditional policy set was significantly modified after World War II, when Dutch 
neutrality had not prevented Germany from invading the Netherlands. Under the Cold 
War context, the Netherlands threw in its lot with the Atlantic Alliance. While European 
integration was valued as a check on the ambitions of bigger European powers, a wider 
security/political role for Europe was seen as a diversion from the main focus of Western 
security, NATO (Sie Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 4; van der Harst 2007: 128; de 
Wijk 2007: 150-152, 159).  
The end of the Cold War posed a significant challenge for Dutch security policy. 
The collapse of the Eastern bloc cast a shadow of doubt over the main preconditions of 
Dutch security policy, the constant engagement of the USA in Europe and the checking 
of the ambitions of continental powers (Sie Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 4). A 
persistent focus on Atlanticism was deemed unrealistic under the new circumstances, but 
a turn towards some kind of Eurocentric security policy was also not possible both 
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because of the Dutch traditions and because the European security framework remained 
highly problematic in the 1990s (de Wijk 2007: 152). More as a reflex towards the new 
geopolitical conditions, the Netherlands had presented a very integrationist position in 
security matters during the negotiations for the creation of the EU in the early 1990s, but 
soon reverted to more moderate positions (Pijpers 1996: 253-255; Tonra 2001: 169; Sie 
Dhian Ho and van Keulen 2004: 5).  
A more decisive and visible turn in Dutch foreign policy came after 1994, when a 
novel coalition entered power in The Hague. For years Dutch party politics reflected the 
logic of consociationalism. In this vein, while the Dutch party system was very 
fragmented, it was characterized by both centripetal competition and governing by broad 
coalition governments. Party competition was structured around a socioeconomic class 
dimension (pitting middle class against working class) and a religious dimension (first 
pitting Catholics against the dominant Calvinists, but progressively redefined as a 
competition on social issues between Christians and secularists) (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 
2003: 48-49). The Christian Democratic party CDA was the pivot of all coalitions, 
sometimes reflecting a more liberal economic policy when the conservative liberal VVD 
was its partner and sometimes promoting more protectionist welfare policy when the 
labour PvdA was its partner (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 114-115). While all major 
Dutch parties supported both Atlanticism in security policy and European integration as 
an economic union, the custodian of this foreign policy set were the Christian parties, 
which consistently formed part of the government (van der Harst 2007).  
After the elections of 1994, a unique constellation of Dutch politics arose. For the 
first time, PvdA and VVD formed a government together without the presence of a 
Christian party (Irwin 1995). Serving as a kind of a link between two parties that were 
considered to be the most removed from one another on economic matters (Irwin and can 
Holsteyn 1997: 115) was the smaller D66, a ‘social liberal’ and avowedly pro-European 
party (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997: 106; van der Brug 1999: 181). The formation of this 
coalition (called ‘purple’ because of the red of PvdA and the blue of the VVD) signified 
an important change in the direction of competition within the Dutch party system: this 
apparently paradoxical coalition portrayed the degree to which the Dutch party system 
was disengaging from the rigid battle lines of class and religion and entering a period 
where government efficiency and issue salience would influence the dimensions and 
stakes of competition (Irwin and van Holsteyn 1997). While the purple cabinet enjoyed 
amazing popularity (expressed in its reelection in 1998 against a demoralized CDA) (van 
der Brug 1999) for eight years, the price of its economic success was the entry into the 
public debate of newer issues concerning values and identities, most prominently the 
question of immigration (Van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003: 53-55). 
The new coalition also made a mark in foreign policy, as the Netherlands showed a 
more pronounced willingness to contribute to the development of political and military 
capabilities outside of the NATO framework. While, as we saw, in the early 1990s 
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governments under CDA had entertained the idea, it was not until 1994 and the creation 
of a truly novel coalition that the new post-Cold War environment was interpreted as 
requiring a clear strengthening of European defense and security institutions (Homann 
2000: 185-186; Stahl et al 2004: 421). In fact, the CDA-led government’s proposal to 
integrate foreign policy into the supranational structures of the new European Union at 
Maastricht expressed more a traditional Dutch preference for the Community method as a 
check on great power ambitions than a new vision of a truly enabled Union in the security 
field (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 129-130).  
The new government’s pro-European activism was pronounced in two phases. 
Firstly, in 1994-1995 a new foreign policy report was published that emphasized the need 
for the Netherlands to endorse Europe and to be part of rising efforts to give the EU a 
security component (van Mierlo et al 1995; Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen: 5). Foreign 
minister and D66 head Hans Van Mierlo was particularly instrumental in emphasizing 
Europe as the new locus of Dutch security policy (Sie Dhian Ho and Van Keulen 2004: 5; 
de Wijk 2007: 152-153). Purple’s Europeanism received a new impetus after the 
ravishing endorsement of the coalition in the 1998 elections and the St. Malo summit of 
the same year between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac. During its second term, the PvdA-
VVD-D66 government endorsed and promoted the EU’s Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP), to the extent that one could speak of a ‘dramatic policy change’ (Stahl et al 
2004: 423; de Wijk 2007: 154). In comparison with the preferences of other ‘Atlanticist’ 
EU members like Denmark at the time, the Dutch stance created an even bigger contrast 
(Tonra 2001: 159-168). 
Throughout the 1990s, European foreign and security policy was an issue of low 
salience in Dutch politics. While important international developments like the Yugoslav 
wars received much attention (Stahl et al 2004: 432), the minutiae of institutional 
developments in the EU did not. However, the new bolder direction of Dutch foreign 
policy can be ascribed to a very considerable extent to the creation of the Purple 
coalition. The most important may have been the role of the very pro-European D66, 
which served as the conscience or ‘glue’ of the coalition (van der Brug 1999: 183). Policy 
polarization between PvdA and VVD extended to the foreign policy field as well, as 
PvdA was coming out of a period of significant anti-NATO sentiments in the 1970s and 
1980s (Pijpers 1996: 250; Tonra 2001: 74), while VVD remained the most Atlanticist 
party of the Netherlands. As a self-styled reformist and outsider party, D66 added 
significantly to the government’s foreign policy direction (especially with van Mierlo in 
charge of foreign affairs in 1994-1998). While the Dutch public at the time had a 
conspicuously indifferent attitude towards technical issues of European security, party 
politics was still the crucial filter between international systemic imperatives and foreign 
policy change.  
The foreign and security policy innovation of the 1990s proved to be resilient 
beyond the life of the Purple coalition and it permanently impacted the orientation of 
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Dutch foreign policy – adding confusion but also reducing dogmatism (Pijpers 1996: 257; 
de Wijk 2007: 163). Comparative analyses of European security policies in the 2000s 
emphasize a new permanent ‘Europeanist’ tilt in what remains a fundamentally 
‘Atlanticist’ security policy (Stahl et al 2004; Stahl 2005). Unlike states that 
demonstrated their intense Atlanticism (like Denmark), the Netherlands treaded a more 
careful line during the Iraq war crisis in 2002 and 2003 (Stahl et al 2004: 421-422). This 
was both due to the very volatile domestic political environment of the time (Stahl 2005: 
22-23; de Wijk 2007: 157-159), but also due to a residual ‘Europeanism’ in defense and 
security matters that positioned the Netherlands more towards the middle of the 
Atlanticism-Europeanism axis (Stahl 2005: 27, 34). Seen in a long-term perspective, the 
Dutch decision to provide ‘political but not military’ support to the US intervention in 
Iraq (Stahl 2005: 15, 23) was not only a reflection of traditional Dutch attachment to 
orthodox ideas of international legality (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 130) but also a 
symptom of a slide away from unconditional Atlanticism – an understanding that coming 
closer to Europe also necessarily entailed a degree of distancing from the United States 
(de Wijk 2007: 154).  
 While it is true that the Netherlands retained an overarching commitment to NATO 
(Pijpers 1996: 265), the security policy of the Purple coalition represented a significant 
change in Dutch foreign policy in that a clearly European dimension was absent before. 
As such, it mirrored the existence of a novel coalition in The Hague that expressed the 
realignment of Dutch politics around issues of policy efficiency and the creation of new 
socioeconomic identities away from older economic and social cleavages. The anti-
Purple backlash of the early 2000s that accompanied the rise of Pim Fortuyn and issues 
of immigration and integration, further entrenched this axis of competition (van Holsteyn 
and Irwin 2003). But this axis, under conditions of consensus politics practiced by the 
embattled mainstream parties, also effectively absorbed the new direction of foreign 
policy of the 1990s and made a more balanced foreign policy between Europe and NATO 
a pertinent question of future Dutch security policy (Sie Dhian Ho 2004: 9-10; de Wijk 
2007: 163-164). Even the pervasive Euroscepticism that characterizes radical politics in 
the Netherlands in the last 10 years, and continues to underpin the new direction of party 
competition, is a testament to the change of discursive frame within which foreign policy 
options are being considered (Coolsaet and Soetendorp 2000: 131-132).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The four cases presented here aimed to fulfill two different goals. The first was to 
complement the comparative analysis that forms the backbone of this dissertation and 
showcase the viability of the analytical framework in diverse cases where the outcome 
(foreign policy change) or crucial initial conditions (politicization of foreign policy 
issues) varied. The case studies had the scope and ambition of a plausibility probe, i.e. 
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offering a narrative in broad strokes that nevertheless employed the main analytical 
categories of the comparative analysis (political identities, systemic parameters of party 
competition, feedback loops between domestic and international politics etc.). As a 
complement to the deeper case studies of the previous chapters, the plausibility probe 
further supports the main assertions of the theoretical framework through the logic of 
comparison. These assertions are that domestic party politics are the necessary condition 
for international systemic changes to be translated into new foreign policies; and that the 
kind of domestic changes that makes new foreign policies conceivable includes a 
combination of systemically relevant realignment of political identities and changes in 
the systemic parameters of party competition.  
As the case of Austria showed, the institutionalization of new stakes of party 
competition and a new discursive framework – a normative anchor – of party politics is 
needed for foreign policy change to become possible. The comparison between New 
Zealand and Australia portrayed how the rise of new political identities (here the post-
materialist social groups) is not enough to change the discursive framework of foreign 
policy contestation without permissive systemic and institutional conditions in party 
competition. The extent and nature of domestic change in turn determined the ultimate 
channeling of international change into new foreign policies. The Dutch case finally 
showcased the role of changes in the parameters and terms of domestic political debate 
for the development of new foreign policies even when specific foreign policy issues 
were not salient politically.  
The second goal that the plausibility probe aimed to fulfill here was to show that the 
analytical framework of this dissertation can ‘travel’ across time and space within some 
basic scope conditions (basically the existence of a parliamentary system of democratic 
government). While I am far from making the claim that the world works uniformly 
according to a theoretical framework of my design, I think that the basic ideas of this 
thesis – that domestic politics matter in the creation of new ideas of foreign policy, that 
international and domestic politics are intrinsically linked, and that one has to take the 
discursive framework of domestic party competition seriously – are straightforward 
enough to find application in diverse cases. In exercising the requisite caution associated 
with a plausibility probe, we can still say that the general empirical generalizations 
generated by the three thorough case studies seem to survive the test of these four 
additional short narratives.  
In all cases party systems were the quintessential repositories of ideas and self-views 
of countries’ position in the world. Foreign policy ideas had to find suitable hosts to be 
expressed through. But even then (as in the case of Austria and Australia), the 
institutionalization of new foreign policy may be halted by the stickiness of dominant 
frameworks and underlying ideas of party competition. In all four cases foreign policy 
entrepreneurship by partisan actors can be seen as an effort to absorb international 
systemic changes and, through them, support new patterns of party politics. Even where 
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foreign policy change in the end did not take place (Austria) or was incomplete 
(Australia), the process of contestation of foreign policy impacted the systemic features 
of party competition and altered important features of the respective party systems. Of 
course domestic change receives important impetus from the bottom, from the societies 
political parties profess to represent. Yet partisan actors are constituted by and engage 
with structures both below and above them (the foreign environment of a state). Finally, 
none of the four additional cases portrayed the interesting phenomenon of the three main 
case studies, i.e. the exchange of foreign policy positions between parties. Still, it is an 
interesting observation that in two cases (New Zealand and Australia) foreign policy 
innovation accompanied domestic policies by parties that were completely opposite than 
the ones they had pursued in the past (I refer to the process of economic liberalization 
under Labour parties) – indeed, foreign policy change was a needed complement of these 
parties’ domestic policies from a practical and symbolical perspective. 
In sum, the theoretical expectations presented in the first chapter seem to be 
confirmed in all cases and the theoretical framework can travel with relative ease across 
time and space. Foreign policy change of democratic parliamentarian polities can be 
better understood as the result of interaction between two necessary conditions: 
international and domestic systemic change. The focus will now shift to the theoretical 
and metatheoretical implications of this argument, which will be presented in the 
concluding chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: THEORETICAL AND METATHEORETICAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPARATIVE RESEARCH AND THE 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the theoretical chapter I discussed the potential theoretical implications of the 
argument and the ensuing comparative research for three broad strands of political 
science literature. In IR, the question concerned important issues about the role of ideas, 
institutions, identities and agency in world politics. In FPA, it was about the importance 
of party politics in foreign policy and the process of preference formation that took 
history, identities and ideas seriously. In comparative party politics, I was interested in 
showing that party system dynamics can have policy outputs in the field of foreign 
policy, as well as that party systems can be affected by international events. My research 
was inspired by a combination of liberal/domestic and constructivist/ideational analytical 
frameworks from within IR. By taking a deeper look into the domestic politics of foreign 
policy, I am making a methodological point about the usefulness of comparative analysis 
in the study of foreign policies and the development of narratives of policy change. 
Altogether, my research is informed by a frame of mind that sees politics (and 
international relations in particular) as a multi-textured process that we can only begin to 
understand if we trace the complex interplay of agency, ideas and institutions across 
levels of analysis. For International Relations specifically, this leads to a plea for a more 
daring engagement with other literatures and specific empirical questions. 
While I will address all of these issues in this final chapter, I will also go one step 
further and trace the implications of the empirical research for a more general question of 
metatheoretical nature, that of the interrelationship between systems embedding social 
action. As I focused on party politics as a systemically embedded phenomenon, the 
question opens up as to how this research can be framed within a more general 
sociological framework. By using some elementary concepts from open systems theory, I 
will try to show the importance of this research for foundational questions not only of 
agency/structure but also of social systems. I will start by answering the main questions 
posed in the theoretical chapter, and in the following sections I will continue with a 
treatment of the implications of a systems-based view of party-based foreign policy 
change along the lines suggested here. I will also address residual questions of an 
epistemological and methodological nature.  
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ANSWERING THE THEORETICAL QUESTIONS OF THE THESIS: 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND PARTY 
POLITICS 
 
a) Identities, ideas, agents and International Relations 
 
The comparative analysis and the plausibility probe starkly revealed the ideational 
nature of the politics of foreign policy. In all three major cases, the preferences and ideas 
of important domestic political identities were translated into a competition over new 
foreign policies once the normative anchor of party competition – the language of politics 
that informs partisan actors with understandings of what party competition is all about – 
was significantly altered. Only when the SPD and the FDP joined in government, when 
the Canadian Conservatives understood themselves as agents of a decentralized version 
of Canadian nationalism, and when PASOK absorbed Simitis’ modernization in its leftist 
ideology, did the political identities represented within these parties cue ideas towards 
foreign policy change.  
In more general terms, this shows that the ideational framework within which 
political preferences are expressed is crucial not only for their propagation but also, in a 
step earlier, for their actually coming into being. While important individuals or party 
factions in all cases had hopes of thorough foreign policy change, specific projects of 
foreign policy change virtually came into existence in the minds of leaders, party actors 
and public opinion only when new foreign policy projects became clearly aligned with 
corresponding rival projects of domestic policy along new lines of competition. These 
new lines of competition built and overlay existing powerful axes of competition rather 
than replacing them completely – but still, the change was meaningful enough for new 
political projects of change to arise.  
As discussed earlier, this view crucially complements standard accounts in 
transnational relations literature about the power of ideas, individuals and domestic 
institutions in world politics. All these things clearly matter in foreign policy change, but 
in order to understand how and when they do, one must look at the general ideational 
framework embedding their expression and interactions. This framework gives meaning 
to different preferences not as idiosyncratic interests but as coherent policy sets for the 
governing of a polity. This argument comes very close to the literature about national 
identity and how it conditions and delineates frameworks of argumentation of foreign 
policy173. Yet one problem with this literature is that it is very easy to fall into 
impressionistic narratives whereby national identity is very difficult to pin down and its 
effects only loosely understood. One of the implications of the argument presented here is 
                                                
173 As we saw, the foundational text in identity research is Jepperson et al (1996). Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993) dealt with identity and politics earlier, yet their positivistic take on the topic gained little traction in 
the literature. Some recent examples of research on identity and foreign policy include Ashizawa (2008), 
Bukh (2009), Legro (2009) and Lucarelli (2006).  
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that ‘national identity’ (much like ideas of individual political identities vying for 
influence), in democratic polities at least, can be pinned down by looking at institutional 
spaces codifying terms of engagement between political forces and a language of 
politics174. Party systems are such institutions, and IR scholarship interested in national 
identities and the normative frameworks of foreign policy decisions would be well 
advised to employ the vast amount of work comparativists have done in coding, 
measuring and untangling the content of political competition in democratic states. 
Saying that this or that country is traditionally ‘Atlanticist’ or ‘neutralist’ or ‘Europeanist’ 
or ‘Anti-American’ etc. is both a shaky abstraction and a problematic starting point for 
research when one could instead rely on accurate data and/or historical accounts that 
present the range of rival opinions codified in party competition175.  
A second problem with the identity literature is its static nature. Identity presupposes 
or generates a research bias towards stability – in any case, it is not a concept inviting 
research on change. Some works that tackle this best actually start by untangling identity 
as the sum of different identity elements; foreign policy change in these works is used as 
an opportunity to understand how actors engage with domestic identities and dominant 
discursive frames to promote their preferences (Barnett 1999; Hopf 2002; Wæver 2001). 
Once the non-unitary nature of domestic identity is accepted, one is bound to accept that 
the formulation of foreign policy choices is not a passive expression of preferences 
within a pre-given framework, but rather a dynamic process whereby actors engage with 
the given discursive framework, sometimes even altering it all the while they are being 
constituted by it. The sociological discussion of the agency/structure debate176 enters here 
as the most promising theoretical framework for making sense of this interaction between 
societal interests and normative anchors that structure discussion. 
As we saw, according to the agency/structure problematique, political agents engage 
with the normative structures they are embedded in as much as they are constituted by 
them. This is a dynamic interrelationship that may well lead to both significantly altered 
agents and structures. Here, the question of time plays an important role when trying to 
understand agent/structure interactions. Deep historical narratives can untangle 
policy/agent equilibria at a given point in time by looking at the step-by-step mutual 
constitution of agents who promote preferences and the normative frameworks that 
embed societal competition of interests (Checkel 1998: 337). In the three cases presented 
in the dissertation, partisan actors were constituted as much by the normative structure of 
the party system as they effected change on this structure through the promotion of new 
policies. Indeed, successful institutionalization of foreign policies in all three cases also 
                                                
174 ‘Domestic political institutions provide the rules of the game for citizens and state officials […], identify 
what is legitimate and what is not [and] help national actors define their interests domestically and 
internationally’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 79).  
175 For the example I used, see Stahl (2005).  Also see the discussion on Engelmann-Martin’s identity-based 
analysis of Ostpolitik at the end of the West German chapter.  
176 On coconstitution of agent and structure in constructivism also see Checkel (1998).  
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signaled the final passage to a new interpretation of party competition. Through 
contestation of rival foreign policy projects, the SPD, the Tories and PASOK cemented 
the change of the normative anchor that structured party competition all the while initial 
changes in this anchor had made the expression of new foreign policy projects possible. 
This interaction solves the apparent contradiction of a focus on both normative 
frameworks of contestation and policy change, as it allows for an evolutionary and 
mutually reinforced change of both actors and structures.  
The intention of my argument is of course far from discrediting or verifying ‘theories’ 
in general. My concern is with developing and then applying to practical problems a 
theoretical framework that can be shown to be more or less suitable for understanding 
specific questions at hand. In this vain, I would say that the three cases have shown that a 
framework combining liberal and constructivist premises about the role and nature of 
domestic politics accounts satisfactorily for the role of political parties in foreign policy. 
Along the lines of the liberal strand of IR theory as developed by Moravcsik, it becomes 
obvious that domestic preferences (both of material and ideational nature!) matter for 
foreign policies, but in a more complicated way than is depicted by Moravcsik. His 
theory becomes even more powerful if it is embedded within a constructivist framework 
that will inform it with a more textured understanding about the environment of 
preference contestation, the role of ideas and the importance of the international 
environment as a feedback loop on domestic politics. The combination of liberal and 
constructivist premises can bridge precisely the empirical and epistemological divide 
between stability and change discussed above. Social constructivism embarks from the 
acceptance that a complex web of ideas and discursive constructions embeds existing 
patterns of policies and the study of change needs to take this into account, lest it 
degenerates in vacuous explanations like ‘change happened because new preferences 
arose’ or ‘because a new government took power’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 69).  
This theoretical framework, provisionally and humbly dubbed here ‘liberal 
constructivism’177, does not exhaust itself in the study of party politics and foreign policy. 
It can potentially help us understand other aspects of domestic politics and their role in 
foreign policy such as bureaucracies, economic interests, and even the role of individuals. 
The aim here is to incorporate in a coherent epistemological understanding the duality of 
stability and change, a proxy (or a heuristic) of the other essential pair, that of agency and 
structure. The validation of this liberal constructivist framework constitutes a plea for 
further emphasis on domestic politics in IR discussions because this holds the promise of 
increasing the scope and enriching the vigor of different theoretical strands. This analysis 
is not only a vindication of a framework combining liberal and mainstream constructivist 
                                                
177 Not to be confused with Risse-Kappen’s liberal constructivism, where the term ‘liberal’ is used in its 
ideological meaning (Checkel 1998: 334).  
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premises, but also constitutes a straightforward criticism of post-structuralist views of the 
role of ideas in domestic politics178. 
As already implied in the theoretical chapter, post-structuralists hold a rather 
schizophrenic view of the social world179. While they are engaged in a commendable 
effort to both uncover and undo, through science, the structures of power that reproduce 
themselves in discourses and identities, they also see these structures of power as thin 
layers upon which material reality is based. In this framework, analysis oscillates 
between focusing on apparently all-powerful and all-too-stable structures and an interest 
in sweeping changes based on the discursive agency of political entrepreneurs. As is 
sometimes the case with conspiracy theories, the mood swings between resignation in 
front of powerful discursive frameworks and a willingness to underpin and effect change 
by recording it per se. In practical terms, post-structuralist analyses of foreign policy 
oscillate between stability and change, and between agents and structures, without really 
ever standing firmly on the middle ground and without building bridges between the two 
extremes.  
My analysis here shows that this is an overtly pessimistic view of politics. In all three 
cases we looked extensively at how discursive structures (the normative anchors of the 
respective party systems) did not prove any more determinant than what partisan actors 
made them to be. In all three cases, active agency on behalf of self-conscious actors 
promoting preferences and ideas, and looking for political gains as dictated by the 
systemic parameters of party competition, in the end managed to crucially modify what 
only some time before seemed like overwhelming normative frames of competition180. 
The SPD managed to alter the emphasis on anti-Communism as the basis of competition 
in West Germany, Mulroney undid the pan-Canadian framework of party competition, 
and Simitis successfully molded the imperative of modernization in the polarizing 
strategy of PASOK. In all cases, the discursive reproduction of patterns of power over 
agents were effectively interrupted, which contradicts even more post-structuralists’ 
views if we take into account that for them discursive frameworks are little more than 
discourses, whereas here they have been conceptualized as complex structures including 
ideas, historical processes and institutions.  
At the same time, change was shown here to be a more complex and path-dependent 
process than what a simple substitution of rival dominant discourses would imply. In all 
cases partisan actors had to respect existing understandings and principles that governed 
party competition such as the relational positions of parties and patterns of opposition 
between them. The simple promotion of alternative discourses would not have been 
enough inside institutional spaces that codify not only terms of debate but also prior 
                                                
178 Checkel (1998) also differentiates between constructivism and post-structuralism (in his terminology 
‘post-modernism’).  
179 As a reminder from the theoretical chapter, I am referring here mostly to works falling within the 
tradition initiated by Campbell (1992). In foreign policy a good example is Hansen (2006).  
180 Here also see Blyth (2003: 698).  
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understandings of interests and relations between political identities. In all three cases, it 
is more accurate to speak of bounded agency that built on some prior features as much as 
it sought to change others.  
Indeed, partisan actors used the durable elements of the respective normative anchors 
and in redefining them turned the tables on their opponents. By embracing the pragmatic 
class-inclusive and interconfessional strategy of CDU/CSU, the SPD redefined the 
meaning of bipolar competition in West Germany. Mulroney convinced of the usefulness 
of the FTA by presenting it as a veritable project of national reconciliation, i.e. in using 
the unitary discourse of the Liberals even though his understanding of what this meant 
was the complete opposite than the Liberals’ pan-Canadianism. In Greece, PASOK’s turn 
towards modernization did not abandon the party’s embrace of a polarizing competition 
against ND as enemy of the progressive pole comprising of the Center and Left of Greek 
politics. Instead, the realization of parts of Simitis’ project became possible only when he 
showed that this was a viable renewal of PASOK’s winning formula. Once the 
contestation of foreign policy was complete, in all cases party systems had been infused 
with new elements, but the basic patterns and formats of competition remained the same. 
This duality between stability and change of the party systems is consistent with an 
understanding of a dynamic interaction between structures and agents, a far more 
complex process than a simple alteration of discourses over time. Put simply, continuity 
did not preclude change, but in fact contained already within it elements of change181! 
What becomes evident then from this discussion is that a middle-ground research 
strategy holds the promise of more interesting narratives than one wavering between the 
extreme poles of stability and change. Stability and change need to be understood as 
processes themselves, dynamic concepts that do not denote neat situations in specific 
points in time but roughly defined periods where stability or change simply prevail, 
without the one precluding the other. In this universe, the prospects for change are 
actually far bigger than what post-structuralists would think. As much as agents are 
constrained by existing discourses, they can also engage with them, identify cracks and 
inventively appropriate concepts and narratives in order to promote their own ideas and 
interests. Revolutionary change in this world is barely ever possible – but significant 
change is indeed feasible. This may be a less inspirational message than the one 
conveyed by post-structuralists, but it is far more hopeful than what a constant 
condemnation of all-powerful discourses constituting hopeless actors allows for182. 
The inclusion of constructivism in a theoretical analysis of the domestic politics of 
foreign policy presents another implication. Employing constructivism in the analysis of 
a specific empirical question necessitates accepting its philosophical and epistemological 
premises. Key among them are its ontological holism and idealism (Wendt 1999). Seeing 
the social world through the eyes of constructivism implies an acceptance of the unity of 
                                                
181 This is a variation of an argument also found in Buzan and Wæver (1997).  
182 Within constructivist literature, this emphasis on agency has been made e.g. by Checkel (1999).  
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politics across levels of activity (and analysis). This means that studying the effect of 
party politics on foreign policy through constructivist lenses requires an incorporation of 
the international dimension in questions of policy change. Constructivism in turn would 
see these levels of activity (domestic politics, policymaking, international system) 
connected through their common idealist nature (i.e. concepts and intersubjective 
understandings giving meaning to tangible, material things).  
In the three cases of foreign policy change I looked at, the international dimension 
played a prominent role, not only by providing the impetus for foreign policy change 
(détente, the failure of the international free trade regime, and the end of the Cold War in 
the Balkans), but also by constantly affecting the process of promotion of new foreign 
policy preferences. Indeed, international developments were framed according to 
domestic political projects, and ideas and norms attached to changing international 
systemic constellations served as discursive resources for the promotion of internally 
consistent ‘visions of domestic society’. I pinned down this interaction by looking at a 
very specific feature of party-based foreign policy contestation: the employment of the 
‘international argument’ by policy entrepreneurs. The SPD/FDP government presented 
Ostpolitik as a necessary response to the need for détente and peace in Europe; the 
Canadian Tories presented the FTA as an embrace of commercial regionalism when the 
multilateral trade regime had failed and Canada was faced with the prospect of losing 
foreign markets; and Simitis presented Helsinki as a solution to the question of 
reconciling Greece’s anchoring in the West with the territorial securing of the country in 
the Aegean in light of the new geopolitical environment in the Balkans. In all cases the 
proponents of change presented international shifts in terms that strengthened their 
domestic position (Cortell and Davis 2000: 77), however the objective existence of these 
changes was a necessary condition for the formulation of alternative foreign policy 
projects. 
This view of foreign policy contestation does not upset the analytical insights 
provided by the agency/structure problematique – if anything, it strengthens them. 
Including the international dimension in the analysis in the shape of feedback loops into 
domestic competition means that the structure that embeds and constitutes actors is even 
more complex. It includes not only systemic features of party competition, ideas and 
identities codified in this competition, and institutional features of domestic politics, but 
also ideas and material structures of the international system. Through political identities, 
the normative anchor of domestic party competition acquires an international dimension 
as well. For example: in West Germany the Cold War underpinned the bipolar 
competition between Adenauer’s CDU and the SPD; in Canada anti-Americanism 
supported Trudeau’s definition of party competition as a pan-Canadian affair; in Greece 
tensions with the West and Turkey cemented the anti-Right polarization and PASOK’s 
dominance.  
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This of course meant that policy entrepreneurs had to deal with even more 
complicated and overwhelming structures in their efforts to redo party politics – it also 
meant that these same structures offered more opportunities and more resources for 
agents to change things. In all cases, international systemic change became the catalyst 
for ongoing party system dynamics to rise to the level of new institutionalized features of 
party competition. Reformers in all cases (Brandt, Mulroney, Simitis) became enabled by 
international systemic change to promote coherent definitions of the stakes of party 
competition and the character of their states. In this way, party systems in West Germany, 
Canada and Greece came more in line with the international environment surrounding 
these states – and foreign policy projects that had seemed unthinkable just a few years 
before (recognizing the DDR regime, free trade with the US, allowing Turkey to become 
an EU candidate) were accepted as valid solutions to new challenges. 
The incorporation of the international dimension, and generally the engagement with 
metatheoretical debates in IR, can make important additions to discussions that until now 
focused on a simple inside-out view of foreign policy. I will treat this issue and its 
consequences for FPA in the following section. For IR itself though, it is a validation of 
an eclectic approach that combines methodological realism with a problem-driven theory-
building ontology. Again, the point is not to validate constructivism to the detriment of 
other approaches, but rather to show that there are different ways of understanding a 
specific problem, in this case the effect of domestic politics on foreign policy change. At 
the same time, this research strategy seeks to reflect back on schools of thought and 
theories, expanding their scope of applicability.  
For mainstream constructivism for example, it is quite a challenge to explain change 
(when the focus on identities and ideas privileges a stability-centered mindset) and also to 
be applied in a middle-range theory that is looking at domestic politics (as it is essentially 
a system-level theory, much like neorealism) (Checkel 1998: 338-342). Yet engaging 
with concepts in new ways also yields interesting results in terms of what these concepts 
can analyze. We already saw for example that our theoretical framework can readily help 
us understand change through the agent/structure debate. Now we can also see how 
constructivism’s logic can be replicated in domestic politics. In Kratochwil (1982) it was 
shown that there is a crucial difference between idiosyncratic preferences of each state 
and bona fide interests that are respected by the community of states. The difference 
between preferences and interests is that the first turn into the second only after their 
congruence with the general common principles of the system of states is demonstrated – 
and in turn, they can be legitimately promoted when this congruence is exploited. By the 
same token, political preferences on domestic and foreign policy have to abide by a 
certain logic that governs competition between political forces183; and, when it comes to 
                                                
183 ‘It is probably not enough to invoke an international norm as supporting a narrow domestic material 
interest. Instead, one must connect the particular interest with the nation’s more general beliefs and durable 
national priorities’ (Cortell and Davis 2000: 77).  
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foreign policy, the passage from domestic political preferences into new national interests 
is critically determined by the ability of the bearers of these preferences to portray their 
agreement with the values and norms that govern the function of the international system. 
Ostpolitik, the FTA and Helsinki were presented not as the creations of specific domestic 
political identities (even though they were very much so), but as pragmatic evolutions of 
the self-positioning of states in the world and a way to align them with rising ordering 
principles of the international system. 
 
b) Not just from the inside out: Implications for Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
I have avoided to position this dissertation exclusively vis-à-vis the FPA literature 
and instead opted for a more open IR framework. FPA has yet to escape the dictums of its 
behavioralist origins and a rather atheoretical view of foreign policies as outcomes of 
domestic interactions. A standard FPA account would then duplicate the existing 
problems in the literature of political parties and foreign policy, namely the view of 
parties as monistic actors carrying preferences and ideologies and directly effecting 
change in policy outcomes. If it took account of party systems, an FPA argument would 
probably only focus on a comparison of their mechanic effects (number of relevant 
parties, pattern of competition) on different national foreign policies (for example, how 
does a two-party system differ from a multi-party system in its foreign policy conduct). 
This dissertation only engages with FPA to the extent that it wants to complement and 
promote ongoing efforts to make this literature open to wider understandings of ontology 
and theoretical inquiry. While it has been formulated almost 20 years ago, Carlsnaes’ 
(1992) incorporation of sociological discussions in a theoretical analysis of FPA remains 
the most ambitious and interesting effort to broaden the agenda of the literature. I believe 
that some insights from the empirical research here are highly relevant for this effort as 
well.  
Carlsnaes inserts the agent/structure debate in the field of FPA. He sees foreign policy 
change as the result of a constant mutual constitution between political agents and their 
environment. Foreign policy change in a given point in time can be seen as the outcome 
of such a process, whereby actors and structure end up significantly altered. This process 
of ‘structuration’ can be traced in a reverse research trajectory, as a researcher must 
untangle the interactions between enabled and structured agents and embedding 
structures. Much like constructivism, Carlsnaes sees agents engaging both with domestic 
and international webs of ideas and institutions in their efforts to promote their 
preferences. Carlsnaes’ contribution is also among the first to call for thick narratives 
guided by a precise theoretical framework in structured and focused comparisons. 
This dissertation has responded in part to the research agenda put forward by 
Carlsnaes. One valid criticism to his research plan is that his agenda of untangling in 
reverse the process of structurarion is overly ambitious. Indeed, Carlsnaes does not 
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provide an answer as to how far back we need to go in order to reconstruct the 
agent/structure relationship. In my case studies, I answered the question ‘how far back?’ 
with ‘from when it all started’. All three cases provided a macro-historical account of the 
societal and systemic interactions that led to the specific equilibria of party systems at the 
time of foreign policy change. The important thing of course is to make historical 
accounts in a focused and strategic manner; in this case, we are mostly interested in the 
way party politics and foreign policy constituted each other throughout the years. It was 
shown that the German, Canadian and Greek party systems evolved in broad accordance 
with shifts in the international conditions of these countries, with specific foreign policy 
issues (security in a Cold War Europe, free trade with the USA, bilateral relations with 
Turkey) serving as transmission belts of international structural developments in 
domestic politics. At the same time, party system dynamics produced recalibrations of 
national foreign policies. In between the two, partisan actors were engaging with both 
domestic and international institutional spaces. 
Even more importantly, Carlsnaes’ research agenda implicitly accepts the need to 
incorporate the possibility of the international system reflecting back into the domestic 
arena after foreign policy change. All three cases of foreign policy change we looked at 
in detail can be seen as comprising multiple webs of interaction between agents and 
structures. On one level, a state as such can be seen as engaging with its international 
environment, with foreign policy change decisively shaping international or regional 
systemic constellations: while West Germany responded to détente, it was the finalization 
of Ostpolitik that gave détente a more final and specific direction. By the same token, 
Canada’s embrace of the FTA crucially affected the nature of North American 
regionalism and Greece’s decision in Helsinki altered the course of Euro-Turkish 
relations. On another level one can see political parties as actors engaging with domestic 
party systems and the international system as structures, responding to them but also 
altering them. On an even lower level, one can think of individuals as being the agents of 
interest, the party-based actors, leaders of factions and policymakers who become 
constituted by party competition and indirectly the international system itself. Foreign 
policy change can then be seen as successful attempts by these individuals to alter their 
surrounding environments, yet these environments themselves contributed mightily to the 
development of new foreign policy preferences to begin with. Ultimately, foreign policy 
change can be seen as a bona fide societal event, as individual agency becomes 
transmitted through intra-party politicking, party politics and foreign policy making all 
the way to new foreign policies and significantly altered patterns of international 
politics184.  
Having said that, FPA still presents some concerns that any research of the domestic 
politics of foreign policy is best advised to address. Very important here is the question of 
                                                
184 This also addresses a lacuna within constructivism, namely the ability of constructed agents to reflect 
back on structures (Checkel 1998: 335).  
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institutional arrangements within which domestic political processes are embedded. 
While a loose ideational ontology can account for these within a general argument about 
structures constituting actors, a ‘harder’ narrative of the specific effects of institutional 
arrangements (laws, rules of the game etc.) on processes of contestation is also required. 
This is not only an insight of FPA, which has traditionally been concerned with 
bureaucratic and institutional aspects of the foreign policy-making process, but can also 
be found in related literatures like transnational relations. There, recourse is usually made 
to the concept of ‘state-society relations’ that in turn was mostly developed within the 
field of International Political Economy185. State-society relations are usually used as a 
control or an independent variable when explaining foreign policy outcomes186. While I 
did not focus on state-society relations in this sense, crucial institutional features 
mediated between society, the party system and the state in all cases and were treated 
accordingly.  
The point of comparative analysis was to untangle specific processes of foreign 
policy contestation and change. In this sense, choosing varied cases (West Germany, 
Canada and Greece) did not only have the point of covering as many types of liberal 
parliamentary democracies as possible (European consensus, Westminster and South 
European types), but also of capturing as many variations of institutional settings as 
possible187. In this way, the theoretical framework of party-based foreign policy change 
was shown to function in a heavily constrained state with federalism and bicameralism 
(West Germany), in a semi-strong state with strong parliamentary government and 
assertive societal (provincial) counterweights (Canada), and in a country with strong 
politics vis-à-vis society and weak state vis-à-vis politics (Greece). These institutional 
features served as background conditions for the narratives, yet in crucial junctures 
institutional arrangements played important role in the outcomes of the cases. Even more 
significantly, hard institutional features did not just form structures within which agents 
acted, but, in broad agreement with our constructivist framework, these agents engaged 
with these institutional features and employed them in order to promote their goals. Since 
this dissertation is concerned with electoral politics, the most relevant institutional feature 
underpinning party systems is the electoral system and the way it facilitates the creation 
and victory of social coalitions. In all three cases this particular aspect of the institutional 
structure embedding political competition not only affected party politics, but also served 
as an important resource for the successful implementation of change.  
In West Germany the electoral system contained two important features: First, a 5% 
threshold for entry in the Parliament. Second, a complicated system of seat allocation that 
                                                
185 The key text of this kind in transnational relations literature is Risse-Kappen (1994). The focus of IPE 
on domestic political structures started mainly with Katzenstein (1985) and Gourevitch (1986).  
186 Domestic structure is also used as a comparative tool to check the opposite effect, that of international 
norms on domestic politics (Checkel 1997). See below for a discussion of points of reference for 
comparison.   
187 If I had to answer, I would say that this makes my research design fall within the ‘most different cases’ 
type; for a recent discussion, see Levy (2008: 10).  
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combined first-past-the-post single seats with proportional representation on federal state 
(Land) basis. Under this system, voters could vote strategically by voting for a party that 
was not sure of passing the 5% threshold in the proportional ballot while voting for the 
candidate in their single-seat constituency who represented the big party they felt closest 
to. In this way, voters could make sure that one of the two big parties they preferred the 
most (CDU or SPD) would win a seat while they also helped potential smaller partners 
enter the Bundestag. This system underpinned the anchoring of the FDP in the bourgeois 
camp, as throughout the 1950s and 1960s voters of this camp would strategically vote the 
CDU or the FDP depending on how strong they wanted the one or the other party to be in 
the coalitions they were forming together. Scheel’s decision to move the FDP to the left 
after 1966 contained precisely the danger that the party could miss many of the strategic 
votes of the broad anti-Socialist camp that allowed it to win 5% of second-preference 
votes.  
The electoral law played a decisive role in the creation of the SPD-FDP coalition in 
1969, as the FDP managed to enter parliament with a paper-thin margin while the 
nationalist NPD failed to do so by an equally small amount of votes. The 5% threshold 
made a coalition possible and a few hundred thousand votes made the difference between 
this and other more probable outcomes (a CDU/CSU government in a two-party 
Bundestag or a grand coalition if the NPD entered). In 1972, it was the SPD’s turn to reap 
the benefits of the electoral law that the CDU had enjoyed for two decades. With the FDP 
now firmly in the orbit of a progressive coalition against the CDU, it was time for FDP 
and SPD voters to take advantage of the electoral law: supporters of the government 
voted massively for SPD candidates in the single-seat districts, while many SPD 
supporters voted for the FDP in order to ensure its presence in the Bundestag. This vote 
splitting reflected the congruence of the two parties galvanized by the Ostpolitik: the SPD 
outvoted the CDU in the single seats by more than 6 to 4 (Conradt and Lambert 1974: 
66). While vote splitting had been observed in the past, its extent in the foreign policy 
elections of 1972 was unique at the time and has rarely been repeated since. Forming a 
big part of the reasons that gave the Social-Liberal coalition victory, the West German 
electoral system was an active institutional feature that throughout the 1960s both 
structured party strategies and formed a resource of these same strategies. 
In Canada the electoral system is simpler. It provides for simple single-seat 
constituencies (called ‘ridings’) where victory is assigned with the first-past-the-post 
method. While in other Westminster democracies this system has contributed to the 
establishment of convergent competition between parties, in a country with huge 
geographical disparities like Canada it has contributed to the exacerbation of these 
disparities through the development of fragmented geographical representation in the 
party system. The role of the electoral system as a mechanism of fragmentation of the 
Canadian polity had been recognized from early on (Cairns 1968). It meant that partisan 
actors would by necessity engage in a process of brokerage of regional interests in order 
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to build majorities rather than practicing pan-Canadian non-sectional politics. Ironically, 
even the self-described dean of pan-Canadianism, Pierre Trudeau, practiced politics that 
drove the regional wedges even deeper.  
The electoral system played on a small role in electoral landslides like the one that 
brought Brian Mulroney to power in 1984 other than inflating the extent of victory. Yet 
in conditions of polarization around the FTA issue in 1988 the electoral system assumed 
its role again as a crucial determinant of party strategies. For Mulroney, the decision to 
make the forthcoming election a referendum on the FTA made sense not only because the 
main political identities represented within the Conservative party held strong 
continentalist preferences, but more because these identities were strategically dispersed 
in a way that would allow the Tories to win a majority even while losing votes. While 
they lost support everywhere in relation to 1984, they retained their strength in epicenters 
of pro-free trade feelings (like Alberta) and even increased their appeal in Quebec. The 
electoral system exacerbated the Tory strategy of turning Canadian party competition into 
a competition between regionally based communities. Mulroney could also rely on the 
electoral system to help his cause in a more straightforward way, namely by making the 
Tories the only pro-FTA party, he could expect the anti-free trade vote to be split 
between the Liberals and the NDP, which in a majoritarian system would mean an almost 
certain victory if the Tories would retain their pole position. 
In Greece the electoral system reflected and strengthened the traits of the three-camp 
party system and the binary direction of competition. It was a system of proportional 
representation that ensured the representation of small parties that made it beyond a 3% 
threshold, but it was unbalanced in a way that it allowed the first party to form a majority 
in parliament (provided it scored at least above the mid-30s, which back then was a 
foregone conclusion for the two major parties of Greek politics). In this way the electoral 
system reinforced the bipolar competition between ND and PASOK as the overriding 
trait of the party system, since it assured whichever of the two parties came up first 
(virtually even by a single vote ahead of the other) a working parliamentary majority. For 
the modernizing leaderships of both parties in the late 1990s, the prospect of winning the 
election depended on their ability to maintain the broad social appeal of each party as a 
veritable pole of Greek politics. Especially for Simitis, it was essential to prove that 
absorbing the demand of economic and foreign policy modernization into PASOK’s 
message was congruent with the party’s traditional strategy of anti-ND polarization.  
In 1996 already, Simitis’ moving of PASOK towards the center meant that the party 
won simply by staying ahead of ND, despite losing votes to the Left. The Helsinki 
council presented both Simitis and Karamanlis with delicate challenges, as their 
respective strategies would meet significant opposition within their parties. Both 
PASOK’s Papandreist nationalists and ND’s liberals were certain to undermine the 
leaderships’ choices to support and oppose Helsinki respectively. Yet in the end the 
dynamics of polarization between the two parties assured that the leaderships’ foreign 
 
 
 240 
policy decisions became institutionalized as PASOK’s and ND’s official positions. As 
throughout Simitis’ first term neither party created conditions of dominance in opinion 
polls, the prospect of victory for each remained very real and, under the specific electoral 
system, this required expanding support to the detriment of the other – a goal enough to 
force internal dissenters into discipline. In the end, PASOK won by the slightest of 
margins in Greek political history (roughly 70000 votes) and this meant that Helsinki was 
institutionalized as part of Greek foreign policy identity.  
This discussion shows that many of the issues raised in FPA and transnational 
relations literature remain pertinent even for a research project that takes a view of the 
social world as made up of complex interrelations where ideas and identities matter. Ideas 
and identities are meaningful, but obviously they acquire strength when they assign 
meanings to consequential and tangible social structures. To theorize about the interplay 
of ideas or the contestation between preferences and identities as if these take place 
within an institutional void is highly perilous, if not plainly inaccurate. So much of 
domestic-politics analysis in foreign policy research is correct and domestic institutional 
settings (sometimes grouped under the moniker ‘state-society relations’) matter.  
The argument of this thesis does not negate this insight but has taken it very seriously. 
Yet again, I would say that I do take this argument one step further. It became obvious 
above that domestic institutional settings are neither intermediate variables between 
domestic preferences and foreign policy outcomes, nor even independent variables 
determining these outcomes. Rather, domestic institutional settings are themselves 
subjects and objects of the political agency of partisan actors – they determine as much as 
being employed and shaped by them in their effort to promote preferences and ideas. As 
the example of the effect of the electoral system in the three cases showed (the most 
pertinent institutional feature when talking about electoral politics), it was an essential 
part of the domestic normative structure that determined the direction and meaning of 
party competition; at the same time, it was an important resource in the hands of actors 
that sought to alter elements of this normative structure. As a general theoretical insight, 
we can say that looking at hard, tangible institutional features does not negate our 
ideational, holist and multidirectional ontology. Instead, it critically complements it and it 
is shown to be easily absorbed into the agency/structure mindset188.  
One final concern of FPA to be addressed is the question of the primacy of party 
politics as such, a question I touched upon briefly in the theoretical chapter. I claimed 
there that in democracies party systems form an institutional space through which 
preferences of bureaucracies or pressure groups and new policy ideas need to pass in 
order to find their way into policy. In the three main cases I considered, non-party actors 
were indeed important in various stages of the foreign policy change: In West Germany, 
                                                
188 For this reason as well, a simple comparison between party system types and their mechanics would not 
reveal the complexity of domestic politics and the interplay between party system structures and partisan 
actors. The point is to use domestic institutional arrangements as vivid elements of a process of change 
instead of just control and background factors as a standard comparative FPA research would.  
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the bureaucracy of the Foreign Ministry was known to be opposed to Brandt’s 
innovations and the leaks of documents at crucial moments of negotiation were attributed 
to disgruntled elements of this ministry (Clemens 1989). In Canada we already saw how 
the FTA debate captured the imagination of the country, leading to the creation of 
numerous pro- and anti-free trade associations and pressure groups. Before the FTA, 
important actors like trade unions or the finance sector held well-known positions and 
had obvious access to various political parties. In Greece the narrative of foreign policy 
Europeanization starts with the activities of academics around Simitis and with the work 
of civil society organizations promoting more contacts with Turkey (Heracleides 2007; 
Tsakonas 2010). However in all these cases foreign policy change only became possible 
once the dynamics of party competition allowed the matching of new foreign policy ideas 
with successful political projects that took account of the opportunities offered by the 
structure of party competition. Even in the case of severe bureaucratic resistance in West 
Germany, not much could be done against Ostpolitik after its impressive electoral 
approval in 1972. To sum up: Party politics seem to have analytical primacy as the space 
within which ideas and preferences stemming from other sources compete, and the pace 
and outcome of this competition is crucially determined by the systemic dynamics 
peculiar to the world of party politics.  
 
c) Foreign policy and party politics: Dimensions of competition and types of 
representation 
 
The argument of this dissertation on party politics concerned mainly two questions. 
The first question concerned the ability of party systems to have policy outcomes in 
foreign policy just like they do in other areas of public policy. This was shown to be the 
case, even though the argument here is more complicated than one that matches 
ideological identity with specific outcomes (e.g. leftist governments with expansion of 
the welfare state) (Schmidt 1996). I will return to the issue of the socioeconomic Left-
Right and foreign policy outcomes later. For the time being, suffice it to say that in my 
view party politics does affect foreign policy. The second question this dissertation 
sought to answer was the impact of foreign policy, and through it of international politics, 
on domestic party politics. This is a question first explored by Valen (1976) and recently 
taken up with renewed rigor in comparative research189. Here it was shown that the 
impact of the international system on domestic politics was pronounced, specifically in 
two stages: First, by strengthening existing party system dynamics (e.g. providing an 
opportunity for FDP’s turn to the Left in 1966-1969 or contributing to the convergence of 
Quebec and the West under the same party in 1984); and then by serving as a powerful 
                                                
189 The most ambitious work in this respect, and the most influential in this dissertation, is Kriesi et al 
(2006). More specialized recent work on international influence on domestic politics can be found, among 
others, in Golden (2004), Potrafke (2009) and Swank (2005). Gourevitch (1978) first took the question of 
international influence on domestic politics from the field of political economy into a broader literature.  
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argument in the process of foreign policy contestation, thus cementing party system 
dynamics into new durable systemic arrangements and new normative anchors of 
competition.  
But if the impact of foreign policy, and indirectly of the international system, on the 
main dimensions of competition is pronounced, a more counterintuitive question arises 
that is, nevertheless, still closely related with this finding. What if, through party-based 
contestation of foreign policy, changes in a state’s international systemic environment 
influence the passage from one model of popular representation in the party system (i.e. a 
party type) to another? The main argument of this thesis certainly did not seek to engage 
with this question. Yet empirical evidence from the three cases is intriguing in this 
respect, and it would be worth it to entertain the question. From the outset, I would say 
that evidence from West Germany, Canada and Greece vindicates the suspicion that 
foreign policy plays an important role in the development and passage into new party 
types and new ways of representation within a party system.  
Comparative party research since Duverger (1954) has been particularly concerned 
with the ways political party organization connects with and represents social interests. 
Without going too deep into a massive literature that would require a second dissertation, 
it suffices here to say that political parties have developed their organizational structure 
in accordance with the way and the extent they sought to represent specific social groups. 
Early parties were no more than parties of notables, representing the few politically active 
citizens when entry into politics was limited due to educational or other criteria. Soon 
parties of notables gave their place to mass parties that sought to integrate into political 
life strata mobilized by new cleavages (class and religion). The mass party laid emphasis 
on the constant mobilization, participation and ultimately representation of societal 
groups in politics and government. After World War II the party-society relationship 
began to change due to the desire of party cadres to emancipate themselves from constant 
societal control while in government. Thus arose the type of the catchall party, whose 
main mission was no longer the representation of the masses (even though it retained 
many of the reflexes and institutions of the mass party) but the electoral success of the 
party and its rationalized administration towards that goal – including the control of the 
party in office by a specialized party administration and the dominance of the party-in-
office over the party-on-the-ground. After the 1970s, in the Western world at least, a new 
type of party seems to have replaced the catchall party, namely the cartel party. The cartel 
party lays premium on its constant presence in government and its ability to attain 
resources through a symbiotic relationship with the state. Whereas the mass and, to a 
smaller extent, the catchall parties were expected to represent and promote mass demands 
towards the state, today mainstream parties have coalesced around a centrist cartel that 
stresses the inability of the state to implement differentiated policies and their 
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organizational structure is geared towards ex post facto legitimation of predetermined 
decisions190.  
What is important here is that this development of the organizational types reflected 
significant ongoing social changes, as well as that the advent of each new type signified 
the creation of different kinds of policy pressures on the state. In other words, policy and 
party type have always been closely interlinked; by extension, direction and content of 
policy competition in a party system, and party type, can also be thought of as intricately 
related. The passage into different party organization types creates new pressures for 
policy change – e.g. the rise of Labour parties significantly affected social legislation in 
Europe. But premade decisions also need different party types to be promoted towards 
society and to receive the stamp of popular legitimacy. Many of the compromises that 
characterized the creation of the European welfare state in the post-War era critically 
hinged on the consolidation of the catchall party and its ability to justify decisions with 
reference to electoral gains. In other words, these transitions receive impetus from below 
(social developments that create different demands of representation) and above (shifting 
of the normative point of reference of party competition and the need to support policy 
shifts with congruent patterns of party-society relationship) (Blyth and Katz 2005: 40-
43). In sum, it is not a reach to hypothesize that fundamental reorientations and 
redefinitions of the stakes of party competition as the ones witnessed in the cases here are 
accompanied by the development of new types of organization and societal 
representation. 
Quite intriguingly all three cases of foreign policy change and party system dynamics 
examined here correspond to significant shifts in the patterns and dominant types of 
societal representation through the respective party systems. In West Germany changes in 
the foreign policy positions of the three main parties deeply affected the direction and 
stretch of policy competition, and these changes were accompanied almost by necessity 
by the creation of new organization types. Already the decision of the SPD in Bad 
Godesberg to mitigate its radicalism (an acceptance of Westbindung being a key part of 
this programmatic change) also presupposed the organizational development of the party 
towards the catchall type that the CDU was already presenting in some respects. By the 
same token, the bruising defeat the Union parties suffered in the Ostpolitik debates and 
the 1972 elections required their adaptation to a new normative anchor of competition 
imposed by the victorious Brandt government. The new reformist leadership that 
consolidated its position after 1974 around Helmut Kohl recognized that this required an 
organizational rejuvenation of the party first and foremost in order to adapt to its new 
(actual and potential) audience and to legitimize its new policies (among them, slowly 
                                                
190 For an analysis of the development of party organization and the rise of the cartel party, see Katz and 
Mair (1995).  
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ascribing to Ostpolitik)191. Thus, the Ostpolitik debates did not only finalize the 
emergence of two Volksparteien around a convergent axis of competition but facilitated 
the consolidation of the catchall (and eventually the cartel) type in the German party 
system. 
In Greece the situation was similar: The consolidation of a convergent two-partyism 
that absorbed into the Left-Right axis the modernization-populism cleavage was crucially 
determined by PASOK’s and ND’s stance on the Helsinki issue and the outcome of the 
2000 elections. The policy convergence of the two parties was underpinned by their 
common course away from the mass mobilization function they had performed in the 
1980s and 1990s and towards the mutual convergence around the cartel party type. This 
change of organizational type was closely related to both parties moving away from 
ideological policy profiles and towards catchall strategies. After the mid-1990s, the 
modernizing leadership of PASOK sought to move it away from being a uniformly petit 
bourgeois and working class party as a way to promote the goal of Europeanization 
within the party. At the same time, the new leadership of ND self-consciously sought to 
absorb the discontent with the modernizing project and thus dilute the primarily middle 
class profile of the party. In both cases, policy reversals required the shedding away of 
the class-based mass representation function in favor of an election-geared organizational 
and ideological flexibility (Vernardakis 2011: 205-276).  
The situation was less clear cut in Canada, where the two national parties always 
balanced diverse regional and linguistic demands, their claims to ‘true national parties’ 
notwithstanding. The NDP was an exception in terms of organizational structure 
precisely because it saw itself as a mass party of organized labour that saw regional and 
community cleavages as parochial. The main organizational novelty brought about by the 
consolidation of a new normative anchor of competition following the FTA elections of 
1988 must be sought probably in the new patterns of representation promoted by the 
regionalist parties that arose out of the dismantlement of the Tory coalition. Both the 
West-based Reform party and the Bloc Quebecois introduced new features in Canadian 
politics, combining populist reliance on personalized leadership (Preston Manning for 
Reform, Lucien Bouchard for the Bloc), renewed emphasis on mass mobilization and 
reliance on new communication techniques with a catchall potential. In all, while both the 
old Conservative party and the Liberals had organizational structures that responded to 
the territorial fragmentation of the Canadian polity, the new parties of the early 1990s 
developed organizational patterns that decidedly broke with the brokerage or pan-
Canadian patterns of the old national parties. Here as well, the consolidation of a new 
normative anchor that eroded the pan-Canadian axis of competition led to developments 
                                                
191 For a linking of developments in Ostpolitik with organizational changes in CDU, see Clemens (1989: 
153-156). For a general discussion of CDU’s organizational history up until around that time, see Pridham 
(1977).  
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on the policy level (articulation of regionalist demands) that were accompanied by new 
models of mobilization and representation192.  
All three cases then offer some evidence as to the contribution of foreign policy to the 
emergence of new types of party organization and popular mobilization and 
representation. This seems to be less far-reaching than what could be assumed initially. 
Indeed, the link between the actual policy stretch within the party system and different 
dominant models of mobilization and party organization has been made before (Blyth and 
Katz 2005: 42-46, 53-55). Since in all cases examined here foreign policy contestation 
contributed to the passage to different stakes of party competition, it is normal to expect 
also the development of different organizational structures by parties that were looking to 
improve their positions within the party system. The question is whether we can construct 
a more general argument about the impact of international politics on the relationship 
between parties and societies much like we did about its impact on the actual context of 
policymaking and the normative anchor of party systems.  
First of all, the international context is very often acknowledged as very important for 
the development of new types of party organization. Blyth and Katz (2005) for example 
explicitly relate the emergence of the catchall party in the post-War years and the 
consolidation of the cartel party in post-Cold War era to prevailing conditions in 
international political economy. Political parties still had the ability to deliver to their 
mobilized supporters in the years when international arrangements allowed for Keynesian 
policies, whereas the advent of globalization both constrained governments and served as 
convenient pretext for parties to present neoliberal policies as ‘inescapable’ and focus on 
their perpetuation in power. To the extent that shifting international conditions constrain 
and reformulate the boundaries of potential policies, one can anticipate that new types of 
party organization will follow these shifts. The examples of West Germany and Greece 
actually also show that the impetus towards new types of party organization can be made 
due to developments in the political and security field, whereas the example of Canada is 
a snapshot of Blyth and Katz’s political-economy argument.  
This discussion then reveals yet another way the international system impacts 
domestic politics beyond the content and patterns of contestation of policy. From a 
macro-perspective, one could say that shifts of international structural patterns become 
absorbed by domestic politics not only in the shape of new normative anchors of party 
competition but also in the shape of new types of popular mobilization, party 
organization and policy legitimation. Much like the impact of international systemic 
shifts on the domestic patterns of policymaking takes place in two stages, as stated above, 
change in the type of popular representation through the party system also seems to be 
affected in two stages. First, international systemic shifts contribute to changes in the 
social bases of party systems, changing the policy preferences and (by extension) the 
                                                
192 Important insights about shifts in party organization and mobilization after 1993 are provided in Carty et 
al (2000).  
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expectations of representation by voters. In West Germany for example détente 
contributed throughout the 1960s to the slow erosion of the appeal of the anti-Communist 
strategy of CDU, to the increased attractiveness of a catchall strategy by the SPD and 
generally to an increased feeling of reformism by a society where both religious and class 
bonds were being loosened. In all cases international systemic shifts underpinned and 
strengthened preexisting social developments that were bound to alter the relationship 
between parties and society. In a second stage, international systemic shifts are taken up 
by actors on the top, i.e. partisan actors who seek to entrench new patterns of party 
competition according to their systemic needs. Here new patterns of party organization 
are developed deliberately in accordance with the policy shifts required. In Greece for 
example the policy changes required by the absorption of the demand of modernization 
by PASOK and ND also necessitated their transformation into catchall and, eventually, 
cartel parties.  
So the main argument of this dissertation seems to extend to the question of party 
organization as well and to vindicate the argument by Blyth and Katz concerning the 
congruence between dominant international systemic structures and party-society 
relations. In an abstract macro-view it has been acknowledged that, for example, the Cold 
War era was the time of the mass party turning into the catchall party, and that the post-
Cold War era saw the advent of the cartel party. The three cases presented here seem to 
make this argument more concrete, identifying party agency as the critical filter through 
which international developments and societal changes become absorbed into permanent 
systemic features. Foreign policy contestation becomes one of the filters through which 
international developments affect not only the normative point of reference of policy 
debates in a party system, but apparently the relationship between party system and 
society as well. At this stage, this argument can only serve as invitation to further 
research that escapes the scope of this dissertation.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE 
ARGUMENT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
a) Methodological implications: Foreign policy change as the basis of comparison 
 
This dissertation has undertaken a research that follows a counterintuitive logic of 
comparison, as I prefer to follow Welch (2005) and accept foreign policy change per se 
as the crucial criterion for the selection of cases. As I explained in the theoretical chapter, 
there are many sound epistemological and methodological reasons why to focus on cases 
of foreign policy change as laboratories of processes and interplaying factors. Foreign 
policy change itself becomes the anchor of comparison around which the construction of 
narratives can be built, the significance of necessary factors can be assessed etc. Yet this 
strategy carries important analytical repercussions: focusing on foreign policy change as 
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the anchor of comparison neutralizes the need to use other factors in this function, yet 
these factors are the ones that have precisely been predominant in comparative analyses 
of the impact of domestic politics on foreign policies193. One such factor for example has 
been the Right-Left continuum of party politics that supposedly offers a basis for cross-
nation comparison of foreign policy outputs. It has been primarily used in an effort to 
associate the ideological profile of parties with attitudes towards foreign policy issues or 
questions of international interest. As we saw in the theoretical chapter, Rathbun (2004) 
presents the most concise employment of this method. It is important to portray why 
making foreign policy the basis of comparison is a better strategy than relying on 
objective measures of domestic politics not only from a theoretical but also from an 
empirical viewpoint194.   
There are many good arguments for why comparative analysis of foreign policy 
should rely on the Right-Left analytical axis for the deciphering of patterns and 
regularities in foreign policy outputs. A recent argumentation in favor of the Right-Left 
cleavage as a uniform conceptual framework for understanding rival preferences across 
issues of world politics, is made by Noël and Thérien (2008). They provide a powerful 
literature overview in a host of issues of world politics, and demonstrate that the Right 
and Left span borders and world regions and provide a viable tool for mapping policy 
positions on foreign policy. This is an argument that runs in the same vein as that of 
Rathbun (even though, in my view, it provides a more refined conceptualization of what 
Right and Left mean) and it definitely demonstrates how, for specific purposes, a unique 
axis of domestic politics is a useful basis for comparison. Yet a closer look at the cases 
we examined in this dissertation shows that creating uniformly applicable axes of 
domestic politics for comparative purposes is a problematic proposition – regardless of 
whether one is looking at foreign policy change or just trying to interpret a foreign policy 
output. Let us examine briefly why, using specific examples.  
I will start with the only ‘economic’ case I studied, the Canadian FTA. Here the 
Right-Left scheme seems to absorb the question of trade liberalization quite well. Moving 
from Right to Left, support for the FTA decreases and opposition increases, as one would 
expect. The Conservatives on the Right initiated the policy, the Liberals opposed it after 
oscillation and the NDP on the Left was fundamentally against it. Yet as we saw 
Canadian politics was only to a certain extent structured along a socioeconomic Right-
Left axis – this interpretation thus only applies unproblematically to the self-styled 
ideological and non-regionalist NDP. But opposition between the Tories and the Liberals 
                                                
193 It is striking how neglected foreign policy change is even in IR literature, even in completely abstract 
discussions about theories. Fearon (1998) for example in his interesting discussion of the relationship 
between IR and foreign policy, differentiates between ‘domestic’ arguments that explain sub-optimal 
foreign policies and ‘domestic’ arguments that explain ‘differences in states’ foreign policies’ (i.e. 
differences between states) or particular foreign policy outcomes. A longitudinal dimension of difference of 
foreign policies of the same state is not explicitly considered.  
194 I already discussed the possibility of making party system mechanics the basis of comparison in a 
previous section.  
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(determining to a considerable extent the content of party competition in Canada) mostly 
revolved around the normative anchor of national unity, the accommodation of Quebec 
and the building of trans-regional coalitions. Of course Noël and Thérien would say that 
Right-Left absorbs other cleavages and issues as well, structuring them along a unique 
axis beyond distributional issues.  
This is the direction I have chosen to take here of course, but the question is really 
whether these nation-specific axes of competition (even if perceived in Right-Left terms) 
are comparable cross-nationally. Could one say that Right-Left in Canada signified not 
only a continuum starting from neoliberalism (Tories) to socialism (NDP), but also one 
ranging from region-based decentralisation (Tories) to pan-Canadian nationalism (NDP)? 
It does seem to be the case, even though to intellectually associate pan-Canadian 
nationalism with the Left and decentralism with the Right across time and context of the 
party system would stretch the argument too far 195. Regardless, for such a policy issue of 
profound redistributional consequences, the impact of the Right-Left divide is only 
discernible in a quite roundabout way and certainly not as direct as expected. Summing 
up, yes, one can collapse Canadian politics in one axis on a specific point in time; and 
yes, one can even use the Right-Left scheme to describe the points of this axis; but 
generalization on Right-Left grounds beyond the point that a Conservative government 
attached neoliberal economic arguments to a policy of many other repercussions, remains 
debatable.  
Moving to the security issues examined here, Noël and Thérien (and I would imagine 
Rathbun as well) could see in the Ostpolitik and Helsinki decisions and contestation 
patterns a typical Left-Right opposition between pacifist, pragmatic and inclusionary 
progressive foreign policies and nationalistic, authoritarian oppositions. Again, this can 
be a plausible heuristic for a superficial, case-by-case analysis, however it overlooks 
crucial caveats. First, it conveniently brushes aside the fact that just a few years prior to 
the foreign policy change Right-Left structured foreign policy options in a completely 
opposite way; both in West Germany and Greece it was the Left that was nationalistic 
and hawkish, while the Right was pragmatic and multilateralist. Second, the Right-Left 
                                                
195 A counter-argument might be given about the ability of the Right-Left to accommodate even non-
economic and non-ideological cleavages such as linguistic or religious ones. During the Cold War, for 
example, it was very common to associate different sides of ethno-religious conflicts with the Right or the 
Left. For example, one could associate the white minority of South Africa during apartheid with the Right 
and the ANC with the Left, just like in Lebanon it was common to talk of the Christian Right fighting the 
Palestinian Left. What is interesting here is that the accommodation of these conflicts in the Right-Left axis 
seems to owe a lot to the international structure of the Cold War. It was normal to associate allies of the 
Western bloc with the ‘Right’, even more so when their ethnic or religious opponents were molding their 
demands in a leftist rhetoric. Yet this is only a testament to the strength of the international system to go 
‘all the way down’ in domestic politics and align them; the confusion that ensued after the end of the Cold 
War shows that the Right-Left universalist frame of mind was a symptom of a particular era (nevertheless, 
see Noël and Thérien (2008:166-197) for an application of Right-Left to the post-Cold War era, even 
though their argumentation concerns mostly issues of redistributional global justice. How the Left-Right 
accommodates the explosion of sectarian, religious and ethnic politics since 1989 is largely left 
unanswered).  
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dimension is far from uniform in both cases. In West Germany, between 1966 and 1972 it 
was the centrist party, the FDP, that was far more advanced in progressive positions than 
both the Right (CDU) and the Left (SPD). In Greece, the parties to the Left of PASOK 
maintained a far more nationalistic position that after 2000 overcame even that of ND. In 
both policy issues Right-Left was not a straight line. Third, it is unclear whether attitudes 
commonly associated with the Right or the Left consistently aligned with the policy 
positions of the various parties. For example, the verdict is still out on whether the 
Ostpolitik was a progressive, leftist policy of rapprochement with the Eastern bloc on 
behalf of the SPD, or a pragmatic policy updating the party’s traditional Gesamtdeutsch 
nationalism. All in all, while Right and Left definitely formed salient points in the axes of 
competition of West German and Greek politics, they were charged with very specific 
connotations that allow cross-country generalizations only with a great deal of 
cautiousness.  
This all is not to say that Right-Left is useless. To the extent that it structures party 
competition in so many historical and local contexts, it is clearly a powerful heuristic for 
voters, politicians and researchers alike. What I doubt is the ease with which specific 
values are extrapolated to the field of various foreign policy issues. I think that Right-Left 
is very useful for within-case analysis, precisely because it forms a part of the party 
system constraints on partisan actors wanting to implement change. Both Brandt and 
Simitis had to frame their preferred policies with reference to their parties’ position on 
this axis – Ostpolitik was framed as a step of democratization of the Federal Republic and 
Helsinki was presented as a policy of redefined progressive values. It may not be a reach 
to suggest that in both cases ‘the Left’ seems to have served as an argument for pushing 
through nationalistic (Ostpolitik) or neoliberal (Helsinki) policies, rather than the 
opposite (leftism informing Brandt and Simitis’ conceptions of foreign policy).  
So, if Right-Left is so problematic, is cross-time and cross-country comparison of the 
domestic factors of foreign policy meaningless? Here I can answer only for the specific 
issue that concerns me, namely foreign policy change. It seems that the only safely 
generalizable conclusion is that domestic politics matter, and that prior patterns of 
ideological conflict in national settings condition support and opposition for policy 
initiatives. While the urge of IR and FPA scholars to draw conclusions about uniform 
patterns of world politics, foreign policies etc. according to universal analytical units 
(Right and Left for instance) is understandable, one should pause and appreciate the 
wealth of insights comparative party politics have made available for comparative work 
in international relations. Finding regularities, patterns and analogies not in mechanistic 
matches of values, ideologies and parties with presumed policy options understood in 
binary terms (e.g. peace or war, equality or liberty), but in processes, mechanisms and 
capabilities of political agency is, in my mind, no small feat. Broad-brush arguments like 
the ones of Noël and Thérien are very useful in putting research topics on the agenda – 
their holistic view of domestic and international politics is something this dissertation 
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most definitely embraces. On a macro-level, a Right-Left view of foreign policies may 
work just as well, but it is clearly insufficient for the purposes of more specific questions 
like the one of foreign policy change. In the end, making an ontological question, and not 
an elusive standard of generalization, the basis of comparative research is a step 
absolutely worth taking.  
 
b) Epistemological consequences: Constructivist international politics, positivistic party 
politics and their combination 
 
This dissertation walks a very fine line between two approaches of political science 
with fundamentally different (maybe even opposing) epistemological and historical 
foundations. On the one hand, I make use of tools and concepts developed within a post-
positivist framework of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis, looking at 
ideas, coconstitution of actors and structures, spanning levels of analysis and making 
modest theoretical claims. On the other hand, I fill the shell of the constructivist 
metatheoretical framework with the insights of a hard positivistic sub-discipline, that of 
comparative party politics and more specifically party systems theory; here, it is all about 
comparison, application of concepts on specific cases (deductive method), acceptance of 
the primacy of the systemic level on the constituent elements (political parties), and the 
detection of uniform patterns of interaction that hopefully provide insights across cases 
and throughout time. It is indeed a challenge to maintain a sane state of mind 
epistemologically when going back and forth between two traditions that seem 
completely at odds with each other. Indeed, it may be that the small interest from IR and 
FPA in political parties is also due to the fact that the recent ‘turns’ in both literatures 
towards more ideational, sociological and post-positivist traditions (Houghton 2007; 
Kubálková 2001) only match the epistemological assumptions of the party politics 
literature with difficulty.   
That said, I believe that there is one essential point of contact between these two 
literatures, one that allows the smooth incorporation of comparative party politics in what 
is basically an International Relations argument: the conceptualization of both the 
domestic and international environments of policymaking as systems as such. The 
systemic nature of both levels is very consequential for this argument, as was discussed 
in the theoretical chapter. Understanding domestic party politics as a system allows 
seeing party politics embedded within an institutional space that contains practices and 
arrangements, codifies terms and patterns of engagement, and reproduces structural 
constraints on the activities of politicians. Seeing the international environment (i.e. the 
source of foreign policy change and the ultimate recipient of new policies) as a system 
also allows for a more textured understanding of the space that embeds nation-level 
politics, namely one that includes material arrangements of power and the ideational 
directions of conflict that underpin it. While a constructivist view in IR and a party 
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systems theory view of domestic politics are divided by fundamental epistemological 
differences, they also bring to the table a very similar tendency to view the respective 
arenas in a more holistic way. Beyond this impressionist finding, however, the question 
remains: what is it in these literatures that makes the systemic view so similar in practical 
terms across levels of analysis? 
As discussed already in the first chapter of the thesis, the party systems literature is 
far less mechanistic and far more nuanced than what a crude structural argument would 
suggest. In fact, it makes very clear that the systemic attributes of a domestic party 
system (patterns and format) have an inescapable normative underpinning that is in a 
dynamics relationship with the systemic over-structure. In Sartori’s classic statement, the 
systemic features of a party system like the number of relevant parties directly affect the 
intensity of ideological conflict within the system. Despite his ardent positivism, Sartori 
leaves space for a more nuanced understanding of what conditions the ‘mechanics’ of 
every system, i.e. a normative and ideological base within which party competition and 
the arithmetic effects play themselves out. And for Mair (1997: 15) political parties have 
an interest in reproducing the existing dimension of competition in which they function 
through ‘the establishment of a language of politics in which one particular conflict is 
prioritized, and in which any potentially alternative alignment of forces is either absorbed 
or marginalized’196. While comparative analysis of party systems is clearly interested in 
deciphering patterns and regularities, it is acknowledged in the background that these 
patterns regulate the expression of conflicts and stakes of competition that are fairly 
unique from national setting to national setting. This is a more refined view of the 
concept of the ‘party system’, one that sees a discursive underpinning behind a very 
materialist structural argument197; I would argue though that this refined view is very 
consistent with a general conceptualization of domestic party politics as a system, 
precisely because the notion of a social system or institution entails a normative 
dimension that gives meaning and sustains the material arrangements that regulate 
interaction between its elements198. 
By the same token, I employ here a view of the international system that is very much 
analogous with the conceptualization of domestic party systems. Indeed, underpinning 
the material interactions of nation-states are ideational dimensions of conflict and 
competition that give rise to, give meaning to, and help sustain more or less stable 
                                                
196 Interestingly Mair also makes use of an argument put forth by Katzenstein (1985) to show how the 
structure of national electoral markets and the patterns of interaction among parties are also derivative of a 
country’s international position and size. The international system has an effect on electoral competition in 
that its demands and challenges may structure the dominant ‘language’ and define the range of electoral 
choices. 
197 See e.g. works by Capoccia (2002) on anti-system parties and by Minkenberg (2001) on the radical 
Right in Europe; both take a relational view of national party systems, acknowledging that extremity, anti-
systemness etc. are determined by national context and the direction/content of party competition from case 
to case. This also ties in with the discussion in the previous section about the universality of the Right-Left.  
198 See Scott (2003: 136) quoting Max Weber and Talcott Parsons among others. Also see Luhmann (1984: 
23). 
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patterns of interaction between players. While (neo)realism does offer a viable (and 
intuitively plausible) account of why states behave the way they do, it silences the fact 
that patterns of competition and cooperation in various arenas are supported by shared 
understandings of the stakes of this competition – much like party actors at home, state 
actors can only realize internationally their ‘interests’ against alleged foes and with the 
help of presumed allies when they have the same ideas with these foes and allies of what 
the ‘game’ is about. Also much like domestic party actors, state actors have the ability to 
energize or silence specific interpretations of what the game is all the while they remain 
within a commonly understood grand structure of rules and meaning of interaction – 
more often than not, these ideational dimensions of international conflict correspond 
closely to domestic ideological divisions that span borders199. 
To understand the ramifications of this view of the international system, let us return 
to examples derived from our three main case studies. In all three cases the underlying 
idea that structured international systemic interactions changed significantly. In the case 
of West German Ostpolitik, the bipolar competition of the Cold War was affected by the 
rise of the demand of détente and the redefinition of the nature of competition in Europe. 
In this changing context, competition between the two blocs was not about achieving 
some illusionary victory in the near future but about promoting conflicting demands 
within a rising new arrangement of stability in Europe. In this way, the overlying East-
West superpower competition remained dominant but was cut across by a new frame of 
competition pitting Euro-centric Gaullists against Atlanticists in the West, and stability-
minded Moscow against insecure East European regimes in the East. While structural 
imperatives of bipolar competition remained very relevant on all actors, there was no 
denying that a more textured and refined understanding of the stakes of competition had 
emerged after the mid-1960s.  
In the case of Canada and free trade, throughout the 1980s it had become obvious that 
a wider change in the arrangements of international trade, closely related to the retreat of 
the rigid Cold War framework, was underway. These changes made trade nationalism 
against the United States as well as trade multilateralism towards the rest of the world 
obsolete and counterproductive policies. Both were undermined by the rise of economic 
regionalism of a neoliberal bent that drew its strength as much from rising ideas of 
economic liberalization as from the loosening of intra-West ties throughout the 1980s in 
the face of receding threats from the Eastern bloc. The failure of the GATT regime was a 
stark proof of this rising tendency that cut across the existing multilateral arrangements of 
international trade. While trade liberalization remained the stake of state interaction in the 
trade sector, it was qualitatively altered due to the regional alternative. Again, while 
                                                
199 See for example the analysis of Wight about the ancient Hellenic system of states and the emphasis he 
lays on the democracy-oligarchy and hellenism-medism axes. The interaction of these two cleavages 
(cutting across borders and arenas of domestic politics) on different points in time affected the patterns of 
interaction among Hellenic city-states and Persia. At the same time though, these axes were still 
‘ideological struggles within a single community’ (Wight 1977: 105-106).  
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material imperatives on states (their ‘interests’) remained largely unaltered, the normative 
and, subsequently, the political environment within which these played out was 
undergoing significant change. Just as in Cold War Europe, the choice in Canada 
between a view of the world of international trade as one of competing regions and one of 
multilateralism was driven by political projects with domestic aims. 
In our last case, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations were severely recast after the end of 
the Cold War and the ensuing upheaval in the Balkans. While Greek-Turkish competition 
in the Aegean was to a large degree a controlled affair underneath the overwhelming 
Cold War framework and the influence of NATO, the end of the Cold War ushered in a 
period of flux whereby the actual underlying principles of state competition took 
significant amount of time to be crystalized. This was the time when culturalist readings 
of international affairs, looking at religions and civilizations as the new fault lines of 
world politics, competed with more sanguine views about the expansion of liberal norms 
of domestic governance and the creation of lasting ties of regional cooperation. Again, 
the international system did not prescribe much more on its own than a crude 
understanding of interests and security; a more nuanced reading was required by 
domestic actors to make sense of the new realities. This reading was not value-free; it 
was a highly political process whereby agents would seek to promote redefinitions of the 
stakes of international interaction that corresponded to their values and long-term 
interests.  
The above shows that a systemic view allows for a uniform, coherent viewing of 
international and domestic politics as institutional spaces reproducing patterns of 
interaction and supported by commonly shared understandings of the stakes of 
competition. Both the domestic party system and the international system embed actors 
within specific understandings of the meaning and stakes of politics, and these actors 
have the ability to inventively link international with domestic structures and alter them 
accordingly. The cross-level unity of politics is expressed in the common systemic nature 
of domestic and international politics, and more specifically a view of systemic 
interactions as supported by commonly accepted terms of engagement and stakes of 
competition that can nevertheless also be up for redefinition. In sum, the intersubjective 
nature of the framework within which political actors engage is the main ontological 
similarity between domestic and international politics200. 
Such a holistic view of the two layers of systemic activity also allows us to 
conceptualize cases of foreign policy change as cases of systemic interaction, whereby 
each systemic level affects the other through the mediation of political agency. From a 
                                                
200 On the inter-subjective nature of party politics see Budge (1994). Building on Schelling, he claims that 
competition between parties needs a cognitive anchor that will allow them to interpret the dynamics of 
competition and will usually lead to an equilibrium that will allow the systemic relations to reproduce 
themselves even in conditions of constant competition. A common understanding of each party’s 
ideological boundaries denotes shared understandings about their strategy in coalition formation, just like 
in electoral competition. 
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macro-perspective, one can see foreign policy change in all cases as the process through 
which domestic party systems became ‘harmonized’ with the new stakes of international 
politics. This is the concept of domestic-international equilibrium discussed in the 
theoretical chapter of this thesis. Through the Ostpolitik, the West German party system 
passed from a structure of competition reproducing in domestic politics the ‘hot’ Cold 
War to one reflecting the more nuanced understanding of cooperation and adversity in 
Europe. Through the FTA debate, the Canadian party system passed from a pan-Canadian 
axis of competition to one representing a balance between regional communities that felt 
more empowered within a continentalist framework. Through the Helsinki debate, the 
Greek party system passed from a monolithic competition between Right and Left to a 
competition that structured within the Right-Left spectrum a new cultural axis of 
competition between libertarian modernization and nationalistic populism that to a large 
extent was expressive of competing readings of the post-Cold War environment (liberal 
v.s. culturalist). In all cases the underlying logic of the international system seemed to 
reach into domestic politics, and changes of this logic reverberated deep into the 
normative framework of party competition as well.  
  
OPEN SYSTEMS THEORY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
 
The discussion about the systemic nature of domestic and international politics raises 
the question of whether the main empirical and theoretical arguments of this thesis can be 
systematized on a higher level of abstraction. Here I will try to assess how the 
conclusions of the comparison can be interpreted by general systems theory and how our 
empirical findings can contribute to abstract theoretical conceptualizations of 
organizations and systems. I will particularly focus on insights from open systems theory, 
a branch of organizations literature taking inspiration from, and finding application in, 
management, biology and economics (among other disciplines). Generally, open systems 
theory sees systems (organizations or institutions) as open to their environment and their 
workings as significantly influenced from outside. As a general concern then, open 
systems theory seems to fit the problem presented in this thesis quite well. Moving on to 
some of the more specific insights of various approaches within open systems theory, we 
can say that an open systems view cues the following basic assumptions: 
a) The basic distinction is between systems/organizations and their environments. 
However this does not dictate a rigid separation between the whole and its parts, whereby 
only one of the parts is seen as a system. Instead, the environment can be seen as a 
system in its own right, and the systems we are looking at as subsystems of the wider 
whole, as well as containing subsystems themselves (Luhmann 1984: 5-7; Scott 2003: 
90-91). An open systems view is very much congruent with a view of systems as being 
hierarchical, building up from the simple systems contained in other systems to complex 
and self-perpetuating systems encompassing others (Scott 2003: 83-85). 
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b) Very consequential for analysis is the choice of where to draw the boundaries 
between systems and environments. Sometimes this is not obvious, and what one 
designates as the system (i.e. the point of reference for research) and the environment 
determines the way system-environment relations will play themselves out in the analysis 
(Luhmann 1984: 17, 29-30). 
c) The very notion of boundary (and not border) between system and environment is 
also very important. A boundary designates a more or less porous area between the 
system and the environment, an area of interchange and contact as much as one of 
partition and delimitation (Luhmann 1984: 28-29; Scott 2003: 89). Boundaries exist also 
between systems and subsystems, thus reproducing within and across systems endless 
system-environment constellations (Luhmann 1984: 18, 181-182). 
d) The key characteristic of open systems is their constant interaction with their 
environments – which themselves can be conceived of as systems or sums of other 
systems (Luhmann 1984: 30). The logic of open systems theory is precisely that systems 
evolve or change through their interaction with their environments. Either in the shape of 
information or in the shape of resources, the environment decisively affects the inner 
workings of a system (Luhmann 1984: 37-41, 184; Scott 2003: 133). The role of 
environment is important in processes of change as well as perseverance of the system. In 
fact, survival and change are closely related aspects of a system’s function; in most cases, 
a system’s survival goes through adaptation, and adaptation means change. Change and 
stability are thereby closely connected, and in both cases the role of the environment is 
very important (Luhmann 1984: 50-52, 192). As a source of additional complexity, 
contingency and fluidity, the environment is decisive in the processes of change and 
survival of a system; without the environment, a system would not be able to diversify 
and reproduce its main functions, nor to adapt to changing conditions (Scott 2003: 100-
101) – achieving in Luhmann’s terms ‘dynamic stability’ (Luhmann 1984: 49). 
e) Looking at system/environment constellations, one should not look for the outputs 
of a system but rather try to evaluate the general outcomes that arise as the ‘the joint 
product of organizational performance and environment response’ (Scott 2003: 144; also 
Luhmann 1984: 202). Systems and environments are in constant processes of interaction, 
whereby outputs of systems can affect the environment as much as the environment 
impacts the system (Luhmann 1984: 177; Scott 2003: 141-143). In Scott’s words (2003: 
149): ‘Organizations are viewed as interdependent with environments in a number of 
senses. Participants’ perceptions of their environments together with the attention 
structures of organizations result in enacted environments that are products of both 
environmental features and organizational information systems. Environments directly 
affect organizational outcomes, which in turn affect subsequent perceptions and 
decisions. Environments influence organizations, but organizations also modify and 
select their environments. And environments supply the materials and ingredients of 
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which organizations are composed’. With this, open systems theory comes very close to 
sociological work on structuration and the agent/structure debate (Scott 2003: 100).  
From the above it becomes obvious that the argument of this thesis can persuasively 
be put in terms of open systems theory. As will become evident down the line, many of 
the insights of open systems theory crucially complement the findings of the comparative 
research. I will now present how the findings of this dissertation fit in this very 
preliminary outline of open systems theory.  
As discussed above, this thesis takes a systemic view of domestic party politics and 
the international environment. The international system can be seen as being made up of 
many different subsystems – usually these take on the shape of regional constellations of 
international politics (e.g. Europe, Southeast Asia etc.) but here I propose that we see 
national party systems as subsystems of the international system. To the national party 
systems we looked at (West Germany, Canada and Greece), the international system 
serves as the environment. Moving further down, we could have taken the view of 
political parties as subsystems themselves but this would have added unneeded 
complexity to the argument. Instead, political parties and partisan actors are seen as 
simple elements of the lowest degree within the first-order system, the party system. The 
elements are expected to adapt to, and engage with, the logic of patterned interactions 
within the system, but they are also the ones that act on behalf of the system towards the 
environment and other systems. Indeed, the West German or Canadian party system does 
not act on its own as such; it is the parties and actors within it that do. This serves, if 
anything, as an important reminder against personification and reification of 
organizations. As was emphasized time and again, the party system’s adaptation and 
change takes place through the agency of partisan actors and is contingent upon their 
abilities and willingness to promote change201.  
The open systems emphasis on boundaries is very important and also fits in easily 
with a view of international politics influenced by constructivism202. When it comes to 
the relationship between party systems, and between party systems and their international 
environment, the concept of the boundary is self-evidently important. As Caramani 
(2004) shows with his exhaustive historical research, the shape and character of each 
distinct party system in Europe was shaped early on, during the period of nation-state 
formation. Wars, state creation or expansion crucially determined the shape of a polity, 
the cleavages expressed within it and the relative strength of different social or ethnic 
groups. In other words, where the boundary was drawn between nation-states (party 
systems), and between party systems and the international environment, weighed heavily 
                                                
201 ‘The actions of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of 
international relations’ (Waltz 1959: 122; emphasis added). Also see Cortell and Davis (2000: 78) who 
speak of historical contingency and the role of human agency in how international norms become absorbed 
in domestic politics.  
202 For an early treatment of the concept of the boundary in IR, see Kratochwil (1986).  
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on ensuing developments203. Thinking of our three cases, the historically contingent 
limits of the specific polities affected the relative strength of societal forces and policy 
outcomes at critical junctures. For West Germany, it was the fact that a state was formed 
where German Catholics for the first time since 1871 enjoyed such a degree of influence. 
For Canada, it was the relative weight of the Francophone community and the East-West 
direction of Canadian nationalism within the North American continent that antagonized 
the West. For Greece, it was first in 1912-1919 geographical expansion, and then in 1922 
the coming of the refugees, that crucially affected the nature and character of politics 
there. In all of these cases, the new boundaries signaled at the same time lines of closure, 
delineating new polities and creating practical limits within which ‘domestic’ politics 
would take place, as well as points of opening, signifying the place of these polities in 
regional and global systemic settings that would heavily influence domestic politics down 
the way.  
The interaction and mutual constitution of international and domestic systems has 
been a staple of this dissertation, as has the emphasis on change, both international 
systemic and domestic. What an open systems view adds to the preceding discussion 
however is the view of systemic change as a mechanism of adaptation and survival. This 
expands our understanding of the process of party system change significantly, as it alerts 
us to the fact that small changes in the character of party competition may actually serve 
to entrench and perpetuate the party system in its main structural characteristics. In his 
discussion of party system change Mair (1997: 14, 87-90, 211-214) already alluded to the 
converging strategies of political parties in a system with a view at preserving its main 
features, i.e. the number of relevant parties and the established patterned relations 
between them. In the theoretical chapter I made reference to the concept of party system 
change as explained by Mair and also left the possibility open that accepting less than 
wholesale party system change may be a rewarding strategy for established parties in 
order to absorb pressures and update the existing constellations of the party system. What 
open systems theory does now is complement this view by insisting on the role of the 
environment as source of strategies that seek to combine change with stability.  
In West Germany, Ostpolitik served to update the binary competition between CDU 
and SPD that had functioned as the basis of the party system since 1949. While the 
opposition over foreign policy was essentially a conflict between two different readings 
                                                
203 Caramani’s argument is that the process of delimitation of the spaces of national party competition 
heavily determined the more or less uniform development of party competition across Western Europe 
towards the socioeconomic Right-Left axis, as well as that it explains residual differences due to linguistic, 
ethnic and other cultural cleavages in specific cases. This process ‘took place before the social, political, 
and technological changes that previous literature has identified as the main causes of the process of 
nationalization: universal suffrage, PR [proportional representation], mass political communication, and 
nationwide issues that emerged from the two world wars and the Cold War[.]’ (Caramani 2004: 290). With 
the exception of the last factor, Caramani’s argument can be seen as an open-systems juxtaposition to 
largely closed-system explanations about the rise of modern politics in Western Europe. See especially 
chapter 7 of his book. 
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of the stakes of party competition, the passage into the new interpretation of these stakes 
(supported by SPD and FDP) and its eventual acceptance by CDU meant that the key 
structural characteristic of party competition was to continue in the 1970s. Indeed, while 
the developments in the West German party system during the Ostpolitik crisis were no 
doubt monumental (the FDP moving into a coalition with the SPD, the collapse of CDU’s 
normative dominance of party competition etc.), it is worth considering that these 
changes were as much an adaptation of the existing party system to ongoing international 
and domestic changes (Cold War détente and diminishing importance of traditional 
cleavages). How stable would the West German party system have been in the 1970s if 
the rigid bourgeois-socialist reading of binary competition of the Adenauer era had 
survived? Already cracks had begun to appear in the 1960s with the rise of the nationalist 
NPD and of the extreme Left. Throughout this time – essentially the era of the Grand 
Coalition – the West German party system seemed unable to absorb increasing strains 
caused by the rise of new social demands and the uncertain position of the country in the 
international field.  
While the Ostpolitik feud of 1969-1972 clearly reflected adversarial strategies of 
actors wishing to overtake their competitors, it can also be seen as a convergent strategy 
to the extent that it unleashed a discussion about German nationalism and Germany’s 
position in Europe, as well as the ‘extent of democracy’ in the Federal Republic, within 
the secure confines of CDU-SPD competition. Despite the high drama leading up to the 
1972 elections, it was precisely these elections that signified the final consolidation of the 
three main parties against their anti-system competitors (whose vote share collapsed 
between 1969 and 1972 and remained miniscule up until the early 1980s). From a party 
system perspective, the SPD-FDP victory if anything cemented the binary nature of party 
competition, also at a time when elements of the CDU were hoping for a return to the 
predominant-party system days of the past.  
Also in Canada, foreign policy served a preservation function as much as a change 
function. With the Tories leading a disappointing government and the Liberals helpless 
under the leadership of John Turner, both major Canadian parties were feeling the 
pressure of the NDP. Yet the FTA changed all of this. As much as it was a brilliant coup 
on behalf of Prime Minister Mulroney to redefine the meaning of party competition in 
Canada, and for this it was met with Turner’s unequivocal opposition, both leaders saw in 
foreign policy a very helpful tactical weapon in times of hardship. For Mulroney it served 
to galvanize the two pillars of support to the Conservative party (Quebec and the West) 
around an image of a decentralized Canada despite their differences on the specific 
content of this image. For Turner on the other hand it allowed the reenergizing of the 
traditional Liberal self-image as the defender of Canadian values and a strong national 
identity. Both saw in the FTA an opportunity to isolate the NDP, something that promptly 
occurred once the media became caught in the apocalyptic and personal face-offs 
between Mulroney and Turner. It is the main argument of the exciting book of Johnston 
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et al (1992) that the free-trade character of the 1988 elections came about not only 
because of adversarial strategies of opponents, but also because of convergent strategies 
of parties sharing a common interest in binary politics in Canada.  
While the FTA ended up changing the normative underpinning of party competition 
in Canada, it actually contributed to entrenching the bipolar competition between Tories 
and Liberals at a time when party system stability seemed very precarious. Of course, as 
we saw, the FTA contributed in significant ways to the breakdown of the party system in 
the early 1990s, transposing the demands of continentalist regionalism within Canadian 
politics. Yet even this breakdown can be seen as an evolution of the updated two-
partyism that was safeguarded with the free trade election of 1988 around the question of 
national unity – Reform and Bloc Quebecois were direct descendants of the new 
Conservative party after all, and one of the victims of the 1993 elections was the NDP, 
whose ambition to supplant regional cleavages with pan-Canadian ideological issues was 
dealt the decisive blow not in 1993 but in 1988. Despite different structural expressions 
of this centralist-regionalist divide (from a two-party system in 1988 to fragmentation in 
1993), it still updated the traditional bipolarity of Canadian politics around the question 
of national unity204.  
The same dialectic between change and adaptation/preservation seems to have been at 
play in Greece as well. With a new modernization-populism cleavage (partly arising due 
to foreign policy issues like the Macedonian question) cutting across the Greek version of 
the Left-Right axis of competition, both major parties found themselves in a problematic 
position, their uniform class-based profiles no longer corresponding to ongoing changes 
among the electorate. PASOK’s embrace of modernization in 1996-1999 created 
pressures from the Left, thus putting its ability to dominate an anti-Right pole of Greek 
politics in danger. ND on the other hand saw PASOK enter its hitherto reliable bourgeois 
milieu and undermine its profile as the party of European orientation and economic 
reform. Under processes of partial dealignment of Greek citizens from the party system, 
the two big parties were as much concerned with outdoing each other as they were with 
preserving their joint dominance of the party system. At the moment when the two-party 
system seemed the most fragile in almost 20 years, foreign policy significantly helped 
both parties reposition themselves along a new axis of competition, reconciling their old 
strategic positions with new definitions of their policy profiles.  
The ability of PASOK to deliver on the demand of Europeanization, evidenced in the 
course towards EMU and starkly symbolized in the Helsinki decisions, allowed the party 
to redefine its anti-Right polarization strategy by absorbing the question of 
                                                
204 Mair (1997: 218-219) also sees the Canadian party system after 1993 as containing an essential 
structural continuity to the extent that one of the two governing parties (the Liberals) remained strong and 
the regional parties remained in opposition. For him there was more an unfulfilled potential of party system 
change than change per se. While I have argued that important changes in the direction and content of 
competition occurred in the Canadian party system in 1988-1993, it is true that there was no complete party 
system change in Canada. Of course both views can be reconciled within the open systems argument about 
congruence between selective change and adaptation/survival of systems.  
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socioeconomic modernization. ND’s opposition to Helsinki signaled the party’s 
willingness to repackage its pro-European reformism within a more populist profile. Both 
moves resulted in PASOK and ND losing their class purity and turning into pure vote-
driven catchall parties. Yet at the same time, they also redefined their competition and 
faced off challenges by the Left or even voter apathy. In the 2000 elections the two 
parties polled together their biggest percentage of votes, also winning the greatest 
absolute number of votes between them ever. The foreign policy question of balancing 
national interests with Europeanization gave rise to a fundamentally different, but 
significantly rejuvenated, two-party system in Greece. 
In sum, an open systems view of party system dynamics brings us, in an interesting 
turn of events, back to some of the main concerns of the party systems literature. More 
specifically, it forces us to see the significant changes party systems underwent in all 
three cases as cases of adaptation and preservation of systems. From an open systems 
perspective, the role of the environment in providing resources and opportunities to 
system actors was crucial in their ability to maintain the overarching systemic features of 
party competition. As stated previously, in all three cases party systems were essentially 
‘streamlined’ with new international systemic features and it becomes obvious here that 
this streamlining involved as much change as it did continuity. In many ways, these well-
documented cases of change (which were seen as such at the time) served to entrench 
existing party system formats and patterns even more. Plus ça change… 
The open systems view is very much consistent with the sociological view of the 
agent/structure debate we focused on before. What is particularly interesting here is open 
system theory’s concept of ‘outcomes’ that is juxtaposed to system ‘outputs’. Outcomes 
designate precisely the fact that system outputs only acquire meaning when they meet 
and interact with the activities of the environment – in a sense, outputs of systems 
themselves. In this sense, outcomes of system-environment interaction capture and codify 
significant changes brought about both on the system and the environment through their 
mutual influence. As discussed above, the real empirical significance of the foreign 
policy changes we are looking at is how they impact the environment of the states and 
how they bring about changes in the international system – international politics can be 
seen as the outcome of interaction between different foreign policies after all.  
In the open systems view then the foreign policy changes we studied are best seen as 
parts of holistic outcomes that unite system and environment-level developments. As we 
have already seen, Ostpolitik contributed decisively to the stabilization of détente in 
Europe; the Canadian 1988 election paved the way for the creation of regional integration 
institutions in North America; and the narrow victory of PASOK in 2000 essentially 
ratified Helsinki and put EU-Turkey relations on a completely new footing through the 
candidate membership process. In all these cases the actual outcomes extended beyond 
national foreign policies and included new arrangements of regional constellations of 
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power and new norms of international systemic interaction – to go along with new 
arrangements in the ordering principles of the relevant subsystems (the party systems).  
Regardless of the various theoretical repercussions of open systems theory, seeing 
foreign policy change through this lens adds credibility to the sociological direction taken 
in this dissertation and opens up a new agenda in the future for both IR and comparativist 
scholars to theorize about domestic politics. It shows how a closed-system view of party 
systems is both empirically problematic and analytically limiting. While in recent years a 
wave of research has focused on the impact of various international processes 
(Europeanization, globalization etc.) on domestic party politics, a macro-historical 
perspective that sees party systems as crucially determined by historical processes and the 
shape of their boundaries with the outside world is lacking. The open systems perspective 
offers the conceptual tools to take the systemic perspective of party politics one step 
further, towards the study of the mutual construction of domestic and international 
politics. The study of foreign policy change as an instance of visible interaction of the 
two is a good place to start with this research but other avenues may be explored as well. 
I will close this section by juxtaposing an open-systems perspective of party system 
change with two of the most famous and parsimonious abstract models of party system 
change: the economistic Right-Left model of Anthony Downs and the crosscutting axes 
of competition model of James Sundquist.  
Downs’ abstract model of party competition relies on economic premises such as the 
rationality of office-seeking parties and the material concerns of interest-driven voters. 
Yet Downs’ model is more refined than that since it acknowledges as the most important 
determinant of party strategies and party systems outcomes ‘the distribution of voters 
along the political [Right-Left] scale’. Changes in this distribution are ‘among the most 
important political events possible’ and parties do not only adjust to this distribution but 
also try to alter it by luring voters towards their own positioning on the scale (Downs 
1957: 139-140). In other words Downs rightfully sees party and voter rationality playing 
out not in a neutral void but in an all-important context. This context determines whether 
such changes as the rise of new parties will take place. For simplicity’s sake Downs 
assumes that partisan actors will engage with the political background of the party system 
directly, i.e. he leaves little space open for structure-on-agent contingency. But while this 
omission is understandable since it would dilute the basic insight of the model, what is 
striking is how much more the model can be enriched if one sees the abstract political 
system of Downs as an open system.  
As we saw in our analysis, the international environment can profoundly affect the 
two main mechanisms of domestic political change identified by Downs. First, change in 
the distribution of voters along the main political/ideological scale can take place in other 
ways than the enfranchisement of new voters (the only exogenous mechanism mentioned 
by Downs). As we saw, Mair (using the Katzenstein argument), as well as scholarly 
works on national political identities, have talked about the international reference of the 
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ideological context of domestic politics. A change of voter distribution may very well 
reflect profound changes in the state’s position in the world from a security, economic 
etc. perspective. Second, change may be effected by political parties seeking to alter the 
normative environment, within which they function. Again, partisan actors can do this 
through new foreign policy positions mobilizing different political identity elements that 
have international referents. As research here has shown, both of Down’s potential 
mechanisms of systemic change have an ‘environmental’ dimension. An open-systems 
view of party competition significantly enriches Downs’ model. 
Sundquist on the other hand is more concerned with party system change, and more 
specifically realignment, which he defines as ‘a durable change in patterns of political 
behavior’. Realignment has less to do with volatility of electoral results than with the 
‘basic party attachments of the voting citizens […] It is the pattern of those 
predispositions, of party identification within the electorate, that defines the alignment of 
the party system’ (Sundquist 1973: 5-6). Sundquist uses the term ‘organic change’ to 
define the kind of developments he is interested in. In the abstract models he constructs, 
different potential outcomes are derived according to the way party leaderships absorbs 
the rise of new issues that cut across the axis that had structured their competition until 
that point. Whichever the structural outcome, a new party system arises with ‘a new 
rationale, and a segment of the electorate has formed, or is in the process of forming, new 
party attachments on the basis of that rationale’ (ibid: 28).  
Sundquist’s model has a lot in common with the theoretical perspective of this 
dissertation. First is his ‘softer’ understanding of party systemic change that includes the 
change of the ‘rationale’ of the party system – what I have dubbed the ‘normative anchor’ 
– even below a lasting systemic structure (his empirical interest is obviously with the 
realignments below the stable US two-party system). A second point of agreement is the 
acceptance that party systems are the outcomes of historical processes and that a 
normative anchor at a point in time absorbs older and newer cleavages – a ‘collage of 
successive overlays’ (ibid: 10). Finally, his acceptance of historical contingency and 
rejection of historical cyclical arguments (ibid: 36) fit very well with the emphasis this 
dissertation has laid on contingency. However, I believe that this model also stands to 
gain from an open-systems view. Most striking is the nature of the cleavages Sundquist 
sees as holding the potential to upset existing arrangements: ‘Realignments occur when 
the crosscutting issue is intrinsically moral – like slavery – or when an issue that may be 
basically nonmoral becomes infused with moral overtones’ (ibid: 30). Also given the 
emphasis Sundquist places on the cross-pressures applied on voters due to multiple 
issues, one can see that foreign policy is an issue that, under his model, should hold huge 
potential to bring about realignment. Not only is it very often infused with moralistic 
tones, but foreign policy also holds the potential to absorb and systematize different 
issues and cleavages within overarching stakes of competition about the near-totality of a 
state’s orientation – what I called here ‘visions of domestic society’. An open-systems 
 
 
 263 
view of Sundquist’s realigned polity would accept foreign policy’s role as the 
transmission belt of environmental pressures on the normative anchor of party 
competition and their contribution to realignments.  
 
THE DECLINE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT AND THE FUTURE OF PARTISAN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
 
In literature on political parties a pervasive theme in the last years has been the 
apparent decline of ‘party government’. By this is meant the gradual loss of the ability of 
political parties to deliver on their pledges and commitments to their electorate, and the 
accompanying change of the nature of popular representation in liberal democracies from 
one of projection of societal interests in government towards one of top-down promotion 
of predetermined policies to the people. Expressions of the decline of party government 
are, amongst others, the indistinguishable policies of mainstream parties in office, the 
convergence of party competition around the proverbial ‘center’ and symptoms of 
dealignment such as voter volatility, the rise of anti-system parties and increase of voter 
apathy. As discussed previously, the relevant literature has increasingly settled on the 
‘cartel party’ thesis, whereby the concept of the cartel party captures both the 
convergence of mainstream parties towards self-perpetuating strategies and the 
minimized ability of citizens to influence policy making through parties, as these focus 
on their symbiotic relationship with the state. While phenomena like globalization are 
considered to have an important effect on the ability of states, and by extension 
governments and parties, to perform many of the policies they were used to performing in 
the past, scholars also account for the adaptation of partisan actors themselves who used 
fatalistic discourses in various junctures to allow party democracy to move from the logic 
of representation, to that of office-seeking to today’s management of non-change205. 
All this is a way of saying that during the last 30 or so years political parties are 
apparently becoming less important for policymaking. Coupled with processes of 
individualization of Western society that weaken collective identities such as the ones 
created by the societal cleavages of the industrial era, the role of political parties role as 
the transfer mechanism of collective demands is becoming less and less important. Yet if 
this tendency is a fact, what does it say about the argument brought forth in this 
dissertation? After all, if parties are increasingly less able (or willing) to promote new 
policies, and if old cleavages are receding and new ones are expressed in alternative ways 
than partisan mobilization, why focus on them as agents of potential foreign policy 
change? Would it not be normal to expect that our model, with its focus on cleavages, 
collective political identities and partisan agency, would become less and less relevant as 
the very existence of party government slowly fades away?  
                                                
205 See, indicatively, Mair (2006) among a vast literature.  
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The answer I give is twofold: first, I would argue that looking at party competition as 
a heuristic of the main directions of opposition and contestation of policy in democracies 
still makes sense. Despite the apparent convergence of centrist parties, party systems still 
align along meaningful axes of competition – if anything, the cartelization of the center 
has brought about in recent years a resurgence of parties occupying the extremes that 
stretch the policy space and keep ideological politics relevant (Bornschier 2010). The 
convergence of the cartel parties of the center-right and the center-left does not eclipse 
the ability of a party system to structure different views on a new policy issue. As 
evidenced with issues of immigration, economic policy, and even foreign policy (e.g. in 
the case of so-called humanitarian interventions), the direction of competition may not 
reflect old established ideological axes so much as versions of a nascent cartel v.s. 
populism axis – but competition there is. In addition, one should not underestimate the 
ability of centrist parties to differentiate from each other if circumstances demand this – 
more often than not, this will be made precisely in order to contain among themselves the 
range of possible attitudes towards a policy issue and so stave off challenges from 
extremists or populists. But even with this goal in mind, contestation of policy issues will 
necessarily follow prior ideological and societal commitments.  
In relation to this, one should keep in mind that party-based foreign policy change 
does not necessarily follow adversarial, ideological politics. For example, both the 
Ostpolitik and Greece’s decision to grant EU candidate status to Turkey resulted from 
centrist policies of parties looking to broaden their electoral base. Adversity in the party 
system resulted because other parties were looking to defend the normative anchors of 
party competition that existed before; yet from SPD and PASOK’s perspective, the 
redefinition of their own profile and of the stakes of the party system looked to increase 
their appeal beyond their traditional societal and ideological agendas. Foreign policy 
change then may result as much from centrist strategies as from the pursuit of ideological 
goals. Summing up, the current tendency in party politics of mature democracies towards 
cartelized politics among centrist parties precludes neither ideological politics that create 
oppositions on new issues nor the emergence of new policies if these are meant to 
increase the support of mainstream parties. 
What about the second question: Do politics today still function following mobilized 
collective identities? Should an IR or FPA scholar expect new foreign policy ideas to rise 
within the field of mass electoral politics? Or do the individualization of Western 
societies, the cartelization of the centrist parties and the personal nature of populist 
leadership mean that the root of political identities and policy ideas is only still to be 
found among the hitherto favored arenas of foreign policy research (individuals, 
bureaucracies, institutions)? First of all, individualization and breaking down of old 
established political identities (classes, religion or confessions etc.) rarely mean that an 
electorate becomes completely unstructured. While types of organization vary with time, 
and it is improbable the Western world will experience anything like the role of trade 
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unions or churches of the 19th-20th centuries again, the breakdown of these traditional 
identities only creates space for new ones to emerge. The example of the Green parties of 
the 1980s emerging from the environmentalist movements of the 1970s comes to mind 
here.  
But even this model of mass mobilization may be a demanding threshold that applies 
to a few countries of North-Western Europe. In our cases, we saw that political parties in 
Greece built strong class-based political identities in the 1980s from above and on the 
basis of political, rather than socioeconomic, cleavages. While mass mobilization from 
below may be lacking, political identities can emerge when a cleavage becomes 
crystalized and partisan actors position towards it. As we saw in the case of New 
Zealand, there was no organizational expression of the post-materialist cohort that meant 
so much to Labour’s decision against nuclear vessels and led it to victory in 1987; yet the 
emergence of this social group allowed partisan actors with predefined ideas to find an 
electoral and social pillar through which to push forward their ideas. In the case of 
Greece, it also seems that Simitis’ project was sold to PASOK with a very specific target 
in mind, namely the middle-class electorate that was becoming dealigned from the 
polarization of the two parties after the mid-1990s. While these new political identities of 
individualist strata did not express themselves through mass organization, they did offer a 
very important tangible social referent to projects of change. New policy ideas then may 
not emerge in our postmodern era within new institutional structures of mass 
mobilization, yet policy ideas floating within the party system still need to show 
themselves to correspond to societal groups, indeed to create new political identities 
themselves, in order to make a difference. In a roundabout way, the match between 
societal groups and policy ideas still matters. 
Nevertheless, even in today’s Western societies opportunities for mobilization around 
new issues and the building of new durable political identities exist, especially in times of 
crisis. As research on the radical Right (Minkenberg 2000) and Left (March 2009) has 
shown, extremist parties do not just represent the so-called ‘modernization losers’ but 
also mold their electorates into durable political identities, mobilized around demands of 
ethnic or economic justice. The financial crisis of the last four years in Europe has only 
increased the electoral potential of populist parties of the Right and Left and served to 
galvanize the new political identities mobilized by ‘pro-democratic anti-party-system 
parties’ (Blyth and Katz 2005: 55). Both a reservoir of new policy ideas and sources of 
organizational innovation, the new populist parties in Europe even come with well-
developed foreign policy ideas of their own that underline their differentiation from 
centrist cartel parties and stretch policy space in foreign policy as well (Chryssogelos 
2012). In other words, even though today’s context is much different, relying on a 
conceptualization of domestic party competition along the lines of Bartolini and Mair’s 
understanding of cleavage-based party systems with significant space for partisan agency 
is a viable strategy. IR and FPA scholars can rest assured that the cycle of voter 
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mobilization, political identity creation and policy innovation in the field of foreign 
policy in Western party democracies is far from over. Consequently, party systems 
remain a very relevant institutional space within which the rise of new foreign policies 
and the patterns of foreign policy contestation are adequately reflected.  
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